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# 国学与西学：国际学刊（半年刊）

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# 目 录

## Contents

### 卷首语 From the Editor's Desk \*

黄保罗	关于中国当代宗教学研究大局的对话 .....	1
卓新平		
Paulos HUANG	A Dialogue on the Overall Situation of Religious Studies in Contemporary China	
Xinping ZHUO	.....	29

### 人学、神学与国学 Humanities, Theology, and Chinese National Studies

陈越骅	哲学何时变为宗教——早期奥古斯丁忏悔的逻辑 .....	33
Yuehua CHEN	When did Philosophy Converts to Religion? Early Augustine's Confession before His Confessions .....	40
徐龙飞	法的开端——论罗马法的基督教教化及其对当今法学思维之意义 .....	41
Longfei XU	On The Horizon (Origin, Beginning) of the Right: About the Christianization of Ius Romanum and its Meaning for Contemporary Jurisprudence .....	63

### 实践神学与中西教会和社会 Practical Theology and Sino-Western Views on Church and Society

Qiujuan ZHANG	John Hick's Religious Pluralism from the Perspective of Cultural Heterogeneity .....	67
张秋娟	文化异质性视角下的宗教多元主义 .....	81
Teng HE	Augustine on Will and Sin .....	83
贺 腾	奥古斯丁论意志与罪 .....	92

### 中西经典与圣经 Chinese and Western Classics and the Bible

Shufeng TIAN	The First Treatise on Aristotelian Ethics in China and its Origin .....	95
田书峰	亚里斯多德伦理学在中国的最早传播 .....	110
江璐	《名理探》与《穷理学》关于逻辑推理的讨论 .....	111
Lu JIANG	The Treatment on Logical Reasoning in Mingli tan and Qiongli xue .....	121

### 教会历史与中西社会 Church History in the West and in China

Colten YAM	Marius Victorinus' influence on Augustine's Trinitarian theology .....	124
任卓贤	维克托利努斯对奥古斯丁三一神学的影响 .....	140
Zhenyu ZHU	Dante's Hell as Civitas Diaboli .....	141
朱振宇	魔鬼之城:但丁的地狱 .....	155

**比较宗教文化研究 Comparative Religious and Cultural Studies**

Yingying ZHANG	Henry of Ghent and the Inevitable Failure of Divine Illumination .....	159
张迎迎	根特的亨利和注定失败的光照论 .....	170
孙 帅	加尔文三一论与教父传统 .....	171
Shuai SUN	Calvin's Doctrine of the Trinity and Patristic Tradition .....	182

**书评与通讯 Reviews and Academic Reports**

ACADEMIC NEWS

蒋 佳	新托马斯主义思潮和教会权力话语变动 .....	185
Jia JIANG	Neo-Thomism and the Ensuing Transformation of Discourse of Power in the Roman Catholic Church .....	194
陶杨华	爱欲的分野与历史实在的生成：“上帝之城”与“地上之城”二元历史架构探源 .....	195
Yanghua TAO	The Divergence of Love and The Genesis of Historical Reality: An Inquiry into Augustine's Thesis of Two Cities .....	208
Mingyu MA	The similarities and differences between Aristotelian relations and duality relations: from the traditional square of oppositions to Buridanian octagons .....	209
马明宇	亚里士多德式逻辑关系与对偶性关系的异同：从传统正方形到布里丹八边形 .....	231

<b>投稿须知 Notes for Contributors</b> .....	232
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注释体例及要求 Footnote Format and Requirements .....	236
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\* Neither English abstracts nor key words are provided for the foreword from the editor's desk, book reviews and academic reports.

## 卷首语 From the Editors' Desk

### 关于中国当代宗教学研究大局的对话

黄保罗, 卓新平

(上海大学历史系、中国社会科学院世界宗教研究所)

**摘要:**本对话于2017年12月18号在北京建国门内大街中国社会科学院世界宗教研究所进行,主要包括:一、影响卓教授个人走上学术道路的家庭背景和相关事件。大学英语专业及其背景知识的学习促使他较早接触了宗教学,并于宗教学敏感的1978年考取中国社会科学院世界宗教研究所硕士研究生基督教专业,且有机会留学德国攻读博士(1983-1988),所得经验主要是学术视野、研究方法上的脱胎换骨。二、回国之后的研究及成果:1. 辛苦专研出版经历评职称道路,从1993-2018年成为任期最长的担任了25年的副所长和所长。2. 学术研究三部曲:第一步是比较系统地介绍、研究西方宗教学的历史与现状。硕士论文研究现实主义神学家尼布尔(Reinhold Niebuhr, 1892—1971),博士论文就是《当代中西宗教理论比较研究》(China und ihre Bezugnahme zu Religionstheorie des Westens, Peter Lang Verlag, 1988),后又出版《宗教与文化》,《宗教起源纵横谈》《西方宗教学研究导引》。第二步则是集中研究基督教,一研究基督教的历史,二研究基督教思想,三对中国基督教历史的专题研究,出版《圣经鉴赏》《基督宗教论》《当代新教神学》和《当代天主教神学》,《基督教犹太教志》等。第三步是《马克思主义宗教观探究》等中国宗教与文化战略问题研究及相关的争议,亦涉及到全球化的宗教与当代中国发展的关系。3 从个人研究到为整个宗教学研究平台担任组织工作,从1998年担任中国宗教学会会长,开始组织国际及国内学术会议、丛书及刊物出版、宗教学会、学生培养等。如俗称“神仙会”的“中国基督宗教研究年会”(1998-2011),并与许多单位合作,还有国际会议,如在美国、芬兰等。后组织中国社科论坛宗教学分论坛。博士生发表核心刊物论文的压力问题需要反思,并不合理。三、基督教研究的现状和未来及期望是什么? 宗教研究的脱敏是中国发展的必需,基督教中国化是其在华生存和发展的必需,大家应该关注和争取落实国家领导人和政策为宗教学的发展所提供的机遇。对宗教学未来的期待,大家可能要更多地关心一下现实,特别是现实社会的宗教研究,而不能只是自己埋头做自己的那种纯学术。如果没有这种好的氛围支持,是做不好纯学术的,甚至根本就做不下去。

**关键词:**宗教学、敏感、基督宗教、研究平台、现实社会的研究

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黄保罗(以下简称“黄”):卓老师,非常感谢您。今天是2017年12月18号,我来中国社会科学院是想与卓老师做一个对话。目前,我正在中国大陆对汉语学界做基督教研究的著名学者来进行对话,按计划差不多要谈20多人,所谈内容一部分会在我们这个《国学与西学国际学刊》上发出来,最后还想把这些访谈合在一起做一个文集,但最重要的是想与此基督教研究领域的学者对话。我想,您们这一代人已在中国的学术界做出了重大贡献,所以我就有了这样来进行对话的想法,谈完之后,我们

请录音公司把它整理成文字, 然后给您看, 您再来修改, 也可以增加, 然后我们再加工, 最后形成一个比较成熟的文本。

根据这样一个计划, 我主要是想请您谈三个方面的内容。第一个内容就想谈一谈您个人是怎么走上学术这条路的, 也可以追溯一下您个人的家庭教育和求学背景。第二个内容就是想知道您主要做了什么研究? 主要是哪些具体研究? 第三个内容则是针对基督宗教研究来说, 从您的视觉来看, 汉语学界的研究现状和发展趋势, 以及您有什么好的建议或者嘱咐。主要就是这三个方面的内容, 我们可以来自由谈, 谈的时候也可以对其内容加以穿插进行。

## 一、您个人是怎么走上学术这条路的, 也可以追溯一下您个人的家庭教育和求学背景。

黄: 第一点, 就是想问卓老师您可不可以介绍一下, 您个人是怎么最后会走向成为一个学者的呢, 而且还是做宗教这一行研究的。

### 大学英语专业及其背景知识的学习而接触了宗教学

卓新平 (以下简称“卓”): 我的经历其实也比较简单。我从事宗教研究, 尤其是基督教研究, 也主要是一种文化学术的兴趣使然。这跟我在文革期间上大学的经历有关系, 文革期间曾在 1972 年时一度恢复从高中生中间招收大学生, 即毕业的高中生可以直接上大学。当时也正是邓小平出来主持工作的一段时间, 后来有人把这个时间定为所谓的修正主义教育路线回潮。

黄: 这个是工农兵学员?

卓: 就是招收工农兵上大学的开始。在 1971 年曾有一个试点, 首先清华北大招收, 1972 年开始全面铺开, 那么这一年也招了一些高中毕业生。我一开始是没有这个资格的, 因为当时是推荐, 我们学校推荐的三位大多数在当地都有点社会背景。所以, 我毕业以后先是到一个教师培训班, 属于中专。我们当地那个大学是一个专科学校, 有个英语专修班。由于当时学校开始抓教育质量, 有一个在校学生基本上是个文盲, 因为跟不上而退学, 于是, 我们这个教师培训班所在的师范学校就推荐了一个同学过去, 但是, 这位同学对外语不感兴趣, 而高中毕业生入大学在当时规定只能学三个专业, 一个是外语, 一个是音乐, 再一个是体育。我们当地的这个大专只有外语, 没有音乐和体育专业, 所以, 这个同学后来去而复返, 又回到了原来的教师速成班。此后, 校长就问我愿不愿意去? 这对于我来说是一个难得的学习机会, 所以, 我说我很愿意去。这样, 我就到了该大专的英专班, 比别的同学晚入校将近三个月。

黄: 这个是在 1972 还是 1971 年?

卓: 是在 1972 年。所以, 我去了以后就一心想把学习赶上去, 开始猛攻外语, 等过了一两个月期中考试, 我竟然在全班也考了个中游。学习上去以后, 压力就来了, 学校有人说这是走白专道路, 这种批评在当时很厉害, 所以, 我也感觉到, 如果仅仅学专业的话, 会让人家觉得你就是在走所谓白专道路。我们班上有一位老师是从长沙那边省教育学院下放过来的, 她就对我说, 其实要真正学好一门语言, 就要了解这个语言的社会文化背景。这样的一句话提醒了我, 此后, 就不再是仅仅去学外语专业的知识内容, 而是开始在学校图书馆借文史哲的著作来看, 包括马恩的著作也是在那个时候开始看的。当时风行读书无用论, 图书馆很少有人问津。当图书馆年终写总结的时候, 图书馆主任还把我借书多写进去了。我那时借了很多书来看, 对知识是如饥似渴。图书馆有些书不让学生借, 于是, 我在周末的时候就找老师借, 那时候还没有实行五天工作制, 星期六下午找老师借书回家, 读一个晚上, 然后读一个白天, 在星期天晚上回到学校时, 就还给老师, 这样又读了很多一般借不到的书, 对自己文史



哲知识方面有很大的提高。在读书中,我根据学习英文的需要而主要是想了解西方思想文化背景,而在这些西方历史文学哲学书籍中有很多都涉及宗教,尤其是有不少关涉基督宗教的因素。所以,应该说,在那个时候,我就开始对这些领域比较感兴趣了。当然,当时还是朦朦胧胧的,也没有想到以后会怎么发展,只是对这方面有些兴趣而已。我们大学毕业以后,在农村劳动,锻炼了一年后,分配我留校,留校后马上又让我去农村里继续做农村工作。这样,我又去农村待了两年半,也就是说,前后在农村里共待了三年半,一直到1977年底才回到学校。

### 1978年考取中国社会科学院世界宗教研究所硕士研究生基督教专业

卓:我于1977年底到长沙去湖南大学进修,随之亦在湖南师院旁听。这个时候正是“文革”后恢复大学考试,并得到消息说,到1978年还会招收硕士研究生。我当时关注到,中国社会科学院的世界宗教研究所要招收研究生,其中有一个专业方向就是基督教研究。我想,这个专业以前没有,大家都没有学过,而我有英文基础,在研究这一语言的历史文化背景时已经朦朦胧胧对基督宗教方面有点了解,于是,我就报考了这个专业的研究生。可以说,我是从一个学术探索的兴趣而进入宗教研究这一领域的。当时报考的进程还是比较曲折的,我们学校的校长一听说我报考宗教学,而且还是基督教专业的研究生,就把我叫去狠狠地批评了一顿。按照他的理解,学宗教就是要出家当和尚,而学基督教就是要当洋和尚!然后,学校又把我以调换教师的方式,赶到下面县城的一个中学去代课。在这种情况下,我到中学去后,反而因祸得福,中学的校长和教务处主任了解到我想考研究生的情况以后,当场表态说,我既然现在归他们学校管了,那么,学校就给我放假,让我去准备考试,考完后再来教课。这样,就给了我两个月专门准备考试的时间。知恩图报,笔试考完了,我马上就自己买了一张车票去那个县城中学任教去了,老老实实地给他们学校学生高考外语做准备。这是我进入基督宗教研究开端时的一段插曲,但没想到,外界这种对宗教研究的误解竟会伴随我余生!

到了中国社会科学院以后,我的导师是赵复三先生,他当时任世界宗教研究所副所长,后来我去德国留学的时候,他升任我们中国社会科学院的副院长。应该说,我们当时是赶上了一个好时代,大家都发奋学习,希望能够弥补“文革”导致的文化、教育等方面的损失。中国社会科学院研究生院是1978年新办的,办学没有地方,就借用了北京师范大学的一些教室和宿舍。北京师范大学图书馆晚上自习的人很多,入口处窗户门的玻璃甚至都曾被拥挤的人群所挤破,学生到那儿就是要占座,占座成为当时流行的话语,那么好的学习氛围迄今都让人怀念。当时,我们是开放性的办学模式,老师不是很多,除了专业老师之外,我们经常去北京大学、中国人民大学和北京师范大学听其他文史哲方面的课,尤其是北京大学去的比较多,许多课程如哲学原理、中外哲学史、世界史、逻辑学等都是在北京大学听的大课。在这一听课的过程中,我对宗教尤其是基督教的了解就跟世界文化的发展、人类文明精神特性的形成等有机结合起来。我对基督教的研究应该说是一种学术性的探讨,自己的兴趣也主要是从学术这个角度来对基督教的发展进行探索。这一研究到2018年对我而言一晃就是40年了,可以说,我这人生的大半辈子基本上都奉献给这一学术研究了。所以,我主要是从事宗教研究,其中很大比重都是基督教研究。

黄:那请您就给我简单地再讲一下您个人的背景。您是知识分子家庭出身吗?或者请您谈谈这个社会背景或气氛。在1971年及1972年的时候,好像社会上的气氛从总体而言就是不好好读书学习,大家都不怎么学习,但您就特别喜欢学习吗?

卓:对,说实话,我们当时就感觉到,知识无用论对我们这一代是一种伤害。所以,在大家都不学的时候,不少人反而会有更大的求知渴望!张铁生交白卷是在我们入校之后,随之就是读书无用论再度风行,高校大概也就那么两三年就又回到过去的状况。这也是为什么会让我们毕业后下放到农村劳动“补课”的原因,结果,我们所学的一点点知识最后都白教白学了。在农村几年,当然对我们研究社会科学也还是很有教益的,对我们社会阅历的增长非常有帮助。

我们家并没有什么基督教的背景,我属于少数民族的土家族,我们的老家文化传统中有一些道家思想和儒家思想,也有一些源自原始宗教的民间信仰及习俗。中国大多家庭中都多少留有一些儒家传统的影响,虽然在整个社会发展过程中,过去百年对儒家思想多有批判,但中国社会及其基层的家族家庭仍有着根深蒂固的儒家思想的熏染,这就是我们中华传统文化的思想特色之一。

所以,我个人在文化倾向上也多多少少、至少是间接地留有一些儒家思想因素。如果说中国人跟中国传统文化的主要关联,应该说是儒家思想对我们产生了主要影响,但也有部分的道家思想留存,即儒道对我们的影响是大一点。在儒道方面,虽然当年考研究生也有这些专业,但是他们要求考生的古汉语要比较好,而研究基督教这个世界性宗教则要求外语比较好。我是学外语的,所以,就选择了基督教这一研究专业。由于儒道这种传统的熏染对大多数中国知识分子都有影响,所以,我在研究基督教的过程中也一直非常关注儒道的发展,有时也进行一些与基督教比较对照的研究。所以,我们研究基督教,从一开始就不是一个封闭性的单独研究,而是进行了不同宗教的比较研究,有更宽阔的视野。

黄:对我自己而言,后来我反思我自己的学术经历,发现也是儒家对我的影响较大,这还是超过我的想象的。可能是在我上学之前或者我的家庭中,从自己的父母、祖父母那儿就不知不觉地都受到这种影响,必须承认这一事实。

我再接着问:您后来到了中国社科院学习,当时赵复三先生是您的导师,他也是副所长吧?当时的所长是任继愈先生吗?还是谁?

卓:当时我们研究所的所长是任继愈先生,赵复三先生是副所长,我们所在的基督教研究室也是赵复三先生负责。

黄:还有,当时属于您的老师辈的,还有哪些人?

卓:我们这个专业研究从我们研究所本身来讲,研究所主要负责人是任继愈先生,任继愈是儒佛道三教研究专家,主讲佛教和道教课程,也上中国哲学课、古汉语课,我们都听过这些课程。另外,还有一个黄心川先生,也是副所长,他在学术上是一个杂家,儒释道、基督教、伊斯兰教、印度宗教哲学等都比较通,知识渊博,宗教研究经验也非常丰富。我们也听过他的课。赵复三先生则主要是讲基督教的历史,对犹太教、西方思想文化、古今哲学都很有造诣。另外,我们后来还请了高望之先生,他后来是我们研究室的主任。他是研究世界历史的,主要是给我们上犹太教的课程。在伊斯兰教方面则有金宜久先生,他是讲世界伊斯兰教的课程。在佛教方面还有郭朋老师,道教方面有钟肇鹏老师,讲宗教学理论和无神论历史则有吕大吉老师,当时牙含章先生则专讲中国无神论。此间徐梵澄先生也从印度回到中国,在我所工作,可惜没有开课。我们这个专业的课重点还是研究基督教。在北京大学,我旁听了世界史的课程,主要是朱龙华老师讲课,他的世界史课讲得非常好、非常生动,我比较喜欢听他的课。在西方哲学史课程上,我听过任华老师的大课。后来所里请北大老师专门给我们讲西方哲学史,讲课老师比较多,包括朱德生、陈启伟等老师。当时北大哲学系或哲学研究所的课,至少有一半老师的课程我们都听过。当然主要是听研究西哲的课,比较而言,中哲的课可能听的少一些。另外,我们还听了中国人民大学麻老师的逻辑学课程,主要讲形式逻辑。我当时对于各种知识是如饥似渴,来回奔波在北京师大、北京大学、中国人民大学之间,关注的面还是比较广的。并时常来建国门的研究所内听课,去所里设在白云观的图书馆借书。记得赵复三老师亲自带我们在图书馆找书、借书。那时社科院的研究生院让我们继续补习英语,还请了新华社的郑老师给我们讲新华社电文稿,请了傅惟慈先生给我们讲翻译课,还请到当时社会上比较有影响的王佐良先生给我们讲大课。我还曾选修过法语课。另外一个方面,我们也跟宗教界有一些联系,例如我们这个专业就有圣经研究方面的课,当时是请北京市基督教会的阚学卿、石泽生两位牧师开的课。另外上海的郑建业先生对我的专业方向也有所关注,是我的外聘导师,我也曾去上海请他做相关指导。所以说,研究所当时就是开放性办学,

涉及许多学科,上课的老师也是非常之多,这对我们来说极有好处,开阔了我们的学术视野。除此之外,中国社会科学院也开了一些大课,让我们去听,这些课基本上都是名家来讲,如于光远、唐弢、邢贲思、许涤新等人的课,基本上都挤满了听众。我记得当时讲《资本论》的那个田光老师讲得非常细、非常专,听起来几乎就像是章句之考。就我们所的专题讲座而言,任继愈所长还专门请李泽厚先生来我们所讲过美学,给我留下了深刻印象。这些课我基本上都会去听,收获很大。当时我们研究生院虽然条件不是怎么好,八个学生一个宿舍,分为上下铺,教室也多为牛毛毡搭的临时建筑,但大家如饥似渴地学习,经常在借用的北师大教室晚自习结束之后,到这种牛毛毡房挑灯夜读。我们那一届研究生当时称为所谓的“黄埔一期”,即招收的第一届硕士研究生,而那时还没有博士生。可以说,三年硕士研究生为我打下了一个很好的基础,培养了我认真读书的习惯和广泛研究的兴趣。

### 宗教学的敏感性及其与科学的关系

黄:好的,我想再追问一下,就是在这个阶段,我记得好像有一句话,在上世纪的80年代比较风行:“学好数理化,走满天下都不怕”。大家因此对自然科学非常重视,而中国因为受“五四运动”以来突出科学的影响,总是觉得科学与宗教是矛盾的吧?那么,您作为宗教学的研究生,在这样一种学术氛围中专门做宗教学研究或者基督教研究,是否感到有压力或困难?在那个时候,与其他的学者比较,或者说在这种社会大氛围中,您能找到知音吗?是否感到有很多观念方面的差异?

卓:是有压力,从报考宗教学研究生开始,我就切身感受到宗教问题的敏感和研究宗教不为社会所理解。如前面提到的,我所在大学的校长知道我报考后就批评了我的这个选择。我的高中班主任也百思不解我为什么要研究宗教。不少研究宗教的学者都感到投入这种研究就好像带有“原罪”一般受到别人的误解和责问,我也深深感受到,研究宗教恰如“扑尔敏”那样,扑向这个学科就势必“过敏”!我曾经呼吁,中国社会应该使宗教“脱敏”,然而,不但宗教没有脱敏,我们研究宗教的学者却成了“敏感”人物!

这种处境非常令人遗憾,而这种对宗教的认知及态度,也很难使中国被世界所真正理解,且不利于中国社会自身的和谐、稳定。为了中国社会能够保持长治久安,为了共同建设好人类命运共同体,我们必须对宗教有正确的认识,也理应包容宗教在中国社会的存在,更应该放弃对宗教研究者的偏见和歧视。

不过,我们上研究生赶上了中国的改革开放,这是一个探讨和摸索的时代。特别是在讨论宗教与科学的关系上,我的兴趣非常浓厚。其实,对于自然科学我本来就是情有独钟的。高中的时候我最喜欢的两门课,一个是物理,一个是数学,我还当过数学科代表,自学过大学物理。当时我上家乡的大学,初衷就是奔着物理学去的,有着强烈的物理学情结和痴迷的自然科学之梦。因为当时我在高中就在自学修理钟表、安装半导体收音机,我的母亲是在当地教学仪器站工作,就是为当地大学、中学的物理学、化学这些课程提供教学仪器的。我所在的这个师专也有物理学专科,而且这个物理学的教研室主任与我们家很熟,我在中师教师培训班学习时,中师的周校长知道我喜欢物理而专门为我借来当时湖南大学所用的物理学教材让我自学,后来也是这位校长推荐我去了当地的大专。所以,我当时很希望能通过那位师专物理学教研室主任的介绍而让我能够转到物理学专科去。遗憾的是当时明确规定,我们应届高中毕业生上了大学只能学外语、体育和音乐这三门专业,我转科的目的无法实现,这才放弃了对物理学的追求,从此,走向文科学习之路。虽然放弃了物理学科,但是,我一直关注自然科学史的研究,对当时最新科学的发展也比较感兴趣。对之我虽然不懂,但是关注。记得我们家乡新华书店曾经来过一本关于人造卫星的书籍,我硬是说服售书员把那唯一的书卖给了我。在大学图书馆,我看到一本关于人类自然科学历史发展的书籍,对科学发现进行了编年史那样的排列,我就把这一科学编年全部抄了下来。在自然科学历史的研究上,应该说读了不少书,所以,在我们研究所工作期间,也与中国科学院自然科学史研究所的有关科研人员有着非常亲切的接触,我还专门登门拜访过他们研究所的席泽宗院士,曾想邀请他参加由我组织的



宗教与科学对话的国际论坛。从欧洲历史发展来看, 宗教与自然科学有非常复杂、充满辩证意义的交织, 二者既有矛盾冲突, 同时也有科学为宗教服务、宗教利用科学来论证其信仰的案例, 因此, 我们不能把宗教与科学的关系看得太简单了, 尤其当时中国流行的那种好像宗教跟科学只有必然对立的观点, 我本人是持保留态度的。我在上大学的时候, 关于自然科学的发展史是我的业余爱好, 当时做的笔记从远古的自然科学发展一直到 20 世纪最新成果, 记了厚厚的一本。只是后来我上研究生到了北京, 简单地想跟过去告别、忘掉那个幼稚的我而开始一个全新的自我, 故而把自己以前所写的日记、所记的笔记全都撕破扔掉了。现在看来是个错误, 因为年老而想“追忆似水年华”, 很多东西却再也找不着了, 而那时做得非常细, 本该保留的, 真是追悔莫及。

所以, 我一直保留了关注自然科学发展史的习惯。在组织宗教与科学对话的国际论坛时, 我曾经利用假日专程拜访了好几位院士, 为此甚至还放弃了去台湾参加学术会议的机会。本来这些科学家不愿参与任何关涉宗教的讨论, 在我的诚意感动下最后来了三位院士, 我记得天文学家王绶琯院士在参加我们那次论坛后, 又参加了其他院校组织的宗教与科学对话会议。此外, 在中科院组织编辑科技百科全书的时候, 科学与宗教的关系这一部分就是请我负责组稿和编辑的, 我因而专门邀请研究所的同事们参加编写了自然科学与佛教、道教、伊斯兰教的关系等, 而自然科学与基督教的关系则由我自己撰写。这样, 我对宗教跟科学的关系问题并不陌生, 而且一直是持有比较辩证的看法。当前社会上关于宗教与科学的讨论, 如天文学、量子科学、生物学、环境科学、人工智能等方面的话题, 我都十分关注, 而且也做了一些功课研究, 特别是最早在国内写文章讨论上世纪下半叶关于“新时代运动”与自然科学的关系问题, 对《物理学之道》等著作也有过相关评论。在科学史与宗教的关系上, 我曾经关注过哥白尼、布鲁诺、伽利略等科学家与天主教的冲突、以及他们个人的命运问题。其实, 这些冲突不只是与宗教相关, 也与不同时代的科学观相联系, 因为欧洲中世纪的天主教拘泥于古代托勒密的天文体系, 用的是这种旧的自然科学观念体系, 对新的自然科学发展萌芽不敢或不愿确证及承认, 教会要维系社会的稳定、护持传统的权威, 对于对它表示反对、否定的观点势必会出面反对, 这样的话就造成了历史上对一些科学家的伤害, 以及对科学发展的阻拦, 故而会反对哥白尼等人在当时带来的新发展和提出的新观点。而现在, 天主教已经完全接受了新的宇宙观, 并且向伽利略等科学家表示了道歉、为其正名。罗马教廷还专门成立了教宗科学院, 其院士有不少都是诺贝尔奖得主。在中世纪, 当时的一些科学家本身就是天主教僧侣, 他们的很多自然科学实验、研究也是在天主教修道院或教会机构里面做出来的, 所以说教会乃完全反科学的话, 是绝不可能允许这些自然科学家进行研究的。应该承认, 宗教在历史上是不断地调适与科学的关系, 对待科学既有张力也有包容和接受。对于宗教与科学的关系, 必须一分为二地分析, 实事求是, 既要看到它曾经因为种种原因确实对科学家有所打压, 对一些科学成果拒不承认, 但也要看到宗教也在关注科学的发展, 在不断调整自己对科学的认知。我个人认为, 这种看法会比较辩证、客观一些, 体现出历史之公平。

黄: 对您刚才讲的这种作为一个宗教学者或者基督教研究的学者, 在上世纪 1980 年代您公开发表过这种学术观点吗? 对于当时的主流学术思潮, 您觉得能够接受这类观点吗? 或者, 当时这种看法有可能完全发出来吗?

卓: 当时我们还没有发表这些见解的资格, 因为我们是学生, 主要是学习这些内容。那时的学风比较朴实, 学校和导师并不鼓励学生积极发表文章, 更没有像现在这样有硬性任务。学生的职责就是好好学习, 尽量多读书, 积累专业知识, 训练研究方法。

#### 高等院校的宗教学研究及招生情况

黄: 但是, 那个时候中国大陆也开始号召走向世界嘛, 让国人积极走向未来, 这个是改革开放大的趋势和主流。另外, 当时也是宗教政策得以恢复、落实的年代, 而基督教和其他各个宗教的活动也慢慢地正常化起来了。但尽管是这样, 真正招收宗教学研究的研究生仍不很多, 当时除了社科院之外,

好像其他高校招得并不多吧？

卓：专门从事宗教学的研究生，应该说当时主要是我们社科院在招收，但北师大有一批代培的研究生也挂在我们所里，不过以学习中国哲学为主。当然，那时北京大学也招了一批研究印度佛教、亚洲宗教等方面的研究生。

黄：对的，但后来在高校里面也新建了一批宗教学系或宗教学专业，这个是1990年代的事情吧？那么，围绕这个问题，我们还可以继续讲，您读硕士时您的硕士论文是写哪一方面的题目？

卓：高校以四川大学为首，早在1980年就成立了四川大学宗教研究所，并开始招收学生。后来，北京大学等高校也成立了宗教学系或专业，如北大宗教学系最早就是和我们所联合开办的。

**硕士论文研究现实主义神学家尼布尔(Reinhold Niebuhr, 1892年6月21日—1971年6月1日)**

卓：我的硕士论文是写美国当代基督教思想家莱因霍尔德·尼布尔。当时，导师让我们四个学基督教专业研究方向的学生分一下工，我那天碰巧不在学校。听说本来是要把基督教思想理论研究这一专业方向分给比我大十岁、就是我们中间英语最好的那位来自复旦大学的同学，但他说自己年龄大了，还说他就想研究基督教的现状。这样，基督教思想研究专业就让我来学了，我从此就定下来研究基督教思想史，其他人的分工则是有一人研究中国基督教的历史，还有一人专门研究天主教。

当时我主要是侧重于现当代基督教思想发展的研究，而我对尼布尔感兴趣是因为他是现实主义神学家。因为我们都经历过文革，我在农村里呆了很多年，不再会充满理想，所以，我认为，自己就不是一个理想主义者，而是一个现实主义者，那研究尼布尔这样一位称得上是基督教现实主义者重要代表的人物，可能会更有感觉一些。尼布尔是新正统派的神学家，对现实非常冷静，既不会洋洋得意，也不会垂头丧气。他曾说，人生恰如攀爬桅杆的水手，上面是旗杆所在的巅峰顶点，下面却是波涛滚滚、可能给人带来灭顶之灾的万丈深渊，而人就恰恰处在这二者之间。所以，他对社会政治的分析非常理性和睿智。例如，我们今天讲在20世纪70年代出现的所谓“尼克松主义”，其兴起实际上就是受到美国基督教新教现实主义思想的影响，尤其是受到尼布尔等人的现实主义分析的影响。尼布尔在当时被称为“美国国务院御用神学家”，他当时就力主美国政府联合中国来共同对付苏联，他提出的这样一个战略构想被基辛格所接受，并启发他为此而给尼克松出主意。于是，尼克松派他悄悄地经巴基斯坦而到中国来访问，商量中美关系的巨大变化。当时人们在这种氛围之下只看到基辛格的努力和运筹帷幄、纵横捭阖，却不知在他这个后面有着基督教现实主义思潮的社会大背景。尼布尔在他的很多著作和文章里面都谈到联华反苏的这个问题，而我在写尼布尔的硕士论文时阅读了大量尼布尔的著作，注意到其中许多地方都论及这一方面的问题，我后来在研究尼布尔的著作中也专门谈到这一点。所以说，尼布尔不仅是做抽象的神学理论研究，而且也关注现实社会的发展变化，由此提出他的对策建议。于此，我就觉得这个人在中国确实值得我们认真研究。我对理想主义的浪漫思想是敬而远之，而对现实主义的研究则情有独钟，觉得这类研究带来的思考、启发可能对我们来说会更直接一些，会更有现实价值。所以，这是我选择研究尼布尔的一个重要原因。另外一个直接动因则是我的导师在文革期间已经翻译了一部分尼布尔的著作，而且已经在当时研究美国哲学的相关译丛中翻译出版了。这样，也已经有一些现成的中文资料给我们提供启迪和参考吧。

黄：噢，所以您就来研究这个问题了，那么您的这个导师赵复三先生是有留学背景吗？还是有着国际生活的背景呢？

卓：赵复三先生原来是上海圣约翰大学毕业的，精通英文，据说他年轻时用英语讲解《圣经》曾风靡一时。赵先生的家庭背景与国民党政治有较深的渊源，他的舅舅担任过国民党的高官，但他在上世纪1940年代后期悄悄地参加了革命，而他的家庭也跟中国教会有着密切的关联。

黄：您刚才提到的同学，即和您这一批共同来做基督教研究的同学，在您们四个人是不是有一个即林金水？

卓: 林金水是我们这一届的同学。他是我们在北京参加基督教专业硕士研究生复试时的八个人之一, 我们是好邻居、好朋友。但我们的导师赵复三先生是学习外语出身的, 所以, 他最初招收的四个学生也都是学习外语专业的。他要求学生的外语应该比较好。这样, 他就推荐林金水到了历史所学习历史专业, 请马雍先生即研究中国历史特别是近代史的专家来带林金水, 所以, 林金水硕士期间主攻意大利来华的天主教耶稣会传教士利玛窦研究, 是中国当代系统研究利玛窦的第一人。我们这四位中则是孙善玲女士研究中国基督教历史的, 她以新教传教士李提摩太作为研究题目。她此后还参与了《基督教史》的翻译。

黄: 她就是段琦老师的学生吗? 好像是一起翻译的这本书?

卓: 她不是段老师的学生, 而是我们的师姐, 她和她的丈夫与段琦老师三个人共同翻译了那本书。我的两位师兄一个是任延黎, 专门研究天主教的, 另外一位是陈向荣, 他是研究基督教的现状, 硕士论文写了美国基督教的大觉醒运动, 他的英语很好, 后来就改行到研究生院教英语去了。这是我们四个人的情况。

黄: 那后来您毕业之后就留在社科院了?

卓: 毕业之后, 我们专业的同学当时留下了三个人, 后来有两位调走了, 而任延黎先生则是在从意大利留学回来以后重新到我们所工作的, 并且一直工作到退休。

#### 留学德国攻读博士(1983-1988)

黄: 那么, 您是工作几年后又出国留学的?

卓: 我是 1981 年毕业留所工作, 1983 年出国留学。

黄: 听说您这个留学还有一段神奇的经历, 因为您原来没学过德语, 却去了德国留学。

卓: 对呀, 我现在想起来还觉得不可思议。我出国留学应该是在研究生快毕业的时候就确定了, 毕业前曾准备让我去加拿大多伦多大学留学, 但当时因为没有毕业不让出去而作罢。毕业后我们准备到美国去留学, 所以, 当时我们 80 多人参加了社科院的一个英语培训班, 请了一位美国教师来教我们托福课程。那时候, 我在托福班上英文还是比较好的, 在班上的托福考试曾考得前一名, 后来, 在社科院送我们到教育部参加出国考试的学者中间, 我和另外一个学经济的同学考了个并列第一名。最早我自己曾联系到美国德鲁大学, 对方也发了邀请函。但我的导师说还是去芝加哥大学吧, 芝加哥大学的宗教学专业比较好一点, 是美国宗教学两大学派之一, 另一派即哈佛大学。芝加哥大学著名宗教学者伊利亚德的弟子北川三夫教授与我们所好像也有一些联系。

但正在留学准备的过程之中, 德国巴登符腾堡州有个代表团访华, 其成员有天主教人士在与我所座谈时主动跟我们研究所提出来, 愿意联合培养一个博士研究生, 即资助其到德国去留学。结果, 我的导师就动员我不去美国而去德国学习, 并且说, 德国是哲学的故乡, 基督教思想的底蕴也比较深厚, 而且, 他劝我乘还年轻再多学一门外语吧, 德语对于研究哲学和神学尤其必要。这样决定下来以后, 德方很快就帮我联系好了慕尼黑大学, 不久慕尼黑大学也发了入学通知和留德邀请函。本来, 一般情况下中国学者到德国学习, 通常先要到同济大学培训一年再能出去。当时同济大学也给我发了这个培训通知, 培训工作由教育部负责。那时我已经拿到了德国慕尼黑大学的入学通知书, 也不是太懂德国的情况, 我觉得如果拿到入学通知书而不去及时报名注册的话, 那么, 留学的机会可能就会作废。所以, 我自作主张说, 既然通知书都已经来了, 那我还是赶快去德国吧。同济大学属于教育部管, 而中国社科院与教育部不是一个系统, 对我们的要求也没有那么严, 如果你愿意来学习德语当然更好, 但不来也没有关系。于是, 教育部就直接让我办手续去德国留学了。

#### “为学犹如金字塔, 既要博大又要高”的思路成就了德语考试的奇迹

我办出国留学之前没有学过德语, 只是私下找了一个原来中央人民广播电台做播音的老师, 教了我一点 ABCD 入门、简单而皮毛性的德语, 然后, 就飞到德国留学去了。1983 年 5 月底, 我到了德国,



随后收到的大学正式通知书告知,我要在9月中旬参加大学德语入学考试,考试通过方能入学就读。你看6、7、8月到9月中旬,一共就只有三个半月的时间,而且,还要办移民局、健康保险等手续,一下子给我的压力就很大,当时真的就蒙了。这个考试通知书是我到了德国才拿到的,我事先并不知道,德国大学入学的条件是要先通过德语的入学考试,早知道可能我就打退堂鼓不来德国了。我在中国拿到的入学通知书并没有考试一说,到了德国我就慌了,问当地住在学生宿舍的中国学者说,这个该怎么办啊?这些早来的中国留学生看见我比较着急,就向中国驻德大使馆负责教育的同志汇报了,但使馆的同志说得很轻巧,回答说:那还不简单,考不上就回国呗!这样就更加增加我的压力,但我不甘心,也想那就拼一下试试吧。提供奖学金的机构安排我在隶属于慕尼黑大学的一个德语培训学校就读,因为歌德语言学院的学费太贵,所以,没有安排我去。大学培训学校与歌德语言学院的要求差不多,一般就是让你学习一年以后再参加这个大学的入学德语考试,其课程安排是在初级班学习四个月,在初级一班学习两个月以后有个考试,然后进入初级二班再继续学习两个月,随之进入中级一班学习四个月,遂可进入中级二班学习四个月完成整个德语培训学习,所以,到中级二班学完的话正好是一年的时间,只有进入中级二班以后才有资格参加考试。按照常情,我是根本不可能赶上9月中旬的考试了。但我想,我只有三个月的时间,不可能按部就班去学,所以,必须争取时间。于是,我就拼命学,本来我入学的时候就已经比较晚了,还剩一个多月就是初级班的考试,但我就毫不犹豫地报名参加考试。结果这一考试竟然考过了,而且,我好像还在那些参加考试的学生中考了个前五名,所以,我就敢跟老师申请,让我直接升入了中级一班学习。这样,我等于节省了两个多月的时间,到中级一班学了两个月之后,本来还要再学习两个月才能进中级二班,但离考试已经没有几天了,我不得不跟老师提出来,希望让我跳级到中级二班,这样才有资格参加大学德语考试,那位好心的老师居然也就同意了,所以,我到中级二班后也就学了十天左右就直接赶上大学考试了。现在回想起来那种连滚带爬地学习跳级还真是有点悬,也让我高度紧张,丝毫不敢放松。

慕尼黑大学入学资格德语考试分两种情况,如果考生考得非常好,那么笔试考完就直接通过;如果笔试不好就直接淘汰;而如果笔试考得还可以,但不是那么特别的好,则还要参加口试,只有口试通过才行。我是匆忙参加考试,其状况就属于得参加口试的那类。参加口试时,我看到我们中国学生中有一些是在国内大学学过四年德语专业的,而且已在德国语言进修了一年,一共有五年的德语底子,因此我也就感到踏实了。那个口试我也顺利考过了,这样就获得了进入慕尼黑大学学习的资格。

根据考试的体会,我之所以能够顺利考过,就是在于德国的语言考试和我们国内的考试不一样,考题不是注重考语法,而是考各种人文知识,这就要求考生阅读量大,而且阅读速度要快。但我一有英文的基础,有些词汇是相同的,二是我的人文知识比较扎实,结果这种考试反而成就了我。如果光靠语言语法范围的考试那我可能就没戏了,德国的语言考试则重在实用,没有一定的知识量肯定是不行的,因为考生若缺乏相关知识连题都看不懂,那就没法回答了。所以,掌握相关的文史知识对于学习语言很有必要,我通过这次考试的检验也算是尝到了甜头,其实这是我在国内上大学的时候我们一位资深老师支的招,告诉我学习文科需要知识渊博,自然科学的研究可以奇峰突起,在某一点达到突破就有成就,而社会科学则要求“为学犹如金字塔,既要博大又要高”。知识面广会帮助你了解相关语言的背景情况,使你一下子就能明白语意,很快进入角色。

黄:所以说,这种学习方法其实您原来在湖南上大学的时候就已经打了基础。

卓:对呀,就是说博学会这这方面的好处。记得我在德国学习两年以后,有一次去参加他们德国友人为中国留学生组织的文化访问,等于是文化旅游吧,期间会参观一些名胜古迹、历史重镇和教堂、博物馆等,那就需要翻译嘛。一开始德国朋友请了北京大学德语系的教师来翻译,这位教师德文非常好,发音纯正、语法标准,但其文史知识面却不够,第一次就到考古博物馆听讲解,生疏的内容使之一下子就懵了,根本听不懂。这时他们就让我出来试试做翻译,没想到我竟然如鱼得水、翻得很好,甚至

好像就是我在那里做讲解一般,可以说那一次是让我出尽了风头。人家都好奇地问我来德国多久了,我说只有两年,他们觉得不可思议,因为参加那次旅游的中国学生不少在中学就开始学习德语了,而后又在大学学了四年德语专业才来德国留学的,但连他们都感到怯场不敢出来翻译,故对我的感觉是很奇怪。

其实,就在我参加大学入学德语考试完了之后,就有一个很有意思的事情发生。一位在德国已经两年多的中国留学生找我取经,说他都已经来德国两年多了但考德语还是通不过,而我三个半月一次就考过了,问我有什么经验可以告诉他。于是我就跟他开玩笑说,那你就找个德国女朋友帮你练习德语吧,他听了哈哈大笑,说他的老婆就是德国人,在云南学习时认识的,结婚后随夫人来了德国。我说那你不行,你都拥有了德国人的家庭了,这个德语考试还考不过,那可能就没有学习语言的天赋了。我在学习德语时想找个德国人练练口语都不行,跟德国人搭话他们觉得你怪怪的,基本上不会搭理。有一次在我们宿舍附近的英国公园散步时终于找到一位 40 多岁的老外愿意和我说话了,但交谈几句后才知道原来他是捷克来的移民,也是想找人练习德语口语。我们真是两个可怜的老外啊!但话又说回来,入学德语考过并不意味着语言就过关了,其实我当时所掌握的这种语言知识结构对于学习专业还远远不够。所以,我进了大学以后的第一个学期基本上就是拼命听课,在这半年我没有修一个学分,而是恶补这个专业学习的德语能力,什么大课、研讨班都去听,其他时间就是拼命地自学,以此弥补语言及知识上的缺陷。

#### 慕尼黑大学的神学及哲学和汉学学习

黄:那您就是 1983 年 9 月份入了慕尼黑大学?

卓:对,是 9 月份考试通过,到了 11 月份才正式注册入校。

黄:哎呦,卓老师,我和您是同一年入学,我是进入本科,那一年我是 7 月份高中毕业,然后 9 月份上了大学本科,但您是去读博士了。对了,那您可不可以简单地介绍慕尼黑大学的基本情况,特别是大学的神学研究主要做什么、它的基本状况是个什么样的?应该说慕尼黑大学按照传统来看在办学上起作用的还是以天主教为主吧?

卓:慕尼黑大学有天主教神学系和基督教新教神学系,分为两个学系,但是我的主科专业是在哲学系。哲学系有个著名的讲座称为瓜蒂尼讲座(Guardini Lecture),这最早是为一个祖籍意大利的神学思想家瓜蒂尼(Romano Guardini, 1885-1968)教授设立的,以前是设在柏林大学,二战结束以后转到慕尼黑大学来了,讲座全称是“基督宗教世界观与宗教哲学”讲座,其第一任讲座教授就是瓜蒂尼,第二任教授是著名天主教神学家卡尔·拉纳(Karl Rahner, 1904-1984),第三任教授就是我的博士生导师毕塞尔(Eugen Biser, 1918-2014),他在欧洲很有名,但世界范围好像不是太有名。这个讲座是慕尼黑大学哲学系的五大讲座之一。除了哲学主科之外,我还在基督教新教神学系学了一个副科,在东亚系以海外汉学为第二个副科,因为按照慕尼黑大学的知识结构要求,每位学习文科的学生都要学一门主科、两门副科。

黄:所以,您主科是哲学,那然后又学了一个副科,是天主教神学还是基督教神学?

卓:是基督教神学即新教神学,因为我的主科导师是天主教背景,他的课与天主教神学有关,有些课程还是与天主教神学系联合组织的,所以,我在基督教新教神学系学了一个副科,这样两大神学领域也都可以研究。此外,当时大学的宗教学专业是设在新教神学系的,后来才转到哲学系。这样,我共有三个导师,哲学、神学、汉学都包括在内了。神学系的导师是毕克勒(Horst Bürkle),汉学导师是施密特-格林策尔(Helwig Schmidt-Glitzner),他的中文名字是施寒微。中国人了解自己的文化是如何在海外传播的也很有意义,所以,就选择了东亚研究专业。施寒微教授经常到中国来,当时他是慕尼黑大学最年轻的教授之一,主要研究中国历史和文学。

黄:是东亚学吗?



卓:东亚学就包括汉学,还有日本学、蒙古学、朝鲜学等。他是研究宋史的,对中国宗教、文学等也很感兴趣。30多岁当上教授这在德国都算比较年轻的,他后来去德国北部哥廷根大学附近担任沃芬比特尔(Wolfenbüttel)图书馆馆长了。所以,这就是当时慕尼黑大学文科的学科结构,其分学科学习的进路对我的帮助也很大。当时,我们按照大学课程,既去听全校性的大课讲座报告,也去听各个系与我们相关的专业课程,还参加我们自己研究所的专业课,并有具有辅导、补习性质的课程小组活动。此外,德国的图书馆也是多样的,在慕尼黑有巴伐利亚国家图书馆,是德国第二大图书馆,有大学图书馆和各个系的图书馆,还有各研究所的专业图书馆。这样,我们的学习资料比较丰富,去图书馆的选择空间也很大。根据学校读博士学位的要求,我先后修完了硕士博士的学分。

黄:您把硕士学分也修了?

卓:对。

黄:因为涉及到神学是吧?

卓:不是。我们中国社会科学院办的研究生院在慕尼黑大学没有记载,他们不知道这是什么大学,所以,我的学历在当时认证上出了问题,慕尼黑大学把我的学历认证拿到当时作为德国首都的波恩找德国教育部认证,德国教育部对中国的情况了解得多一点,知道我们社科院办了那个研究生院,所以,给慕尼黑大学回复,部分承认我的硕士学历,即硕士论文可以不写,但是读硕士的学分要补齐,就是有这么个妥协的结果。

黄:讲这个学历,我的经历可能很相似,在芬兰也是,他不是光看您学位的,看您课程表学过哪些课。

卓:对对对,所以,对于我而言,那么,主科副科的学分就都得修了,你想,在那两年多的时间内要把学分全修完,对我们中国人真的是很不容易。读硕士的学分,先要修初级研讨班学分,修两分后,才能修高级研讨班学分;通常修一分要上一个学期的初级研讨班课,要写一份15页的(德文)学习报告,然后,要做一次半个小时的报告,根据报告在研讨班的评议来修改,最后才能把这个(德文)报告交给老师给你打分。我的初级研讨班学分一共修了两个,后来系里就给我免了初级班学分,修高级研讨班学分也是要修一个学期的课,写一份30页的(德文)学习报告,在研讨班做一次45分钟的报告,然后,修改好报告交给老师打分。这种高级研讨班学分读硕士学位需要四个,而读博士学位则需要八个,我一共修了九个。

黄:所以,获得的知识会特别多,让人有学得如饥似渴那种感觉。

卓:当时改革开放初期,有报告文学说,陈景润为了研究哥德巴赫猜想而写了一麻袋的演算草稿。其实,我读学分的每一个报告都是三易其稿才交给老师,后来,我看到自己宿舍放所写报告的初稿、废纸也堆得差不多是一麻袋了!所以,这样写完前后十余份报告以后,对自己学术写作能力的培养提高也很起作用,完成学分之后我的博士论文半年就写出来了!

### 博士论文

黄:您博士论文是什么?

卓:博士论文题目就是《当代中西宗教理论比较研究》(China und ihre Bezugnahme zu Religionstheorie des Westens,1988)。毕业后我已经正式出版了德语版的论文,是国际上一个很有名的学术出版社叫彼得·朗出版社(Peter Lang Verlag),在德国、法国、瑞士、美国都有分社。你大概知道专门出版学术著作的欧洲出版社,对这个出版社有所耳闻。

黄:是的,我知道这个出版社,我有些同学的论文就在这里出版。所以,有了非常好的训练,就写起来非常得心应手,那您是哪一年毕业的?

卓:我实际上在1987年就读完了,我1983年去德国,应该说1983年11月才入校,大约四年的时间读完,应该说是非常不容易的,一般外国学生在德国留学要十年,我有来自亚洲的同学,比我早两年

来德国,我读完博士回国两年后再访慕尼黑时看见他还没念完。慕尼黑大学对上交博士论文有规定,博士论文做完了如果没有正式出版的话,就要作者自己印刷 120 本交给各个大学的图书馆;如果是正式出版的论文,那么交给大学五本书就行了。所以,我为了正式出版自己这第一部书,在德国又多待了一年才于 1988 年回国,这样我前后在德国一共度过了五年半的时间。

### 总结德国留学的经验所得

黄:五年多,那么,您是 1988 年几月份回国的?

卓:我是 1988 年底,11 月份回国的,从 1983 年 5 月底算起来将近五年半的时间。

黄:您在德国读博士,是您们社科院给您的一个交流项目吗?还是其它项目?

卓:是德方跟我们所的一个合作项目,所以,我拿的是德国奖学金,没花国家的钱。我到德国就是安心学习,没去打工挣钱,但我有读万卷书行万里路的想法,因此,放假的时候就去欧洲各国了解当地的名胜古迹,到过不少地方,我也有喜欢到处跑这样一个特点。

黄:如果简单地总结一下,您在德国这五年多的时间,总体给您最大的感受是什么?

卓:这对于我的学术发展是一个质的提高,特别是视野由此而开阔,这对于宗教研究帮助巨大,看问题就更为透彻了。

黄:不仅仅是理论上吧?也包括看到很多实际情况,是从理论到实践都有收获。

卓:对的。另外,就是自己在学科的研究方法上得到了很大的提高。德国人做学术非常严谨,在方法上就是强调逻辑严密,要体现出一种思辨精神,再就是强调研究学问首先要有查找资料的功夫。而看问题则要有一些独特的观点,不能人云亦云、平淡无奇。

黄:那么,必须得要有自己的突出性特点,要有超越前人的地方。

卓:这种训练对我来讲,应该说是学术视野、研究方法上的脱胎换骨,有很大的提高。在这五年多时间内,德国不像中国大学要求博士研究生必须发表什么两篇核心论文,在那五年多时间内我连一篇发表的文章都没写,除了修学分以外就是踏踏实实地读书做研究,扩充自己的知识,这样才打下了很好的基础。

黄:然后您就出版了博士论文这本书。

卓:是的,博士论文是我的第一本书。

黄:我们也是,我们一般讲,这个博士论文是一个学生成为一个学者的奠基之作呀,好像这是进入学术圈的一个起点。

卓:而且,德国口试答辩也很有意思。学生博士论文写完上交以后,学校考试委员会就将之交给两个老师来评分,评分通过以后再组织的口试就不叫什么博士论文答辩了,干脆就叫博士答辩,主考老师一般不问你论文里面的问题,而是综合性地问方方面面的问题,考的是学生的知识面,而我们现在国内博士论文答辩就基本围绕着论文来展开。德国博士考试的综合分数包括两个老师对论文的打分,博士论文通过再安排口试,分主科和副科三场口试,博士毕业的总分数是根据两个老师打的博士论文分加上三个口试分,这样综合起来的分数就是总分数的等级,如果通过就分为全优、优良、良好、及格四等。

黄:这样说我要感谢您了,您是我的第二个博士答辩的老师。这个中文的博士答辩在德文中怎么说,主考人称答辩老师还是其他?

卓:称考官或者是主考老师,德文中博士考试答辩的专门词就是 Rigorosum。

黄:对,芬兰语叫做 opponentti。

卓:所以说,留德对我的知识面、视野开拓等帮助就是很大。我回国以后的前五年还看了一些书,因为当时没有担任行政职务,但后来从我担任副所长到现在已经将近 25 年,这期间已经没有时间认真系统地阅读、广泛地涉猎,而只能是为了某一个研究课题去看相关的专业书,我感觉自己系统读书

就是在德国的五年和回国后的前五年,这十年看书真是获益匪浅。到德国留学对我来说一是多学了一门外语,二是学到德国人做学问的那种严谨,三是受到德国人系统性研究的熏染,所以,我现在考虑问题相对而言会比较系统,这跟当时在德国的学术训练是有关联的。

## 二、您回国之后的研究成果

黄:那好,那我们现在就谈下个阶段,即您1988年回国之后的情况吧。您还是回到了世界宗教研究所,您说一开始的五年还能读些书,是1988年到1993年吧。

卓:是的,1992年我破格评上研究员,1993年就开始参与行政工作了。

### 副研究员和正研究员生涯

黄:1988年您回来那时候就是副研究员了?

卓:没有,我回来以后才评的副研究员,大概回来一年以后评的副研究员,到1992年参加院里高级职称破格考试,这样评上了研究员。

黄:那还是比较年轻啊。您是哪年出生的?

卓:1955年的,当时在37岁评上研究员,38岁开始当副所长。

黄:那您回来之后,最初五年主要做了什么研究课题?

卓:这个五年我基本上是专心做研究,因为我回国前我们研究所的领导说,外文再好不是决定性的,拿到博士学位也不是决定性的,而真正看学术水平就是看能否写出像样的东西来,能有什么学术出版。这个话实际上对我刺激很大,我在1987年博士口试通过后曾回国休假,听到所里领导的这些话之后,就改变了我当时已经开始学习古典语言的计划,转而去写学术著作了。现在回想起来,应该说,我真是觉得,自己在这个选择上犯了一个很大的错误,本来我已开始古典语言的系统学习,拉丁文、希腊文和希伯来文这三个课程我都已经报名参加,并已开始了一段初级学习,后来,我反复琢磨我们领导的话,感到如果回国以后没有学术成果,恐怕别人会瞧不起,以前就有同学说,我们这些年轻一些的研究生就是会考试,并没有什么真才实学,写不出东西来。而如果回国后要想堵别人的嘴,领导已经明确指出光靠博士学位、会外语还不成,必须要有真的学术成果。在琢磨回国的准备上,这种功利性想法逐渐占了上风,所以,那一年我回到德国就开始为写书收集资料,并且干脆放弃了古典语言的学习,现在的确后悔莫及,但已无法弥补了。随着思路的改变,我用中文所写的最初三本书的草稿就是当时在德国完成的,回国以后就马上联系出版社准备那三本书的出版,其中《宗教与文化》一书在德国时就直接写信联系人民出版社的总编薛德震先生,没想到他真的给我这个无名之辈回函让我把书稿寄到出版社看看质量如何,这就促成了我在国内第一本书的出版。所以,我回国后仅用了一两年就出了三本书,加上德文博士论文专著,已有四部著作出版了,《宗教与文化》1988年10月出版,《宗教起源纵横谈》1988年12月由湖南人民出版社出版,另一部《西方宗教学研究导引》则于1990年由中国社会科学出版社出版。当然,这些书都不是太厚,属于篇幅比较小的书。

黄:但那个时代年轻人出书非常重要啊!

卓:当时,我的中外文著作等于是有了四本书在那儿,这样的话,评副研究员就比较轻松了,年轻学者那时能出这么多成果的人不是很多。

黄:那您这一回来也就得到重用了吗?

卓:评副研究员以后那几年比较边缘化,所以是我潜心学习提高的几年,在学术上受益匪浅。期间,我也尝试过参评研究员但失败了,有评委那时说他们看不懂我的德文著作,所以无法评价我的学术水平。

黄:那在出版了这三本书之后,即您后来几年主要是研究什么?

卓:后来我就把重点摆在基督教研究去了,所以,在基督教研究方面写了一些书。

黄:您写《当代新教神学》和《当代天主教神学》,那个时候要更早吗?

卓:出版那两本书时我已经评上正研究员了。我评上正研以后又写了这两本书,那么比这更早出版的有《圣经鉴赏》《基督宗教论》等。

黄:那好像还有什么圣经词典或什么的词典,您编过一个什么词典吧?

卓:我们研究室编过基督教词典,但我没有参加,因为要写“中华文化通志”项目中的《基督教犹太教志》。我申请评正研之前,又写了几本书,当时破格评正研一是要有学术著作,另外则是要考两门外语,其实我申请破格参评正研时已经有了四年副研的资历,如果是有五年副研资格就不算破格了,正好我副研四年的时候参加了破格考试。

黄:但像您这样两门外语都这么好的,还是不多吧?

卓:是不多,我是 1992 年通过院里破格考试两门外语而评上的。当时全院破格评选了 4 名正研、1 名副研。得以破格评上正研的有樊纲、现任我院副院长的李培林、经济所原来的副所长朱玲、以及我本人。全院当时参加破格考试的也大概得有四、五十来人吧。

黄:那我是不好意思,当时在北京不认识您们。可以说,我和您是擦肩而过,我是 1991 年到芬兰去的,您是 1988 年回来的,我是 1987 年来北京学习的,我原来并不搞现在这一行,而是学习语言学的。您评了副研之后,就做了几年基督教研究室的副主任吧,然后 1992 年评的正研,那么 1993 年以后呢?

**任期最长地担任了 25 年的副所长和所长**

卓:1993 年之后就开始当副所长,主管研究所的外事,于是我就开始组织国际学术会议了,最初于 1994 年与爱德基金会合作在北京组织召开“基督教文化与现代性”国际学术研讨会。

黄:当时的所长是谁?

卓:当时我们研究所的所长是吴云贵先生,是研究伊斯兰教问题的。我们两个人是同时被提拔的,他是从伊斯兰教研究室的副主任直接提拔而当上所长,我是从基督教研究室的副主任提到副所长岗位上,然后又兼任基督教研究室的主任。

黄:您做所长时间是比较久的。

卓:加上副所长任职,到现在是 25 个年头吧,足足任职 24 年的时间。

黄:这么久啊,那您算不算您们研究所任所长时间最长的? 您们研究所创始人任继愈先生担任了多久的所长?

卓:任继愈先生自 1964 年担任所长,期间包括文化大革命十年,他担任所长一共是 21 年,至 1985 年他调到北京图书馆担任馆长。我当所长的年头没有超过任先生,只有 20 个年头,但是我在研究所担任行政领导的时间、即加上副所长任职时间则比他还多四年。任先生 1985 年调到北京图书馆去当馆长,离开了我们研究所,而我则是一直在这里没有离开过,迄今不当所长了,也一直没动。

黄:您做所长是哪一年?

卓:是担任副所长五年以后的 1998 年,所以,到 2018 年恰好是 20 年。

黄:您做副所长的时候吴云贵先生是所长吧?

卓:对,他当了一届,然后我就接任了。

黄:那这以后您就比较忙了,但是,我看您还是在坚持学术研究。

卓:的确比较忙,但我还在抽空继续从事学术研究,科研人员不搞学问,哪成呢! 学问是属于自己的,是学者得以安身立命的看家本领,是自己真正的本行,其他则是身外之物、有无不定的。学问你必须得做,是不是这个道理?



黄：对，从现在我们追溯这段历史来看，从学术发展的角度来考虑，这种学术领导组织工作、即参与搭建相关学术平台也非常重要，学问可能是您一个人的事情，而学术发展则不仅仅是您个人，对其他学者来说也很重要，需要相关学术团队和学术活动平台，因而对整个学科体系的发展、对中国学术的推动等都非常重要。您觉得，您自己在推动中国宗教研究这个方面做了什么有意义的工作呢？这要从您 1993 年开始当副所长、以及后来一直当所长来评估。在这二十多年里，您觉得您自己在学术上主要有哪些感受，或者说您是如何开展宗教学、以及基督教研究的？

### 学术研究三部曲

卓：应该说，我回国后的宗教研究可以分为三部曲。

第一步是比较系统地介绍、研究西方宗教学的历史与现状。为此我回国后完成了那三本书的出版，在介绍西方宗教学的同时亦对中国宗教学的发展有所比较和思考，特别是对宗教与文化的关系有一些体悟吧。

第二步则是集中研究基督教，随着在学术上已经站稳，我就开始比较系统地研究我自己的专业本行即基督教研究。我主要是从这几个方面来做，第一个就是研究基督教的历史，但我还没有从古到今基督教史研究的系统著作，主要是从一些专题论文、从一些有关基督教文化史研究的文集里面对之加以探讨，其中包括把中国基督教的历史做了一个学术梳理。

黄：您讲的这个历史，是指基督教会历史，还是基督教思想史？

卓：这个阶段主要是研究基督教会的历史，这是第一点。

第二点就是重点研究基督教思想，主要侧重于研究当代基督教思想现状及其发展，其重点就是 20 世纪以来当代基督教思想的发展，为此我申请了一个社科基金重要项目，研究当代基督教思潮。其成果就是出版了一套丛书，由我主编，而且在其六本书中我自己就写了四本，内容涵括当代新教神学、当代天主教神学、当代亚非拉美神学、以及当代世界基督教会的发展概况。当代东正教神学部分我邀请了从俄罗斯留学回国的张百春博士来承担，他后来以这部著作而奠定了其研究东正教的学术地位，并且进而有更深入的拓展。还有一部著作涉及当代基督教的社会关怀问题，由我们研究所的一位同事来承担。这两位学者都因参加这一重点课题而在学术发展上有明显提高。此外，在研究当代基督教思想方面，我还专门研究了美国新教神学家尼布尔，并在台湾出版了一本专门研究尼布尔的专著。

第三点就是前面所言对中国基督教历史的专题研究。我们当时参加了由汤一介先生主持的中华文化通志项目，由我负责完成其中中国基督教犹太教志的撰写。

黄：那也会涉及到开封犹太教等问题吧？

卓：是的，但这里面一大部分主要是讲基督教在中国的历史。

黄：讲中国基督教就是从景教开始吧？

卓：对，这样就粗线条地把中国基督教历史系统梳理了一遍。也探究了犹太教在中国的历史。

黄：这里所说基督教和犹太教只是指它们在中国的存在吧？

卓：是在中国的历史，这些课题的重点就是在研究中国的基督教和犹太教，实际上基督教研究是我研究的重中之重，这方面出版的著作也比较多。

### 《马克思主义宗教观探究》等中国宗教与文化战略问题研究及相关的争议

黄：在您的三部曲中，最近主要是宗教理解和文化战略问题吗？

卓：是的。我后来当了所长，那就得思考一些宗教政策、宗教理论方面的问题，于是，我此后的研究就更多转到宗教理解与宗教文化战略这一领域去了。我最近几年写的书也多有这方面的侧重，感到宗教理解是中国目前需要关注和正确解决的。

这就是我回国后研究工作的第三步，集中到中国宗教与文化战略问题，亦涉及到全球化的宗教与当代中国发展的关系。因为我处在这个工作位置上，必须思考这些有关宗教与当代中国，宗教与世界

现状的关系问题。应该说,我回国研究工作的第一个阶段和第二个阶段并不是有太多的人关注,但第三个阶段的研究受到的关注比较多,而且受到的批评也比较大,就是说大家比较关心宗教政策和宗教理论问题,但这方面的分歧很大,各自坚持自己的观点和理解,甚至我根据阅读原著而对马克思主义宗教观进行的研究也受到不少批评,让我也很是困惑。本来一些问题马克思主义经典作家说得再清楚不过了,但经过这种让人感到匪夷所思的批评后反而使人们的认识糊涂了。目前这个问题的探讨分歧仍然很大,不少观点截然对立,对这种理论混乱局面的发展我深感担忧。为此,我这几年专门出版了《马克思主义宗教观探究》等专著,对马克思主义的研究我是抱着非常认真的态度,为此我一篇一篇地阅读了涉及马克思主义经典作家论述宗教观的所有著作,而且阅读了中文的新旧译本、看了其英译本,也直接阅读了马克思、恩格斯的德文原著,这一研究花了我十多年的工夫,最近由中央编译局负责的经典作家基本观点研究的课题在北京大学结项,搞了一场新闻发布会,其中研究丛书的 12 部著作中也有我完成的一部,其研究时间算起来前后也有 15 个年头了。

黄:对,我那次来,您给我看过那本书的试印版,装帧很漂亮。

卓:这就是我回国以后宗教领域研究的三个阶段吧,在第三个阶段专门研究基督教的成果就比较少,仅仅涉及过基督教中国化的问题,而主要精力则放在宗教文化战略这一大的方面,侧重现实问题研究。

黄:这大概就是因为您做所长、以及后来担任中国宗教学会会长的缘故吧,这种担当使您必须考虑得更远更广,是不是?

卓:在中国这个氛围中,研究宗教现状就使人跟社会的交往比较多了,它涉及到方方面面,而社会对之也比较关注。所以,我就把研究的重心转到这个问题上来了,其实,做现实探讨也是我博士论文中实际涉及到的问题,这样就等于是回归到我撰写博士论文时候所思考的一些问题,而且,现在更有实践经验。但非常遗憾的是,在这个根本问题上人们似乎没有什么大的变化,其理论认知到现在也没有得到理想的解决,好像还看不到质的突破之迹象。大家对之仁者见仁、智者见智,没有共识,也没有意识到其问题的严重性,实际上,这一问题确实很大,其如何解决势必影响到中国未来发展的可能走向。

黄:但是这个问题好像很复杂,好像基本上很难厘清。

卓:但我个人认为,我是已经讲清楚了其根本所在的问题了,不过批评方并不那么看,认为有原则性分歧。我个人认为,这些针对我的观点所展开的批评并没能真正反驳我的观点,这些批评一是没有全面透彻地来探讨相关问题,对我至少是有些误解或者是故意误解吧;二是我觉得相关批评既没有建构出新的理论框架,也没有通过他们的批评而把我这个理论的认知结构破坏掉,也就是说并没能解构掉我的认知体系。

黄:就是说,批评方在理论上,在逻辑论证上,以及在批评的客观公正性这三个方面来看,都没有掌握让人心悦诚服的真理。

卓:应该说,这在近十年的争论中,尽管各种批评比较多,但我一直还是坚持我自己的观点,我认为,这些观点是完全能够站住脚的,那些批评我的说法,既没能体现出真理,其强词夺理也仍然显得软弱无力。

黄:这一点我觉得很钦佩,作为学者,您这种独立性是需要坚持的。

卓:我认为是正确的,我就坚持,我可以跟你据理力争,但我总觉得,他们批评我的一些观点基本上是站不住脚的,因为缺乏理论支撑和学术规范。所以,我感觉,这些批评不是学术性的,但其政治考量却并不正确。我认为,在中国当前这种社会氛围和学术语境中,我们应该回到马克思主义经典作家关于宗教的认知,必须提倡认真读经典,即一篇一篇地仔细阅读,一段一段地认真分析,一句一句地反复推敲。如果没有下这种基本功,没有充分的知识积淀,也就没有资格和能力来参加这种理论性和知

识性都很强的学术争论。

黄：但您的这本书出版后影响应该也很大，批评方就应该研究这些内容吧。

卓：很多人可能根本就不看这本书，没有看到就敢出来批评，那就是按自己的想象了，他们原来批评我不研究马克思主义，说明他们根本就不知道我的研究；而当我回应我有这方面的研究时，他们却断言那是“你的马克思主义”，不值得他们去研究。所以，批评者并没有具体说出我的这些研究著作错在哪里。其实，他们可能根本就没有看，至少可以说，他们没看懂，这种批评态度本身就不是科学的、学术的、公平客观的，其批评多有望文生义、断章取义之嫌。所以，这些年，我有关这一方面的研究，使我处在风口浪尖上，有人形象比喻说是“在刀尖上跳舞”！我现在已回国30年了，我的宗教研究生涯也有40年了，大致就是这样三个阶段的研究，即研究国际宗教学的发展，展开对基督教的重点研究，以及思考探讨宗教与文化战略和我国宗教政策、宗教理论这三大块。这三个阶段对我的学术发展而言基本上就形成了一个发展的轨迹。

**从您个人研究到为整个宗教学研究担任组织工作：国际及国内学术会议、丛书及刊物出版、宗教学会、学生培养等**

黄：那按照这三个阶段、三个研究主题，我们可以再具体谈谈，来细化一下，增加更丰富的内容。比如说，您在学生培养，学术平台的搭建，学术会议的组织，以及学术刊物的编辑等等方面的工作。其中包括您们研究所《世界宗教研究》这个刊物，另外，除了基督教研究这个系列丛书，有组织编辑出版了其他方面的什么书？我也是感到很荣幸，能有机会得到您的提携和帮助。您参加了我的博士答辩，您还给我的几本书出版帮助写了序言，然后我们还有学术合作，在您主编的“基督教文化丛书”中就曾出版过我的《汉语学术神学》等。我们还一起合作主编了“汉语学术神学丛书”。您的这些工作对于整个中国的基督教研究和宗教学研究出现学术繁荣和发展，起了非常重大的作用。我们在学界的许多同仁们，对您都是很钦佩的。我还记得您组织的一个会议系列，大家称之为“神仙会”，吸引了许多老师和学生参加。这个会最初是哪一年开始的？

卓：我也记不太清楚了，大概始于1998年吧。

黄：一共是组织了十几届吧。

卓：第一届应该是1998年开始的，是我组织的中国社会科学院基督教研究中心的第一次亮相。

黄：此后是每年一届？

卓：基本上是每年一届，有一年开过两次会。

黄：出了多少集会议论文集，就意味着办了多少次会议？

卓：办了十多次会议，大概是从1998年开始，2012年就不再举办这类会议了。

黄：我是2003年认识您的，就是您到芬兰去参加我们赫尔辛基大学召开的那个“基督宗教与中国文化”国际会议。

卓：对的，应该是。后来我们也邀请过你们大学的教授与会。

黄：是不是2009年也开了会？

卓：是开过会，我记得是2011年开了最后一次，2011年以后就没再召开了。

黄：我记得我是2007年第一次参加了这个神仙会。通过这个会议所搭建的学术平台，对整个中国的学者都有吸引，不仅仅是中国大陆的学者，也包括少数台湾朋友，而来自香港的学者则较多，香港学界与中国大陆学术界有很密切的联系，也包括我们这些海外的华人，推动了华人学者对基督教的研究。我可能就参加过差不多三届或者是四届会议，我可能是2007年、2008年、2009年参加的，对吗？

卓：2010年也开过会。

黄：2010年也开了？那一年我也参加了吧，我好像每次都参加了。对，那我参加了四年的会议，即2007年、2008年、2009年、2010年，2011年好像就没有了会议了。

卓: 2011 年也召开了会议, 还出版了会议论文集, 可以进行查验, 这样看来会议开到了 2011 年。

黄: 到 2012 年就没有了吧? 那我一共参加过五次, 即 2007 年、2008 年、2009 年、2010 年、2011 年的会议。

卓: 到 2011 年开了最后一次会议。所以, 一共开了十几次会议, 从 1998 年到 2011 年就有 14 个年头, 至少有 15 次会议。

黄: 我们当时就觉得, 这个会议对于全国基督教研究领域学术力量的整合和青年人的培养, 都是很重要的。另外, 出版这个基督宗教研究丛书, 还有您们所的《世界宗教研究》, 《世界宗教文化》等学术杂志, 是不是与您也相关, 研究论文主要是在这三个刊物上比较多。

卓: 《世界宗教研究》由我主编, 具体工作是编辑部的同仁在做, 《世界宗教文化》以前我也比较关照, 后来另有专人负责了。我的工作可以分为两大块, 一是我个人的学术研究, 二是后来就主要涉及学术组织工作。我个人学术研究前后到去年为止好像共出了 32 本书, 后来从学术研究转向学术组织工作, 就是出版丛书、组织会议等, 耗费了我的主要精力。我担任副所长后最早于 1994 年和爱德基金会合作组织过一次国际学术研讨会, 以“基督教文化与现代化”为主题, 这是我主持召开的第一次国际学术研讨会, 此后我还和美国旧金山大学利玛窦中西文化研究所的吴小新博士合作在北京组织了一次规模较大的基督教研究国际会议, 与美国伯克利联合神学研究院也合作开过一次国际学术研讨会, 这样就形成了系列学术会议。我基本上是两条腿走路, 一方面我组织了基督教的研讨会, 包括每年一次的神仙会, 基本上是基督教研究专业领域的学术活动。另一方面, 则是我作为中国宗教学会会长而组织了全国的宗教学术研讨会, 包括每年中国宗教学会的年会, 也还组织过“中国宗教学 50 人论坛”。学术涵括面应该很广。

黄: 您作为中国宗教学会会长是哪一年?

卓: 我想, 应该是 1998 年以后吧, 是在当所长以后, 所以, 会长也当了十多年了。我们研究所在当时有一个不成文规定, 谁当所长, 谁也就当中国宗教学会会长。我于 1998 年开始当所长, 所以, 估计在 1999 年以后就当会长了。从我当会长起, 我也组织每年的中国宗教学年会, 这样就不仅是把基督教研究加以整合, 而且在中国宗教学方面也开展学术研究的合作, 组织各种学术会议。所以, 在组织学术会议上主要就是这两个大的系列, 其规模也还是比较大的。

黄: 您们组织的宗教学年会我好像没有参加过。

卓: 中国宗教学年会的定位是属于国内会议, 这样的会议对您的身份而言就跨界了, 但召开国际会议时我们也会请外面一些人来参加。中国宗教学会议有时候是我们的工作会议, 理事们一年碰一次头, 附带有些学术讨论, 但重要的是每年要商量一些学会的具体工作事情。全国宗教研究机构、高校相关专业、以及相关党政部门对宗教学都非常关注, 所以, 我们中国宗教学会的结构也比较特殊。通常由我们研究所所长担任学会会长, 我所副所长则担任常务副会长。此外, 重要高校宗教研究机构的负责人、有关省市宗教学会的会长、宗教界的领袖人物和党政部门的相关领导也会担任我们的副会长。例如, 国家宗教事务局的副局长, 中央统战部负责宗教工作相关部门的领导, 各宗教全国协会的副会长, 以及相关大学的校长、宗教研究院的院长, 一般也可能当选为我们学会的副会长。因此, 大理大学、中央民族大学、西北民族大学、内蒙古师范大学等大学的校长或副校长, 北京大学宗教研究院、山东大学宗教研究院、中央民族大学宗教研究院等大学宗教研究院的负责人, 都是或曾经是我们学会的副会长。我们最年轻的副会长, 只有 40 来岁, 所以, 学会不断增加新鲜血液也挺好。

黄: 我们再回到刚才所谈基督教的神仙会, 还有和不同机构合作的这种学术会议, 另外, 好像您们还组织了一个中国社科论坛, 这个会我也参加过几次。

卓: 中国社科论坛是我们院出面组织, 由各研究所分论坛的形式具体操办的。这是我们社科院开展创新工程以后在最近这几年才开始实施的。



黄:就是2010年之后或者2012年之后吧。

卓:对的,可能就是最近这几年的发展。

黄:但您们这个牌子很响,中国社会科学论坛。

卓:是称为中国社会科学论坛,我们本来是希望整个社科院来做,规模大一些,就像北京大学组织的北京论坛,上海那边组织的上海论坛那样,但是我院比较低调,不愿意做那么大,也就只好让各个研究所来做分论坛。这样,我们也办了好几次了。

黄:这个论坛还会继续做下去吗?

卓:理论上讲应该继续坚持,只要中国社会科学论坛这一选项还继续做的话,而且还有一定的资金支持,那么我们当然也就继续开下去吧。

黄:我看到最近您们也 and 北京市基督教两会合作举办会议,这好像是有几年的事情了,也就最近几年吧?

卓:我们以前曾跟爱德基金会合作过,开过两次会,现在我们也和北京市基督教两会合作,也就开过两次会议,合作的时间还不是很长。

黄:好的,除了这个办刊物、出丛书,以及组织学术会议这样几个板块,另外您们还有培养学生这方面的发展吧?

卓:培养学生是由我们的研究生院整体策划,我们所在其中有个宗教学系,在我当副所长以后曾经当过宗教学系的系主任,但现在不再具体负责了。由于部门不同的原因,我们培养学生很受名额限制,这对我们有一定的不利影响。就我们系招生情况来看,一般我们系每年硕士和博士加在一起不超过十个人的名额,就只有这么小的一个规模,后来才有一些博士后招收计划。可我们有这么多老师,许多都没有学生指标。所以,一个导师原则上也就只能带一个学生,除非别的专业有轮空现象,这样一个导师最多也只能带两个,可以带博士的导师基本上就不带硕士了。实际上,我们系可以带硕士的导师有40多人,但是我们只有4个硕士名额,这样大概十个导师才能有一个学生名额,而我们系可以带博士的也有十几个导师,而博士名额也只有4个,后来各增加了一个名额,也就是5个硕士,5个博士,那么,是不是根本不能满足培养学生的需求?这样,我们只能根据考试的情况来灵活掌握。初步估计,几十年来我们系在研究生院已经初具规模,先后毕业的研究生加在一起也有大概好几百学生了吧。

黄:您个人带的博士也有不少了吧?

卓:我在研究生院带的博士大概也不多,因为每年名额比较少,约二十年来加在一起所带学生大概也就二、三十个吧。

黄:那他们大多数还在宗教研究这一行,还在从事这一行研究吗?

卓:大部分还是在从事宗教研究这一行,也有少部分改行的,还有一些存在着就业困难,越晚毕业的学生就业也越难。

黄:另外还有博士后吧,一般博士后就很少改行了,对吧?

卓:博士后也有改行的,因为现在博士后也找不着工作,如有其他机会就业则就会有改行的可能性。到目前为止,出站的几个博士后好像还没有改行,但还没有出站的博士后如果原来没有工作,那从现在开始就有危机了,博士后现在也找不到工作。

#### 博士生发表核心刊物论文的压力问题

黄:还有这样一个问题,就是说我们的学术平台也有问题,现在很多从事宗教学研究的人员,特别是从事基督教研究的年轻学者感到困惑,他们发文章比较困难,但要评职称就必须有相应的学术成果,必须出书发文章。那您们在这个方面怎么来为大家做点贡献?

卓:难度的确比较大。最近我在微信上看到报道,就是各个学校及研究机构都要求博士生要在核

心期刊发表两篇论文。但如果这样计算下来的话, 全国大概有六、七万博士生, 那就要发表十二、三万篇论文, 这已经占整个人文学科论文的一半数量了。而科研人员、学生的导师们也得发表论文啊! 大家都要发表论文, 但有限的期刊不可能让人们发那么多论文, 尤其是宗教学限制很多, 所以, 这个难度太大了。我是不同意这种做法的, 因为研究生在学习期间一共就三年时间, 学生应该集中精力多学点知识, 然后, 把自己的博士论文专心做好就行了, 若要让博士生写文章、发文章, 势必就会分散掉很大的精力, 而且, 现在处于在读研究生这种情况发文章也不是那么容易, 所以, 在这个中间过程要费掉的精力就更多了, 使学生在校三年时间得不到专业学习的集中, 而最后一年学生还要到处跑工作、找工作, 几乎没有什么太多的时间来潜心学习。记得我在德国那五年多, 就没有发表论文这个压力, 所以, 我就有可能埋头看书, 能够比较系统地看很多的书籍。

黄: 您觉得, 现在国内在这个方面会有调整嘛?

卓: 目前看没有什么调整的希望, 但这样的话, 实际上是把一些学生的基本训练给破坏了, 所以, 我是不同意这种做法的。但有人说, 这种规定可以锻炼学生的写作能力。其实写学分论文也同样可以锻炼写作能力的, 不是让文章非发表不可。而现在这种核心期刊形式的发表对学生们的要求难度是太大了, 试问宗教学在中国有几个核心期刊? 其他专业的期刊能否发、发多少宗教学的论文? 但我们现在也只能服从这种规定, 有了规定的话, 我们导师自己说话也不算数, 只能如实按照这个规定去做, 否则, 就会影响学生毕业。我们对这些博士生的确很同情, 但是爱莫能助、真没有办法。我们为此在不断呼吁扩大我们宗教学杂志的发行了、增大其版面。我们宗教学的杂志非常之少, 而公共性研究学科的杂志一般也不愿意登宗教研究的文章, 所以, 我们比其他任何专业的难度都要大。

黄: 所以, 这对宗教研究的学科发展也可能会有不利影响。

卓: 我们现在办了几个以书代刊的专业学术杂志, 我们努力争取为学者提供更多的发表途径。现在我们办的有部分杂志可以被承认, 甚至可以等同于核心期刊, 如《基督宗教研究》和《宗教人类学》, 但其它刊物还没有获得这种承认, 我们现在以书代刊的书籍至少有五、六种吧。两个被正式作为核心期刊的杂志即《世界宗教研究》、《世界宗教文化》。

黄: 所以, 我也在做这个《国学西学国际学刊》吗? 我们做的还不错, 现在国内有一些把我们算 B 刊来。

卓: 我们对这一刊物还不承认。

黄: 是吗? 我们刊物加入到托马森路透的那个叫做 ESCI 的类型, 它们中有不少是被作为 B 刊的, 在国外它们中很多杂志甚至被作为 A 刊的。

卓: 我们这里就是情况不同。

黄: 您们是什么? 就是 A & HCI, SCI?

卓: 不是, 并不是光认这个, 而是指明在相关领域有哪些、哪些学科和哪些期刊为核心期刊, 这一类很少, 我们实际上只有三个专业研究的杂志可以被视为其内, 即我所的《世界宗教研究》、《世界宗教文化》, 以及四川大学办的《宗教学研究》这三个杂志。其它杂志能否被承认则要看具体地方或部门的态度了。我们被承认的其它刊物只能是所谓地方粮票, 即只有社科院承认, 但在全国范围却不一定算数。当然, 如果您能在其它公认的那种学术刊物上、就是大家都认可的核心期刊上发文章也算, 但那些期刊绝不会轻易地发表宗教学的文章, 其难度比较大。

黄: 就是不知道这套体系会不会改变, 这对人的约束真是太厉害了。哪有那么多真正懂的人, 那些管职称的人不一定懂专业, 就只看发表的文章是否在有这种招牌的杂志上。

卓: 这实际上就是注重外包装, 而把它的实际内容却忽略了。

黄: 我们在外面评估最主要还是看您文章的内容。

卓: 应该是看内容, 而不是发表的杂志, 但人家就不看内容, 这也没办法。

### 三、您怎么来看这个基督教研究的现状和未来,以及您的期望是什么?

黄:想谈的主要就是这几个方面。已经讨论一个半小时了,我们现在讨论最后一个问题,就是您怎么来看这个基督教研究的现状和未来,以及您的期望是什么?我们此前已经涉猎到了一些,现在可以更深入地展开来谈。

#### 宗教研究的脱敏是中国发展的必需

卓:我对于现在宗教学的学术发展应该说是比较担忧的。到现在有很多人都有这种感觉了,体会到宗教研究的困难。这种状况其实是与我们国家发展的总体态势不相符合的。为什么这么讲?一方面中国现在的GDP是世界第二,因此,中国现在强调要进入世界舞台的中心;而这个世界很大,这个舞台上有着各种各样的民族和各种各样的宗教,信仰宗教者是占了世界人口的84%,有这么大的比重,您在进入世界中心的过程中必须面对它。既然要进入世界舞台中心,那就应该研究宗教,而基督教有信仰者23亿人,占全世界人口将近1/3,所以,对基督教的研究就应该加强。而我们由于过于强调宗教敏感,反而是在回避对宗教的研究。面对这一国际形势,给我们的宗教研究带来很多困难本来就不应该。当然,我们要想破除这种困难,必须付出很艰辛的努力,能够取得很小很小的成果都是来之不易。我的希望就是,整个宗教学术研究的氛围能够有所改善,不要把我们宗教研究者也看成另类。这就需要中国整个社会对宗教的理解,要更加科学、更加客观地对待宗教。如果要想真正地放眼世界,就不能回避宗教问题。

黄:所以,这是我们所处的一个大的现状,国家发展趋势的现状与我们现在宗教研究的实际状况出现了一个反差。

#### 基督教中国化是其在中國生存和发展的必需

卓:要打破这种僵局,我们也想了一些办法。比如说,我们强调宗教中国化,尤其是从基督教中国化做起,因为基督教是与西方社会联系最密切的宗教。全球基督教的力量有这么大,而中国社会在政治经济各方面与西方的问题也是最大的。在这种情况下,基督教的存在和基督教的研究夹在这二者中间更是步履维艰。如果要打破这种局面的话,那就必须从基督教的中国化做起,使基督教真正成为一个中国的宗教,适应中国社会、而且被中国社会所理解和承认。为此,我们做了很多的努力,但也遭到了很多的批评。比如从基督教这边来说,有人坚持认为,基督教本身就是普世性的宗教,为什么强调它的中国化?我曾解释说,这种普世其实是抽象的,而它的具体存在都是处境化、在地化之状。就中国的“处境”和“在地”而言,那当然就是中国化了。所以,要这样结合来看,基督教既是世界的、也是中国的;而对于在中国的基督教来讲,也只有首先是作为中国的宗教,然后,才能体现这种世界宗教的在地化展示。

黄:我们讲的处境神学(Contextual Theology)一直就是讨论这个问题的,所以,这个中国化应该就是与这个处境化一个样的。

卓:对宗教存在的国际社会来说,应该对我们的宗教中国化方向、特别是基督教的中国化发展要有更多的理解和支持,但现在发现批评声音也比较多。所以,从国际、国内的形势来讲,中国的基督教存在和整个宗教存在都需要得到客观、公正的理解。我们的基督教研究及其中国化研究,应该是颇有希望的一个突破口,在这方面,如果能够做好工作,慢慢使社会能够正视学界的客观研究,正确面对中国的宗教和基督教存在,也就是我常说的能够做到使宗教脱敏,那么,这个局面就会有巨大的改观。

现在宗教在中国确实是敏感话题,不少人谈宗色变,一提到宗教的话大家也都不敢去碰,这其实

根本没有必要。如果社会能够正确对待宗教及其研究,那么,对我们的学术出版、学术会议的召开、包括对我们学者的身份认同,都会带来很多好处,减少本不必要的困难和麻烦。因此,我们特别希望能够尽早破这个局,帮助我们走出困境。

黄:正好我昨天看到微信群里面有某个大学发通知,不让学生过圣诞节。

卓:这还是社会方面对宗教的误解在起作用。对我们党和政府的宗教政策,不少人其实并没有认真学习和正确理解,所以,这方面所出问题有时候是超出学术之外的,我们也没有办法来处理。但是。我希望这种状况今后能够得到根本改变。现在的形势发展需要我们更多地了解和研究宗教,而不是对之回避。希望当下的困难和难题是暂时的。

黄:从我的观察来看,全国的宗教研究学者,比如说各地大学、学术机构的学者,他们主要的希望好像都寄托在您们身上,基本上都是看中国社科院世界宗教所和中国宗教学会的作用。

**大家应该关注和争取落实国家领导人和政策为宗教学的发展所提供的机遇**

卓:所以,我们的压力最大,我个人的压力也比较大。对于宗教的正确理解和宗教学研究的必要性,我都是据理力争的,希望能把宗教学作为一个重要学科领域发展下来。

但是,我们自己也有潜力可挖,应该更加积极主动。习近平主席在 2016 年“5·17 讲话”中提到对于哲学社会科学具有支撑作用、需要大力推动的重点学科中就包括了宗教学。而在 2017 年落实习主席的讲话时,中央领导在论及的相关重要学科中也强调了宗教学的学科体系。这对我们学科体系发展是非常好的机遇,我们应该及时组织研讨会来积极呼应、积极紧跟,但在这方面的力度还很不够,一旦机遇失去则很可惜。所以,大家在关键时刻不能光看我们世界宗教研究所,更不能光看我一个人有什么作为,而必须大家共同努力。为此,我也希望我们学界不要太麻木,对于有着重大意义的讨论不要事不关己、高高挂起,而应该积极参与。宗教学的事业是我们大家共同的事业,应该靠共同的努力来维护它,把它发展好。不过,这种发展不能走西方的老路,而要体现中国的特色,要有我们中国学者自己的声音,有我们的体系,有我们的学派,有我们的认知经验。

黄:我简单总结一下,您提到宗教学整个大局和世界形势发展的局面,宗教特别是基督教在当前发展中都占有很重要的比重,中国要成为这个世界大舞台的核心成员,就是说要想起到引领作用,那么,中国就需要正确面对这个宗教问题,不然,就没有办法去有效引领别人。这是一个大局观念,但很多人却不理解,对宗教问题的误判和不正确做法会使我们的国际发展受到很多束缚。我们在寻找突破口,其中基督教的中国化就是一个关键问题。第二个就是政策问题,中国主要领导人对这个宗教研究的政策是积极的,其实给了一定的发展余地,这两个方面应该多加关注。

卓:这样,我们就能够主动争取到一个更好的学术研究氛围,有的学者不是太关注这方面的事情。

黄:这其实也是个战略问题了,是很重要的。讲到这两点,我也想谈点想法,第一点就是关于基督教中国化的问题,我注意到您也讲过,就是要有各种声音,那么,我想指出主要存在的一个问题,就是说中国基督教的中国元素和基督教的所谓普遍性、本质性的元素之间会不会产生张力,以及会不会发生一个要取舍或放弃什么东西的问题。有关的批评者可能是担心这个问题,怕把基督教中国化之后就使之最后不再是基督教了,可能他们是有这方面的担忧。那么,这两个方面,怎么样来使之协调好?我正好最近在研究马丁·路德,我就觉得马丁·路德的思想在这个基督教中国化的问题上应该能够做出贡献,它提供了很重要的资源。这就是路德他所说的两个国度,即属世的、世俗的国度和上帝的国度。今天早上我在中央民大游斌教授那里跟他的学生在一起,我就讲到这个问题。就是说,如果按照马丁·路德所讲的人论,就可以加以发挥。他把人分成肉体、魂体、灵体,或者叫作肉、灵、魂这三个方面,这个俗世的国度和政权管的就是人的肉体、即物质和有形的这个方面,而教会则讲信仰,管的是人的信仰、即人的灵体或关涉永恒性的方面。至于中间层面就是魂的层面,就是所谓道德、伦理、幸福这类东西,相当于一个交叉领域,这就是两个国度都会管到的。如果是在基督教中国化这种状况下,



那么可不可以讲,让这两个方面都能够来仔细地界定和划分自己的管辖领域。如果用这样的一种方法,能不能对基督教中国化的思考做出一些贡献?因为我自己是在北欧生活,故有此思考。卓老师您也到北欧去过,知道那边的情况。北欧的一个很重要的特点,就是社会非常的和谐,而且其宗教关系也非常的和谐。在这个背后就是路德的这一思想在里边起了很重要的影响。所以,我就在思考这个基督教中国化究竟怎样体现的问题。路德的这个思想不仅仅触及一个政教关系的问题,而且也涉及到伦理,涉及到信仰问题。他对二者有一个很重要的划分。我想,可能对于基督教的中国化,无论是推行者还是批评反对者,在这里边可能都存在有一个界定不清或者产生了误解的问题。如果没有误解,应该说所有的基督教都是一个处境化的基督教。基督教在不同的处境里边,就会有不同的表现。但是除了这个处境里面的具体特征之外,基督教总体上的中心词就是叫基督教,无论什么化,无论是什么国家、什么地区的基督教,我觉得它的本质仍然就是耶稣基督这个福音和人的灵性方面的问题。于是,我曾在你们的社科论坛上第一次提出这个观点,后来又用英文写成了一篇文章,我将之叫作代表“基督教中国化途径之一的魂体神学”。就是从肉体、灵体、魂体这三个角度来看基督教的处境。我想,这就是对您刚才所说的基督教中国化这一问题的回应了。注意区分“凯撒的归凯撒,上帝的归上帝”,是一个值得思考的原则,当然我们也是在探讨。

那么第二个问题,就是关于您讲如何对待国家或者党的政策的问题,以及对最高领导人相关讲话的回应,这确实是为宗教学的可能发展提供了一个空间和机遇,但是只有学界、最起码是宗教学界积极回应,大家共同努力,才可能抓住这个机会来推动宗教学的发展,使这个学科能有这样的进步。我也但愿中国在当下能够像您刚才讲的抓好这两个方面。

卓:您所考虑的这个解答从您自己的认知处境方面来讲当然是没有问题的,但是,我们中国社会的存在和文化处境和您所处的那种处境还是不一样的。所以,从这种比较的意义来看,应该说我们还必须有一些另外的思考。

首先,我认为基督教的中国化与基督教作为一个世界性宗教并不矛盾。基督教的世界性不是抽象的,而是从它的地域性发展逐渐体现出来的。例如,基督教早期阶段的特点,主要就是亚洲文化即犹太文化及其涵括;而在其走向成熟、为其体系奠基的阶段,则体现了罗马帝国的文化,从而开始与西方文化挂钩,成为西方的宗教。而从天主教的大航海时代和马丁·路德的宗教改革时期以后,基督教就真正成为了一个世界性的宗教。世界宗教并不是清一色地在每个地域一成不变地存在,而都有其地域的特色。比如说在其语言表达方面,就有一个非常现实的本土化的需求。这种世界宗教进而也会关注甚至参与当地的社会政治进程,这在中国也并不例外。而当我们在中国回忆基督教在华传播的历史时,显然能清楚看到基督教传教在鸦片战争之后的巨大成功,但这也给基督教在中国的历史上留下了一些阴影。正因为如此,所以,基督教的中国化进程就有着更大的紧迫感。我个人认为,如果是对基督教抱有良好愿望的人,就应该支持基督教的中国化。我想,基督教中国化与之保持世界宗教的存在根本不矛盾,而且确有这种必要。其实,基督教中国化最早就是教会自己提出来的。实际上,中国教会无论是天主教还是基督新教,都提出过中国化的必要,这并不是什么新的提法,只不过是延续历史的这种思路而已。

第二,基督教中国化与其它宗教在中国的中国化,都有一个社会存在的必要。实际上,中国化最早的不是基督教,而是从佛教开始的。历史上,基督教、伊斯兰教都有这种中国化的演变进程。中国化在中国主要是体现在两大层面,一是政治上,二是文化上。

政治上就是宗教必须跟这个国家的政治体制相适应,应尽量融入其社会建构之内。这就是我们说的,政府现在提出积极引导宗教与社会主义社会相适应,政府已经有了这个姿态,故而需要双向互动,即积极引导与积极适应的互动。审时度势,宗教也应该主动去适应其存在的社会。这是第一个方面。

第二个方面就是宗教在文化上的中国化, 宗教要适应中国文化处境, 真正接地气, 由此则可从中国文化的相关元素中使自己得到不断的充实。这也是辩证的双向互动, 在宗教在中国文化中充实自己的同时, 中国文化也从相关宗教中为自己增加了新的内容。中国文化从来就不是一个封闭的体系, 而是不断开放、不断吸纳、不断丰富成熟的。从这个方面来讲, 中国文化体现出海纳百川、有容乃大的包容胸襟。基督教的一些优秀元素完全可以融入中国文化, 参与中国文化的革新和创新发展。一方面, 外来宗教可以向中国化学习一些新的东西来充实自己的信仰, 另一方面这些宗教信仰也可以把其自身的积极因素充实到中国化之中, 使中国文化发展也能够有一个更新和深化, 所以, 这就是双赢。

由此而论, 中国化在政治或在文化这两个层面对基督教也都是必要、有益的。

基督教在这方面也有不少经验教训, 比如, 我们讲基督教三自爱国运动, 这就是非常典型的政治层面的中国化。在当时的处境下, 西方社会封锁中国, 西方的基督教会包括天主教会都一边倒地抵制、反对社会主义的新中国, 对中国持有否定和批评的态度。在这种情况下, 基督教如果站在西方社会及教会一边与新生的社会政体即红色政权相对抗、采取抵制和抵抗之态, 那其面临的将会是灭顶之灾。而中国教会开展三自爱国运动, 就必然是一种政治选项, 即与西方社会和教会彻底摆脱关系, 走自己独立发展的道路。基督教与新生的红色政权相适应, 那么, 就是一种政治上的中国化表态, 而这样的占位表达也就得到了中国政治、即其政权政府的支持, 使之获得新生, 并且能够发展到今天。

很显然, 宗教作为一个社会团体, 其社会存在肯定会受到政治的影响, 也会自觉不自觉地参与政治。至于宗教是什么样的政治态度、参与什么样的政治, 当然就与其命运密切相关。

这在西方基督教的历史上同样如此, 仅从欧洲宗教改革谈起, 当时政教分离后的真实状况就是“教随国定”、“在谁的领地, 信谁的宗教”。这就是基督教的政治适应。政权的力量之决定性和影响力在霍布斯(Thomas Hobbes 1588 年 4 月 5 日—1679 年 12 月 4 日)的名言中就可体悟, 他在区分宗教与迷信时就断言: 凡是被政府肯定的信仰就是宗教, 凡是被政府否定的信仰就是迷信! 这也是政治。

英国宗教改革建立的圣公会就称为国教会, 其与天主教的根本区别就是不再让罗马教宗当其最高领袖, 而英国世俗君主即英国国王则称为其教会的最高首领。这也只能用政治来解释。所以, 历史上的基督教并不是清高到不问政治的宗教, 而是与各个历史时期的政治都有极为复杂的卷入。

这种情况下让中国的基督教不问政治、不再参与政治, 有可能吗? 因此, 对于基督教在中国的政治卷入, 尤其是其以往历史的复杂性, 我们要特别关注和特别小心。基督教在中国近代史上以今天的眼光看来有过许多错误的选择和卷入, 因此基督教的中国化不仅必要, 而且基督教还应该在当代中国先行做出其中国化的表率 and 榜样。对于基督教而言, 其中国化的必要性和紧迫性比其它任何宗教都要更大。如果我们要对基督教加以透彻认知的话, 就应该关注其在中国社会处境中的认知, 反思其历史上的相关表态和亮相。西方政治是不完全认同中国政治, 但中国基督教则理应认同中国当今政治, 否则让其保留 1949 年前的认同、继续对西方政治的认同, 岂不是开历史的倒车! 另外, 从积极方面来说, 在基督教中国化的过程中, 基督教思想可以得到提拔和升华。这就是为什么我们讲要落实中国的神学建设, 推动中国特色的神学发展。您看我们当今世界的神学, 有西方神学、也有第三世界神学, 即亚洲神学、拉美神学和非洲神学, 这些神学本身就是有地域特色的, 是从其本土产生的。那么, 我们构建中国特色的中国神学, 也是体现其中国化的一项重要理论建设。我想, 世界基督教对我们的这一倡导也应该是支持和理解的。

无论从哪个方面来讲, 我觉得中国基督教在当前推动的中国化是理论与实践上都说得通的, 包括对其教义信仰传统而言也都是说得过去的。我们可以追溯《圣经新约》中的保罗思想传统, 他对基督教的本土适应及生存已经说得很清楚了。故此, 我觉得没有必要去纠缠、去争议基督教中国化是不是具有争议性, 是否会违背基督教的普世性, 等等, 我们应该积极去做的, 则是对之理解, 并积极地参与、

全力去支持。只有这样,才能使中国的基督教与整个世界的发展形成积极的、良性的互动。如果仍然纠缠于对之猜忌、怀疑、甚至是批评,那么彼此的差距会拉大,相互之间的张力也会加强,但这完全没有必要。这就是我的基本看法。

黄:这很重要,这也是我自己在思考的问题,其实,在很多方面都与您是相吻合的。我想,这里有个处境神学的问题,所以,基督教的中国化从理论上来说、从基督教神学的角度来看,都是没有问题的。这是第一点。

第二点则是,我把这种本土化思考称为政治神学,就是在具体的语境中来处理宗教与相关的政教关系。无论持有什么样的态度,这都是一个不可避免、且必须处理好的问题。这就是政治神学。在我刚才所讲的路德思想的时候,即他关于两个国度的思考,其中都提到了对于相关政治的必要尊重和认可。所以这第二个就是政治神学的问题。

那么,第三点就是文化神学的问题。1949年以前中国社会对基督教教会的评价曾有“多一个基督徒就少一个中国人”之说,而现在就可能不这样了。基督教的三自爱国运动在政治层面已经坚持做了几十年了,那为什么现在的基督教仍然没有被普通的中国老百姓所认可、没有被其视为是自己的宗教信仰?这很值得我们思考,更说明基督教还仍然需要继续努力。

卓:已经有更多的人认同,但是还没有达到全部认同,甚至还没有达到大多数人的认同,所以,还是要继续努力,至少要达到相对而言有着普遍认同。

黄:对。所以,这个文化神学方面也是一样的。在我所讲的这个体系中就有属于灵和魂的问题,那么,还有一个体的问题。这就涉及到慈善,或者说,对人的这种关怀在教会里面是比较具体的,就是对人的身体、医疗、教育、慈善等等方面的关怀。我在我所提出的“魂体神学”中采用了一个方法,旨在伦理、道德、文化认同这些方面的关注,属于魂的层面,那体的方面就是指在物质的、身体方面的慈善行为。这个政教关系或者政治神学可能是一个比较敏感的问题。您觉得,是不是批评者也是在这一点上无法认同?我所讲的只是担忧或者怀疑。

卓:您强调的是一种内涵式的理解,而在中国,这个内涵式理解的任务则是交给中国基督教会自己来完成。我作为一个学界成员,主要强调的是一种外延式理解和从外往里的观察。正是在这个外延方面就会与社会、与政治产生一个积极的互动,如果这个积极互动能够成功,那当然就可能构建起我们中国特色的政治神学。但如果在这方面不是很成功,则可能会形成更大的张力和对抗,而这样对谁都不利,不是双赢而乃俱伤。所以,我们可能要更多地从这个外延式角度来考虑,要有外界的敏锐观察和及时提醒。

英国政治哲学家在观察社会时曾警告大家,当只有一个人或极少数人洞察到社会的疾病时,这时的疾病比较容易治愈,但大家都不以为然;而当大多数人都能够清楚地看到这种疾病时,社会则已病入膏肓,根本无法治愈了!哲学家就是观察者,我们学者就担负着冷静、客观、及时、准确地洞察社会的任务,会更多地从社会与宗教的关系层面来审视。我们当然也希望中国基督教会有一些在内涵式考虑方面的突破和创建,但这不是我们学界的主要任务。我们只是社会与宗教的观察者和警醒者。

黄:其实,我思考这个问题也是很久了。差不多就是在中国举办奥运的时候,大概在2008年或2009年的时候,我就提出了“大国学”的理论,后来还出了两本书,叫做《大国学视野中的汉语学术对话神学》和《汉语学术圣经学》,加上所写的一本《汉语学术神学》,共有这三本书论及相关问题。

卓:其实,国学这个概念本身在中国学界就是有争议的,所以,对于这个大国学,中国大陆有不少人认为表述比较模糊,其内涵不清,故外延无限。

黄:所以,我想一应该正确理解国学,二要解构狭隘的国学理解。我为此要讲两个问题,一个问题是从文化神学的角度来看待基督教与中国文化的关系,我认为,基督教应该作为中国文化的一部分。从政治界定上来说,在中国被列为宗教的只有五种,而基督教和天主教在西方都被当成一种宗教,但



在中国却被分成两种宗教,并具有法律和政治上的合法性。

卓:这不完全准确,我们只是将之称为“五大宗教”,就是说比较大的宗教就是这五个,但还有一些小的宗教在中国也是被承认的。

黄:好,您的这个纠正很准确,是德国传统的精确思考。另一个问题则是从历史上来看中国基督教,其传入已经有 1300 多年了。这一次来北京我正好和清华大学的朱东华教授在一起,我们合写了一篇文章,我想要研究基督教育在华历史的悠久。我最近找到了一个重要文本,即路德评论聂斯托里(Nestorius)的,有 30 多页纸的篇幅。从路德的观点来看,聂斯托里根本就不是一个异端。按路德的说法,聂斯托里这个人只是因为逻辑比较混乱、语言表述较差,本来是想讲讲正确的道理,却被人当成了一个异端。

卓:马丁·路德的这篇文章,是宗教改革前还是宗教改革后写的?

黄:1539 年,是发起宗教改革运动之后。

卓:那就可以理解了,因为当时创立的新教也被天主教看作异端嘛。

黄:对,这是很有意思的,我举这个例子就是想提到我那个大国学的理论。到现在为止,我开玩笑说我也有道路自信、理论自信,但我觉得一些口头讲大国的人却没有自信。因为我讲到中国的宗教好像是“一首两翼四足一尾”的飞龙,“首”就是从以前的皇帝到现在主导中国的政治权威,然后有“两翼”,这就是外来的宗教文化和本土的宗教文化,而“四条腿”我觉得就是本土的佛教、儒家、道家和本土的民间宗教。这里面既有由外来而本土化的元素,也有普世性的元素,而从外来而进入本土化过程之中的,就是基督教和伊斯兰教,它们本来是外来的,但仍然还在努力,想要实现其本土化。此外,再加一个“尾巴”,则是指比较小的文化元素。我的这个理论想要解决两个问题,从政治神学上来说,基督教作为这个身体中的一个部分,存在应该对之怎么处理的问题。不同的学者对之有不同的观点,但我认为从纯学术的角度来说是需要处理好的。我提出这种大国学的理论,基本目的之一就是为解决其中涉及的这个政治神学的问题。此外,还有文化神学的问题,也就是说,基督教是中国文化的一个部分,就像现在科学、世俗主义等也被包括在内那样,而它们的历史都更短。我要做一个现象学的描述,而且指的是中华人民共和国的国学,不是唐宗宋祖的国学。所以,就得要研究这条飞龙。这个一首两翼四足一尾的飞龙,是从我所说的这个政治神学和文化神学来考虑的,我就想提出研究这种问题的必要性,当然不同的学者对此可以有不同的观点。我写那个大国学是强调对话,有一个汉语学术对话的问题,如基督教和中国的对话是很丰富、很大的体系,由此就联系到这个中国化的问题了。

卓:您的这种愿望是好的,但是您所做的这种图像描述,在不少人看来却有些问题。

黄:龙是中国的象征,中国人自称是龙的传人,这都是积极的图像嘛?

卓:但你的这种描述让人家往往看不出中国传统对龙的形象所公认的认知,你参加过好几次研讨会,大家都对之提出了一些批评的意见。其一,在这个整体图像的构成方面,你可能还得了解中国人的心理,对你的描述能不能承受得了。其二,你对不同的宗教怎么来定位,如何来看待相关宗教也是个非常复杂的问题,所以,有的人觉得你与他们在信仰的定位上不同,认为你的定位不对,故而对你提出了抗议,你大概也听到了。

黄:那次争论是在兰州会议上,我对龙的描述是我的最初版本,我觉得我后来对这一龙的图像有了改进。

卓:但问题的关键之处是你把相关宗教搁在哪个位置,信仰这一宗教者的心理感受如何,能不能认可或接受,觉得搁的位置合适不合适,这是你必须考虑的。

黄:我现在已经修改了,已经把伊斯兰教和基督教放在平等的位置了。

卓:所以,就是这个心理承受能力如何? 我们也要了解清楚。

黄:我估计,放在我现在这个体系中,应该就没有问题了,所以,我还是有这方面的思考。



## 对宗教学未来的期待

黄:好的,我还想问问您对于未来还有什么期待? 您们的宗教学会是否可以发挥什么优势,比如可以组织全国高校的学术会议来解读国家的宗教政策、或者领导人的相关思想,以及执政党的宗教理论?

卓:我们每年都开会嘛,所以说并不是没有主持、组织过这样的会议。

黄:那么,您们能不能把您们的想法作为相关提案来提出呢?

卓:这样的提案以前就有过,前不久我们在山东还专门与山东大学合作召开如何推进这类提案的会议,并希望相关人士做出这样的提案来提交相关部门。但是否能被接纳就要看整个社会的氛围和国家的决策了,就是营造这样的社会氛围都不是容易达到的,要靠大家的共同努力。舆论场的形成要靠大家共造舆论,如果不去造舆论就没有这个场,是不是? 这一点其实是很重要的,现在社会上的观念是多元的,你的这种声音没有,其他的声音就起来了,而且会影响到整个舆论场,形成相应的社会导向。

黄:但您除了担任这个宗教研究所所长和宗教学会会长之外,还是全国人大常委啊! 您还曾参加政治局常委关于宗教问题的集体学习。对这种身份,我们以前可称为国师啊。

卓:但就是这次参与学习也被人作为一个批评我的口实。您可能对批评我的文章看得还是不多,现在对任何事好像都可以有不同的理解。您刚才说到所谓社会身份的问题,其实对我的批评者中有一些人的身份比我更重要,在中国的社会地位远比我更高,所以,社会公共舆论很重要。我们宗教学领域的很多同仁就觉得有您那样的地位,您一个人说话就足够了,这种争论不管我们的事。但恰恰相反,一旦形成负面舆论,整个宗教学界的日子都不好过,并不是仅仅波及某一个人。因此,在不同的位置,都要发出不同的声音,对宗教学的维护和推动大家守土有责,人人都应该义不容辞,不可说只是某一个人的事情。我认为,自己还是尽了责任,在关键时刻没有退缩。但是,大家在抱怨宗教学研究氛围不好的时候,也应该冷静想想自己负有多少责任,自己是不是尽了努力? 所以,宗教学的研究、对宗教的正确理解,这是大家共同的责任,而不是某一个人、在某个位置、某个角色上才有责任。

黄:孤掌难鸣,其他人如果不跟上的话,其实,最后受到伤害的还是所有人。

卓:就是这个问题,最终所有人都可能会受到伤害。最近有些学者就遇到了麻烦,受到了莫须有的指责,一下子就感到了压力。

黄:但是在十九大之后,宗教学研究总体上来看形势还是可以的吗? 我们还是可以积极解读十九大的政策的吗?

卓:当然,顶层设计很好,但是,今后的具体工作还得大家做。现在各种不同的理解,不同的观念并没有停止,争论还在继续,是不是?

黄:中国这种开放的大局、大方向是不会变的吧?

卓:是的,所以,我们要顺应这个形势,要积极有为,如果不作为的话,那大好形势也会丢失的,也会变化的。

黄:可能大家还真不知道有这个道理,认识上有差异。

卓:所以,大家可能要更多地关心一下现实,特别是现实社会的宗教研究,而不能只是自己埋头做自己的那种纯学术。如果没有这种好的氛围支持,是做不好纯学术的,甚至根本就做不下去。

黄:所以,我刚才也讲到平台搭建的重要。

卓:平台要靠大家共同搭建,是不是? 如果没有这个平台,谁也唱不了这场戏。

黄:而学这个专业的,学者发不了文章,职称也就评不了。

卓:对,学生毕业找不着工作,这个专业也就萎缩了。尤其是优秀人才也就不来这里发展了。

黄:我现在也能做一点工作,基于这种状况,我办了两个刊物《国学与西学国际学刊》和 Brill

Yearbook of Chinese Theology, 希望从外面为大家打造一个学术平台, 提供发表学术成果的更多机会。您觉得还有想补充的?

卓: 没有了。

黄: 好的, 那非常感谢卓老师! 我们两个人差不多聊了三个半小时, 到时候我们整理之后再发给您, 请您修改, 既可以补充、也可以删减。我正在编辑自己所翻译的路德那六本书, 还在排版之中。我想等这套书出了之后在明年能否开一个研讨会, 到时候也希望卓老师来参与。谢谢, 那我们就谈到这里。

(黄和卓分别修订了对话稿, 2018 年 6 月 4 日)

## English Title:

# A Dialogue on the Overall Situation of Religious Studies in Contemporary China

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**Abstract:** This dialogue was conducted on December 18, 2017 at the Institute of World Religions at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) in Beijing. There were three main parts.

1. The key events and elements that influenced Zhuo to choose an academic career are mainly his family background and his education experience in the English language. When religious studies were still sensitive, Zhuo had the opportunity to get familiar with the subject and started his studies in a master degree program at CASS. Finally, he went to Munich University to pursue his Ph. D. (1983-1988) and received a strong education in the perspectives and methodologies of religious studies.

2. Zhuo's career in religious studies as a scholar and leading academic organizer. 2. 1 Zhuo has studied and published diligently, and worked as vice director and director of the Institute of World Religions (CASS), and was also chairman of Chinese Religious Society for 25 years. 2. 2 Three steps in his research career: 2. 2. 1 The history and current situation of religious studies in the West, with published works such as *China und ihre Bezugnahme zu Religionstheorie des Westens* (Peter Lang Verlag, 1988), *Religions and Cultures*, *On the Origin of Religions*, *An Introduction to Research in Western Religious Studies*. 2. 2. 2 Christianity in China: the history of Christianity, the system of thought and the history of Chinese Christianity, with published works such as *Biblical Appreciation*, *On Christianity*, *Contemporary Protestant Christian Theology*, *Contemporary Catholic Theology*, and *Record on Christianity and Judaism*. 2. 2. 3 The strategy of studies on religion in China, and the relationship between globalized religions and the development of China with works such as *An Exploration on Marxist Opinions on Religion*. 2. 3. The leading academic organizer working to construct a religious research platform as chairman of the Chinese Religious Society, organizing conferences and publishing, both domestically and internationally. A critical reflection on the system of doctoral student training in China.

3. A reflection on the current situation and future of religious studies in China. It is primarily necessary to get rid of considering religious studies to be a sensitive discipline for the development of China, it is necessary to Sinicize Christianity in China. Scholars should not only focus on pure academic research, but should also pay attention to and address the policy needs of the Chinese government so as to find opportunities for the development of religious studies. Thus, realistic social research is important, otherwise, it is difficult to continue with studies on religion in China.

**Key Words:** religious studies, sensitive, Christianity, research platform, realistic social research

本期是教父研究专刊,共刊发如下论文。

在“人学、神学与国学”栏目收录了浙江大学陈越骅的“哲学何时变为宗教——早期奥古斯丁忏悔的逻辑”和北京大学徐龙飞教授的“法的开端——论罗马法的基督教教化及其对当今法学思维之意义”。

在“实践神学与中西教会和社会”发表了北京语言文化大学张秋娟的“文化异质性视角下的宗教多元主义”和德国波恩大学贺腾的“奥古斯丁论意志与罪”。

在“中西经典与圣经”栏目发表了中山大学田书峰“亚里斯多德伦理学在中国的最早传播”和江璐的“《名理探》与《穷理学》关于逻辑推理的讨论”。

在“教会历史与中西社会”栏目,我们发表了香港中文大学任卓贤的“维克托利努斯对奥古斯丁三一神学的影响”和浙江大学朱振宇的“魔鬼之城:但丁的地狱”。

在“比较宗教文化研究”栏目,我们发表了中国社会科学院张迎迎的“根特的亨利和注定失败的光照论”和中国人民大学孙帅的“加尔文三一论与教父传统”。

在“书评与通讯”,我们发表了中山大学蒋佳的“新托马斯主义思潮和教会权力话语变动”,浙江工业大学陶杨华的“爱欲的分野与历史实在的生成:“上帝之城”与“地上之城”二元历史架构探源”,和鲁汶天主教大学马明宇的“亚里士多德式逻辑关系与对偶性关系的异同:从传统正方形到布里丹八边形”。

This number is a special volume to Patristic Studies in China.

In the column of Humanities, Theology, and Chinese National Studies we have published Yuehua CHEN's (Zhejiang University) "When did Philosophy converts to Religion? Early Augustine's Confession before His Confessions" and Longfei XU's (Peking University) "On the Horizon (Origin, Beginning) of the Right: About the Christianization of Ius Romanum and his Meaning for the Contemporaneous Jurisprudence".

In the column of Practical Theology and Sino-Western Views on Church and Society, we have published Qiujuan ZHANG's (Beijing University of Language and Culture) "John Hick's Religious Pluralism in a Perspective of Cultural Heterogeneity" and Teng HE's (University of Bonn) "Augustine on Will and Sin".

In the column of Chinese and Western Classics and the Bible, we have published Lu JIANG (Zhongshan University) "The Treatment on Logical Reasoning in Mingli tan and Qiongli xue" and Shufeng TIAN's (Zhongshan University) "The First treatise on Aristotelian Ethics in China and its Origin".

In the column of Church History in the West and in China, we have published Colten YAM (Chinese University of Hong Kong) "Marius Victorinus' influence on Augustine's Trinitarian theology" and Zhenyu ZHU's (Zhejiang University) "Dante's Hell as Civitas Diaboli".

In the column of Comparative Religious and Cultural Studies, we have published Yingying ZHANG (China Academy of Social Sciences) "Henry of Ghent and the Doomed Failure of Divine Illumination" and Shuai SUN's (Renmin University of China) "Calvin's Doctrine of Trinity and Patristic Tradition".

In the column of Reviews and Academic Reports, we have published Jia JIANG's (Zhongshan University) "The Movement of Neo-Thomism and the Ensuing Transformation of Discourse of Power in Roman Catholic Church", Yanghua TAO's (Zhejiang Industry University) "The Divergence of Love and The Genesis of Historical Reality: An Inquire into Augustine's Thesis of Two Cities", and Mingyu MA's (Catholic University of Leuven) "The similarities and differences between the Aristotelian relations and the duality relations: From the traditional square of oppositions to the Buridanian octagons."

人学、神学与国学  
**Humanities, Theology,  
and Chinese National Studies**



# 哲学何时变为宗教——早期奥古斯丁忏悔的逻辑<sup>[1]</sup>

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**摘要:**早期奥古斯丁在米兰期间学习了柏拉图主义哲学,这对他皈依基督教起了重要作用。除了在《忏悔录》中的回忆,他最早的一批著作《加西齐亚根对话》也给了我们关于他从什么时候以及如何由哲学领悟转变成宗教信仰的重要线索。实际上,促使他写作《对话》的动机却是神秘的宗教经验、米兰教会的强大影响力、以及他融合基督教教义与哲学的努力。他在《对话》中讨论了对个体存在意义问题的危机——人是否有可能获得真理从而获得幸福生活?哲学提供了问题框架,而基督教则为他提供了不可替代的答案:神就是真理,智慧就是认识和拥有真理,所以智慧者既是神又是人——道成肉身的耶稣基督。因此奥古斯丁写作从一开始就是宗教的忏悔,哲学对他来说不过是用于解释领悟了的事实的理性工具。

**关键词:**奥古斯丁;教父学;加西齐亚根对话

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早期奥古斯丁究竟是皈依了柏拉图主义还是基督教是一个奥古斯丁研究中争讼不休的重要问题。<sup>[2]</sup>这个问题的提出与解答都与对早期奥古斯丁著作的深入研究离不开关系,特别是对《忏悔录》之前的“加西齐亚根对话集”的研究更是关键。因为传统上我们基本公认《忏悔录》是奥古斯丁的代表作,而奥古斯丁又是西方教会拉丁教父的集大成者,那么顺理成章的他在写作的《忏悔录》的当然就是代表基督教思想,不管是基督教的神学也好,还是基督教的哲学也好。况且他已经有了教职的外在身份。由此又衍生出另一个关系密切的关联问题需要解答:要么《加西齐亚根对话》集与《忏悔录》表现了精神皈依前与皈依后的奥古斯丁(前者从时间看是在他正式洗礼前写作的),两者作为真理表白的内在逻辑是不同的;要么两者其实是一以贯之的,只不过是代表了思想深度的渐进发展。当然还有很多种别的解读的可能,不过我们大致可以在这个大的范畴来理解这些问题。

奥古斯丁在晚年《订正录》中并没有彻底否定自己早期著作,主要是认为当时用词不当,而且更重

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[1] Yuan GAO, "Augustine's Conception of Sexuality and Marriage: A Defense against Alignment of Human Merits on Continence", *International Journal of Sino-Western Studies*, vol. 12, 73-79. (<https://www.sinowesternstudies.com/back-issues/vol-12-2017/>)

[2] 参见周伟驰 Zhou Weichi, “现代奥古斯丁研究”*Xiandai Aogusiding yanjiu* [Modern Research of Augustine], 载《现代哲学》*Xiandai Zhexue* [Modern Philosophy], 2005(03), 94-97 页。特别是其中对 1950 年代的法国学者 Pierre Courcelle 研究《忏悔录》的经典著作的介绍,所谓奥古斯丁研究的“哥白尼式的革命”。关于奥古斯丁的柏拉图主义在引起近一个世纪的学术转向简介可见拙作陈越骅 Chen Yuehua, 《跨文化视野中的奥古斯丁》*Kuawenhua shiye zhong de Aogusiding* [Augustine in a Cross-Cultural Perspective] (杭州 Hangzhou: 浙江大学出版社 Zhejiang Daxue chubanshe [Zhejiang University Press], 2014), 3-4。本文受国家社科基金青年项目“奥古斯丁《加西齐亚根对话》全集翻译”(14CZJ001)资助;以及一般项目“人与自然关系视域下的教父创造论传统研究”(20BZJ032)资助。

要的是他完整地保存了这些著作,作为最初的公开的表白文档或者说“忏悔”。〔3〕结合他在《忏悔录》对这一时期的回忆,他在加西齐亚根退修的目的之一就是解决自己对个体存在意义问题的危机——人是否有可能获得真理,如何有可能获得幸福生活?另外就是作为洗礼前的准备,不管是思想上与自己和解还是在关系上与亲人和朋友和解。下面我们主要根据奥古斯丁的早期著作《加西齐亚根对话集》探讨他为什么写作,他对哲学与宗教重叠的共同问题的论证逻辑,以及他得出的对这些问题的解决方案。以此初步回答这套对话集作为公开的“忏悔”究竟为自己作了何种辩护。

## 1. 对早期思想历程的表白

奥古斯丁早期信仰摩尼教,他从早年就已经有了宗教体验和宗教组织生活,他的“出场”就不是以哲学家的身份出现,其思想倾向不如说更多是一个阅读过哲学著作的有学识的宗教家。奥古斯丁自己回忆,在去罗马任教之前,他对哲学家的学说是信任也不能完全理解的。可能他除了西塞罗的著作还没深入阅读柏拉图主义者的哲学著作。

至于那些不识基督名字的哲学家,我也并不信任他们,请他们治疗我灵魂的疾病。……这时我心中已产生了另一种思想,认为当时所称“学园派”哲学家的识见高于这些人,他们主张对一切怀疑,人不可能认识真理。我以为他们的学说就是当时一般人所介绍的,其实我尚未捉摸到他们的真正思想。

……我本来能够用信仰来治疗我的疾病……我灵魂的病,本来只能靠信仰来治疗……(《忏悔录》5.10,6.4)〔4〕

奥古斯丁深入阅读哲学书籍在“米兰圈子”里开始的。在那里,他被推荐阅读柏拉图主义著作,而且他听了翻译者坚定基督教信仰的英勇案例(《忏悔录》8.2)主教安布罗斯和奥古斯丁在米兰结识的其他富有学识的朋友也阅读柏拉图主义的书籍。在这个环境中,柏拉图主义哲学与基督教并不被认为是矛盾的,反而被认为是帮助理解信仰的有效途径。因为“柏拉图派的学说,却用各种方式表达天主和天主的‘道’”。〔5〕哲学服务于宗教是一种共识。因此奥古斯丁思想的柏拉图主义哲学痕迹并非一种个人行为的结果,而是当时知识环境的结果。但是如何运用和理解柏拉图主义思想则是每个人不同的选择,奥古斯丁的杰出成就是他在坚持基督论的前提下发展自己的综合理论。〔6〕安布罗斯的典范作用是毋庸置疑的。奥古斯丁多次听他的讲道并称赞说,里面充满了灵魂超脱尘世飞往另一个世界的呼吁——这种彼岸性的思想给奥古斯丁带来革命性的影响。〔7〕其中思想转变的关键在于安氏用于阅读圣经的“文字使人死,精神使人生”的原则。〔8〕下面我们还要不断地回到这个原则,努力理解哲学在其中扮演的作用。

386年的“米兰花园奇迹”事件一向被认为是奥古斯丁内心皈依的标志。这甚至已经成为一个文

〔3〕 奥古斯丁,《订正录》I.1.4. Augustine. The Fathers of the church: a new translation (Vol. 60): the Retractions[M]. Bogan S M I tr. Washington, D. C. : The Catholic University OF America Press, 1968, p. 10.

〔4〕 奥古斯丁 Augustine,《忏悔录》Chanhuilu [Confessions]. 周士良 Zhou Shiliang 译, (北京 Beijing: 商务印书馆 Shangwu yinshuguan [Commercial Press], 1996)。下面引用《忏悔录》都来自此本,不再注明。

〔5〕 同上,第八卷,第2节。Ibid. VIII, 2.

〔6〕 Brown P., Augustine of Hippo: a biography (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 486.

〔7〕 Brown P., Augustine of Hippo: A biography (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 75.

〔8〕 《忏悔录》,第六卷,第4节。Augustine, Confession, VI. 4.



化符号,因为而奥古斯丁的转变/改宗(conversion)被认为是西方文学上仅次于保罗的改宗,他在花园受到上帝直接启示一样的“突然改宗”的模式与保罗的案例如出一辙。因为两者的相近,所以也有学者认为这是一个“神话/迷思”(Mythos),只是标志而已。因为从宗教的观点看,改宗强调的是心灵的转向,而不是强调信条的转变,奥古斯丁长期以来经历了“基督教、摩尼教、西塞罗怀疑主义、物质主义、新柏拉图主义、基督教”的漫长转变过程。每一次改变都不是干脆利落,而是相互纠缠渗透。<sup>[9]</sup>

如果我们把“花园奇迹”看作是一种宗教体验,那么体验可以是真实发生的事件,对奥古斯丁的思想变化是有突出意义的。花园奇迹之前,奥古斯丁长长铺排的是影响自己心意改变的各种外在与内在的“讲理”,但唯有花园奇迹是“神迹”——奥古斯丁认为是神与自己的直接启示。或者我们可以这么理解,所谓哲学也好、神学也好,各种人间的智慧并不能使他真正有精神转向,他在等待的其实是“来自神的”直接的灵感与朕兆。(《忏悔录》8.12)花园奇迹之后,他启程前往加西齐亚根疗养和写作,从时间上看,当时的著作应该就是信仰确立后的辩白,所谓“我的文学已经为你服务”。(《忏悔录》9.4)神迹是他信仰生发与巩固不可或缺的支撑,也是他区分哲学与其它宗教的标准之一,例如他在疗养期间牙疼了,据说亲友们祷告后他就痊愈了。(同上)这种经历作为“事实”是他信仰论证的坚定支柱。

仅从他自己承认的早期经历而言,他从来就是“宗教的”,在身份认同上、在生活实践上、在思维方式上等等。因为我们要分清楚今天我们所认为的宗教概念与古代的差异。考虑到罗马当时的风气,宗教信仰多元化,人们普遍具有宗教文化习俗,拥有宗教身份和团体归属并没有什么奇特的,倒不如说没有宗教身份才是奇特的。<sup>[10]</sup>但是他不把自己归为信奉某一流派的哲学家,从职业上也好、组织归属上也好、写作目的上也好都不是当时所谓的“哲学”的。因为哲学家对于大多数人而言反而是奇特的身份。只不过哲学之名在当时的知识氛围中并非与宗教对立的,相反是一个追求真理的学问的意思。“‘哲学’这一概念在罗马后期已成为‘幸福生活指南’的代名词”。<sup>[11]</sup>奥古斯丁在《论幸福生活》及《反学园派》中都曾认为真正的幸福在于哲学。<sup>[12]</sup>他把基督教看作是哲学中真正通往上帝的无碍道路。<sup>[13]</sup>在“爱智慧”的普遍意义上,基督教是真正的哲学。<sup>[14]</sup>所以他使用这一表述,把基督教认为是真哲学,但不是说基督教是“哲学流派”。

基督教对奥古斯丁产生吸引力的特殊性之一也于其历史事实。圣经的权威代替了希腊人、罗马人的神谕,对于奥古斯丁其中一个重要原因是因为它传播广大的现实结果,甚至安布罗斯作为主教在罗马临时首都米兰具有的现实权威深深震撼了奥古斯丁。对于一个在摩尼教势力较大的非洲出身的小贵族子弟,奥古斯丁在罗马帝国的中心地区看到的是基督教对其它宗教与哲学流派的胜利,我们可以想象他对于基督教在多元宗教版图中的地位有了新的认识。他在《忏悔录》记述在米兰经历的各种社会事件与朋友的交往,中流露出把这种现实作为其思想改变的基础。古代宗教并非如现代认为的是一种个人的选择,而更多是一种公共的、群体的生活方式。<sup>[15]</sup>正如罗马人曾经有把被征服的神纳

[9] 以上参见:Hippo. S A B O, Wills G. Saint Augustine's Conversion (Viking, 2004), 5-6.

[10] 例如现代学者对罗马帝国宗教文化的研究;特别是对庞贝古城的考古挖掘的宗教生活研究,发现宗教在罗马人生活中的公共性。古代晚期的情况,基督教胜过罗马传统宗教但并不与其它宗教直接对立,参考 J. Northet al., Religions of Rome (Cambridge, U. K., Cambridge University Press, 1998), 364ff.

[11] 赵敦华 Zhao Dunhua, 基督教哲学 1500 年 Jidujiao Zhexue [Christian Philosophy 1500], 第 2 版 Second Edition. (北京 Beijing: 人民出版社 Renmin chubanshe [People's Publishing House], 2007), 153.

[12] Augustine, the Happy Life in Writings of Saint Augustine volume 1, trans. Schopp, Ludwig (New York: Cima Publishing Co., 1948), 43 n. 1.

[13] Ibid., 45.

[14] 《驳朱利安》IV 14. 72. Augustine, Against Julian., trans. Matthew A. Schumacher, C. S. C., (New York: Fathers of the Church, inc., 1957), 228..

[15] 参考 J. Ru · pke, On Roman religion: Lived religion and the individual in ancient Rome. 2016, p. 1-2, 8-9.

入自己万神庙的传统,只有最终胜利的神才是真神,因为如果不是真神的喜悦,谁又能够获得胜利呢?虽然神意莫测,但终究神意落实到地上会有结果。圣经提供了解读神意的文本依据,奥古斯丁说,“由于我们的能力薄弱,不能单靠理智来寻获真理,便需要圣经的权力,从此我也开始开除如果你不是要人们通过圣经而相信你,寻获你,你绝不会使圣经在全世界享有如此崇高的权威……”他也承认,“基督教信仰传布于全世界,享有如此崇高的威权,绝不是偶然而毫无意义的。”(《忏悔录》6.5,6.11)

他相信圣经是来自于神的话语,但不是指字面意义,而是指圣经在不同的读者看来有不同的效果,对于一般读者是通晓明白的,但对于少数有能力研究的人则是隐微的真理入口。要有一般读者数量上的基础才能够产生更多获知真理的幸运儿。(同上 6.5)他并非轻易地尊奉圣经的字面意义,而是将其看背后有神圣启示的“谜面”,就好像希腊的“神谕”传统,普通人只能看到一堆毫无逻辑的词语,但是得到神灵感动的的神官就能解读出神的真意。而要成为神官,除了求得圣灵感动,还要学会特殊的阐释技巧,而这种训练就是哲学提供的。所以这种理解与他对学园派的怀疑论论证思路是一样的,即相信一种神秘而更根本的“神圣知识”。我们从中能够看出一种诺斯替思潮的影响,但这种隐微知识的传统又比之更为久远在希腊神秘宗教、甚至柏拉图主义那里就能看到。例如奥古斯丁就知道毕达哥拉斯的秘传传统。(《论秩序 2.53》)到了新柏拉图主义的普罗提诺,据说他的老师教导真正的柏拉图主义但却要求学生不准外传。这种宗教与哲学衣钵的心传传统直到奥古斯丁时代仍然对于知识分子具有吸引力。

他把圣经接受为神的启示,把基督教真理看作文字启示背后的奥秘,再以哲学教导与自身的才智作为阐释的工具。对他来说,真理已经摆在那里,如果圣经有字面的矛盾或者自身理性认识出现怀疑,那么需要调整和改变的是自己的论证逻辑,直到一切都趋于和谐。<sup>[16]</sup>例如他认为自己接受了柏拉图主义后能够理解过去认为有矛盾的保罗著作,“清楚看出这些纯粹的言论绝无歧异之处,我学会了‘战战兢兢地快乐’。”(《忏悔录》7.21)有了柏拉图主义的框架,圣经的“文字”开始显露出“精神”,反过来这种精神又统摄了他对文字的理解。可以说他掌握了打开寓意释经学大门的钥匙,或者说能够根据信仰的前提把圣经的“文字”建构成系统的神学。但无论如何却不是为柏拉图主义而论证。

如果说古代哲学家也普遍有神学(伊壁鸠鲁派等除外),例如新柏拉图主义的“太一”是哲学家抽象的神,那么当时古代晚期的哲学思想与宗教思想的区分又是什么呢?从奥古斯丁对学园派批判看,至少有两个标准:宗教有(完美、已然完成的)智慧者,宗教有启示的经典。但是各种哲学流派只有:(进行中的)智慧的追求者,纯粹依靠自身理性的训练。他认为自己阅读柏拉图主义著作是上帝让他通达真理安排的道路,“[我]能知道找寻目的而不识途径的人,与找寻通往幸福的天乡——不仅为参观而是为了定居下来——的道路,二者有何区别。”(《忏悔录》7.20)

在上述宗教与哲学区分的意义上看,奥古斯丁始终是宗教的立场,从来没有从“哲学”变成“宗教”的时候。有变化的只是不同的哲学思想促使他对神的理解有了新的变化。哲学只是过程、工具而不是目的。他的早期著作确实是他自己接受了(新)柏拉图主义的证明,但这种接受是他对信仰的理解逻辑的改变,这种逻辑指向的结论是基督教——而这才是皈依的对象。更确切地说,并不是哲学的逻辑指向了信仰,而是信仰有了新的论证逻辑。

## 2. 柏拉图主义为基督教信仰扫除的障碍

奥古斯丁坦诚地宣告,“我是如此地时刻准备着,迫不及待地想要抓住真理,不仅依靠信仰而且依

[16] 例如安布罗斯的著作就很好体现了当时米兰圈子的论证逻辑,他经常为了论证目的而脱离文本语境地适用圣经例子,将其作为论证的事实案例与权威话语。

靠理解,我确定在那个时刻,我将会与柏拉图主义者一道找到它,它并不会与我们神圣的奥秘有任何区别。”(《反学园派》Ⅲ. 20. 43)他确实地区分了柏拉图哲学与基督教的“奥秘”,而后者才是他真正想要获得的东西。早期奥古斯丁知道这就是“三位一体”的上帝,而这奥秘只向真诚地坚定信仰的人透露。(《论秩序》2. 16)

1. 在神的本性上。奥古斯丁从摩尼教时期开始就相信神的存在,对这个问题不需要哲学证明,他的转变在于如何理解“神”:神是什么?神如何作用于万物?等等。而柏拉图主义为他扫除的障碍是基督教中的“道成肉身”与“创世”等独特教义在理解上的困难。他在《忏悔录》描述自己活得这种觉悟的奇妙经历说,“我读了柏拉图派学者的著作后,懂得在物质世界外找寻真理,我从‘受造之物,辨识你形而上的神性’”。他感觉自己被上帝提升到了理智世界,发现自己看到的真理就是“存在本身”(esse),然后,他微弱的视觉被一道强光所震撼,内心激动近乎迷狂,然后他才发觉自己:“是远离了你漂流异地”(《忏悔录》7. 10. 16)神在这个物质世界之外,所以能够是这个世界的创造者;而且神在理智世界中才能被认识,他就是“道”、“真理”本身。

2. 在真理不可知的难题上。学园派提出了认识真理的难题,因为其论的精妙,确实困扰了奥古斯丁:如果人在本质上无法认识真理,那么人怎么知道他信仰的(宗教)是真理呢。但奥古斯丁认为学园派的难题的答案其实指向了“真正的柏拉图主义”。因为学园派的怀疑论其实不是学园派的真正学说,而只是他们为斯多亚认识论提出的反对意见。大众对学园派的“怀疑论”印象来源于这里,所以武断地认为学园派就是倡导“一切不可知,真理也不可知”的学派。斯多亚认为真理可以通过感觉印象被“掌握”。<sup>[17]</sup>这个怀疑论论证的重点在于感觉认识能力并不具备判断真与假的标准,也就是说感觉不是认识真理的能力。对感觉进行判断,需要借助不同于感官的、更高级的认识能力,并且要证明这种能力其实是能够知道真理的。那么,这就是理性的力量。跟进一步,理性最优秀的人,智慧者应该是能够知道真理的。(《反学园派》Ⅱ. 6. 15)

3. 真理的尺度问题。人的灵魂要知道自己获得的东西是否恰当,就需要一个尺度或者说标准(modum),没有标准就没有办法知道自己是过了还是不及。没有标准也就不可能拥有真理。而学园派促使人们去寻找真理,却并没有找到真理的标准。因此,光有寻找是不够的,幸福生活就是获知真理标准的生活,就是拥有真理的(智慧的)生活。圣经上说,“我是真理”,因此幸福生活也就是拥有神的生活。(以上见《论幸福生活》2. 14, 4. 31,)

### 3. 对个体存在问题的辩护逻辑

奥古斯丁结合柏拉图主义提出的属于自己的信仰辩护方案在于对“爱-智慧”的颠覆性解释。他对学园派怀疑主义的反驳贯穿了整个加西齐亚根对话。他就学园派的论证提出一个悖论:如何确定谁是智慧者?智慧者在别人看来是智慧的吗?那么这位评判者又如何知道、以何为标准呢?(以上参考《反学园派》3. 4)即使世界上有智慧者,只要他是一个个体,他就无法判断自己获得的知识是否是智慧的,别人也无法判断他是否是智慧的。就因为这种“真理标准的问题”,在“爱-智慧”的道路就算是西塞罗也无法找出一个已经成功的智慧者,也无法知道自己处于这条爱的道路上什么位置。所以奥古斯丁在《反学园派》中就已经选定了一条宗教的道路:不是人去寻求智慧,而是智慧本身向人启示;不是人去寻找智慧/真理成为智慧者,而是智慧者决定了什么是智慧和真理。智慧者就是真理的认识者,就等于真理本身。因为柏拉图主义给奥古斯丁的启发就是到“精神世界”(或者用他们的术语应该

[17] 汪子嵩等 Wang Zisong et al.,《希腊哲学史》Xila zhhexueshi [History of Greek Philosophy],第四卷 Fourth Vol. (北京 Beijing: 人民出版社 Renmin chubanshe [People's Publishing House], 2014), 第 488 页。



叫“理智世界”)去寻找真理,而理智世界就是思的世界,真理本身就是思想。希腊哲学的“努斯”概念被奥古斯丁进行了转化,真理就是真理的认识者。而这个理论上的空位被填入了一个确定的人,圣人理想落地生根有了一个实体,那就是基督教所信仰的基督。圣经中对基督的记载就是真理的启示,只不过不是字面意义,而是背后超越人类理性的智慧。

首先,奥古斯丁归纳了一个西塞罗等哲学家比较赞同的定义:“智慧是关于神圣事物和人类事物的知识”。(《反学园派》I. 4. 16)在两种事物中,更重要的,当然是“神圣事务”,也就是对神的认识。在这个定义之后,对话举出了一个类似于有神通的“巫师”阿尔比凯利的例子,用以反证一个人拥有两种知识却品德有缺,不能够被称为“智慧者”。例如,奥古斯丁说,“我宁可希望这位阿尔比凯利能够教导向他求学作诗的人,或者在咨询者的请求下,他能够马上就别人提出的某个主题自己作诗。”(《反学园派》I. 7. 19, 21)其它各种在当时为人们“求神问卜”的职业者都不能算作有智慧或真正的知识。

奥古斯丁重新区分了“智慧者”与“哲学家”,并指出后者是对智慧的寻求者,处于寻求智慧的过程中,并不表明已经拥有了智慧、到达了终点。对话里提出一个观点:幸福者应该是完美的。(《反学园派》1. 3. 7)因此而不是处于探索过程的“真理探索者”,而是真理的拥有者——“智慧者”。因此“智慧者”就是指拥有了真理的人,智慧就是指“拥有了真理(的完成状态)”。

其次,拥有真理的只有真理本身,真理即是神,因此只有神拥有真理。拥有智慧,就是认识真理,就是认识神,唯有神完全认识神本身。<sup>[18]</sup>奥古斯丁说,“在我看来,智慧是,关于神圣和人类事物的、指向幸福生活的、不仅是知识,而且也是勤勉的探索。如果你想要分析叙述部分,那么它的第一个部分——也就是拥有知识——是指向神的;而第二个部分——也就是完全满足于探索的——属于人。进而,神以第一部分而是幸福的,人以另一部分而是幸福的。”(《反学园派》I. 8. 23)结合前面对智慧的两重区分看,单纯人类之中理论上不可能有“智慧者”,如果有人是智慧者,那么他必须既是人又是神(完全的智慧、完全地认识和拥有真理、也就是真理本身)。

那么对于一般人来说,最重要通往真理途径已经被打通,那就是倾听智慧者的启示。但最后的结果是有拣选的,需要“最纯洁的人”(《独语录》20. 34)等等限定。虽然真理不在感觉世界,但它存在于理智世界并可以为理性认识,奥古斯丁总结:真理是可以认识的。需要的是两种力量——理性和权威。这个权威对于当时的奥古斯丁来说,就是耶稣。他既然尚未获得真理,那么心灵为了保持对真理的追求就要借助权威的力量,这种心灵状态就是“信仰”。(《反学园派》3. 20. 43)对奥古斯丁而言,同时符合这些条件的就只有基督宗教中启示的“基督”。奥古斯丁说,“我现在恳求最高神的权柄和智慧,除了神秘的[圣经]向我们启示为神之子的那位之外还是谁呢?”(《反学园派》2. 1. 1)

总之,奥古斯丁的解决方案是指出,智慧者认识智慧,他知道自己认识真理,而不需要别人的判定——智慧者的存在本身就指示出了智慧的所在、真理的所在,他所知道的就是智慧,反过来也是如此,智慧就是智慧者所知道的。智慧者与智慧并不是二分的而是统一的。那么,智慧者,他的智慧会失去吗,例如睡眠或者疯狂?奥古斯丁的回答是否定的,因为智慧者定义了什么是智慧,他所不知道的东西就不是智慧。(参考《反学园派》3. 13. 29 及下,特别是 3. 14. 31)

遵从上述逻辑,奥古斯丁最后总结:真理是可以认识的。需要的是两种力量——理性和权威。这个权威对于当时的奥古斯丁来说,就是基督。他既然尚未获得真理,那么心灵为了保持对真理的追求就要借助权威的力量,这种心灵状态就是“信仰”。(《反学园派》3. 20. 43)所以,权威的作用乃是在探求真理过程中指明方向并坚定信仰的,因为权威就是真理本身。与哲学不同的是,权威的证据就在于“事实”,这个世界的秩序、世界之所以如此以及正是如此,正是真理作用的结果。古代的贤人并非真正的权威,而是这个世界中出现了这些贤人并参与到世界的伟大秩序中去,这个事实就是最大的权

[18] 见奥古斯丁的《论幸福生活》4. 34,参考稍晚的著作《论教师》11. 38. 48-49 等处。

威。人的理性的作用就是对此做出理解。(参考《论秩序》2. 17-28, 32)

## 4. 结论

在皈依之前和之后，他是这么看待基督的，“假使记载确实，则我在基督身上看到一个完整的人，不是仅有人肉体，或仅有肉体灵魂而无理性，而是一个真正的人，但我以为基督的所以超越任何人，不是因为真理的化身，而是由于卓越的人格，更完美地和智慧结合。”(《忏悔录》7. 19)因此，仅从这点出发，在奥古斯丁认定基督就是真理化身时，他的自我认同就已经是基督徒了。基督如何是真理的化身，这一宗教表白(confession)的逻辑在最早的作品加西齐亚根对话中就已打通。在独语录的开篇祈祷，奥古斯丁已经认识到特殊的基督教教义，他眼中的神并不是一个哲学家的抽象的神，而是一个倾听人祷告的三一人格神。

他在后期著作更加显明了上帝对智慧的自由与主权：

我们不仅承认，而且特别要宣告，确实存在着的是上帝的最高智慧，每个灵魂——无论他声称有何等的真知灼见——其智慧都是从哪里来的。至于我们称之为“世界”的有形质的万物，是否有灵魂可言，或者是否有自己的灵魂，即是否具有可借以掌管自身运动的理性生命，这是一个宽泛而晦涩的问题。……。既然没有灵魂能从其他灵魂一一而不是上帝最高而永恒的智慧那里获得智慧和祝福，即便这个问题永远得不到解决，于人又有何妨呢？(《论四福音的和谐》I. 35)<sup>[19]</sup>

奥古斯丁把非人格的努斯(理智本原、智慧本体)替换成了人格化的上帝，似乎是一种武断的嫁接。如果说真理，或者说努斯、理智世界是永恒不变的，那么加上会变化的人格因素岂不是就矛盾了？奥古斯丁对这个问题的解决，可以说正是他写作加西齐亚根对话的动力。在《反学园派》中，奥古斯丁以哲学思考为开端却以宗教信仰为结尾，联系整个“加西齐亚根对话集”的主题，可以说这是他内心皈依基督教之后写下的坦白思想的“忏悔录”。他把理由和原因悉数展开，让他的家人和朋友评判自己的信仰是否自愿以及理由充分。所以他通过哲学思索得出的权威和指引的“神”不是抽象的“神”，却是宗教的“基督”，因为他“发现没有比他更有权柄的”(《反学园派》3. 20, 43)。奥古斯丁说，“属于哲学的问题有两个：第一个关于灵魂，第二个关于神。”(《论秩序》2. 47)而他坚定的答案，或者整个哲学发展的基础是“灵魂不朽”与“上帝存在”(真理不朽)(《独语录》18. 32)因此，他所说的哲学其实就是神学，与他对智慧的定义的二分是相对应的。但哲学的角色更多是一种对已然确立的东西的辩护，而不是说通过哲学自身就到达了他所信仰的东西(类似“自然神学”)。我们至少看到他感受到的宗教现实与自己的宗教体验在思想“转变”中扮演了更重要的角色。

[19] 奥古斯丁 Augustine,《论四福音的和谐》Lun Sifuyin de hexi [The Harmony of the Gospels]. 萨蒙德英译 S. D. F. Salmond English tr., 许一新汉译 Xu Xinyi Chinese tr., (北京 Beijing: 生活·读书·新知三联书店 Sanlian Shudian[SDX Joint Publishing, 2010]), 45-46. 奥古斯丁认为，人凭借上帝在人的灵魂中埋下的尺度才能发现自然界的和谐运动和规律，所以人对自然的认识能力也来自上帝。见 BAI Junxiao, “Reasonable Measurement and Motion: Numerical Order in the Soul and Music”, International Journal of Sino-Western Studies, no. 15 (2018): 27-48.

**English Title:**

**When did Philosophy Converts to Religion? Early Augustine's Confession before His Confessions**

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**Abstract:** Early Augustine learned Platonic Philosophy in Milan, which played a key role in his conversion to Christianity. Apart from his recollections in *Confessions*, his first writings, *Cassiciacum Dialogues*, provide significant clues as to when and how his philosophical understanding turned into religious belief. Actually, his reasons for writing the manuscript were an effort to harmonize Christian doctrine and philosophy, the great influence of the Milan Church, and his mystical religious experience. In his writings, he dealt with the crisis of meaning in human existence: how could one know the Truth and live a happy life? Philosophy provided the framework for his probing, but only Christianity provided him with the answers: God is the Truth, wisdom is to know and have the Truth, and thus a wise man must be both God and man, who is the incarnation of Logos, Jesus Christ. Therefore, from the very beginning, Augustine's writings were religious confessions, with philosophy serving only as rational tool to explain what is apprehended as truth and fact.

**Key Words:** Augustine; Patristics; *Cassiciacum Dialogues*

# 法的开端——论罗马法的基督宗教化及其对当今法学思维之意义<sup>〔1〕</sup>

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**摘要:**古典希腊与罗马世界的法律文化为法学、法律设置了开端,特别是为近现代法学思维开启了思维与实践的空间,尽管法学与法律的这一开端早已超出自身,然而法律与法学的每一步发展又无不与这一开端相关联,并且立于肇自这一开端的逻辑秩序中;本文尝试以罗马法的思维方式与结构为出发点,首先探讨其神哲学的基础及其与法学的分离,由此探析罗马法的目的诉求及其与希腊法学的殊殊;在这一基础上,探颐出自万邦之法思想的罗马自然法,从而转入罗马法与宗教、特别是与作为神圣宗教的基督宗教的内在逻辑关联的分析,展示并反思罗马法在中世纪的基督宗教化与法典化的意义,并且阐释近现代法学质询作为其开端的罗马法的意义,最终提点出作为法与历史主体的人的尊严与价值。

**关键词:**法;罗马法;基督宗教;当代法学;意义

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尽管本文能够在原始文献之基础上从历史、文化、社会以及城邦等诸多方面入手而加以探知<sup>〔2〕</sup>,然而由于本文之旨趣并非在于历史的、教会史的以及区域史等方面的研究,并且由于本文希冀在方法论意义上有所突破,因而在此并不过多描述每一单一而具体之历史现象与事件、并且不过多阐释其意

〔1〕 Cf., Paulos Huang, "The 500th Anniversary of Religious Reformation and Law", *International Journal of Sino-Western Studies*, vol. 13, 1-6. (<https://www.sinowesternstudies.com/back-issues/vol-13-2017/>)

〔2〕 就此请参见 Theodor Mommsen, *Römische Geschichte*, Deutscher Taschenbuchverlag GmbH & Co. KG, München 1976, Band 1-8. Mommsen(蒙森)是十九世纪德国著名法学家、历史学家、铭文学家、古典学家与经济学家(或国民经济学家),他的多卷本罗马史从意大利与拉丁早期原住民与移民之描述开笔,进而以罗马建城与罗马法为全书之开卷,涵盖法律、宗教、习俗、娱乐、语言、方言、文学、民族、货币、经济、军事(战争)、政体等几乎社会生活所有领域,自1854年首度初版之后,修订增删,到1932年已经出到第14版,至今都是国际学术界公认的罗马史标准著作。此外,其若干单行本著作也是学术界权威参考文献: *Die römische Tribus in administrativer Beziehung* (Altona 1844); *Über das römische Münzwesen* (Leipzig 1850); *Die unteritalischen Dialekte* (Leipzig 1850); *Die Stadtrechte der latinischen Gemeinden Salpensa und Malaca in der Provinz Baetica* (Leipzig 1855); *Die Rechtsfrage zwischen Caesar und dem Senat* (Breslau 1857); *Die römische Chronologie bis auf Caesar* (Berlin 1858/2. Auflage 1859); *Geschichte des römischen Münzwesens* (Berlin 1860/Neudruck 1956); *Römisches Staatsrecht*, Band I, (Leipzig 1871/2. Auflage 1876, 3. Auflage 1887), Band II (1 und 2, Leipzig 1874/1875/2. Auflage 1877), Band III (1 und 2, Leipzig 1887/1888, Neudrucke: Basel 1952, Darmstadt 1952, 1971). *Abriß des römischen Staatsrechts* (Leipzig 1893, 2. Auflage 1907, Neudruck, Darmstadt 1974); *Römisches Strafrecht* (Leipzig 1899, Neudrucke: Berlin und Darmstadt 1955, Graz 1955)。同时,涵盖十九篇论文的两卷本《罗马研究》同样是学术界权威参考文献: *Römische Forschungen*, Band 1, (Berlin 1863/2. Auflage 1864), Band 2 (Berlin 1879, Neudruck, Hildesheim 1962)。最终,在其逝世后,若干未刊文稿被集成八卷本文集出版: *Gesammelte Schriften*, 8 Bände, Band 1-3, *Juristische Schriften*; Band 4-7, *Historische Schriften*, Band 8, *Epigraphische und numismatische Schriften* (Berlin 1905-1913)。蒙森相关著作以及其他权威学者的研究著作也将在本文行文中随时引述。就罗马法律、宗教、习俗、娱乐、语言、方言、文学、民族、货币、经济、军事(战争)、政体等相关领域之基本研究文献而言,敬请参考 Paul Krüger, *Geschichte der Quellen und Literatur des römischen Rechts*. (2. Auflage, München 1912); A. Rosenberg, *Einleitung und Quellenkunde zur römischen Geschichte* (Berlin 1921)。尽管罗森伯尔格(Rosenberg)这两部权威专著出版于近百年前,然而至今依然是罗马史入门与上述各领域文献资料蒐集之必备指南。又:本文所有引文皆笔者自译,谨此说明,下不另注。

义,而是仅仅从神学、哲学、宗教学、法学与法哲学以及它们之间的关系角度而在引述前辈学者依据原始文献所达成之权威性研究成就的基础上不揣浅陋与冒昧而紧扣主题以略发浅见而已,希冀在尊重与致敬前辈学者及现有研究成就的同时而对本论题之研究稍有推进;入题之先,预表此意。

## 1. 罗马法的结构及其对于近代法学思维兴起的贡献

### 1.1 罗马法的神哲学基础以及法的分殊的开端

#### 1.1.1 罗马法的诉求——法律并非要求人的服从,而是赞襄人的自我决定

法律并非要求人的服从,而是赞襄人的自我决定,这不仅是现、当代法律之要求,而且也是罗马法的本质属性;如同罗马哲学一样,罗马法及其法学在论题与思维方式上也深受古典希腊文化、特别是古典希腊哲学之影响,这种影响既来自古典希腊哲学的辩证思维,也来自古典希腊学术中的修辞学<sup>[3]</sup>;罗马法及其法学也将其论题主旨与思维方式传承给欧洲法学:在大量而广泛引述前人研究成果的基础上,德国著名法学家卡尔·海因斯·拉多尔(Karl-Heinz Ladeur)在其名著《西方法的开端》(Der Anfang des westlichen Rechts)一书中认为,罗马法对于理解当今西方法律思想的决定性的意义在于其所具有的特殊性,这一特殊性呈现为法的自治性的发展(die Entwicklung der Autonomie des Rechts)<sup>[4]</sup>,换言之,如同罗马法专家弗里茨·舒尔兹(Fritz Schulz)所恰当指出的,这一特殊性呈现为一种“离隔性”或“隔绝性”(“Isolierung”)<sup>[5]</sup>,这指的是罗马的法律尽管与宗教仪式(宗教礼仪)隔如参商,然而罗马法却与宗教密切相关,罗马法律与宗教仪式在同样的秩序思维中表述不同的秩序<sup>[6]</sup>;在拉多尔看来,在整体的罗马文化中,对于法与规范的认知具有特殊性,应当不同于对于其它事物的认知,罗马文化特别要在法的认知与宗教认知之间加以区分,法的自治性或离隔性在这样的区分下具有向内、向外两种表现,由于其认知的特殊性,则向外呈现为一种完备性、完足性(Vollzug),甚或一种闭关性(Abschließend),而向内则呈现为一种开放性、发展性,呈现为一种闭关性的过程(Prozess der Abschließung),亦即呈现为法学认知的不断发展、以至于法学整体认知的不断充盈与保持<sup>[7]</sup>。

罗马法的这一特殊性与古典希腊的法学思想迥然不同,概而言之,可有四方面之言说,一方面,尽管古典希腊法学也在不同案例的法过程中区分具体的法的情形,然而却并未在罗马法的意义上推演出一种实务法或务实法(ein substantielles Recht)<sup>[8]</sup>,以至于古典希腊法学并不具有罗马法意义上的法教义学(或法义学,Rechtsdogmatik),并且由此并未发展出作为法学认知的护佑者的专业法学家以

[3] 就此请参见 J. Stroux 发表于 1934 年“Acti del congress internazionale di diritto romano I”(《罗马法国际研讨会论文集 I》)上题为“Über Griechische Einflüsse auf die Entwicklung der römischen Rechtswissenschaft gegen Ende der republicanischen Zeit”的论文,论文详尽阐释与分析了古典希腊哲学、法学等对于直到共和时代结束的罗马法思维的深刻影响,这篇文章与其发表于 1926 年题为“summum ius summa iniuria”的文章收入 R? mische Rechtswissenschaft und Rhetorik. (1949)。当然,是否古典希腊哲学、特别是古典希腊学术中的修辞学对于罗马法产生过影响以及究竟产生何种影响,在国际学术界是有争议的,持否定观点者,请参见 U. Wesel, Rhetorische Statuslehre und Gesetzesauslegung der römischen Juristen. (1967)。

[4] 就此请参见 Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Der Anfang des westlichen Rechts. (Mohr Sieback, Tübingen 2018). S. 7.

[5] 就此请参见 Fritz Schulz, Prinzipien des römischen Rechts. (Drucker & Humblot, Berlin 1934/Neudruck 1954). S. 19.

[6] 就此请参见 Fritz Schulz, Prinzipien des römischen Rechts. (Drucker & Humblot, Berlin 1934/Neudruck 1954) 以及十九世纪德国著名法学家、法史学家 Rudolf von Jhering, Der Geist des römischen Rechts auf den verschiedenen Stufen seiner Entwicklung. Band I-III, (Leipzig 1852-1865/Neudruck 1968)。

[7] 就此请参见 Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Der Anfang des westlichen Rechts. (Mohr Sieback, Tübingen 2018). S. 7. Fritz Schulz, Geschichte der römischen Rechtswissenschaft. Waimar (1961)。

[8] 就此请参见 Susanne Göde, Recht ohne Gesetze: Verfahren der Rechtsprechung in der Literatur der griechischen Antike. (Ancilla iuris 2015). S. 31; Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Der Anfang des westlichen Rechts. (Mohr Sieback, Tübingen 2018). S. 7.



及法学的专业化以及法学技术<sup>[9]</sup>;而另一方面,古典希腊的律学思想也为罗马法学思想开启了重要的继往开来的可能性,“律”并非仅仅是、甚至并非是分殊于事实秩序的抽象的规范,并非能够被削减为一种具有教育养成功能的因素,而是社会秩序的各种形象以及这些形象的总和,并且更是理念世界与人的世界之间的中介<sup>[10]</sup>,由此可见,在古典希腊的法学思维中,法律首先具有神学、哲学以及宗教品性,强调人与纯粹理念的关系,此外,法律并非要求人的服从,而是赞襄人的自我决定,不仅将人的自我决定权视为理所当然者,而且赞襄每一个个体将自我向每一个他者、向共同的他者开放;第三方面,法与律在古典希腊、特别是在罗马世界中(特别是早期的罗马法历史中<sup>[11]</sup>),并非仅仅是人所必须遵守的一些规则、律则,而是秩序、甚至是未完成的秩序,人必须认知之、理解之,应当在行为中实践之,并且由此而令法律与自身相关联,使之具有一种个体自身关联性,法律、特别是罗马法在这个意义上具有一种普遍性<sup>[12]</sup>;第四方面,如同古典希腊的律学思想为罗马法学思想开启了重要的继往开来的可能性一样,古典希腊法学与罗马法学为一种以基督宗教为代表的普遍的法学思想准备了前提条件,它们既为普遍的法学思想的诞生与发展预备了道路,并且将自身融入其中,而同时在这种诞生与发展之中又不再是其自身,希腊哲学与法学、希伯来宗教与律法思想以及罗马文化中的官僚体制与法律思想,都为基督宗教、法学的基督宗教化以及普遍的法学思维与法学思维的普遍化预制并创设了根基与道路。

在这个意义上,我们庶几能够总结说,古典希腊与罗马世界的法律文化为法学、法律设置了开端,特别是为近现代法学思维开启了思维与实践的空间,尽管法学与法律的这一开端早已超出自身,然而法律与法学的每一步发展又无不与这一开端相关联,并且立于肇自这一开端的逻辑秩序中。

### 1.1.2 罗马法作为认知论与认知本身

从思维方式来看,认知是现、当代法学与法学思维之本色,这亦是从小罗马法一脉相承而来;在拉多尔看来,罗马法与希腊法最具意义的共同性在于,它们都是古典城邦的产物,这种共同性所具有的意义是多方面的,首先,由于罗马与雅典同样都是手工业以及艺术等其它手工造作之中心,同样都是贸易与物品交换之中心,因而如果没有对于世界的质料性的观察、没有对于神人关系与人际交往关系的观察,那么就没有神学、哲学、宗教、艺术与法律等的兴起<sup>[13]</sup>;其次,由于古典的城邦是公共生活的中心,于是人的认同并非关涉某一疆域、而是更多的关涉某一城邦<sup>[14]</sup>,于是城邦也是对于共同生活的实践认知的中心,也是公共的法则(公开的、城邦共同的以及法的)建立与付诸实施的中心,因而柏拉图对于法律思考更多的是为了城邦生活<sup>[15]</sup>;最终其三,在前两点中所隐含的思想是,法律服务于人的

[9] 就此请参见 Karl-Heinz Ladeur, *Der Anfang des westlichen Rechts*. (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2018). S. 7.

[10] 就此请参见 Jacqueline de Romilly, *La loi dans la pensée grecque; de origins à Aristote*. (Les belles Lettres, Paris 2002). S. 77, 195; Karl-Heinz Ladeur, *Der Anfang des westlichen Rechts*. (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2018). S. 8.

[11] 就此请参见 L. Amirante, *Una storia giuridica di Roma. Dai re a Cesare*. (1987). 这部专著对于罗马法早期的、特别是直到帝国时期之前的共和时期的历史而言是不可放弃的权威著作;此外,亦请参见同样重要的权威著作 Christian Meier, *Res publica amissa. Eine Studie zur Verfassung und Geschichte der späten römischen Republik*. (Frankfurt am Main 1997/3. Auflage).

[12] 就此请参见 William Edmund Ball, *St. Paul and the Roman Law and Other Studies on the Origin of the Form of Doctrine*. (Forgotten Books, London 2012). S. 68. Karl-Heinz Ladeur, *Der Anfang des westlichen Rechts*. (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2018). S. 8.

[13] 就此请参见 Josiah Ober, *Democracy and Knowledge. Innovation and Learning in Classical Athens*. (Footnote 37/ Princeton UP, Princeton); Ders. *Athenian Legacies. Essays on the Politics of Going On Together*. (Princeton University Press, Princeton 2007); James I. Porter, *The Origins of Aesthetic Thought. Matter, Sensation, Experience*. (Cambridge university Press, London 2010). S. 175, 277; Karl-Heinz Ladeur, *Der Anfang des westlichen Rechts*. (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2018). S. 9-10.

[14] 就此请参见 Mario Vegetti, *L'etica degli antichi*. Laterza, (Rom/Bari 1989). S. 47; Karl-Heinz Ladeur, *Der Anfang des westlichen Rechts*. (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2018). S. 10.

[15] 就此请参见 Jacqueline de Romilly, *La loi dans la pensée grecque; de origins à Aristote*. Les belles Lettres, (Paris 2002). S. 218 (Footnote 27); Aldo Schianone, *IUS. L'invention du droit en occident*. Belinn, (Paris 2009). S. 350; Karl-Heinz Ladeur, *Der Anfang des westlichen Rechts*. (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2018). S. 10.

教育与素质的养成,并且由于各城邦法律并非完全一致,同时由于法律本身在面临新情况时也在不断发展,于是法律的教育与涵养也是持续的,以至于罗马的万民法在城邦多元化的背景中对于法律的普世适用性贡献巨大<sup>[16]</sup>;这也是欧洲法治国家之公民将尊重与遵守法律视为基本素养之历史渊源。

从历史过程来看,对于罗马国家而言,国家疆域的拓展与统一并非必然意味着法的统一,而并非绝对统一、而是相对统一的法律与过渡性条款,甚或有利于新的疆域融入国家整体;自治法的形成对于罗马国家而言意味着法学与法学家的特殊专业的形成,法学家不仅要谙熟法学原本的概念,而且还要阐释、阐发某一特定自治法所特有的法律品性与精神气质,这甚至超出法学自身而影响与塑造了整体的罗马文化<sup>[17]</sup>,这样的法学实践的结果为罗马文化带来新的思维与知识,在罗马文化中造成了所谓“认知革命”(“epistemische Revolution”)<sup>[18]</sup>。尽管所谓“认知革命”作为术语并非毫无问题,但是:它却首先提示出罗马帝国的宗教并非道成肉身的神启宗教,而是俗世宗教,而俗世宗教是一种严肃的、实践性的宗教,而俗世的宗教意味着并非能够回溯到一种被给出的律法之中,亦即并非能够被奠基在一种由神明所给出的神圣律法之上;其次,“认知革命”提示出罗马帝国俗世宗教与帝国律法的实践品性,亦即提示出其有用性与好用性(顺手性),特别是其实践性能够被视为帝国律法的主导因素;其三,这种实践性的认知建构了从希腊修辞学到罗马理性世界图景的过渡,这一理性世界图景(亦即理性的世界理解)始于并展开在希腊,持续展开并不断发展在罗马帝国中;其四,这一始于希腊而在罗马不断展开的理性世界理解,同时也意味着神话与宗教认知的统治地位的某种动摇——尽管神话与宗教认知同样也是理性认知、并且甚至直到今天都从未中断过;最终其五,这种非神话与非宗教的关于世界的理性认知,共生在罗马帝国的法学思维中,呈现出人的自治性,是罗马帝国当此之时新兴而新型的法学思维的前提条件,法在此更多的意味着法本身的实践品性,意味着人对于法的诞生(创设)与使用过程的参与,这种参与绝非严肃道德论的或卫道士般的,而是人对于他者与自身的理解,而且是将他者理解为自身的法与权力的界限,也就是说,每一个个体所享有的法的权利,并非无边界、无限制的,而是不能伤及他者的权利的,法的主体的利益并非是隔绝他者的,并非是无关他者的;这呈现出罗马文化对于法在公共生活领域中(譬如商贸、建筑、战争、宗教等)的功能的推崇,也呈现出罗马国家之法学、法律文化之特质,这一特质依然呈现在当今的法学与法学思维之中。

### 1.1.3 罗马法的内在分殊与界限——法是一种权利、律是实证法条文

在当今的法学思维中,法与律亦是清晰分殊的,这样的内在分殊亦有其罗马法渊源;而罗马法有其产生的历史渊源,不仅与意大利早期民族以及罗马城初期历史密切相关,而且与早期罗马人群团体的架构以及社会结构有内在而直接的逻辑关联<sup>[19]</sup>;古典罗马法本身不仅有自身的概念设置与法的体系的内在结构<sup>[20]</sup>,而且是一个综合统筹性的体系,法(ius)的制宪建构具有多元性,属于这一多元性体系的有律(leges)、民众意志的表述、元老院意志的表述、其它决议团体的意志表述(到帝国建立之

[16] 就此请参见 Karl Christ, *Römische Geschichte*. (Darmstadt 1973). Christ(卡尔·克里斯特)是蒙森之后德国又一著名罗马法、罗马史权威学者,其著述极具学术参考价值,是本文这一论题以及相关领域必备参考文献。就此论题亦可参见 J. Heurgon, *Rome et la Méditerranée occidentale jusqu'aux guerres puniques*. Collection Nouvelle Clío, Band 7. (Paris 1969). 埃尔龚(Heurgon)的这部权威专著是 Collection Nouvelle Clío 系列中的第七卷,同样极具学术参考价值,同样是本文这一论题以及相关领域之必备参考文献。Karl-Heinz Ladeur, *Der Anfang des westlichen Rechts*. (Mohr Sieback, Tübingen 2018). S. 10. Alfred Heuß, *Römische Geschichte*. (Paderborn 2003/9. Auflage).

[17] 就此请参见 Karl-Heinz Ladeur, *Der Anfang des westlichen Rechts*. (Mohr Sieback, Tübingen 2018). S. 11.

[18] 就此请参见 Aldo Schianone, *IUS. L'invention du droit en occident*. (Belinn, Paris 2009). S. 280.

[19] 就此请参见 Wolfgang Waldstein, Michael Rainer, *Römische Rechtsgeschichte. Ein Studienbuch. 11. , neu bearbeitete Auflage*. (C. H. Beck, München 2014). S. 16-26.

[20] 就此请参见 Wolfgang Waldstein, Michael Rainer, *Römische Rechtsgeschichte. Ein Studienbuch. 11. , neu bearbeitete Auflage*. (C. H. Beck, München 2014). S. 40-46.

始)以及法的设置的其它形式<sup>[21]</sup>,这与罗马国家之官僚体系、元老院、平民大会等政治结构相关<sup>[22]</sup>;罗马法不仅有其自身历史发展过程,而且与哲学、历史学、宗教学、经济学以及等相关学科密不可分<sup>[23]</sup>。

在奥古斯都的帝国时代(亦即皇帝还无法专权的时代,亦即依然处于所谓 *Prinzipat* 时期<sup>[24]</sup>),罗马皇帝的敕令也以法的形式被颁布<sup>[25]</sup>,而原本体现经典的罗马法的建构本色的,是主持法务与法庭的高级官员(亦即所谓 *praetorio/prätor*,通常是四位<sup>[26]</sup>)的律令(敕令)的形式<sup>[27]</sup>,这不同于罗马皇帝的法的设置行为,亦即不同于其敕令的颁布行为<sup>[28]</sup>,主管官员的律令与现实生活密切相关,也与不同地区所发展出的不同习俗相关联,具有极强的实践性,也就是说,其律令不仅包含法律适用性诉求的先决条件,而且也包含作出法律决定(决议、判决)的过程。罗马的市民法(或公民法, *ius civile*)作为一种法的范式最能体现罗马人对于法(*ius*)的理解,与律(*lex*)不同的是,也就是与被设置的法不同的是,法(*ius*)是一种与某种思想相呼应的权利,甚至是奠基在某种思想之中的权利,这样的法的思维影响了市民法(公民法),以至于市民法(公民法)在这个意义上并非一种一成不变的、而是一种不确定、不固定的法:私人或每一个个体都部分的是法的生产者,都被承认为法的现实的生产者<sup>[29]</sup>。

[21] 就此请参见 Theodor Mommsen, *Die Rechtsfrage zwischen Caesar und dem Senat*. (Breslau 1857); *Römisches Staatsrecht*. Band I, (Leipzig 1871/2. Auflage 1876. 3. Auflage 1887), Band II (1 und 2), (Leipzig 1874/1875/2. Auflage 1877), Band III (1 und 2), (Leipzig 1887/1888, Neudrucke; Basel 1952, Darmstadt 1952, 1971. Abriß des römischen Staatsrechts. Leipzig 1893, 2. Auflage 1907, Neudruck; Darmstadt 1974; *Römisches Strafrecht*. Leipzig 1899. Neudrucke; Berlin und Darmstadt 1955, Graz 1955. Heinrich Honsell, *Römisches Recht*. Springer-Verlag, Berlin Heidelberg New York London Paris Tokyo 1988). S. 1-7. Detlef Liebs, *Römisches Recht*. 6. Auflage, (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 2004). S. 17-43.

[22] 就此请参见 Wolfgang Waldstein, Michael Rainer, *Römische Rechtsgeschichte*. Ein Studienbuch. 11., neu bearbeitete Auflage, (C. H. Beck, München 2014). S. 78-92.

[23] 就此请参见 Wolfgang Waldstein, Michael Rainer, *Römische Rechtsgeschichte*. Ein Studienbuch. 11., neu bearbeitete Auflage, (C. H. Beck, München 2014). S. 73-78. 关于罗马法的概念与概念体系,亦请参见 Heinrich Honsell, *Römisches Recht*. 8. Auflage, Springer Berlin Heidelberg 2015). S. 19-23.

[24] 关于 *Prinzipat* 请参见 Wolfgang Seyfarth, *Römische Geschichte*. Kaiserzeit 2. 2., berichtigte, Auflage, (Akademie-Verlag Berlin 1975). S. 349-350, S. 545.

[25] 就此请参见 Wolfgang Waldstein, Michael Rainer, *Römische Rechtsgeschichte*. Ein Studienbuch. 11., neu bearbeitete Auflage, (C. H. Beck, München 2014). S. 168-175, 181-185. 关于奥古斯都时期国家政治秩序,请参见三世纪时的历史学家 Cassius Dio 的名著: *Monumentum Ancyranum* 以及对这一名著的权威研究: Theodor Mommsen, *Monumentum Ancyranum*. 1865. (Nachdruck 1970); P. A. Brunt, J. M. Moore, *Res gestae divi Augusti*. 1973; E. Weber, *Meine Taten*. *Res gestae divi Augusti*. 2. Auflage, 2004. 此外,就奥古斯都时代国家政治秩序与法律(特别是法律),亦请参见 D. Kienast, *Augustus, Princeps und Monarch*. 3. Auflage 1999; E. Schönbauer, "Wesen und Ursprung des römischen Prinzipats". *Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte, romanistische Abteilung* (Wien/Köln/Weimar) 47 (1927), S. 264 ff. F. Guizzi, *Il principato tra res publica e potere assoluto*. (Roma 1974, Nachdruck 1989). F. Wieacker, *Zur Verfassungsstruktur des augusteischen Prinzipats*. (Festschrift für Grewe 1981). S. 639 ff. Johannes Maase, *Die Errichtung des augusteischen Prinzipats zwischen 30 und 18 vor Christus*. *Konzeption und Durchführung*. (Grin Verlag 2013) (1. Auflage 2007).

[26] 关于 *praetorio/Prätor* 请参见 Wolfgang Seyfarth, *Römische Geschichte*. Kaiserzeit 2. 2., berichtigte Auflage, (Akademie-Verlag Berlin 1975). S. 545.

[27] 就此请参见 Mario Bretone, *Geschichte des römischen Rechts*. Von den Anfängen bis zu Justinian. 2. Auflage, Beck, München 1998. S. 102. Karl-Heinz Ladeur, *Der Anfang des westlichen Rechts*. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2018. S. 17. Detlef Liebs, *Römisches Recht*. 6. Auflage, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 2004. S. 43-76. Wolfgang Kunkel, Martin Schermaier, *Römische Rechtsgeschichte*. 14. Auflage, Böhlau Verlag, Köln Weimar Wien 2005. S. 63-81. 就主持法务与法庭的官员(*praetorio/Prätor*)的律令,请参见被两部视为特别重要的权威著作: H. G. Pflaum, *Les Procurateurs équestres sous le Haut-Empire romain*. Paris 1950, Nachdruck 1974 及其 *Les carrières procuratoriennes équestres*. Band 1-3, Paris 1960-1961.

[28] 就皇帝敕令与官员律令之间的关系,请参见 G. Tibiletti, *Principe e magistrato repubblicani*. Roma 1953. R. Klein, *Prinzipat und Freiheit*. 1969. M. A. Levi (Hrsg.), *Augusto e il suo tempo*. 1986.

[29] 就此请参见 Mario Bretone, *Geschichte des römischen Rechts*. Von den Anfängen bis zu Justinian. (2. Auflage, Beck, München 1998). S. 71. Karl-Heinz Ladeur, *Der Anfang des westlichen Rechts*. (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2018). S. 17. Jill Harries, *Cicero and the Jurists*. From Citizens' Law to the Lawful State. (Bristol Classical Press, London 2006). S. 186. Heinrich Honsell, *Römisches Recht*. Springer-Verlag, (Berlin Heidelberg New York London Paris Tokyo 1988). S. 14-18.

#### 1.1.4 法、祖先的习俗、法的界限及其可突破性

罗马国家有其独特的国家思想与政治秩序、有其独特的政治实践,用以规范社会秩序与人们的行为<sup>[30]</sup>,在严重的人与人之间的冲突、社会冲突、社群冲突、甚或族群冲突中,祖先们的习俗(mos maiorum,习惯法)通常被作为例证(exemplum,案例)而被引述<sup>[31]</sup>,例证通常不仅意味着一种例外、意味着原有的法律界限被突破,而且也表明罗马法的界限被不断突破<sup>[32]</sup>,而由于所谓“祖先的习俗”在罗马国家又被视为是神圣的、宗教性的,所以祖先的习俗作为例证(案例)不仅作为宗教性的律法总是在现有法律的界限突破中得以实施,而且这样的例证并非在某些饶有威望的若干祖先个人的范式般的榜样及其相互关系中、而是在非个人化的抽象理解中的到表述,也就是说,例证是在超出诸多单一案例之外而被理解<sup>[33]</sup>;在这个意义上,尽管市民法(或公民法, ius civile)无论如何都是一种与政治相分离的法,然而法的概念以及案例的抽象理解与阐释,能够让政治的谋略得以贯彻。

#### 1.1.5 罗马法文化中法的主体——反思性个体作为历史的能动力

现代主体论哲学中所谓主体本质的多样性,在罗马法中已有呈现;从历史分期来看,我们所探讨的罗马法到基督宗教法的过渡这一时期,是古典晚期到早期中世纪,这是法的主体建构过程的开端,这可以说是原始主体或本色意义上的主体、原型主体(proto-subiectus)<sup>[34]</sup>;所谓罗马的原型主体,是历经各种法务情形的个体(譬如各种契约的签订),他们由于其各自的历练而通晓立法的经验论逻辑,他们在如此这般的法文化的社会中将自身发展为反思性的个体,并且不会被所谓“陌生的”、“外在的”政治权力所过度地左右、所过度地决定;这样的主体的建构过程并非是一种目的论的、其终结事先就能够清晰预判的,而更多的是一种社会的能动力,以多重形式令社会充满活力,熟谙罗马法经验论逻辑的原型个体主体,能够结成范式与关系的多样性、多元性的联盟,这种多样性恰恰甚至能够被视为现代主体的本质性标示;尽管主体的统一性、特别是基督宗教—罗马原型主体的统一性,本质上是多样性的产物,是在不同生活形式与内涵基础上的不同行为模式、不同问题视角与不同思维等的产物,然而统一性并非主体的本质,主体对于法的感受与理解并非一致而统一的,法的主体与主体之法并非从虚无中诞生,而是在长期过程中形成,整体的历史、文化等作为法的“基础设施”共同决定了法的形成<sup>[35]</sup>。

#### 1.1.6 罗马法的自然法思想——出自万邦之法的自然法

尽管在罗马法中已然有了自然法思想,然而罗马法的自然法思想并非从原本的、原型的罗马法中产生的,而是在与各民族及其法律思想的相遇与交流中逐渐认识到的——这也符合本文不远的前文

[30] 关于罗马国家以及国家思想,请参见 E. Meyer, *Römischer Staat und Staatsgedanke*. (5. Auflage, Artemis Zürich 1975). 关于罗马国家行政,请参见 J. Marquardt, *Römische Staatsverwaltung*. Band 1-3, in 2. und 3. Auflage, 1884-1885 (Neudruck 1952), 这部三卷本专著是对蒙森关于罗马国家思想的补充,尽管在某些特殊论题以及部分描述与分析上被后代的研究超越,然而在整体上还不能被取代。

[31] 关于祖先的习俗与习惯法,请参见两部著名的权威著作: L. Friedländer, *Darstellungen aus der Sittengeschichte Roms*. (9. Auflage von G. Wissowa 1919-1921, Neudruck 1964). J. Marquardt, *Das Privatleben der Römer*. Band 1-2, (Leipzig 1886).

[32] 就此请参见 Michèle Lowrie, *Writing, Performance and Authority in Augustan Rome*. (Oxford UP, Oxford 2009). S. XI. Melanie Möller, "Exemplum and Exceptio. Building Blocks for a Rhetorical Theory of the Exceptional Case". In: Michèle Lowrie/Susanne Lüdermann (Hrsg.), *Exemplarity and Singularity. Thinking Through Particulars in Philosophy, Literature and Law*. (Routledge, Abingdon 2015). S. 96-110. Karl-Heinz Ladeur, *Der Anfang des westlichen Rechts*. (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2018). S. 19.

[33] 就此请参见重要工具书 Heumanns Handlexikon zu den Quellen des römischen Rechts. (9. Auflage, bearbeitet von Emil Seckel, Jena 1907; Nachdruck, Graz 1971). Adolf Berger, *Encyclopedic dictionary of roman law*. (Philadelphia/USA 1953).

[34] 就此请参见 Heinrich Honsell, *Römisches Recht*. (Springer-Verlag, Berlin Heidelberg New York London Paris Tokyo 1988). S. 17-18. Wolfgang Kunkel, Martin Schermaier, *Römische Rechtsgeschichte*. (14. Auflage, Böhlau Verlag, Köln Weimar Wien 2005). S. 176-223.

[35] 就此请参见 Axel Honneth, *Das Recht der Freiheit. Grundriss einer demokratischen Sittlichkeit*. (Suhrkamp, Berlin 2011). Karl-Heinz Ladeur, *Der Anfang des westlichen Rechts*. (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2018). S. 21.



中所阐释的罗马法的认知品性,在这个意义上,恰恰并非是罗马法规范了各民族的法律,而是相反:罗马法从各民族的法律中探求与认知到了自然法,也就是说,罗马法在对各民族法律所具有的共同性的思考过程中诞生了自然法思想。

上述这一点能够从历史背景与思维方式两个方面来探讨;首先,从历史的角度来看,如同前文所阐释与分析的,恰恰由于罗马国家统治疆域的拓展(无论是何种形式的拓展,或者是通过战争,或者是通过和平手段等),以至于它虽然不断接触到不同民族与区域的不同法律思维与法律体系,以至于罗马法成为一种法的庞杂的综合体系,然而却也发现其中之相同性与普遍适用性,因而罗马法中的自然法与万民法思想并非具有某种神性属性,也就是说,在罗马法的思维中,自然法并非是神明(上帝)设置的,并不具有神性起源,并不具有神性属性,甚至并非出自于某些基本规范,而是出自于对不同民族所遵守的不同法律的基本共同性的观察与思考<sup>[36]</sup>,这也符合罗马法作为认知论的品性,如同前文所阐释与分析的;也就是说,在历史的过程中、在罗马国家的拓展过程中,所逐渐形成的罗马法并非是一个单一的法的体系,而是一个法的综合性的系统,包含各行省之法、新兼并与占领地区的法等,因而在罗马法整体的思维中能够展开一种自然法(ius naturale)或万民法(ius gentium)的思想。其次,从思维方式的角度来看,不同于基督宗教的是,或者说与基督宗教相比较而言,一方面,罗马文化、特别是罗马法与罗马宗教中,万物起源、万物开端的思想比较模糊,对于起源以及神明创世的思考也不及希腊哲学与犹太教、基督宗教的思考来得清晰;另一方面,罗马法文化在诸多民族的特定的生活形式中发现不可更改的内容,并且由此发现普遍适用的自然法基本法则;因而罗马法文化似乎不必将自然法回溯到神明(上帝)之中,不必将自然法奠基在神明的秩序意志或上帝的意志之中,而是将超越各民族的共同性视为法的形式、法的共同形式<sup>[37]</sup>,这一点也影响了基督宗教。

西塞罗在其著作中也探讨自然法以及相关思想,他似乎也将自然法部分地归入于神性理性,亦即将自然法的基础论证为神性理性,然而这对应的是俗世宗教(亦即并非宣称直接来自神明或来自神明启示的宗教——如此这般宣称者是所谓神圣宗教)对于神明(上帝、众神)的想象,也就是说,这样的法则、律法并非能够被理解为出自神明的意志设置,并非能够被理解为对于神明意志或神圣理性及其所设置的法律的援引,而是一种起誓、宣誓,以为了表明自身思考的正确性,亦即将自身的思考以起誓的方式而设置在被呼唤的神明的名号中,或者以起誓的方式将其思考设置在作为存在基础与存在本身的宇宙秩序之中,这样的宇宙秩序并非被理解为人的存在的始作俑者、创设者,而是作为自然与人的存在秩序的基础而被理解为一种终极稳固性与无可论证性——这呈现为一种神性、神圣性;西塞罗在其名著《论国家》(De re publica)中区分法(ius)与律(lex),在他看来,法的基础在整体的自然之中、并且是人所能够认知的,而律则是此间世界的立法者所给出的,他以不同的概念讨论不同的问题,以 lex(律)讨论自由意志与人所给出的法律之间的关系,以 ius(法)讨论国家宪法,以 mos(伦理)讨论被普遍认同的习惯法,以 iudicabam(或 iudicam,自然法则)讨论自然界的秩序(譬如天体运行之规律);其

[36] 就此请参见 Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Der Anfang des westlichen Rechts, Mohr Siebeck, (Tübingen 2018). S. 26. Mario Bretonne, Geschichte des römischen Rechts. Von den Anfängen bis zu Justinian. (2. Auflage, Beck, München 1998). S. 229. 就历史的疆域拓展而言,请参见 Theodor Mommsen, Römische Geschichte. (Deutscher Taschenbuchverlag GmbH & Co. KG, München 1976). Band 1, 334-398, 405, 466-473; Band 2, 32-85; Band 3, S. 169-199; Band 4, S. 120-161, 214-295; Band 6, S. 17-229. 就原本的罗马法,请参见 Theodor Mommsen, Römische Geschichte. (Deutscher Taschenbuchverlag GmbH & Co. KG, München 1976). Band 1, S. 76-89, 94-105, 159-173; 就拓展与变化后的罗马法,请参见 Band 1, S. 257-278, 291-301; Band 2, S. 20-26; Band 3, S. 258-259, 261-261, 269, 348-391; Band 5, 152-161, 226-230; Band 6, S. 239, 247-249; Band 7, S. 34-35.

[37] 就此请参见 Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Der Anfang des westlichen Rechts. (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2018). S. 26-27. Theodor Mommsen, Römische Geschichte. (Deutscher Taschenbuchverlag GmbH & Co. KG, München 1976). Band 1, S. 173-196; Band 2, S. 386-406; Band 3, S. 419-443; Band 4, 229-230; Band 5, S. 235-238; Band 6, S. 100-102, 247-249, 254-255; Band 7, 27-33, 55-56, 120-121, 156-167.



概念分殊之明晰, 非常值得我们思考<sup>[38]</sup>; 这样的分殊似乎给罗马帝国及其法律的基督宗教化过程造成很大压力, 或者说, 似乎为思考神学、哲学与法学的基督宗教思想家造成思考的难题, 特别是为自然法从自然理性到神性理性的思维转换造成困难。

然而基督宗教的思想家们在此并无太多教条与禁忌, 他们在上帝创造万物的前提下、亦即在“起初”或“在起初天主创造了天地”的宇宙论与创世论前提下将自然法视为自然理性逻辑思考的产物。也就是说, 基督宗教重要思想家的自然法思想继承了罗马法的自然法思维方法, 将自然法视为人的自然理性的产物, 亦即视为人的理性思维与认知的产物, 无论是奥古斯丁、抑或是其后中世纪经院哲学的诸多学者、以至于经院哲学的高峰托马斯·阿奎那、甚或威廉·奥康与宗教改革家马丁·路德, 皆持此一观点; 而在一些学者看来, 后人对于罗马法的自然法思想的汲纳, 在方式上近乎于一种无意识的、不假思索的, 亦即理所当然的<sup>[39]</sup>。

## 1.2 罗马的法与宗教——罗马的俗世宗教与作为神圣宗教的基督宗教

### 1.2.1 近现代法学为什么质询作为其开端的罗马法——其意义究竟何在?

不仅近代的法学家(譬如萨维尼)、而且现代的法学家都认为, 罗马法自诞生以来其普遍适用性甚或纵贯全部欧洲法学、法史、法学史、法学教义史与社会历史等<sup>[40]</sup>, 以至于罗马法对于欧洲以及欧洲以外的文明与文化都极具意义<sup>[41]</sup>; 众多罗马法专家所达成的共识在于, 罗马法的历史并非仅仅罗马法的法学文献的历史, 而且也是罗马法不断规范日常生活的历史, 也是人们不断认知罗马法的历史, 而当今如同以往一样, 甚至第二次世界大战结束以来的日常生活的各个领域都被法的、特别是罗马法的规范所建构, 并且这些规范的增删变化同时反映出时代的变化, 因而在近现代质询本源就具有了意义<sup>[42]</sup>; 而质询开端、起源, 首先似乎意味着质询一个隐形或隐性的前提, 也就是把过程与当下视为某种终结点、哪怕是临时性的终结点; 质询开端、起源, 其次似乎也提示人思考其后的发展轨迹, 这轨迹似乎不仅有线性的, 而且还有多元并进的, 有可能是连续的, 也有可能是有中断的; 质询开端、起源, 同时也意味着质询问题所包含的诸多元素以及问题的意义。

在此要探讨的问题是法律的宗教源泉。

如同探讨历史的过程一样, 探讨法律的宗教源泉与过程, 也必然是从历史上的某个当下出发而回溯到本源的, 罗马法作为近现代西方国家法学的源头之一——之所以是“之一”, 是因为现代法学也受

[38] 就此请参见 Cicero: “Ergo ille, civis qui id cogit omnis imperio legumque poena, quod vix paucis persuadere oratione philosophi possunt, etiam is, qui illa disputant, ipsis est praeferendus doctoribus. Quae est enim istorum oratio tam exquisita, quae sit antepenenda bene constitutae civitati publici iure et moribus?” (“于是那样的人就以强力命令与法律的惩罚强迫所有市民去做这件事, 而这是哲学家们凭其话语无法说服少数人去做的; 甚至冠盖前茅的博学鸿儒们也仅仅诉诸讨论而已。究竟这些人的什么言说如此这般的博洽, 以至于相对于被公开的法律与诸多伦理规范所良好建构的国家而言人必须将它考量在先?”) De re publica. Lateinisch-Deutsch, Übersetzt und herausgegeben von Michael Albrecht. Reclam, Stuttgart 2013. Liber primus, 2, 3.

又: “Sed posteaquam coepit rationem huius operis scientissime Galus exponere, plus in illo Siculo ingenii quam videretur natura humana ferre potuisse iudicabam fuisse.” (“在嘉鲁斯开始以博闻强识阐释其著作的法律理性时, 我则认为, 在这位来自西西里的男人中隐匿着比人的属性所能带来的更多的精神。”) 同上, Liber primus, 14, 22.

Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Der Anfang des westlichen Rechts. (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2018). S. 26.

[39] 就此请参见 Fritz Schulz, Geschichte der römischen Rechtswissenschaft. Böhlau, (Weimar 1961). S. 84. Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Der Anfang des westlichen Rechts. (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2018). S. 26.

[40] 就此请参见 Friedrich Carl von Savigny, Geschichte des römischen Rechts im Mittelalter. Band 1-7, in (2. Auflage, Heidelberg 1850-1851, Nachdruck 1956). P. Koschaker, Europa und das römische Recht. (4. Auflage, München und Berlin 1966). Peter G. Stein, Römisches Recht und Europa. Die Geschichte einer Rechtkultur. (Fischer Verlag 1996). Herbert Felix Jolowicz, Roman Foundation of Modern Law. (Oxford University Press, Oxford 1957).

[41] 就此请参见 Heinrich Honsell, Römisches Recht. (8. Auflage, Springer Berlin Heidelberg 2015). S. 1-3.

[42] 就此请参见 Wolfgang Kunkel, Martin Schermaier, R? mische Rechtsgeschichte. (14. Auflage, Böhlau Verlag Köln Weimar Wien 2005). S. 241-245.

到其它因素的影响,譬如犹太文化中的法律概念、法律思想<sup>[43]</sup>——在其整体的展开过程中,呈现为法律、法学的基督宗教化与日耳曼化,甚至由于伊斯兰教拓展到罗马文化许多地区而产生完全不同于希腊—罗马文化的伊斯兰教文化,以至于罗马法在历史的展开过程中也包含伊斯兰教文化的因素<sup>[44]</sup>。这也表明,一方面,尽管罗马法文化与宗教文化中的宗教仪式(宗教礼仪)关联甚少,并非呈现为程式化的外在现象,然而却并非完全独立于宗教之外,宗教对法律的影响甚至是直接的、内在的;直到古典晚期,毫无宗教影响的法学思维几乎是不可想像的,这不仅对基督宗教的传播造成相当困难,而且对于罗马法的基督宗教化而言也是一种难题。当然另一方面,法律与宗教是相互影响的,这种相互影响的关系同时也为基督宗教与法律文化创设了相结合的可能性。

### 1.2.2 罗马的宗教与罗马法

如同前文已然提及的、而在此仍需要强调的是,罗马的宗教是实践的、务实的宗教,并非道成肉身意义上的、而是人的宗教<sup>[45]</sup>,并非虔诚的(*pietas*)、而是忠诚的宗教(*Loyalität*)<sup>[46]</sup>;从宗教学的角度来看,如果基督宗教是神圣的宗教的话,那么罗马的宗教更多的是俗世的宗教,并非将自身必须、必定、必然回溯到一个绝对—神论的神圣本源,并非宣称自己是以道成肉身为本源的、神明(上帝)启示的信仰,譬如既有某种信仰,将皇帝视为神、视为具有神性品性的统治者,又有与之截然相反的观点,或曰:并非严肃认真地将皇帝视为神<sup>[47]</sup>;在此,“宗教”作为普遍概念,在罗马国家日常生活中能够涵盖极为不同的关于宗教或关于“神圣”的理解,能够涵盖各种不同的、甚或在教义上相互冲突的宗教,这一内涵庞杂的概念本身就是值得研究的问题。

如同罗马人的法律一样,罗马人的宗教实践与其罗马理念与罗马城密切关联<sup>[48]</sup>,基督宗教诞生前、直到古典晚期,罗马作为一座城决定着罗马文化的气质与空间,这首先呈现为罗马史上一种宽容的氛围,这可从罗马法、罗马宗教以及罗马宗教与罗马法三个方面来看:

一方面,从罗马法的角度出发来看,如同前文所阐释的,在不断思考并入罗马国家的其他民族与地区的法律的同时,罗马法不仅有能力推动、并且也的确推动了自身的理性化,而且为罗马的宗教创设了某种普世化的条件,这在宗教上则呈现为一种多神的品性,其他民族的神明也被恭敬在罗马人的神庙中,罗马的宗教是不断容纳外来宗教、陌生宗教的宗教,不仅神明,而且宗教在罗马的文化中庶几应当呈现为复数;从宗教学的角度上来看,宗教在罗马国家与文化中应当是一种上位概念,包罗一切可以包罗的宗教,罗马国家许可人从中各取所需,以达成对国家的认同、服从、甚至忠诚,罗马人的宗教首先所关涉的,似乎并非个体,似乎并非个体的宗教,而是关涉国家、关涉社会、关涉人群团体的宗教,这使得罗马的宗教作为某种政治统筹性、政治统合性的宗教而具有一种似乎并非完全的价值意

[43] 就此请参见 Karl-heinz Ladeur/Ino Augsberg, “Der Buchstaben tödtet, aber der Geist machete lebendig”? In: *Rechtstheorie* 2009. S. 431-471. Karl-Heinz Ladeur/Ino Augsberg (Hrsg.), *Talmudische Tradition und modern rechtstheorie. Kontexte und Perspektiven einer Begegnung.* (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2013).

[44] 就此请参见 Karl-Heinz Ladeur, *Der Islam und sein Recht. Die Vermeidung der Unterscheidungen.* In: *Aechiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie* 103 (2017). S. 71-100.

[45] 就此请参见 Marie-Françoise Baslez, *Comment notre monde est devenu chrétien.* (Seuil, Paris 2015). S. 11. Karl-Heinz Ladeur, *Der Anfang des westlichen Rechts.* (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2018). S. 36.

[46] 就此请参见 Clifford Ando, *The Matter of God: Religion and the Roman Empire.* (Cal: University of California Press, Berkeley 2008). John Scheid, *Les dieux, l'Etat et l'individu. Réflexions sur la religion civique à Rome.* (Seuil, Paris 2013). Karl-Heinz Ladeur, *Der Anfang des westlichen Rechts.* (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2018). S. 36.

[47] 就此请参见 Paul Veyne, *L'emoire gréco-romain.* Seuil, (Paris 2005). S. 50-51, 80, 507, 833; Glen W. Bowersock, *Greek Intellectuals and the Imperial Vult in the second century A. D.*, In: Willem den Boer (Hrsg.), *Le culte des souverains dans l'Empire Romain; Entretiens sur l'antiquité classique. XIX.* (Fondation Hardt, Genf 1973). S. 184. Karl-Heinz Ladeur, *Der Anfang des westlichen Rechts.* (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2018). S. 39.

[48] 就此请参见 Stephan Mitchell, *A History of the Later Roman Empire AD 284-641.* (Wiley, Oxford 2007). S. 230. Karl-Heinz Ladeur, *Der Anfang des westlichen Rechts.* (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2018). S. 36.

义上的、而是含混的普遍适用性或普遍适应性,以至于并非在质的意义上、而是在量的意义上具有兼容并包的普世性,这样的普世性甚或也能够塑造一个帝国,这样意义上的宗教为罗马法不断突破自身的界限以不断发展、以不断在量的意义上的普世化,至少部分的准备了道路与活力;在这个意义上,庞杂的宗教整体作为动力,推动罗马法不断思考作为思维对象的宗教、作为思维质料的宗教,并且不断突破自身的界限,这同时也意味着法的理性化,这一宗教推动下的理性化也表明,至少在一定的历史时期中,罗马法不断超越自身而渐进为普遍适用的法。

另一方面,从罗马的宗教这一角度来看,恰恰由于罗马的宗教具有广泛而庞杂、包罗万象、囊括众神的品性,并且各有其神明、教义、礼仪等,因而罗马的宗教无论作为庞杂之整体、抑或是各单一宗教,在实践上、在国家宗教的意义上比较难于为作为帝国理念基础的罗马法注入活力,以使得罗马法从其具体的宗教实践中获得推动力,以使得法律自身能够具有普遍适用性而适应普世帝国的统治属性;罗马的宗教承认、认可君权(皇帝)的至高无上的地位,甚至赋予其神明的权能,其结果在于此间世界世俗的君权为自身原本并非完全清晰的超越性质创设了凌驾于此间世界的神圣的合法性,并因此而使整体的君权统治无论在世俗、抑或是在宗教的视野中同时具有了神圣秩序与世俗秩序的性质,并且这两种秩序之间也相互限定,风起而云涌、肩随而辘结;罗马的宗教在宇宙论层面清晰呈现出罗马理念(“我给了你无边的帝国”),将宇宙秩序视为神明给出者、被神明给定者,而众神在给定宇宙秩序之后则较少光顾与照料之<sup>[49]</sup>,以至于宇宙秩序庶几无法被回溯到位格化的神明的规范意志、秩序意志之中,以至于整体的宇宙秩序对于人的思维秩序而言几乎是彻底开放的<sup>[50]</sup>,也就是说,人并非仅仅被动地遵从神意而行事,而是能够以其思维与行为主动介入宇宙秩序,这样的介入是一种认知宇宙法则与人自身法则的理性化过程,同时也是法律的理性化过程。

最终第三方面,同时从宗教与法的角度出发来看,能够回溯到神性启示的罗马理念,不仅已然成为了祖先的伦理(亦即前文所谓“mos maiorum”),也就是成为了祖先的法律、法则,而且罗马人也将罗马法回溯到罗马起源神话与罗马民族自己创设的一些神话<sup>[51]</sup>,这样的理念、法则与神话奠定了罗马城的神圣与法律气质的基础,也就是奠定了罗马人日常生活、政治生活的宗教与法律的基础;而由于罗马宗教的庞杂性,于是在罗马的宗教生活中、特别是在基督宗教诞生前的宗教生活中,某个宗教很难作为决定性的、主导的、主宰的、律法意义上的以及意识形态般的主流宗教而成为国家宗教,其宗教生活的特点是并无核心宗教、主导宗教,因而有权威学者认为,其宗教实践的核心因素与结构是祭祀礼仪(或曰祭典)<sup>[52]</sup>,而宗教礼仪的功能之一是传介神人关系,亦即沟通人群与众神,其特点在于固定程式的不断被重复、不断被回忆、不断被当下化,也就是说,神人关系以及人相对于某种秩序的关系在不断的重复中被回忆、被加强、被当下化,这也意味着宗教与法律的的同时的理性化;而基督宗教对这一理性化、特别是法律理性化的过程卓有贡献,并且使得罗马法有可能成为、并且最终成为普遍适用的法。

如同前文所阐释与分析的,罗马的宗教是一种俗世的宗教,是一种务实的、以现实的具体生活为轴心的宗教,不仅罗马的法律体系具有一种案例辨识、案例认知的品性——如同前文在引述权威学者的基础上所阐释与分析的,而且比起神学对宗教的抽象反思而言——神学作为一个学科的目的就是

[49] 就此请参见 André-Jean Festigièrre, *Epicurus and His Gods*. (Harvard university Press 1956). S. 57. Karl-Heinz Ladeur, *Der Anfang des westlichen Rechts*. (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2018). S. 37.

[50] 就此请参见 Bruno Delorme, *Le Christ grec*. (Bayard, Paris 2009). S. 101. Karl-Heinz Ladeur, *Der Anfang des westlichen Rechts*. (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2018). S. 37.

[51] 就此请参见 Marie Theres Fögen, *Römische Rechtsgeschichte. Über Ursprung und Evolution eines sozialen Systems*. (Frankfurt am Main 2003).

[52] 就此请参见 Clifford Ando, *The Matter of God: Religion and the Roman Empire*. (University of California Press, Berkeley 2008. Footnote 171). Karl-Heinz Ladeur, *Der Anfang des westlichen Rechts*. (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2018). S. 38.

以自身特有的方法论对宗教加以超越性抽象反思,毋宁说罗马的宗教也同罗马的法律体系一样更具有案例辨识的认知品性或认知论品性,在这个意义上以及在这样的历史背景上,罗马的宗教并非重在宗教经典与教义的释义(exegesis),而是重在对祭典礼仪(ritus)的描述(describe)与解释(interpretation),也就是说,并非以宗教经典(譬如某部经书、或经文)、而是以现实的、实践的行为作为描述与解释的基础理由,特别是对所谓神谕的解释,其解释的出发点更多的是人的行为;在前文多次引述的法学家拉多尔看来,罗马宗教的这一特点同时也是其弱点,一方面,如同对法的解释一样,这样的解释也难免太过游移性、变通性,另一方面,罗马的宗教过度依赖于社会结构,是一种较少反思自身的宗教,而匮乏反思或思维引导的宗教,在注重并不断容纳新宗教的罗马国家难于面对变化的世界、难于引导社会的进步、难于引导社会适应变化的世界,以至于在古典晚期不仅无法一如既往引导社会、而且已经无法适应与处理社会的变端,因而必定走向衰败,这一点完全不同于犹太教与基督宗教<sup>[53]</sup>;如同著名罗马史与罗马法律及宗教专家克利福德·安多(Clifford Ando)所正确指出的,古典晚期、特别是二世纪末到三世纪末这一百年间(193-284年间),尽管基督宗教尚未被承认为合法的宗教,更未被视为国家宗教,然而罗马的统治阶层、精英阶层已然认识到帝国俗世宗教的衰败状态,他们也在寻求新的意识形态或宗教——哪怕不是普世性的意识形态与宗教——来阐释帝国统治的合法性,当此之时,统治阶层的上层已经看到其统治基础所已然发生的变化,已经将基督宗教视为罗马帝国新的统治秩序的可能性基础,他们不仅已经预见罗马帝国俗世宗教最终消解的结果,而且已经预见到,其俗世宗教与帝国法律体系、统治秩序必定被一个神圣的普世宗教及其律法思维所取代,也就是说,尽管面临罗马传统宗教与社会的抵制,以至于基督宗教被施加各种迫害,然而基督宗教中的普世思想已然在罗马帝国的信仰实践中逐渐取代被罗马的历史、法律以及传统的宗教等所造就与决定的固有信仰,而终于成为普遍适用的宗教与思想<sup>[54]</sup>。

## 2 罗马法律文化的基督宗教化与基督宗教自身的基督宗教化究竟什么是基督宗教化?

### 2.1 基督宗教作为“未完成的宗教”与“基督宗教化”

居今识古,我们庶几可以说,“基督宗教化”不仅对于罗马的俗世宗教以及俗世宗教的罗马人、而且对于基督宗教自身都是一种棘手的理性难题,这样说的原因在于,无论是从基督宗教、抑或是从罗马文化出发来看,它们各自的思维基础首先呈现的是一种在政治、法律、宗教以及实践上的无可融合性;如同前文所阐释与分析的,罗马文化的显著特征,是其文化中根深蒂固的法律理性与宗教政治理性,而基督宗教甫一诞生,就在希腊哲学与犹太宗教的思维方式中具有反思宗教的强大的神学理性;恰恰由于罗马文化与基督宗教各自强烈的特征,因而在它们相遇而向一种新的文化过渡的进程中都经历了痛苦的相互适应的阶段,也就是说,罗马的法律与宗教已然是一种秩序性的思维,而尽管基督宗教的思维秩序由于共同的希腊哲学背景而对于罗马文化来说并非完全陌生的,但是由于犹太宗教绝对一神论影响下的基督宗教三位一体的上帝论并不认信作为人的罗马皇帝的神性属性,因而罗马文化的秩序性思维与基督宗教反思信仰的思维秩序未免产生齟齬,而产生齟齬并非仅仅意味着相互

[53] 就此请参见 Clifford Ando, *Imperial Rome AD 193-284. The Critical Century.* (Edinburgh UP, Edinburgh 2000). Footnote 185. Karl-Heinz Ladeur, *Der Anfang des westlichen Rechts.* (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2018), S. 39.

[54] 就此请参见 Clifford Ando, *Imperial Rome AD 193-284. (The Critical Century.* Edinburgh UP, Edinburgh 2000. Footnote 185). William V. Harris, *Roman Power. A Thousand Years of Empire.* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2016). S. 211. Karl-Heinz Ladeur, *Der Anfang des westlichen Rechts.* (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2018). S. 39-40.



冲突,而是同时也意味着一种相互汲纳而产生新思维的可能性,从社会史与教会史的角度来看,在这一新的可能性产生之前,基督宗教是一种未完成的宗教,在这一可能性成为现实性之后,基督宗教则更是一种在绝对真理诉求中无限完善自身的宗教。

根据前文所引述的罗马法专家弗里茨·舒尔茨(Fritz Schulz)的研究,在罗马帝国基督宗教化的进程中,罗马法律的转换不仅并未被持久遗忘、甚或并未被遗忘,而且具有了更加彰显的人文倾向<sup>[55]</sup>,我们就此可从罗马帝国与基督宗教两方面来观察,也就是说,一方面,从罗马帝国的角度来看,尽管法律系统中论证与反思的非人格化形式相对减弱,并且尽管这种人文化倾向是一种法律秩序自身转变的内在过程,然而帝国及其法律等的基督宗教化依然独具意义,也就是说,罗马法的俗世因素、俗世宗教因素再度被削弱,这不仅意味着罗马法律、特别是“祖先们的律法”(习惯法)在新的文化植被中的连续性,而且也意味着整体的罗马传统在其中的保持;另一方面,从基督宗教的角度来看,基督宗教的哲学家在罗马帝国及其法律等基督宗教化的过程中,总是将其思考回溯到理性、回溯到反思宗教的神学理性,在思想层面给出奠定在神性基础上的法则般的抽象秩序概念,他们以反思宗教的神学理性与奠定在神性基础上的法则般的抽象秩序概念来展示其希腊哲学的思维方式及其这一思维方式主导下的信理内涵,将其思想吟咏给周边世界与共同世界,而在实践层面则汲纳俗世宗教诸多因素(譬如感恩祭典中若干结构以及节庆等),恰恰由于这一点,俗世宗教传统在基督宗教的日常宗教实践中并未完全中断,甚或并未中断。由此,如同诸多学者所总结的,在这种交融、变端的整体氛围中,罗马法的文化语境被改变,也就是说,基督宗教为罗马法的普遍适用化准备了路径,为罗马法成为以作为个体的人为中心的普遍适用的法预设了运行轨迹<sup>[56]</sup>,为罗马法的开放性体系开启了开放性的未来,以至于罗马法的开放性能够使之在中世纪达到一个新的飞跃<sup>[57]</sup>。

对于罗马帝国以及罗马法在古典晚期的文化转换而言,“基督宗教化”这一表述并非能够被理解为某种新的理念与实践、新的崇拜与仪式等及其对于旧有的俗世宗教、崇拜等的战胜与征服;在文化转换过程中,基督宗教在希腊、罗马文化的影响下也历了一个从“未完成的宗教”到完全脱颖而出的过程,基督宗教诞生之初也并非一种同质性的统一宗教(固然也并非必须是一个同质性统一宗教),无论是从社会史、抑或是从教会史的角度来看,基督宗教这一脱颖而出的过程,本质上也是一个改变自身的过程,在其最初的两百年间,基督宗教是被容忍的、甚至是间或受到迫害的少数派宗教,属于这一宗教的社会上层在这一时期尚属少数,从思想史层面来看,基督宗教的脱颖而出是基督宗教内在变化的过程,当其草创之初,基督宗教对其自身信仰与教义的表达不仅尚未完全成熟,而且更为严峻的是充满问题与矛盾,或者说,对于诸多哲学与信理问题还没有足称满意的答案,其信理的核心,无论是道成肉身论、抑或是基督两性论、甚或是上帝三位一体论,新则新矣,然而其思维之内在结构与外在轮廓却并不十分清晰,其自身在成文经典、信理内涵、祭典礼仪、教会组织结构等意义上还是一种未完成的状态、还不是一种完型的宗教,其原因首先在基督宗教内部,当此之时,人们期待耶稣基督(默西亚)的很快的再度来临,以审判生者、死者,人们相信,此间世界的生命终结在可视见的将来,因而经典的结集、理论的建构等并非具有重大且长远之意义;然而无论如何,作为其信理核心内涵,在上帝面前人人平等的思想(并且这一思想同时意味着每一个个体都能够享有与上帝的中介关系<sup>[58]</sup>),不仅对于罗马

[55] 就此请参见 Fritz Schulz, *Geschichte der römischen Rechtswissenschaft*. (Böhlau, Weimar 1961). S. 377. Karl-Heinz Ladeur, *Der Anfang des westlichen Rechts*. (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2018). S. 68.

[56] 就此请参见 John Marenbon, *Pagans and Philosophers. The Problem of Paganism: From Augustin to Leibniz*. (Princeton UP, Princeton 2013. Footnote 214).

[57] 就此请参见 Carolin Humfress, “Law and Custom under Rome”. In: Alice Rio (Hrsg.), *Law, Custom and Justice in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages*. (Proceedings of the 2008 Byzantine Colloquium. Hellenic Studies Institute, London 2011), S. 23.

[58] 就此请参见 René Pfeilschifter, *Die Spätantike. Der eine Gott und die vielen Herrscher*. (Beck, München 2014). S. 97.



的政治与宗教振聩发聋,而且对于罗马的法律思维也补弊起废,并且恰恰这一人人人生而平等的思想对于法律思维的普世化、普遍化贡献颇丰<sup>[59]</sup>,不止一位学者正确指出,特别是当三世纪末罗马遭遇一系列军事失败时,人们更将这一思想不仅视为罗马自身文化传统的替代品,而且视为由习惯法统治的社会秩序合法性的替代品<sup>[60]</sup>。

在这个意义上,我们庶几可以说,“基督宗教化”不仅意味着罗马帝国及其法律等对基督宗教思想的汲纳——这是罗马帝国文化脱离古风般传统的开端,而且必然也意味着基督宗教从希腊、罗马的哲学与宗教中汲纳、甚至过继诸多概念与思想——尽管过继希腊哲学的概念与形式的初衷与目的似乎仅仅在于对上帝启示等的认知,然而这毕竟也是基督宗教成为普世思维、普世宗教的开端,这同时也意味着基督宗教本身在汲纳罗马俗世宗教过程中在经典结集、信理论证等意义上从“未完成的宗教”向完备而完型宗教的达成过程,以至于基督宗教在君士坦丁大帝在位时不仅最终成为帝国存在合法性的法律源泉,而且在基督普世君王思想(Christus Pantokrator)以及反思罗马俗世宗教的神学理性的引导下成为帝国普世君权统治合法性的法律基础与论证依据。

在这个意义上,我们庶几可以总结说,就本文所探讨的法哲学主题而言,“基督宗教化”具有多重含义,一则意味着罗马帝国的基督宗教化,亦即在不断衰落中其君权统治重新找到其合法化的法律基础,再则意味着基督宗教的基督宗教化,亦即基督宗教自身从边缘性宗教、从未完成性宗教到完型宗教的基督宗教化,三则意味着基督宗教自身的同质性统一以及在这一统一之下的帝国的统一,四则意味着基督宗教不仅融入希腊、罗马文化,而且以哲学与神学理性反思之,并逐次建构自身的思想与法律体系。

## 2.2 反思罗马法与基督宗教信理的神哲学法则化

从前文的阐释与分析可见,所谓“基督宗教化”本质上并非单方面的罗马帝国及其原有俗世宗教、法律等的全盘基督宗教化,亦并非基督宗教的全盘罗马化,而是一种不同思想、法律与宗教等的修和、和解;同时,如同前文一再引述的德国权威法哲学家拉多尔所恰当指出的,在整体上描述罗马法的基督宗教化并非一件易事,原因是多方面的,譬如基督宗教的兴起恰恰在罗马法处于危机的时期、罗马文化处于一个“试验”阶段<sup>[61]</sup>,也就是说,基督宗教从一个“未完成的宗教”到完成自身的基督宗教化的过程恰恰处在罗马法与罗马文化的衰落时期。

而两者之间的这一修和思想,不仅引导基督宗教及其信徒在其宗教思维与行为中作出最基本的调整,而且引导基督宗教汲纳并坚持罗马的法律思维,并且在这样的汲纳与坚持中将罗马法造就成动态发展的、自治的以及深知自身界限的西方普遍适用的理性法律的最重要的组成部分;当然,尽管其作为理性法律而具有普遍适用性,但是在其它文化语境中转用或借鉴这样的理性法律亦并非一件易事,原因恰恰由于语境等的不同以及故有而固有意识形态的故有而固有性。

这一修和思想以及修和思维方式中的“基督宗教化”,不仅对于罗马法、而且对于基督宗教都颇具意义,一方面,就罗马法而言,法律认知与宗教认知的分殊不再一如既往仅仅是直觉的或部分理性的,而是在基督宗教神学理性的批判下主动向着理性分殊迈出了第一步,以至于逐渐成为普遍适用的法律秩序,这是其此间世界存在合法性的更为坚实的基础;另一方面,就基督宗教而言,它不再是边缘性、未完成的宗教,不再是松散而零散的教会团体,而是在罗马的社会与制宪秩序(法律秩序)中成为

[59] 就此请参见 Stephen Mitchell, *A History of the Later Roman Empire, AD 284-641*. (Wiley, Malden/Oxford 2007). S. 186. Karl-Heinz Ladeur, *Der Anfang des westlichen Rechts*. (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2018). S. 69.

[60] 就此请参见 Peter Brown, *The Rise of Western Christendom, Triumph and Diversity, AD 200-1000*. (John Wiley, Malden/Oxford 2013). S. 19. Jörg Rüpke, *Reichsreligion? Überlegungen zur Religionsgeschichte des antiken Mittelmeerraums in der römischen Zeit*. *Historische Zeitschrift* 2011 (292), S. 297-298.

[61] 就此请参见 Karl-Heinz Ladeur, *Der Anfang des westlichen Rechts*. (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2018). S. 74.

建制性宗教,从弥散的组织成为自治的教会,并且基督宗教神学反思之下的普世主义宗教因素立足于并稳固在罗马法律与哲学的原生态普世主义的古老基础上,而罗马帝国在帮助基督宗教达成普世宗教的同时,也被视为上帝的工具而具有神圣性;最终第三个方面,同时就罗马法与基督宗教两者而言,由于作为上位概念的罗马俗世宗教是一种祭典礼仪所决定的现实生活的实践性宗教,因而并非众神所给出的律法以及对于律法的阐释、而是每一个单个人的恰当行为才是不同传统与“祖先的伦理”(习惯法)的真正载体,匮乏神性律法及其阐释,导致罗马法与罗马俗世宗教较少神学反思,而基督宗教作为个体(基督)与上帝全新而直接关系的宗教,通过对其经典(《旧约》、《新约》)的不断诠释而奠定其思维的基础,并且因此而是反思的宗教、反思自身的宗教,是主动理解自身的宗教,其理解与反思自身的思维方式蕴涵在希腊哲学之中,也就是说,对于宗教经典的不同阅读方式与理解来自于希腊哲学:譬如对于柏拉图理念概念就有诸多不同阐释,这是基督宗教阐释启示神学的思维基础,在这一思维基础上对于罗马俗世宗教与法律的反思本质上也意味着基督宗教与罗马宗教与法律的修和。

总而言之,不仅对于俗世的罗马法、而且对于基督宗教而言,亦即两者都认可的是,法与律无论在个体自身之中、抑或是个体之间,都是重要的关系条件,人必须具有法律能力,以规范自身、以规范与他者的关系,罗马法与基督宗教的开放语境与动能为西方法的建构奠定基础。

当然,对于基督宗教而言,反思罗马法并非一件易事,特别是当基督宗教自身还是一个少数、边缘性宗教之时,并且罗马帝国俗世的政治秩序对其还施加压力之时,从法哲学角度出发来看,两者冲突的焦点在于宇宙论与自然法,前文阐释了罗马法的自然法思想,而之所以基督宗教不能轻易接受罗马法品性的自然法思想的俗世品性,不能轻易接受其实践性俗世宗教陶铸下的宇宙论秩序,原因首先在于基督宗教所主张的永恒法思想、受造世界的自身法则思想以及上帝意志与人的自由意志之关系思想,恰恰与罗马法之主张相对立,更何况基督宗教的思想家们并非一致而断然认为,自然法思想必然、必须回溯到上帝神性意志之中——譬如占主导地位的基督宗教思想家奥古斯丁、阿奎那等认为,自然法是人的自然理性的产物,也就是说,尽管基督宗教将法、特别是永恒法与正义的终极基础设置在上帝之中、设置在上帝神性意志之中,或曰:设置在立于上帝之中的“起初”(ἀρχή, principium),然而其自然法理解,更多的来自于人对于上帝话语的思考,或曰:来自于人对于“圣言”或逻各斯的阐释与分析、甚或抗论与辩驳;在这个意义上,基督宗教对于罗马法的反思意味着后者还不是一种已经完成而固定的法,并且反思本身与反思的过程都应当是法的构成因素,这使得罗马法及其语境在基督宗教化的过程中具有持续开放而动力强劲的品性。

就基督宗教信理的神哲学法则化而言,依然如同前文所阐释与分析的,基督宗教甫一诞生,作为未完成的宗教也面临自身的基督宗教化问题,除了前文的阐释与分析之外,这样说的理由还在于,基督宗教首先要提出不同于其他宗教的诸如创世论、上帝论、基督论、人文论、救赎论等信理及其神哲学论证,此外在面临众多信众、特别是改宗的犹太人信众时,还必须阐释真正的信仰与异教、异端的区别,还必须阐释被视为律法的《旧约》与被视为上帝恩宠的“新约”之间的关系以及“新约”的律法思想,当此之时,不仅由于宗教是复数的、多元的,而且由于同一宗教内部对自身信理的理解亦非止一种(这一点从基督宗教内部诸多异端的产生就可理解),因而信理及其法则化的阐释是一项重要的理性劳作,而信理的法则化及其在现实生活中的付诸实施与国家政治秩序、法律秩序的关系阐释,对于基督宗教的哲学家们而言同样是一项艰辛的使命。本文在此无法、似乎亦不必对这样的主题面面俱到加以阐释(譬如可从基督两性论出发,亦即从基督完全的神性与完全的人性及其圆融无碍、周流遍至出发,阐发神性法则与人性法则这两种秩序的圆融无碍之关系),仅从上帝论出发对信理的法则化与罗马法的关系稍加阐释,以期点明所探讨的问题而已;基督宗教所信仰的上帝是以圣言创世的上帝、在逻各斯中道成肉身的上帝、在位格关系中三位一体的上帝,这一至真、至善、至美、至义的上帝的理解,尽管一方面与罗马宗教中泛神论、多神论的神明理解以及皇帝君权统治合法性渴求与诉求相互冲突,然

而另一方面也为自身以及罗马宗教与法律留下修和的契机与可能性,基督宗教的上帝是以其神性法则创世的上帝,他是创设法则者,他赋予他所创造的世界以法则,而如果原本就尊崇法律(俗世法律)的罗马皇帝(君主)能够依照这一法则而行事、而统治的话,那么他就能够作为这一法则的传介者、执行者与护卫者而服务于此间世界、甚或主导此间世界;尽管在基督宗教看来,所有的权力、权能、权柄都来自于上帝,以至于权威与权力的自我论证必然被摒弃,然而尊崇自然法则与神性法则的罗马皇帝(俗世统治者)有可能同时成为此间世界的统治权威与精神权威的承载者——尽管这两种饶有分殊、并且也必须有所区分,而且在现实历史中也的确被区分开来;在这个意义上,基督宗教关注的首先是神性意志与自然法则在此间世界的现实生活中的付诸实施,而罗马君权关注的首先是政治权力与俗世法律的合法性,这两者并非必然相互冲突,于是,尽管国家与社会的法律是人所设置的,然而基督宗教的神学法则秩序与罗马帝国的俗世法律秩序不仅依然并不矛盾,而且还有可能并行不悖。

### 2.3 反思罗马法律理性与哲学的基督宗教化

如同前文所阐释与分析的,罗马文化具有法律理性与宗教实践性之特点,在这个意义上,我们庶几能够说,在基督宗教史的早期,罗马文化与基督宗教的修和与结合似乎也能够被理解为罗马理性法律、实践性宗教与基督宗教理性神学、超验信仰的修和与结合,简言之,是思维与信仰、理论与实践的结合;在罗马的文化蕴涵及其基督宗教化过程与基督宗教自身的基督宗教化之间,似乎存在某种一致性,这种一致性呈现在它们的理性思维之中,两者的思想基础、思维方式都能够回溯到作为其源头的希腊哲学之中,它们能够在希腊哲学中各自分别将对方视为知己;也就是说,异教的思维下车伊始就是基督宗教的神学理性与超验信仰的版筑之基,基督宗教作为未完成的宗教在其自身基督宗教化的过程中从未离开这一坚实的基础;这可从思维方式、政治哲学与国家哲学以及哲学、宗教与法律等三个方面来看:

从思维方式上来看,希腊哲学的基督宗教化集中呈现在教父哲学的集大成者奥古斯丁的学术努力之中,而所谓教父哲学者,恰恰是希腊哲学的基督宗教化的丰硕结果,奥古斯丁不仅是这一基督宗教化持之以恒的努力者,而且本身就是其最卓越的代表;基督宗教化的希腊—罗马哲学不仅是基督宗教的自我认知、自我超越,而且也改变了罗马法学。对于奥古斯丁而言,整体的存在真理由两种构成,希腊哲学是外在真理的一部分,上帝将其作为启示的前奏开放给希腊人,而基督宗教的真理则是一种内在真理,尽管奥古斯丁在其晚期的著作中分殊俗世的逻辑与宗教的语言,以至于在这个意义上提点出语言的多元性<sup>[62]</sup>,并且依然在这个意义上提点出认知世界的多样性,然而由于希腊哲学是整体真理的一部分,因而其哲学不仅与基督宗教兼容相济,而且即使是基督徒也能够、并且更能够通过希腊哲学而认知此间世界,并且对于此间世界的认知也是对于上帝创世的朝圣,而朝圣与认知一则是和谐的——朝圣与认知两者都意味着尊重作为上帝创造物的此间世界,再则原本就是基督徒在此间世界最本色的生活,也就是说,认知此间世界与人类社会之秩序也属于基督宗教具体而历史的、并且内涵丰富的生命意义的设置与建构,并且所设置与建构的生命意义必须被不断质询,这不仅意味着认知与照料此间世界、认知与照料人自身<sup>[63]</sup>,而且也意味着基督宗教与古典哲学持续交锋的可能性与空间<sup>[64]</sup>,基督宗教不仅与古典哲学同样为这一持续交锋提供了可能性,而且自身就是这一持续交锋所发生的空间,古典哲学在这个意义上不断基督宗教化。

[62] 就此请参见 Karl-Heinz Ladeur, *Der Anfang des westlichen Rechts*. (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2018). S. 87. Robert A Kaster, *Guardians of Language: The Grammarian and Society in Late Antiquity*. (University of California Press, Berkeley 1988). S. 71, 85, 95.

[63] 就此请参见 Guy Stroumsa, *The Scriptural Universe of Ancient Christianity*. (Harvard UP, Cambridge 2016). S. 44.

[64] 就此请参见 Susan Mennel, *Augustine's "I": The Subject and the Self*, *Journal of Early Christian Study* 2 (1994). S. 291-324 (321-323).



从政治哲学、国家哲学上来看,奥古斯丁认为,在基督宗教诞生后,罗马帝国作为一种理念的现实存在——或简言之:罗马(romanitas)作为理念,已然发生一种内涵转换,罗马帝国已然不再是“我给了你无边的帝国”意义上的国家了,也就是说,不再是时间无垠、空间无际、权能无边以及整体质量意义上的无限永恒之国了,罗马帝国作为神圣的国家其普遍性必须被质疑、其具体的历史性必须被考量、其法律秩序与宗教秩序的互补性必须被审视,罗马理念或罗马帝国作为国家理念已然不再神形兼备,已然不足以作为统治的意识形态,已然不足以作为神明统治的工具;在奥古斯丁看来,尽管法必须从神性意志中推导而出,尽管罗马理念、罗马法在教育养成的意义上曾经能够、并且依然能够持续其功能,以至于没有罗马法人的教育养成就难免有缺憾<sup>[65]</sup>、以至于个体与法的关系本质上能够是个体关联自身的关系,然而罗马法则必须从永恒神性品性中被剥离出来<sup>[66]</sup>,神性的意志就是正义与自由,人对于神性意志内涵构成的探知与绝对理解似乎并无可能、并且似乎也并无意义<sup>[67]</sup>,永恒法并非某种具体的法,而是法的纯粹形式,是基督宗教所认信的上帝的意志,是自由、正义等神圣价值的终极保障,造物主赋予世界以自然秩序、将自然法则刻写于其中,并且留给人以思维与行为的能力,人必须在受造的世界中不断探知这些隐匿的法则<sup>[68]</sup>,怀着朝圣与尊敬之心而认知它们;本文在此经常引述的罗马法专家拉多尔恰当指出,以奥古斯丁为代表的基督宗教哲学家在罗马理念内涵(亦即在政治哲学、国家哲学)之基督宗教化转换过程中的贡献在于,使得基督宗教作为新兴宗教在面对以往世俗案例法的归纳超验意义时,能够在道德律令的意义上更强的阐释法律的神圣性,并且使得每一个个体都自觉将自我与这样的道德律令以及神圣法律关联起来,都以它们作为标准养成自身、检视自身<sup>[69]</sup>。

从哲学、宗教与法律所表述的自我概念来看,基督宗教的自我概念已然不再是希腊哲学中的个体概念,而是在上帝呼召之下、并且为了这一神性呼召而改变了自身的个体;如同其姐妹宗教犹太教、伊斯兰教一样,基督宗教不仅是有经典的宗教——《圣经》,而且是有经典诠释传统的宗教——《圣经》诠释学或释经学,由于经典的诠释在原本的意义上是学习与探知的过程,并且由于经典的诠释作为一种文化以及理性的行为与希腊哲学的相遇,所以基督宗教的经典诠释传统对于其经典的诠释过程不仅是其自身思想绽放的过程与作为一种超验宗教的自身建构过程,而且同时也是对于每一个单一个体的训诫陶养的过程;基督宗教的经典文本《圣经》不仅是自我建构的、而且也是从自我建构到自我超越过程的基础,教父哲学家们对于《圣经》文本的诠释、特别是自始至终多元化的专业诠释,并非在于高自标格、并非在于阐发出多少深刻的思想,更非在于达成能够用来统一全部教会的意识形态般的思想与教义,而是在于涵养人心、滋润人性、陶成人文,基督宗教的历史表明,经典以及基督宗教哲学家对于经典的可理解的诠释,不仅在理论上、而且在生命实践上奠定了个体生命的意义与认同——一言以蔽之:经典及其诠释在于颐养人性、甄陶彝伦,以至于经典文本《圣经》及其诠释不仅在方法的意义导致经院哲学的脱颖而出,而且如同诸多学者所正确指出的,在人类文化史上首次引发关于人的学科(科学)的一种类型的诞生,并且这一在方法上不断系统化的学科类型与神

[65] 就此请参见 Chris Wickham, *The Inheritance of Rome: A History of Europe from 400 to 1000*. (Penguin, London 2009). S. 31. Karl-Heinz Ladeur, *Der Anfang des westlichen Rechts*. (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2018). S. 88.

[66] 就此请参见 Robert A. Markus, *Saeculum: History and Society in the Theology of St. Augustine*. (Cambridge UP, Cambridge 1970). S. 88-89. Stephen Mitchell, *A History of the Later Roman Empire, AD 284-641*. (Wiley, Malden/Oxford 2007). S. 160.

[67] 就此请参见 Kevin Uhalde, *Expectations of Justice in the Age of Augustine*. (University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 2007). S. 136. Ernest Fortin, *Classical Christianity and the Political Order: Reflections on the Theologico Political Problem*. (Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham 1996). S. 205.

[68] 就此请参见 Robert A. Markus, *Saeculum: History and Society in the Theology of St. Augustine*. (Cambridge UP, Cambridge 1970). S. 90. Adam Seagrave, *How old Are Modern Right? On the Lockean Roots of Contemporary Human Rights Discourse*. *Journal of the History of Ideas* 72 (2011). S. 305-327. Karl-Heinz Ladeur, *Der Anfang des westlichen Rechts*. (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2018). S. 88.

[69] 就此请参见 Karl-Heinz Ladeur, *Der Anfang des westlichen Rechts*. (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2018). S. 89.

学亦有相应之关系<sup>[70]</sup>;在这个意义上,在面临多样化的生活形式与生存世界时,经院哲学继承教父哲学而成为一种新的哲学形式,这一新形式的哲学承载着国家的意义,在对《圣经》的阐释与理解中不仅形成一种系统的宗教经典诠释学与信仰的系统论,而且帮助每一个单一的个体在生活形式与生存世界的多样性中给出生命的意义,以至于经院哲学在面临其时代的新问题时也能够被视为一种伦理学或实践哲学,这种伦理学或实践哲学在阐释国家的目的与作为国家基础的法律时具有思维范式的品性以及方法论的意义,其范式的品性与意义在于:对于在释经学中能够被视为法律文本的基督宗教经典文本《圣经》的诠释,必然会面临一个问题,亦即如何解释教会与国家的不同合法性的根源?在此需要特别强调的是:并非别的什么、而恰恰是基督宗教的《圣经》诠释学从教会立场出发至少在一定程度上阻止了国家与教会的毫无缝隙的合一,在一些学者看来,这甚至影响犹太教与伊斯兰教,影响它们反思自己的宗教与法律思想<sup>[71]</sup>。

### 3 古典晚期到基督宗教中世纪的罗马法

#### 3.1 古典晚期基督宗教化的罗马法与法的法典化思想

罗马法在基督宗教化之前并未给出完备的法典思想,在基督宗教中诞生了法典化思想;换言之,古典晚期已经是基督宗教的时代,如同前文所阐释与分析的,古典形式的罗马法在基督宗教中已经悄然发生变化,已经随着基督宗教自身的基督宗教化而基督宗教化,查士丁尼(Justinianus)与东哥特统治者特奥多修斯(Theodosius)治下的罗马法还仅仅是法、法律而已,还没有成为法典<sup>[72]</sup>,在基督宗教经典诠释或释经学的影响下,罗马法不再仅仅是在皇帝(君权)意志下现存法律文本、条文等的汇编,而是开始生成法典理念,并由此而被彻底纂辑、修订与建构为系统而逻辑的法律作品,换言之,古典形式的罗马法已经在基督宗教的意义上获有长足之发展,这一点不仅呈现在西部<sup>[73]</sup>,而且由于西部在政治、军事、经济等方面的衰弱以及由于民族大迁徙与日耳曼化等原因,在罗马帝国之东部、亦即在拜占庭尤其凸显出来,特别是当伊斯兰教兴起并扩张之时,以拜占庭为中心的东罗马帝国对于罗马法的基督宗教化更具深远之意义<sup>[74]</sup>,在东罗马帝国中,其法律思维的主导思想在于,将所有法律都纂辑为成为法,以使得法律文献不仅仅是单一的法律条文,而是在整体上能够在概念层面被思考,以使之成为

[70] 就此请参见 Alain Boureau, *La Religion de l'Etat. La construction de la République étatique dans le discours théologique de l'Occident medieval (1250-1350)*, Les Belles Lettres, (Paris 2006), S. 20. Elsa Marmursztejn, *L'autorité des maîtres Scolastique. Normes et société au XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle*, Les Belles Lettres, (Paris 2009), S. 101. Karl-Heinz Ladeur, *Der Anfang des westlichen Rechts*, Mohr Siebeck, (Tübingen 2018), S. 90.

[71] 就此请参见 Robert M. Cover, *Obligation: A Jewish Jurisprudence of the Social Order*, *Journal of Law and Religion* 5 (1987), S. 65-74. Gareth Fowden, *Empire to Commonwealth. Consequences of Monotheism in Late Antiquity*, (Princeton UP, New Haven 1993), S. 172. Karl-Heinz Ladeur, *Der Anfang des westlichen Rechts*, (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2018), S. 90-91.

[72] 自人文主义时代以来,特奥多修斯所颁布的法律 *Edictum Theoderici* 已经开始被怀疑其真实的颁布者,很可能是西哥特统治者特奥多修斯二世所颁布的,这并非本文所探讨的论题,就此请参见 P. Rasi, *Archivio giuridico* 145 (1953), S. 105 ff. D. Liebs, *Jurisprudenz im spätantiken Italien 260-640 nach Christus*, (Berlin 1987).

[73] 就此请参见 Wolfgang Waldstein, Michael Rainer, *Römische Rechtsgeschichte. Ein Studienbuch*, 11., neu bearbeitete Auflage, (C. H. Beck, München 2014), S. 260-261.

[74] 就此请参见 Michel Kaplan, *Pourquoi Byzance? Un Empire de onze siècles*, (Gallimard, Paris 2016). John F. Matthews, *Laying Down the Law. A Study of the Theodosian Code*, (Yale UP, New Haven 2000), S. 17. Jill Harris, "Superfluous Verbiage? Rhetoric and Law in the Age of Constantine and Julian", *Journal of Early Christian Studies* 19 (2011), S. 345-374 (345). Wolfgang Waldstein/J. Michael Rainer, *Römische Rechtsgeschichte*, 11. Auflage, (Beck, München 2014), § 33, Randnummer 5. Karl-Heinz Ladeur, *Der Anfang des westlichen Rechts*, (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2018), S. 95.



法典<sup>[75]</sup>; 法典思想的意义在于, 一方面, 法的每一个表述(特别是皇帝关于法的表述)同时就是法的创设与设置, 并且超越每一个单一案例而适用; 另一方面, 如果对于法的法律评注导致在个案中对于法典意义的矛盾理解的话, 那么这样的评注就有可能被禁止<sup>[76]</sup>。由于基督宗教的发展, 并且由于罗马帝国分为东、西两个帝国, 于是如同对于西罗马帝国一样, 对于东罗马帝国的法律而言, 罗马帝国作为普世帝国所拥有的普遍适用的法律理念已然不再能够是普世的理念, 并且对于罗马帝国中的异质文化已然不再具有足够的凝聚力、向心力, 这也意味着罗马文化、特别是罗马法对于罗马城的依赖庶几荡然无存; 由此, Romanitas, 亦即罗马或罗马理念, 作为精神的中心、作为法律的中心已是明日黄花, 这为基督宗教与罗马法的相互融入提供了机遇, 如同前文所阐释的, 一方面, 古典的罗马法对于罗马人而言首先是一种生活方式, 甚或是一种自身原则下的生活方式(也就是说, 人自愿尊重、遵守法律), 然则才是一种外在的强力(也就是说, 法律被视为一种强制性的力量)<sup>[77]</sup>, 并且法的法典化思想对于人的生活以及民法模式的形成产生巨大影响<sup>[78]</sup>; 另一方面, 基督宗教强调遵守教义、遵守神性律法与俗世律法, 这与遵守作为自身原则的罗马法不仅绝无矛盾, 而且具有天然的吻合性, 这吻合性甚至是一种不言自明性; 由此, 这一不言自明性与自身原则性就喜结连理, 以至于古典的罗马法已然不再是纯粹古典的罗马法, 而是法典化的、基督宗教化的罗马法<sup>[79]</sup>。

### 3.2 罗马法的日耳曼化

随着罗马帝国的衰落、以至于分崩离析, 无论是在罗马、抑或是在拜占庭所控有的疆域中, 国家机制在文化、政治以及法律层面的演进与改善都未停滞, 随着基督宗教的持续传播——特别是教会组织的以及修院体系的逐步建立、健全, 以至于作为一种政治机制的国家在制宪与法律的发展上必然、必定、甚或必须以教会为基础, 随着民族大迁徙, 不同疆域、语言与文化汇聚到一起, 而在历史上曾经作为统一帝国的经典的罗马理念已经不足以一如既往而囊括之, 当此之时, 基督宗教与罗马法的相互融合, 表明罗马理念、罗马法已经不再能够独自是普世理念, 只能在融入基督宗教后、只能在内涵转换后作为基督宗教的罗马理念而适用, 或者说, 当此之时, 基督宗教的理念成为普遍适用的理念, 罗马文化转入到基督宗教教会中, 并且作为精神财富并未丧失其活力; 日尔曼人在民族大迁徙的路上与罗马文化、基督宗教相向而行, 他们并不拒绝、而是欣然接受罗马文化与基督宗教, 拉丁语作为官方语言被学习、被使用, 并且国家官僚体系与教会修院系统不仅都以拉丁语来学习与接受基督宗教, 而且在保有日耳曼法的同时也同样以拉丁语持守罗马法, 日尔曼的统治者甚至以基督宗教和古典罗马文化的

[75] 就此请参见 Rosamond McKitterick, *The Carolingians and the Written Word*. (Cambridge UP, Cambridge 1989). S. 213. Jill Harries, *Law and Empire in Late Antiquity*. (Cambridge UP, Cambridge 1999). S. 8. Edward Gibbon, *History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*. (Penguin, London 2000). Karl-Heinz Ladeur, *Der Anfang des westlichen Rechts*. (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2018). S. 96. Wolfgang Waldstein, Michael Rainer, *Römische Rechtsgeschichte. Ein Studienbuch*. 11., neu bearbeitete Auflage, (C. H. Beck, München 2014). S. 261-262.

[76] 就此请参见 R. Lambertini, *La codificazione di Alarico*. (1990). Caroline Humfress, *Law and Legal Practice in the Age of Justinian*. In: David Johnston (Hrsg.), *The Cambridge Companion to Roman Law*. (Cambridge UP, Cambridge 2015). S. 161-184 (161, 173). Karl-Heinz Ladeur, *Der Anfang des westlichen Rechts*. (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2018). S. 96. Wolfgang Kunkel, Martin Schermaier, *Römische Rechtsgeschichte*. (14. Auflage, Böhlau Verlag Köln Weimar Wien 2005). S. 223-228.

[77] 就此请参见 Caroline humfress, *Orthodoxy and the Courts in Late Antiquity*. (Oxford UP, Oxford 2007). S. 199, 238. Karl-Heinz Ladeur, *Der Anfang des westlichen Rechts*. (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2018). S. 96.

[78] 就此请参见 Okko Behrends, Wolfgang Sellert (Hrsg.), *Der Kodifikationsgedanke und das Modell des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches*. (Güttingen 2000).

[79] 就此请参见 Wolfgang Waldstein, Michael Rainer, *Römische Rechtsgeschichte. Ein Studienbuch*. 11., neu bearbeitete Auflage, (C. H. Beck, München 2014). S. 267-291.

代表自居,并且以基督宗教与罗马法来论证其统治的合法性<sup>[80]</sup>;同时,以主教为代表的教会的神职体系不仅是教会统一性的基础,而且也是现代国家官员体系的榜样,主教被视为教会权威与法学权威的代表,握有权力去解释地方教会的礼仪实践中的问题以及社会生活中关涉法学实践的问题,而教宗或曰圣座则不仅是上帝赋予权力的托管人、基督宗教教会的领袖、甚至是君权的代表,而且其宗教与法律的整体权威、实际地位与首席权(或首选权)教义也是现代主权国家理念的雏形,甚或是其象征,在这个意义上,整个中世纪基督宗教的神学、哲学、法哲学、教会组织思想、神职体系建构以及相关教义,首先整合了罗马文化、特别是其中的法律思想,并且进一步建构了新而基督宗教的普世主义,这一合成的普世思想、甚或普世价值首先在基督宗教教会论思想的主导下而以基督宗教教会的形式、并且在教会内法典化,然则以俗世国家的政治思想形式而被强调,这一合成而来的普世价值思想不仅为近、现代欧洲法学思想、而且为其国家政治思想的发展奠定了基础。

尽管罗马法在古典时代被规范与程序所决定,在司法实践中被法学家所引领,然而如同拉多尔等法学家所恰当指出的,查士丁尼与特奥多修斯时代并无法典之思想<sup>[81]</sup>,普遍法律或普遍适用的法律,作为一种不同于法律实践的观念,是较晚些时候才发展为一种系统的思想的<sup>[82]</sup>,甚至有学者认为,日尔曼人在其基督宗教化与罗马化的初期淡忘了罗马法,罗马法在其法律实践中并非被充分引用,在其统治的疆域中,不同的民族团体依据其自己的法律而生活,这也能够被视为罗马法衰落的表现(在此需要补充说明的一点是,在这一杂沓纷纭的时代,各个人群团体的法律能够被视为其后的时代中个体权利的过渡形式),而在东罗马帝国的初期也未免于对罗马法的淡忘<sup>[83]</sup>。无论如何,在这些学者看来,法律的法典化思想诞生在东罗马帝国<sup>[84]</sup>,这并非偶然,原因一方面既在于东罗马帝国的文化并非依赖于罗马城、并且以城邦为中心的城市文化的重要性并不凸显,以至于某一城邦的权威无法在文化的记忆中被树立起来;另一方面则在于希腊文化在其中以新的形式的复兴以及官僚体制在整体疆域中的运行,以至于作为目的的普世思维几从未中断过。而西部则并不同时具备这两点,即使在基督宗教化的帝国疆域中,罗马依然是世界的中心、理念的中心,也就是说,西部文化太过依赖罗马城,具有彰显无遗的城邦中心论文化;直到中世纪,罗马法才在博洛尼亚(Bologna)法学派与拉维纳(Ravenna)法学派中得到复兴<sup>[85]</sup>。

### 3.3 宗座首席权教义作为现代主权国家思想之经典范式

从问题本身出发来看,探讨现代主权国家问题,无法离开中世纪的政教关系,皇帝与教宗——君权与教权在中世纪的关系,为主权完整的近现代形式提供了基础;从问题的历史出发来看,在作为世界帝国

[80] 就此请参见 Clifford Ando, *Law, language, and Empire in the Roman Tradition (Empire and After)*. (University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 2011). S. 6. René Pfeilschifter, *Die Spätantike. Der eine Gott und die Vielen Herrscher*. (Beck, München 2014). S. 16. John H. W. Liebeschütz, *The Decline and Fall of the Roman City*. (OUP, New York 2001). S. 402. James G. A. Pocock, *Barbarism and Religion. Band VI, Barbarism: Triumph in the West*. (Cambridge UP, Cambridge 2015). S. 471 ff. Karl-Heinz Ladeur, *Der Anfang des westlichen Rechts*. (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2018). S. 98. Wolfgang Kunkel, Martin Schermaier, *Römische Rechtsgeschichte*. (14. Auflage, Böhlau Verlag K? In Weimar Wien 2005). S. 204-207.

[81] 就此请参见 Karl-Heinz Ladeur, *Der Anfang des westlichen Rechts*. (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2018). S. 99. Caroline Humfress, *Law and Justice in the Later Roman Empire*. In: D. M. Gwynn (Hrsg.), A. H. M. Jones and the Later Roman Empire. (Brill, Leiden/ Boston 2007). S. 121-142.

[82] 就此请参见 Jill Harris/Ian Wood (Hrsg.), *The Theodosian Code. Studies in the Imperial Law of Late Antiquity*. (2. Auflage, Duckworth, London 2010). S. 6, 51. Karl-Heinz Ladeur, *Der Anfang des westlichen Rechts*. (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2018). S. 100.

[83] 就此请参见 Karl-Heinz Ladeur, *Der Anfang des westlichen Rechts*. (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2018). S. 100. 本文在此引述的这一观点并非拉多尔自己的,他所引述的是另一著名德国学者 Fritz Schulz 的观点,然而拉多尔并未给出这一观点的出处,这似乎是一个被普遍接受且耳熟能详的观点。就此,本文前文多次引述的罗马法专家 Fritz Schulz 有两部权威论著足资参照: *Prinzipien des römischen Rechts*. (Duncker & Humboldt, Berlin 1934); *Geschichte der römischen Rechtswissenschaft*. (Böhlau, Weimar 1961).

[84] 就此请参见 C. E. Zachariae von Lingenthal, *Geschichte der griechisch-römischen Rechts*. (3. Auflage 1892, Neudruck 1955). 此外亦请参见 L. Burgmann, M. Th. Fögen, A. Schinck, D. Simon (Hrsg.), *Repertorium der Handschriften des byzantinischen Rechts (Teil I, Band 20, 1995.)*

[85] 就此请参见 Karl-Heinz Ladeur, *Der Anfang des westlichen Rechts*. (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2018). S. 100.

的强大罗马帝国衰亡之后, 一个稳固的中央集权的俗世政治组织(国家), 在中世纪总是不免被视为罗马帝国衰落的象征以及帝国性政治统治衰落的象征<sup>[86]</sup>。前文多次引述的拉多尔等权威学者认为, 从古典晚期到中世纪, 罗马法在西部天主教会、在东部官僚体系中得以保持与发展<sup>[87]</sup>, 中世纪经院哲学的方法自古典晚期即已初露端倪, 经院哲学的方法对于文化的传承与文本的诠释意义非凡<sup>[88]</sup>。

从方法上来看, 经院哲学从对古典哲学与法学的探知出发, 奠定了教会在组织上与思想上的稳固基础, 将信仰与理性在抽象的思维形式与概念的系统结合起来, 造就了基督宗教世界中教宗圣座的神圣尊威, 开创了中世纪罗马—基督宗教的辉煌时代; 以圣座为领袖的罗马天主教会借助经院哲学的方法创设了教会法典, 以至于通过这一法典而承认作为主体的个体自然法权利, 强调了肇端在普世主义中被视为主体的人的因素<sup>[89]</sup>, 并且由此而继承了罗马法的遗产, 甚或取代了罗马法, 在罗马帝国分崩离析之时, 圣座的首席权(首选权)教义在理念与实践上成为现代主权国家观念的先导, 普世教会作为一种机制性、甚或建制性与制宪性的组织(亦即作为法的组织以及享有立法权的组织), 能够被视为现代主权国家的普遍形式, 能够被视为公共权力与私人权利的意义象征, 对于近现代国家不同形式的形成与法人权利的构成具有重大影响。

从古典晚期之神哲学与中世纪之经院哲学出发来看, 耶稣基督被视为恩宠与律法, 在其完全的神性与完全的人性的圆融无碍之中, 呈现出神性律法与人性法律的合一, 奠基在希腊哲学以至于教父哲学之上的基督宗教的信仰越益成为人们生命的内涵与形式, 以教宗为信仰、思想与精神领袖的基督的教会不仅被视为一种组织, 而且也被视为具有内在机制与制宪权能的组织, 以主教为法人、教牧领袖与行政首脑的教区, 在罗马帝国分崩离析之时被视为疆域性的组织结构与行政区划, 教会法典不仅被视为古典哲学与法律的继承者, 而且被视为现代国家行政法的基础<sup>[90]</sup>; 从教父哲学、特别是奥古斯丁的“上帝之国”与“地上之国”的意义出发而言, 所谓“两国”之分殊, 在晚期古典时代并非罗马帝国之当务之急; 当罗马帝国衰落之时、特别是进入中世纪之后, 作为圣座的教宗不仅是罗马天主教会在组织上、信仰上的宗教领袖, 而且在立法与官员体系的意义上越来越是主权与普世性思维的典型形式, 近代国家形式在开端上与宗座的制宪意义密切关联<sup>[91]</sup>; 换言之, 当罗马帝国分崩离析之后, 在神圣罗马帝国德意志民族、特别是其晚期, 罗马皇帝与上帝的天然关联已然不再, 而神圣罗马帝国德意志民族的皇帝的合法性也就不言而喻了, 于是皇帝与教宗——君权与教权, 这两者之间的竞争在俗世权柄与精神权能相互竞争的意义上依然如同古典晚期一样仅仅是次要的而已, 国家与教会分别具有的公共性本质上并非能够被截然分开, 教宗圣座作为一种普遍意义上的立法制宪与组织形式, 不仅能够被视为主权完整的普世形式, 而且也能够被视为近现代国家形式的范型<sup>[92]</sup>。

[86] 就此请参见 Brian Tierney, *Western Europe in the Middle Ages: 300-1475*. (6. Auflage, McGraw Hill, New York 1998). S. 1, 20, 24. Karl-Heinz Ladeur, *Der Anfang des westlichen Rechts*. Mohr Siebeck, (Tübingen 2018). S. 105.

[87] 就此请参见 Karl-Heinz Ladeur, *Der Anfang des westlichen Rechts*. (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2018). S. 100.

[88] 就此请参见 Harold J. Berman, *Recht und Revolution*. Suhrkamp, (Frankfurt am Main 1995). Gillian Evans, *Law and Theology in the Middle Ages*. Routledge, (London/New York 2002). S. 2. Karl-Heinz Ladeur, *Der Anfang des westlichen Rechts*. Mohr Siebeck, (Tübingen 2018). S. 100-101.

[89] 就此请参见 Brian Tierney, *Western Europe in the Middle Ages: 300-1475*. (6. Auflage, McGraw Hill, New York 1998). S. 276, 316. Giovanni Tabacco, *Universalismes et ideologies politiques de l'antiquité tardive à la Renaissance*. (Monfort, Paris 2005). S. 37, 89. Karl-Heinz Ladeur, *Der Anfang des westlichen Rechts*. (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2018). S. 105.

[90] 就此请参见 Jean Bethke Elshtain, *Sovereignty, God, State, and the Self*. ("The Gifford Lectures", Basic Books, New York 2008). S. 63. Karl-Heinz Ladeur, *Der Anfang des westlichen Rechts*. (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2018). S. 104.

[91] 就此请参见 Francis Oakley, *Empty Bottles. Kingship and the Divine in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages*. (Yale UP, New Haven 2010). S. 223. Peter Heather, *Der Untergang des Römischen Reiches*. (3. Auflage, Rowohl, Reinbeck 2011). S. 507. Karl-Heinz Ladeur, *Der Anfang des westlichen Rechts*. (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2018). S. 102.

[92] 此请参见 Richard Miles, *Introduction*. In: Ders (Hrsg.), *Constructing Identities in Late Antiquity*. (Routledge, London 1999). S. 1-15. Karl-Heinz Ladeur, *Der Anfang des westlichen Rechts*. (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2018). S. 102.



从教宗作为宗教领袖的角度来看,有学者认为,圣座在中世纪被理解为一种神统机制<sup>[93]</sup>,而其作为近代国家的范型则在近现代不仅被视为欧盟组织合法性的基础,而且同时也被视为国家政体合法性与基督宗教法律的法则性之间相分离的理由,这一分离亦可被视为政教之分离,而如果政教之分离被视为某种必然或被视为被追求的必然的目的的话,那么其最终之分离必然以圣座神统之终结为前提,或曰:必须以宗教之终结为前提(基督宗教是自然宗教的最高形式)。

从法律概念系统的历史发展过程来看,法律、特别是罗马法历经古典晚期以及中世纪一千年的基督宗教化,已然被成功地建构为法律概念与术语的体系,已然成为学术意义上的法学,已然成为社会实践中被付诸实施的法律,并且在整体的质量上深入近现代而沿革至今;在上述意义上,即使没有圣座、即使没有教会,然而由于至少中世纪以来发展而出的基督宗教的法律庶几就是现代的俗世法律,于是:如果国家俗世政权在体系、合法性以及法律秩序等意义上与教会神职体系、法典秩序等精神权能如影随形、如草随风、如泥随印、如响随声的话,那么这个意义上的政教分离似乎是遥遥无期之事,于是尽管基督宗教的法律体系并非完美无瑕的,然而在当代政教分离的诉求无论是在学理上、抑或是在实践上都无法企及,否则,现代法学与法律以及国家政体要么必须将一千年积淀在自身中的基督宗教的成分彻底过滤干净,必须能够将自己解释为超越任何形式的、以至于超形式的法律规范与秩序,要么俗世国家政权必须彻底更新自身的形式以及法律内涵与法律秩序。

#### 4. 结语

综上所述,如同哲学家与法学家所达成的共识一样,没有中世纪经院哲学在学术上的筌路蓝缕,没有经院哲学家对于依据其普遍法则而创世的上帝在神学、哲学层面的深入阐释与分析,近代科学则庶几毫无可能,在本文前此为止经常引述的众多国际权威法哲学家(特别是德国权威法哲学家拉多尔)看来,这一点也适用于罗马法在近现代的复兴以及在欧洲各国所新生而不同的变种<sup>[94]</sup>;拉多尔等法学专家同时认为,从法学以及法哲学角度来看,如果没有教会法典与宗座权力的完整性及其神圣不可侵犯性,那么近代以来的理性主义、个体主体性以及国家主权完整性的思想则无法想象;如果没有法的基督宗教化过程以及涵盖在其中的世俗化过程,那么近代以来自治的主体权利思想无法想象;同时,罗马法与希腊哲学的基督宗教化,意味着基督宗教版的哲学、法学与法哲学的诞生,这一诞生也意味着在文化转型的准备下古典晚期教父哲学或护教哲学进入中世纪在经院哲学中的持续发展,并且这一持续发展意味着宗教与学术思想各自分殊发展、特别是在大学中机制性的分殊发展<sup>[95]</sup>。

在考量“我来并非要改变律法”的《圣经》经文的意义上,我们庶几可以有如下八个方面之言说,第一方面,基督宗教在时间与空间上都具有一种历史从属性,也就是说,尽管其诞生、兴起与传播等在其自身与古典之间设置了理念的界限以及信仰的分殊,然而却并非终结了、而是承继了古典的信仰与哲学,基督宗教的普世主义、普遍性思维与普世价值思想——或曰:基督宗教作为宗教的普世性,能够被回溯到、甚或被缩减到法律(自然法、实证法)的普世性——既然是普世性,则必然是在人类历史、人类社会之中;第二方面,在基督宗教与罗马法的历史性结合过程中,从属于历史的君权与教权的二元结

[93] 就此请参见 Pierre Legendre, *L'autre Bible de l'occident: Le Monument romano-canonique. (Etude sur l'architecture dogmatique des sociétés.* Fayard, Paris 2009). S. 23, 299. Karl-Heinz Ladeur, *Der Anfang des westlichen Rechts.* (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2018). S. 103.

[94] 就此请参见 Francis Oakley, *The Medieval Experience: Foundations of Western Cultural Singularity.* (The Medieval Academy Reprints for Teaching/Toronto UP, Toronto 1994). S. 168. 在此, Oakley 是在引述怀特海的基础上阐释其这一结论的。亦请参见 Karl-Heinz Ladeur, *Der Anfang des westlichen Rechts.* (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2018). S. 127.

[95] 就此请参见 Karl-Heinz Ladeur, *Der Anfang des westlichen Rechts.* (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2018). S. 127-128.



构,恰恰在自身之中内含一种自由的诉求,国家行政政治的与教会精神的权能各自有其恰当职能,在二元结构中任何单一方面的绝对权能诉求的提出,似乎都应当、甚或必须避免;第三方面,同样在基督教与罗马法的历史性结合过程中,超个体的生命意义的不断激活与多元动态生命世界中的法律规范性,形成一种新的、持续建构自身的生命与思维之逻辑,不仅基督的律法与俗世的律法在这种逻辑的必然性中融汇贯通,而且普世性与主体性也在同一种逻辑的必然性中花萼相辉,于是在普世性中的主体性并非仅仅被普世性所照拂的主体性与主体权利的承载者,而是呈现超主体生命价值与意义的主体性;第四方面,基督教以其道成肉身的信理终结了历史中宇宙论般的救赎论,终结了历史中宇宙论般的个人崇拜与神化个人以及团体崇拜与神化团体的救赎论,不仅开启了个体中神性与人性的直接关系,不仅引入了主体权利神圣不可侵犯的思想,不仅强调了个体生命的神圣性与尊严,而且表述了个体生命中以及文化记忆与回忆中的内在多元性,开启了人在法的秩序中对自身的多元定义与多元发展的更多可能性;第五方面,教会在中世纪被视为古典哲学的象征、被视为古典文化记忆的载体,在希腊、罗马文化中发现、探知、思考并建构自我,特别是在十三世纪以大阿尔伯特与托马斯·阿奎那为代表的经院哲学的高峰时期,整体的中世纪思维的基础结构发生了变化,人的思维与思想不再首先被理解为上帝所赋予的理念的表述,而是首先被理解为人自己的以及被自己所论证的思维的产物,以至于自然法思想被视为人的思维的产物——只是被神性理念完美化而已,作为方法的经院哲学是法的理性的内在形式,这一方法要求放弃神学的主导、要求包括神学在内的学术的自治,并且在上帝与人的关系阐释中重新评价了人<sup>[96]</sup>,大师艾克哈特也认为,人的不确定性开启了人朝向上帝的神秘经验的渠道<sup>[97]</sup>,而如果没有这种前期的思维与理论的准备,也就是说,如果没有如此这般对于作为主体的人的肯认、特别是如果没有对于作为单个个体的人的意义的肯认,那么也就很难想象对于法的肯认、尊重与遵守,这样说的理由除了本文所探讨的以外至少还在于,人是自然法与实证法的出发点;第六方面,对于作为主体的人的价值与意义的肯认意味着任何个人对自身以及对他人的肯认,而主体不再被仅仅理解为意识的形式、不再被仅仅理解为被他者的与集体的意识所建构的形式,而是反思自身、反思自身界限而又持守自身的意识主体,这是人进入法的关系的前提,而政治秩序的合法性、甚或这一合法性在质量与实践上所能达到的极致,必须回溯到对于个体生命主体的价值与意义的肯认之中,这也是基督教自然法思想与实证法理念的理性形式,这一形式不仅肯认人的自由决定的权利,而且将这一权利视为自然法权利——以至于近现代宪法思想与条文中都表述说:人的宗教与良心自由受到保护,这一形式不仅将个体主体权利与自然法的客观秩序联络起来,而且将个体主体权利(特别是对个体权利的承认)与政治秩序的合法性、正义性与正当性联络起来;第七方面,主体权利是就作为个体的主体与国家的关系而言的,尽管这一权利重点体现为公民抵抗权以及对国家行政之主导权与参与权,然而却首先体现为公民个体生命及其尊严是否受到保护以及所受保护的质量,这表明客体自然法权利在逻辑上先于个体实证法权利;第八方面,主体权利、法的主体性以及法的普遍性理解与法的普世性,并非任何个体或者在组织上已完成的团体的任意所建构的、甚或所决定的,而是主体自身与法自身的必然性,这样说的理由在于,人的生命与尊严就是普世秩序、普世价值本身,简言之:人就是普世秩序、普世价值本身!

[96] 就此请参见 Ludger Honnefelder, Albertus Magnus und die kulturelle Wende im 13. Jahrhundert-Perspektiven auf die epochale Bedeutung des großen Philosophen und Theologen. (Aschendorff, Münster 2012). S. 11. Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Der Anfang des westlichen Rechts. (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2018). S. 129-130.

[97] 就此请参见 Loris Sturlese, "Von der Würde des unwürdigen Menschen. Theologische und philosophische Anthropologie im Spätmittelalter". In: Martina Neumeyer (Hrsg.), Mittelalterliche Menschenbilder. (Pustet, Regensburg 2000). S. 21-34 (24). Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Der Anfang des westlichen Rechts. (Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2018). S. 130.

**English Title:**

**On The Horizon (Origin, Beginning) of the Right; About the Christianization of Ius Romanum and its Meaning for Contemporary Jurisprudence**

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**Abstract:** Classical Greek and Roman jurisprudence are the origin not only for the art of thinking in modern and contemporary jurisprudence, but also marked the beginning of the field of praxis; although this beginning has often been noted, every subsequent jurisprudential evolution also referred back to it and was based on its logical order. Beginning from the art of thinking that characterized Ius Romanum, this Article first enquires into its philosophical-theological structure and objective postulates; based on the findings, it then investigates the Roman Ius Naturalis that can be traced back to Ius Gentium; after this it analyzes the inner relationship between Ius Romanum and Christendom, especially their internal logical references; following this it lays out and reflects on respectively the Christianization and canonization of Ius Romanum in the Middle Ages; it then analyzes the sense (meaning) of the questions, opinions and attitudes that modern and contemporary jurisprudence has had about Ius Romanum; and it concludes by arguing that it points to the dignity and value of the human being as Subiectus Iuris et Historiae.

**Key Words:** ius (Right); Ius Romanum; Christendom; contemporaneous jurisprudence; meaning



实践神学  
与中西教会和社会  
Practical Theology and Sino-Western  
Views on Church and Society





# John Hick's Religious Pluralism from the Perspective of Cultural Heterogeneity<sup>[1]</sup>

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**Abstract:** John Hick's religious Pluralistic Hypothesis runs counter to the traditional Christian education he received in his teens, so he has twice been judged a heretic in his life. Scholars in religious studies hold different ideas about Hick's theory. Most of the scholars have studied it from the perspective of homogeneity, claiming that his pluralism confused the differences between the great world religions, and even tried to homogenize them, and finally imposed on them a false unity. This article analyzes Hick's Pluralistic Hypothesis from the perspective of cultural heterogeneity, aiming to prove the feasibility and progress of this theory. Today, religious conflict has become one of the main threats to world peace, and equal dialogue between religions provides a great opportunity for the resolution of the contradictions between them, and can even be an effective way to help maintain world peace. Therefore, the practical significance of Hick's theory of religious pluralism is far greater than its academic and religious significance.

**Key Words:** Religious Pluralism, homogeneity, heterogeneity, Ultimate Reality

## 1. Introduction

At the end of the twentieth century Christianity was in deep crisis. The theological structure developed by the Western church had come to seem hollow and irrelevant to the majority of Westerners, and seem foreign and alien, as an extension of Western cultural hegemony, to many Christians in Africa, India, China and the East generally.<sup>[2]</sup> At the same time, driven by the global economic and cultural integration, great world religions began to have inter-religions and intra-religions dialogues. This interaction and collision have increasingly become the focus of contemporary religious studies in recent decades. In the context of world globalization where cultures are

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[1] Leonard Sidharta, "Looking into the Birth of Gods, A Philosophical Interpretation of the Origin of Idolatry", *International Journal of Sino-Western Studies*, vol. 18, 149-158. (<https://www.sinowesternstudies.com/latest-volumes/vol-18-2020/>)

[2] \* 本文受北京语言大学院级项目(中央高校基本科研业务专项基金)资助,项目编号为 17YJ020007。This paper is supported by project "Rethinking the Religious Pluralism", funded by Beijing Language and Cultural University (Special Funding for Basic Scientific Research in High Education Institutions), Project No. 17YJ020007. John Hick, *A Christian Theology of Religions-The Rainbow of Faiths*, (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1995), preface.

heterogeneous but coexisting, cultural encounters caused the relationship between religions to undergo multiple revolutions of exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism. The British philosopher of religion, John Hick, who is an advocate of an universal ethical religion, has proposed the hypothesis of religious pluralism in his book *A Christian Theology of Religions-The Rainbow of Faiths*<sup>[3]</sup>, attempting to build a cooperative relationship between religions and to develop the faith groups in a harmonious way. John Hick was a leading figure in comparative religion study, and he took an introspective and critical attitude towards his research. With his unique experiences of three controversies in religious studies and his awareness of inner conflicts caused by the conservatives' absolutistic values on religious issues, he realized that a harmonious dialogue between religions is crucial to the peaceful development of mankind. With the aim of coordinating the interrelationship between religions, easing the conflicts among races and maintaining world peace, Hick proposed the religious pluralistic hypothesis. The hypothesis gives the concept of Ultimate Reality which is described as real, ultimate and transcendent, also it points out that Ultimate Reality can be a universal source of all salvific transformation, thus disintegrating the absolute center of each individual religion and promoting the equality among great world religions. The theory provides a theoretical platform and foundation for an equal and harmonious talk among religions, also it works as an inspiration to scholars of religious studies all around the world.

With the unity of knowledge and action, Hick devoted his whole life to the attempt of a theory or hypothesis which can help to establish an equal dialogue between races and an ensured harmony between religions. In his autobiography which was published in 2002, eighty-year-old Hick still raised his doubts about the goal setting and curriculum of the subject, philosophy of religion, in British and American universities, "The first thing to say is that much the greater part of what is called philosophy of religion in the UK and USA is not this at all but is philosophical theology or, in the title of Oxford chair, the philosophy of the Christian religion. The philosophy of religion proper is the philosophy of religion globally, not just of one particular tradition" <sup>[4]</sup>. This proves that it is his lifelong dream to let all religions coexist harmoniously on an equal footing. Although Western scholars have mixed views on his theory, still the hypothesis has promoted the process of peaceful and rational dialogue between religions with great practical significance.

## 2. John Hick and his Pluralistic Hypothesis

Following the Renaissance, the Enlightenment started in Europe in the late 17<sup>th</sup> and early 18<sup>th</sup> century. The anti-feudal and anti-church bourgeois movement once again brought crisis to churches, at the same time provided soil for the seeds of new religious theories. Actually, both domestic and foreign scholars in religious study agree that the pluralism has come into being long ago in Christianity. ZHANG Hua, a leading scholar in religious studies in China, has pointed out, "the concept of Christian pluralism originated in the 1960s and 1970s, and became widely popular after the 1980s; however, Christianity has always faced the dilemma of 'diversity' since the beginning... the

[3] John Hick, *A Christian Theology of Religions-The Rainbow of Faiths*, (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1995).

[4] John Hick, *John Hick-An Autobiography*, (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2002), 311.

Christian basic theological appeal is anti-pluralism, yet it constantly produces seeds of pluralism from some part within itself, thus shaping the historical face of all Western civilization".<sup>[5]</sup>

John Hick was a pioneer in religious pluralism, and three controversies<sup>[6]</sup> in his academic career witnessed his changes from the conservative Christian to the radical one. The occurrence of the three controversies gave a potential to the constructing of Hick's pluralistic hypothesis, provided a mass basis for the spread of the theory, and guaranteed the acceptance of this theory under a new interpretation of a central Christian doctrine.

The first controversy happened in 1959 when Hick moved from Cornell University to Princeton Theological Seminary and hoped he could transfer his ministerial membership from the Presbytery of Berwick in England to the local presbytery of the United Presbyterian Church, the Presbytery of New Brunswick. In the examination of qualification check, he needed to answer a few questions on basic doctrines. When he was confronted with the question related to the doctrine of virgin birth of Jesus, he exhibited his hesitation and could not positively affirm it. So unfortunately, some fundamentalists voted to refuse to accept Hick as a new member. To Hick, being excluded from the Presbytery meant he was no longer a Presbytery minister, and presumably no longer eligible to hold the office of Stuart Professor of Christian Philosophy at the seminary, which was run by the Church. To debate, he stated, "I distinguish between the central Christian faith in the Incarnation, and the theologically peripheral story of the Virgin Birth, and following St Paul, St John and most of the other New Testament writers, I do not found my belief in the Incarnation upon the Virgin Birth tradition. I would therefore not exclude from the Presbyterian ministry..."<sup>[7]</sup>. The whole incident lasted over a year, and finally General Assembly declared that a failure to affirm the doctrine of the virgin birth did not constitute a ground for barring him from Presbyterian membership. The result taught Hick that the principle of toleration on subsidiary theological issues were reaffirmed by the Church<sup>[8]</sup>. Through the first controversy, Hick keenly felt that the dominance of conservatives in the church has been gradually weakened, and a relatively loose environment in Church is the general trend. Also, the incident paved the way for the publication of Hick's work *The Myth of God Incarnate*, which challenges the central Christian doctrine incarnation.

The second controversy happened in 1967, when he was teaching in Birmingham University. Hick described Birmingham as a radical, culturally and religiously pluralistic city, where a tenth of its inhabitants are black or brown. During centuries of imperialism, the racism was planted deeply into British people's mind; On the other hand, different races and cultures merged and collided one another, therefore some political issues were raised up. After that, white and black liberals and radicals sought to fight against discrimination and to promote a just and equal society by taking violent measures. In order to meet this situation of increasing conflicts, Hick with a humanitarian heart, chose to takeover a voluntary group, named All Faith for One Race (AFFOR for short with an

[5] 张华, [ZHANG, Hua], "当代神学的人类学视角及基督宗教多元主义", *Dangdai shenxue de renleixue shijiao ji jidu zongjiao duoyuanzhuyi*, [Anthropological Perspective of Contemporary Theology and the Pluralism of Christianity], 《国学与西学: 国际学刊》, *Guoxue yu xixue guoji Xuekan*, [International Journal of Sino-Western Studies], No. 17, Dec. 2019), 148.

[6] John Hick, *Problems of Religious Pluralism*, (Hampshire and London: Macmillan, 1985), 1-15.

[7] Hick, John, *Problems of Religious Pluralism*, (Hampshire and London: Macmillan, 1985), 3.

[8] Hick, John, *Problems of Religious Pluralism*, (Hampshire and London: Macmillan, 1985), 4.



attempt of exposing the truth of racism), and to be the first chairman. In 1976, he undertook a task to produce a pamphlet, then *The New Nazism of the Nation Front and National Party: A Warning to Christians* had been produced and circulated widely in British churches. After this event, the minority of the church people became aware of, even concerned about Britain's new religious pluralism. They were holding an open and positive attitude to the pluralism, and showing a real desire to see justice. In practice, it was gradually accepted that there is a plurality of divine revelations and contexts of salvations, and that the traditional policy of seeking to convert all mankind to the Christians should be abandoned. Under this circumstances, the doctrine of Incarnation which is one of the central Christian doctrines, was challenged. Hick's experience of debating had paved way for the proposition of Pluralistic Hypothesis in the future.

The third one came from the publication of *the Myth of God Incarnate*, and it centered on the doctrine of the Incarnation, which was greatly valued by the Anglican mind. Because of this event, Hick and other authors of *Myth* had been considered heresy. In this volume, Hick considered the incarnation doctrine as the source of religious exclusivism, so if the metaphorical or mythic features of the language used in describing divine incarnation were admitted, it would be possible for Christians to come to a genuine acceptance of religious pluralism, even the equality of all great world religions.

The occurrence of the three controversies directly contributed to Hick's transforming from conservative Christian to the radical one. At the mean time, it also reflected the embarrassing situation of the traditional churches in British society where the unified and exclusive pattern of the Christian church will inevitably be broken, then a more practical world religious theory will come into being.

In 1985, Macmillan Press published the book *Problems of Religious Pluralism*<sup>[9]</sup>, in which John Hick expresses his ideas on some of the religious issues and explained the theoretical basis of religious pluralism. In this book, he borrows the seeing-as<sup>[10]</sup> proposed by the philosopher Wittgenstein in his *Philosophical Investigations*, and expands it to the experiencing-as which later plays an important role in constructing his theory of religious pluralism. Wittgenstein believes that seeing is just a transient visual experience, while seeing-as is integrated with thought activities and has interpretive significance, "we see it as we interpret it"<sup>[11]</sup>. Hick expands the concept of seeing-as, based only on sight, into the comprehensive conception of experiencing-as which is taken as our ordinary multi-dimensional awareness of the world.<sup>[12]</sup> Hick believes, apart from certain marginal cases, all human experiencing is experiencing as, then he introduces it into religious studies. As far as Hick learns, what Wittgenstein wants to stress is that the way in which we experience our environment depends upon the system of concepts that we use and that this is carried from generation to generation in the language in terms of which we think and behave. There is thus a relativity of forms of experience to what Wittgenstein sometimes called language-games, but Hick

[9] John Hick, *Problems of Religious Pluralism*, (Hampshire and London: the Macmillan Press Ltd, 1985).

[10] Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, translated by G. E. M. Anscombe, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1958, second edition), 197.

[11] Ibid.

[12] John Hick, *Problems of Religious Pluralism*, (Hampshire and London: the Macmillan Press Ltd, 1985), 19.

prefers to name it, cultures. Then it further helps to explain how is that there is not just one form of religious experiencing-as, with its own superstructure of theological theories, but a plurality, which we call the different religions.<sup>[13]</sup> In summary, Hick expands Wittgenstein's seeing as theory into an experiencing as and applies it to human beings' all conscious activities in different cultures, which surely include religious experiences. This conversion of seeing as to experiencing as provides an important basis for the subsequent construction of the Pluralistic Hypothesis.

Another theory which contributes a lot to Hick's theory of religious pluralism is the one proposed by the comparative religious philosopher Wilfred Cantwell Smith. Smith put forward the question of what is religion and what is religious faith in his monograph *The Meaning and End of Religion—a New Approach to the Religious Traditions of Mankind*<sup>[14]</sup>; furthermore, in the following chapters, religious concepts, names and terms which have appeared so far in mankind history and their relation with one another between religions are examined from the perspective of the history of revolution happened to these concepts. Finally, Smith proposes that the concept of “religion”, which originated in the West, with a sense of Christianity involvement should be abandoned for the purpose of having a true understanding of human beings' religious life and conventions, so “cumulative tradition” or “faith” can be the substitutes. Hick inherited the method of interpreting human faith from the historical perspective and different cultures, excluded two most common attitudes of inter-religious dialogue in Christian theology, inclusivism and exclusivism, and proposed that the theory of religious pluralism would be the most feasible one to solve the religious conflicts and political issues. “Each of the great religious traditions affirms that in addition to the social and natural world of our ordinary human experience there is limitlessly greater and higher Reality beyond or within us, in relation to which or to whom is our highest good. The ultimately real and the ultimately valuable are one, and to give oneself freely and totally to this One is our final salvation/liberation/enlightenment/fulfilment. Further, each tradition is conscious that the divine Reality exceeds the reach of our earthly speech and thought. It can not be encompassed in human concepts. It is infinite, eternal, limitlessly rich beyond the scope of our finite conceiving or experiencing. Let us then both avoid the particular names used within the particular traditions and yet use a term which is consonant with the faith of each of them— Ultimate Reality, or the Real.”<sup>[15]</sup>

This is the first time Hick has explicitly given the concept of Ultimate Reality or the Real, which aims to clarify the central issue of the theory of religious pluralism: What is the One which is holy and ineffable in each religion? Hick used the fable of the blind men grasping the different parts of the elephant to map the relationship between different religions, and thus led to the initial assumption of the religious pluralism hypothesis, the existence of Ultimate Reality<sup>[16]</sup>. The putting forward of this concept paved way for his Pluralism Hypothesis in the future.

### 3. The Rainbow of Faiths—John Hick's Pluralistic Hypothesis

In the 1994 Auburn Lectures at Union Theological Seminary, New York, Hick was invited to

[13] John Hick, *Problems of Religious Pluralism*, (Hampshire and London: the Macmillan Press Ltd, 1985), 26.

[14] Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *The Meaning and End of Religion—a New Approach to the Religious Traditions of Mankind*, (New York: the Macmillan Company, 1962).

[15] John Hick, *Problems of Religious Pluralism*, (Hampshire and London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1985), 39.

[16] *Ibid.*, 97.

respond to criticisms of the religious pluralism he advocated. In the lecture, for the first time he officially used the Pluralistic Hypothesis to name his theory and to construct the related contents. He took simple language, clear examples to fully explain his theory of religious pluralism; from the cultural and theoretical basis to the responses to different concerns. In 1995, based on Hick's lecture and responses to criticisms, *A Christian Theology of Religion- The Rainbow of Faiths*<sup>[17]</sup> was published. Although Hick had been working on the research and statement on the theory of religious pluralism for decades, this was the first time he elaborated on his theoretical assumption on religious pluralism in the name of Pluralistic Hypothesis.

In the first chapter, Hick explains the Pluralistic Hypothesis in detail. He begins with the introduction to the three-fold classification within Christian theologies as exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism, then rejects the exclusivism based on God's compassionate doctrine, and rejects the theory of inclusivism on the basis that it is not accepted by religions other than Christianity. The salvation claim is extended to the truth claim, and the relationship between faith and objects of faith is described in aid of the Polish-American psychologist Jastrow's rabbit-duck figure. That is, different judgments about this picture are made by people from different cultural backgrounds, living environments, thinking modes as well as their respective religions, and it is like the way people are seeing their faith. In the end, he leads the solution of a harmonious dialogue between religions to the third one; religious pluralism (Pluralistic Hypothesis).

The core word of Hick's Pluralistic Hypothesis is Ultimate Reality or the Real. In Christian theology, God, Ultimate Reality, the Transcendent, the Real all refer to God, and they are the core and foundation of the faith; and Ultimate Reality and the Real also constitute the foundation of the theory. Hick said, "the hypothesis to which these analogies point is that of an ultimate ineffable Reality which is the source and ground of everything, and which is such that in so far as the religious traditions are in soteriological alignment with it they are contexts of salvation/liberation. These traditions involve different human conceptions of the Real, with correspondingly different forms of experience of the Real, and correspondingly different forms of life in response to the Real<sup>[18]</sup>". Ultimate Reality can not be personalized or depersonalized, and it exceeds human being's conceptual system, so it is ineffable and indescribable. Hick believes that each tradition will continue in its concrete particularity as its own unique response to the Real, in form of different religious experiences<sup>[19]</sup>. Therefore, Hick gives the definition of religious pluralism in his book *The Fifth Dimension: An exploration of the Spiritual Realm*, "We now encounter what is known as religious pluralism, this being the name that has been given to the idea that the great world religions are different human responses to the same ultimate transcendent reality. That reality is in itself beyond the scope of our human conceptual system. But nevertheless it is universally present as the very ground of our being.<sup>[20]</sup>"

Based on Hick's introduction to the Pluralistic Hypothesis, the attributes of Ultimate Reality become clear to readers: the first one is being real, that is, the original being is the ultimate foundation of all beings; the second one is being ultimate, namely, there is nothing more fundamental than it; the third one is being transcendent, which is to say, in the view of human beings' conceptual

[17] John Hick, *A Christian Theology of Religions-The Rainbow of Faiths*, (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1995).

[18] *Ibid.*, 27.

[19] *Ibid.*, 30.

[20] John Hick, *The Fifth Dimension: An exploration of the Spiritual Realm*, (Boston: One world, 1999), 77.

systems, Ultimate Reality is indescribable. The purpose of Hick's endowing the Real with the first two attributes is to include the existence of various ultimate reality in different religions, so as to establish the theoretical superiority of the religious pluralism. Based on the superiority, all religions are responses to Ultimate Reality, "When we have come to see the other great religious traditions as different but (so far as we can tell) equally valid human responses to the ultimate reality that is the ground and sources of everything and the condition of our highest good, we have no reason to restrict ourselves to the spiritual resources of our own tradition"<sup>[21]</sup>.

When talking about world religious issues in his autobiography, Hick once mentioned his favorite words of Sufi Jalaludin Rumi, "The lamp are different, but the Light is same; it comes from Beyond"<sup>[22]</sup>. The divine light was reflected into different colors in different clouds, and it is just like the different responses and religious experiences to their faith in the context of cultural diversities. As the title, *A Christian Theology of Religions-The Rainbow of Faiths* shows, Hick hopes to use the image of rainbow to describe the feature and ideological connotation of his Pluralistic Hypothesis: "This sees the great world faiths as very different but (so far as we can tell) equally valid ways of conceiving, experiencing, and responding in life to the ultimate reality that we call God. The rainbow, as the sun's light refracted by the earth's atmosphere into a glorious spectrum of colors, is a metaphor for the refraction of the divine Light by our human religious cultures"<sup>[23]</sup>.

Rainbow is an apt term to describe the coexistence and the differences of various religions. According to the analogy of rainbow, Ultimate Reality is the sources of divine light and the common goal pursued by various religious believers; different religions are just like the colors in a rainbow, which are formed through the refraction of sunlight by the earth's atmosphere, so there is no distinction of superiority between colors, and it represents all religions are completely equal. The customs, cultures and history of different religions are like the earth's atmosphere which refracts sunlight and helps to form different colors of the rainbow, that is, the human being's mental construction is also an essential condition for the formation of religions. Various colors of the rainbow coexist at the same time, and the ideal goal of religious pluralism is to achieve the harmonious coexistence of various religions. In Hick's theory, he uses rainbow to metaphorize the religious pluralism, aiming to promote equality between religions. However, the traditional theology promotes Incarnation unconditionally, and the promotion has achieved the supremacy of Christianity. Hick's Pluralistic Hypothesis runs counter to it, so his theory meets challenges from all parties.

#### 4. Challenges from the homogeneity perspective

The three controversies in his academic career, his questioning the Incarnation doctrine, and the

[21] John Hick, *A Christian Theology of Religions-The Rainbow of Faiths*, (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1995), 139.

[22] John Hick, *John Hick-An Autobiography*, (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2002), p161. The line is from Rumi; *Poet and Mystic (1207-1273)*; *Selections from his Writings Translated from the Persian with Introduction and Notes*, translated by Reynold A. Nicholson, (George Allan & Unwin Ltd, 1950), 160.

[23] John Hick, *A Christian Theology of Religions-The Rainbow of Faiths*, (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1995), preface.



official proposal of the Pluralistic Hypothesis, put him in the spotlight, and made him under the criticism and doubts from all sides. Hick's academic path shall be filled with hardships and challenges.

The religious pluralism has been suspected since it was proposed. Even today, it has still been a hot topic in the field of religious study. Paulo Huang put forward, "In this global village, pluralism is a disguised inclusivism, but actually the essence of inclusivism is exclusivism"<sup>[24]</sup>, to some degree it also denies the rationality of religious pluralism.

The criticisms of Hick's theory from the perspective of homogeneity can be divided into two categories: the first category is the criticism from the conservatives in Christianity of Hick's denial of the central doctrines (the Incarnation and the Trinity) based on the homogeneity of all western cultures; the second category is the criticism of the theoretical construction of the Pluralistic Hypothesis, and scholars believe that the theory is homogeneous in nature, thus blindly eliminating the differences between cultures and religions.

In 1977, Hick put forward more than once in his *Myth of God Incarnate*, "Christ did not claim to be God", but the Incarnation doctrine is the foundation of Christianity's long-standing one-religion in the western history. The identity of Christ, half man and half god, gives supreme power to the Christian doctrine and Christianity therefore becomes the most advantageous one in great world religions. Inevitably, to question the incarnation must challenge the bottom line of the Christian theological system and touch the nerves of many people. In 1944, Hick gave a lecture at Union Theological Seminary on the Pluralistic Hypothesis, and in 1995, *A Christian Theology of Religions-The Rainbow of Faiths*, an expanded version of the Auburn Lectures, was published. These events caused huge waves first in the field of Christian theology in the West.

In 1997, William J. Wainwright questioned Hick's theory in the book review of *A Christian Theology of Religions-The Rainbow of Faiths* and pointed out that there are logical flaws in the theory<sup>[25]</sup>, "Hick believes that his religious experiences and those of his fellow Christians are *prima facie veridical*. But he also thinks that the experiences of Buddhists, Hindus, and so on are epistemically similar to Christian experience. Hence, they too are *prima facie veridical*. These experiences, however, conflict. If (for example) God exists, Nirvana does not, and vice versa. Now either (1) all are delusive, (2) some are delusive and some are not, or (3) non are delusive. Hick rejects the first alternative, for he thinks that religion is not a 'purely human projection'. He also rejects the second. The traditions must be judged by their moral and spiritual fruits, and these are 'more or less on a par' ... So Hick proposed the concept of the Real to support his hypothesis, but it has flaws (1) that the concept of the Real is empty, (2) that the criterion of religious authenticity isn't adequately grounded, and (3) that by rejecting a tradition's self understanding, pluralism denies its 'otherness'"<sup>[26]</sup>. Besides these comments, Wainwright also pointed out that the Pluralistic

[24] 黄保罗 Huang Baoluo [ Paulos Huang], "儒基会大战吗?" *Ruji hui dazhan ma?* [Is there going to be a War between Confucianism and Christianity? ], 《国学与西学: 国际学刊》*Guoxue yu xixue guoji Xuekan*, [International Journal of Sino-Western Studies], No. 5, June, 2013), 3.

[25] William J Wainwright, Bookreview: *A Christian Theology of Religion: The Rainbow of Faith* by John Hick, *International Journal of Philosophy of Religion*, Vol. 42, No. 2, 1997, 124-128.

[26] *Ibid.*, 124-125.

Hypothesis has two implications for Christian theology. The doctrine of the Incarnation implies the unique superiority of Christianity and is therefore unacceptable. Pluralism also entails the rejection of traditional concept of salvation. For if salvation consists in union with the Trinity, or redemption through the atoning death of Christ, the religions aren't equally salvific.<sup>[27]</sup> Wainwright's criticism reflects the attitudes of most traditional theological critics; in the historical background of long-lasting one-religious monarchy in the West, Hick's Hypothesis denies the core, the Incarnation doctrine, and suggests that all religions are equal and are the reflections of the same Ultimate Reality in different cultural and traditional contexts. Obviously this theory can not be agreed by the scholars who adhere to the traditional theology.

It must be mentioned here that Hick himself is also cautious on this issue, and it is related to his family's religious background. In 1977, as an editor, he participated in the publication of the collective volume, *The Myth of God Incarnate*<sup>[28]</sup>. In 1993, he rewrote and expanded the paper into a monograph, *The Metaphor of God Incarnate*<sup>[29]</sup>. Gavin D' Costa made his comments on it in his book review to *The Metaphor of God Incarnate*, "The title reflects the controversial collection edited by Hick, *The Myth of God Incarnate* 1977, and advances the same argument. What is new is Hick's critical assessment of Christological works previously not attended to by him... In this reviewer's reading, the shift from 'myth' to 'metaphor' signifies no 'literal' advance in the conceptual terms of the earlier debate. This is a shame<sup>[30]</sup>". However, it just shows that after more than ten years, Hick's attitude on this issue has become more cautious.

From the perspective of its theoretical construction, some scholars believe that Hick's Pluralistic Hypothesis has homogenous feature; some even believe that it is monistic rather than pluralistic. It is evident that these criticisms fundamentally negate the logical validity of Hick's theory. Critics of religious pluralism believe that pluralism ignores or eliminates the differences between traditions, even makes them homogenous, become a false unity. In addition, postmodernist writers are apt to attack the integrative way of thinking, because it forcefully changes the complex and colorful world into a single conceptual icon. And the process of globalization has also enhanced this thinking, weakened the "difference" and "alterity" and eliminated "the otherness of the Other". Along with these changes, critics apply this idea to criticizing the religious pluralism, and they say that religious pluralism "totalizes", then "homogenized" all religions, suppressing the mutual "otherness" of each religion. In their view, the religious pluralism is a comprehensive and homogenizing historical scheme, which assimilates to itself, thereby tames and domesticates the practices and beliefs of the different religious traditions. Again, he says, religious pluralism serves effectively to decompose or obscure the radical historical particularity which is constitutive of the true "other". Where a certain Christian barbarism presumes its "superiority" in order to justify the elimination or the conquest of the non-Christian "other", this monological "pluralism" sedately but ruthlessly domesticates and

[27] Ibid, 124.

[28] Edited by John Hick, *The Myth of God Incarnate*, (London; SCM Press Ltd, 1977).

[29] John Hick, *The Metaphor of God Incarnate*, (London; SCM Press Ltd, 1993).

[30] Gavin D'Costa, "Book review; *The Metaphor of God Incarnate* by John Hick", *Religious Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 1, Mar. 1995,

assimilates the “other” -any “other” - in the name of a “world ecumenism”.<sup>[31]</sup>

Raimon Panikkar, the father of inter-religious dialogue, also believes that “to recognize that all creeds are reflections of one transcendent unity or that all religions have relative validity, although this step is important, it does not solve the problem of splitting between human beings.<sup>[32]</sup>” He criticizes the essence of Hick’s theory as monism or reductionism, and he thinks it is unreasonable to attempt to summarize “many” with “one” and assimilate diversity and differences. Mandatory assimilation and suppression will eliminate the possibility of plurality, that is, the religious pluralism would become a tool to promote the laws of identity. Inevitably, this will lead to the emergence of “colonized” regulatory discourse context and the resurgence of universalism over differences.

The critics analyze the theory of religious pluralism from a homogeneous perspective, because they believe that when great world religious traditions were regarded as the different responses to the same ultimate reality, the factors of people who are under different cultures would have been eliminated. This elimination ignores the specific characteristics of different religions and reduces it into a groundless theory. That is, the problems which various religions try to solve are different, but the answer provided by Hick’s theory are the same. For example, the core issue of Judaism is how to bring holiness into everything they do, but the issue faced by Buddhist is how to attain the end of suffering.

In fact, although different great world religions have different ways to express worship, they are same in nature. All religions are constructed on the basis that this world is imperfect and unsatisfactory to most of the people, and at the same time they could promise their believers a better future; they are all about the answers to one question, which is about how to move from an unsatisfactory state to a better one. When Hick tries to solve this problem, he puts different beliefs in one mode, which does not belong to each religion respectively but is given by Hick’s Hypothesis. Because Hick believes that the only way to eliminate the religious egoism and to achieve the goal of equality between religions is to put them on the same dimension of reality, surely the Ultimate Reality can contribute to this possibility greatly. When trying to reduce the “reality” in each religion to its essence, Hick applied a phenomenological method, “experiencing as”, to define the relationship between Ultimate Reality and the “realities” as the relationship between the essence and phenomena. But still his theory has been criticized badly by different parties. Therefore, if Hick’s Pluralistic Hypothesis is studied from the perspective of homogeneity, it will be in a dilemma; while being analyzed from the perspective of heterogeneity, it will give people a lot of inspirations.

## 5. From the Perspective of Cultural Heterogeneity

ZHANG Hua once proposed, “the rapid development of modern anthropology and the anthropological turn in theology are closely connected with the transformation of anthropology and theology, also with the shifting of Western ideological focus to human beings, and it is important for

[31] John Hick, *A Christian Theology of Religions-The Rainbow of Faiths*, (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1995), 40.

[32] Raimundo Panikkar, *Invisible Harmony; Essays on Contemplation and Responsibility*, (Fortress Press, 1955), 61.

people to learn this point in order to further develop anthropology and theology. Therefore it becomes extremely critical to think deeply about many issues of contemporary theology, including religious pluralism, from the perspective of anthropology”<sup>[33]</sup>.

Cultural anthropology, as an important part in anthropology, is closely related to theological studies, and scholars have attempted to introduce methods of cultural studies into theological studies. In fact, some modern theologians have already shown us this possibility. For example, Schleiermacher's idea about theological work can be seen as an inquiry into the culture of the Christian community. Lai Pin-chiu in his paper said that the doctrine of justification by faith is the core belief in Protestantism, but it has been derived into various interpretation in different cultures. Lai believes that if this doctrine can be properly interpreted, it will be a stepping stone rather than a stumbling-block to the future development of Protestant Christianity in China.<sup>[34]</sup> Culture heterogeneity exists generally. In the process of globalization, the direction of cultural development which can be homogeneous or heterogeneous, has also become a hot topic among scholars. Religions, as a carrier of culture, have also demonstrated trend of monism or pluralism. From this perspective, it should be feasible to use heterogeneity theory to explain the religious pluralism.

Many scholars in religious study see religious pluralism as a product of post-Enlightenment rationalism, and some who are influenced by Foucault, Derrida, Habermas, Levinas, and Adorno (although these writers themselves don't discuss this issue) link religious pluralism with a capitalist world hegemony which is concealed behind the current “one world” idea.<sup>[35]</sup> From a cultural perspective to explore the Pluralistic Hypothesis, the discussion of “difference” and “heterogeneity” in philosophical system becomes unavoidable. The differences between beings and between cultures determine that to take the heterogeneous perspective to explore this religious theory can be more feasible and of practical significance.

People's research on heterogeneity stems from the exploration of philosophical theory, but in the era of modernization, globalization, networking and diversification, heterogeneity theory has been borrowed by scholars into various research areas. In the context of globalization, people have begun to pay attention to having a dialogue on the basis of equality and rationality, and henceforth the coexistence of multiple religions has become the norm. Therefore, it is innovative and enlightening to discuss the equality of religions from the perspective of heterogeneity.

Throughout the development of Christianity, conservatives in the field of Christian theology and in church have adhered to the absolute position and universalism of Christianity, and these features have been mainly manifested in religious exclusivism and religious inclusivism. Before the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century, “there is no salvation out of the church” had been an essential principle hold by the religious exclusivists; after that, the idea of Christian absolutism was weakened by the influence of

[33] 张华, [ZHANG, Hua], “当代神学的人类学视角及基督教多元主义”, *Dangdai shenxue de renleixue shijiao ji jidu zongjiao duoyuanzhuyi*, [Anthropological Perspective of Contemporary Theology and the Pluralism of Christianity], 《国学与西学: 国际学刊》, *Guoxue yu xixue guoji Xuekan*, [International Journal of Sino-Western Studies], No. 17, Dec. 2019), 149.

[34] 赖品超, Lai Pinchao (Lai Pan-chiu), “因信称义与基督新教在中国: 兼论芬兰学派对路德的诠释”, *Yinxinchenyi yu jiduxinjiao zai zhongguo : jianlun fenlan xuepai dui lude de quanshi*, [Justification by Faith and Protestant Christianity in China: With Special Reference to the Finnish Interpretation of Luther], 《国学与西学: 国际学刊》*Guoxue yu xixue: guoji Xuekan* [Journal of Sino-Western Studies], No. 16, 2019), 21-35.

[35] John Hick, *A Christian Theology of Religions-The Rainbow of Faiths*, (Louisville; Westminster John Knox Press, 1995), 31.



people's awareness of religious diversity and the occurrence of inter-religious dialogue, then the inclusivism came into being. The religious inclusivism admits that salvation can occur at any time, any place and in any religious practice, but insists that the fact of salvation is the merit of Christ no matter where it occurs. In the end, people of all faiths will be included in the salvation by Christ. Under this circumstance, both the religious inclusivism or exclusivism are the typical form of religious absolutism and egoism essentially, because both of them are in accordance with the Christian centralism. What is more, they contradict with people's awareness of the religious diversity, hence become an obstacle to the establishment of an equal talk between religions. In this situation, a new religious theory, namely religious pluralism, came into being.

Hick once made it clear in *A Christian Theology of Religions-The Rainbow of Faiths*, "Indeed everything of real interest in theology today is controversial, and if the church as a whole is not to descend into bitter argument and mutual anathematizing we have to become accustomed to the rich internal diversity of Christian thought."<sup>[36]</sup> It can be seen that he noticed the diversities within Christianity, and therefore concluded that if there are differences within a religion, the differences between religions will be more prominent and sharper, so he hoped to find a theory which could help to harmonize the religious differences, so as to achieve the purpose of coexistence. Therefore, as an attempt to build a peaceful relationship between religions and to develop the various faith group in a harmonious way, he proposed the Pluralistic Hypothesis. But at the same time, his awareness to the diversities within a religion or between religions can be seen from the statement at the beginning of this paragraph. And he realized that it could be something pretty normal in church in the future, so the differences or heterogeneity of religions should be accepted and be taken as a perspective to solve the problems within or between religions. From the perspective of heterogeneity, Hick's Plural Hypothesis is full of vitality and development potential.

In *Problems of Religious Pluralism*, Hick showed his appreciation to Dr. Philip Almond, for Almond made the cost-benefit analysis of the pluralistic approach to the theology of religions in his paper "John Hick's Copernican Theology" which was published in *Theology* in 1983<sup>[37]</sup>. Almond used the ancient parable of the blind men and the elephant to suggest that the different religious traditions have mistakenly developed dogmatic definitions of the divine on the assumption that their own partial experience of it is complete and adequate. Because each of the men touches different part of the elephant, the one who feels a leg mistakenly identifying the elephant as a tree, the one who feels the trunk identifying it as a snake. The whole thing is like the people's religious experiences, and they develop different conception of divine on their assumption rather than the truth itself. When analyzing and defending his theory of religious pluralism, Hick clarifies that the differences are originated from the formation of various religions. These differences are further reflected in corresponding religious ideologies and practices, therefore different religions have different religious ideas, religious experiences, and ways of responding to the divine reality. In this context, Hick believes that there needs a theory which can make people interested in a large number of differences between these religious senses rather than being bound by them, at the same time to see those

[36] Ibid, 11.

[37] John Hick, *Problems of Religious Pluralism*, (Hampshire and London: the Macmillan Press Ltd, 1985), 96.

differences as humans' responses to the transcendent divine reality. Then we can conclude that Hick's religious pluralism has the following propositions. First, the reality of belief (personal gods or non-personal gods) in the world great religions are not Ultimate Reality, but merely stays as the secondary ultimate reality which are the reflection of the ultimate one, and they are the diversified cultural expressions of Ultimate Reality, the transcendent ontological universe. Second, the redemptions of various religions all include the transformation from self-centralism to reality-centralism. In different cultural, historical and religious backgrounds, people take different paths to seek the unity with Ultimate Reality, thus showing a variety of paths to redemption. Third, the diversity of the secondary ultimate reality will produce different religious forms, religious activities, ethical concepts and religious practices, that is, the pluralism of religions. Fourth, each religion contains multiple good points, also countless evils. The fifth one is the practical significance of religious pluralism: to promote dialogues on the basis of equality between religions, to explore sound ethical resources in religion, to promote religious peace and religious concern to the issues related to human beings' survival.

To sum up, in Hick's theoretical system, clearly he emphasizes the existence of diversity and believes that in the process of developing a world community, human beings should to be tolerant to one another and coexist heterogeneously.

The agreement on the conception of differences help scholars to study Hick's Pluralistic Hypothesis more objectively; from the perspective of heterogeneity, the process of constructing the theory is seeking common ground while reserving the differences, and it is innovative and of practical significance. On one hand, the religious pluralism keeps different doctrine systems intact in their respective religious tradition; but on the other hand, it uses Ultimate Reality as a meta-theory, that is, these complex and diversified religious traditions as a whole are different responses to one Ultimate Reality.

The affirmation of the existence of differences is also reflected in the approvals to different interpretations derived from various cultural contexts to one doctrine. For example, when Huang Paulo and You Bin had a discussion about the Chinese localization of Christianity, they all agree on the "great theology" structure derived from the context of Chinese native culture: Christian science, Christian etiquette, Christian ethics and Christian psychology. These four parts are all built on the basis of Christian classics, thus constituting a complete system of Chinese Christian "great theology".<sup>[38]</sup>

## 6. Concluding Remarks

In 2012, *Religious Pluralism and the Modern World: An Ongoing Engagement with John Hick*<sup>[39]</sup>, the second volume of essays in honor of Hick, was published to mark the occasion of Hick's

[38] 游斌,黄保罗,[YOU Bin, Paulos HUANG]"基督教中国化视角下的路德新诠释", *Jidujiao zhongguohua shijiao xiade ludexinquanshi*,《国学与西学:国际学刊》*Guoxue yu xixue: guoji Xuekan*, [International Journal of Sino-Western Studies], No. 16, March, 2019), 1-16.

[39] Edited by Sharada Sugirtharajah, *Religious Pluralism and the Modern World: An Ongoing Engagement with John Hick*. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

ninetieth birthday. 19 essays were assembled in one volume to reflect the philosophical and theological concerns of John Hick, and there are four sections: 1) religious pluralism and global perspective, 2) religious pluralism and practical concerns, 3) theological and philosophical orientations, 4) John Hick's writings and their impact. "The essays are not recollections or mere praise of Hick's vision for religion in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, but are original insights inspired by his thought. Furthermore, not all the scholars are uncritical of Hick and his program. The conversation remains fresh."<sup>[40]</sup> It can be seen that as a leading figure in the field of comparative religious study, Hick's theory of religious pluralism has far-reaching influence. On one hand, he derived "experiencing as" from Wittgenstein's "seeing as", put forward the proposition that all experience is "experiencing as" and used this as the basis of his Pluralistic Hypothesis. Also based on Kant and Wittgenstein's philosophical views, he explained the philosophical system of Pluralistic Hypothesis with easy words which made his theory more readable and acceptable to readers. On the other hand, Hick's theory of religious pluralism challenged the traditional Christian doctrines, so it has drawn scholars' criticism or support. Those who agree with his view hope to supplement or modify the constituent element based on Hick's theoretical framework, attempting to make this theory more persuasive and complete. Inspired by his theory, some of them even propose a new interpretation to his theory by using different theoretical reference. There are also many opponents: some of them are Christian conservatives, criticizing Hick's infidelity and defamation to Christian doctrine; some of them are from other religions, directly pointing out that Hick's thinking is wishful and idealized, and the western Enlightenment thinking or ideology may be hidden behind his theory.

It is of great significance that Hick's theory of religious pluralism makes a dialogue on the basis of equality possible and lays the foundation for the peace and development of mankind. Because compared with the conflicts of interest which are heavily constrained by various factors, religious conflicts which lack these constraints are likely to break out. Therefore, religious conflicts have become one of the greatest threats to world peace. The equal dialogue between religions has provided a good opportunity for the coordination and resolution of contradictions among religions, and has also become an effective measure to maintain world peace. Therefore, the practical significance of Hick's theory of religious pluralism is far greater than its academic and religious significance.

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[40] Bede Benjamin Bedlack, *Reviews on Religious Pluralism and the Modern World: An Ongoing Engagement with John Hick* by Sharada Sugirtharajah, *Theological Studies*, 2013, Vol. 74 Issue 1, 210-213.

中文题目：

## 文化异质性视角下的宗教多元主义

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**摘要：**约翰·希克与他童年时受到的传统基督教教育背道而驰，因倡导宗教多元论而被两次判为异端。宗教学界对他的宗教多元论也是褒贬不一，多数学者都是从同质化的宗教多元角度来批判宗教多元主义的谬误，认为多元主义消除了传统间差异性，使他们同质化，成为了一个虚假的统一体。本文拟从异质性角度来阐述宗教多元主义假说的可行性和进步性，进一步分析各个宗教的异质共存才是宗教多元主义的基础。

**关键词：**宗教多元主义；同质性；异质性；终极实在





# Augustine on Will and Sin<sup>[1]</sup>

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**Abstract:** As the first philosopher to address free will, Augustine's discussion of the will is closely related to the question "whence comes evil" (unde malum). In the *De libero arbitrio*, Augustine responds to this problem by introducing will (voluntas)/free decision (liberum arbitrium). This article will first distinguish between the will and free decision. In the second section, we will reconstruct Augustine's argument for the self-determination of the will; sin will be defined as departure from God. Finally, this article will point out that post-lapsarian human beings, who suffer from ignorance (ignorantia) and difficulty (difficultas), still have the ability to make decisions freely and still have moral responsibility.

**Key Words:** Augustine, will, free decision, sin

## I . Introduction

It has been shown that Augustine is the first philosopher of the will.<sup>[2]</sup> The reason Augustine could raise this philosophical concept is related to his inquiry into evil. This article explores how Augustine presents the notion of will in *De libero arbitrio* to solve the problem raised by Evodius, i. e., whence comes evil (unde malum)? This question had been raised in ancient philosophy and was named as the "theodicy question" in the context of Christianity and it played a very important role throughout Augustine's writings. It is known that Augustine was a Manichaist when he was young. According to Manichaeism, the principle of darkness is the source of evil. Under the influence of Skepticism, he doubted the doctrine of Manichaeism. After his conversion to Christianity in 386, Augustine finished several works objecting to Manichaeism and confirmed his Christian belief based

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[1] Cf. Yuan GAO, "Augustine's Conception of Sexuality and Marriage: A Defense against Alignment of Human Merits on Continence", *International Journal of Sino-Western Studies*, vol. 12, 73-79. (<https://www.sinowesternstudies.com/back-issues/vol-12-2017/>) This paper is supported by China Scholarship Council, Nr. 201706010376.

[2] For recent accounts of Augustine's theory of will, see Albrecht Dihle, *The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity*, (Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press, 1982), 144; Christoph Horn, "Augustinus und die Entstehung des philosophischen Willensbegriffs," *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung*, H. 1/2 (1996), 113-132; Charles Kahn, "Discovering the will: from Aristotle to Augustine," in JM Dillon & AA Long eds., *The Question of Eclecticism. Studies in Later Greek Philosophy*, (Berkeley/Los Angeles/Oxford: University of California Press, 1988), 234-259; Michael Frede, *A Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), 31-48.

on Neoplatonism. Augustine's anti-Manichean works include *De duabus animabus*, *Contra Fortunatum*, and *De libero arbitrio* and so on.

Even though Augustine never systematically discussed the problem of evil (*malum*), as Leibniz did, he divided evil into three categories: the natural, the metaphysical and the ethical. According to Augustine, the metaphysical evil is the deprivation of good (*privatio boni*). Ethical evil is named as sin (*peccatum*) and this kind of evil has two varieties, namely voluntary sin and punishment of sin.<sup>[3]</sup> By introducing the notion of will, Augustine provided a solution to this old philosophical and theological question.

The notion of will (*voluntas*) is scattered throughout Augustine's earlier works. In *De libero arbitrio*, Augustine articulates his efforts to construct this concept in a philosophical way. When it comes to this work, we must mention Augustine's comments in *Retractationes*, "after I was ordained a priest at Hippo Regius, I completed, in Africa, the second and third of these books, insofar as I could at the same time."<sup>[4]</sup> The first book was finished in 388, the last two books were finished after 392. Peter Brown argues that Augustine still presented a stoic understanding on the will in the first book, although he emphasized the weakness of humanity and the necessity of sin in the third book.<sup>[5]</sup> Following this traditional interpretation, Robert O' Conner separately discusses the Stoicism in *De libero arbitrio I*.<sup>[6]</sup> However, Simon Harrison opposes the traditional reading and defends the continuity of this entire work.<sup>[7]</sup> Related to this discussion, the published works have also concentrated on the discussion of the distinction between voluntary sin and involuntary sin.<sup>[8]</sup>

My concern in this article is with how Augustine established the concept of will while responding to the question of evil and whether his account can also help identify the responsibility of fallen people. In the first section, I will briefly deal with two different conceptions of will. In the second section, I will describe how Augustine constructs the notion of will and connects it with sin. Finally, I will discuss "involuntary sin". I will conclude that Augustine has a consistent understanding of will throughout this work.

## II. Two conceptions of will

As Vernon Bourke shows in his fundamental research, there are different meanings of the

[3] *Contra Fortunatum* 15 "hoc est solum quod dicitur malum, voluntarium nostrum peccatum. Est et aliud genus mali, quod est poena peccati."

[4] *Retractationes I*, 8 "Quorum secundum et tertium in Africa, iam Hippone Regio presbyter ordinatus, sicut tunc potui, terminavi."

[5] Peter Brown, *Augustine of Hippo: a biography*, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000), 149

[6] Robert J. O' Connell, "De libero arbitrio I, Stocism Revisited," *Augustinian Studies*, Vol. 1 (1970), 49-68.

[7] Simon Harrison, *Augustine's way into the will: the theological and philosophical significance of De libero arbitrio*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). Hua Wei has also defended a consistent thesis. See, 花威 Hua Wei, 《意志的创造与堕落——奥古斯丁〈论自由决断〉的内在统一》[The Creation and Fall of Voluntas: Rethinking the Continuity of Augustine's De libero arbitrio], 《哲学门》Zhexue men [Beida Journal of Philosophy], No. 28, 北京 Beijing: 北京大学出版社 Beijing daxue chubanshe [The Press of Peking University], 2013), 31-54.

[8] James Wetzel, *Augustine and the Limits of Virtue*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 76-85, 86-125; 吴天岳 Wu Tianyue, 《意愿与自由: 奥古斯丁意愿概念的道德心理学解读》Yiyuanyuziyou: aogusiding yiyuan gainian de daode xinlixue jiedu [Voluntas et libertas: a philosophical account of Augustine's conception of the will in the domain of moral psychology], (北京 Beijing: 北京大学出版社 Beijing daxue chubanshe [Peking University Press], 2010), 259-306.

concept of will.<sup>[9]</sup> Among them, there are two different notions of will, which are related to human action and can be found in Augustine. In order to illustrate the distinction, we can examine two different examples:

(a) “After some consideration, Michael wants to go to school instead of playing computer games.”

(b) “The young Augustine wants to steal a peach, even though he knows that he benefits nothing from the theft.”

In example (a), we can see that the ‘wanting to’ derives from his reasoning about what is beneficial. It might be better to call it wishing or desiring. In this example, Michael has considered which is better for his life. This notion of will denotes the understanding of will in the ancient intellectual tradition. It finds its roots in the main scheme or conception of the soul. Generally, the soul would be divided into a rational and an irrational part. The will would be subordinate to the rational parts. Hence, there is no separate faculty of will in this psychology.

Now taking example (b) into consideration, we can see that the will is independent on reasoning. It describes the voluntarist understanding of the will. In this tradition, the will can act against reason. This concept of will reveals voluntarism, which stems from the Christian tradition.

Augustine, who is familiar with ancient philosophy and Christianity, has combined these two understandings of will. In his earlier discussions, Augustine has already introduced two concepts of will, namely, will (*voluntas*) and free decision (*liberum arbitrium*). Even though Augustine uses these two concepts interchangeably, we can still illustrate the philosophical difference between them.

*Voluntas* belongs to the intellectual tradition. Cicero used this word to translate Plato’s *boulesis*, which appears in *Gorgias* (466a9-467e5). In this passage, Plato discusses the power of tyrants and sophists. By introducing the will as an intellectual appetite, Plato points out that only those who pursue genuine happiness and lead a rational life can be called powerful. However, those who pursue riches and power are only able to satisfy their own desire. This satisfaction is only accidental and irrational. Because of this Platonic distinction, *boulesis* has been used as a technical philosophical term, which refers to intellectual desire. By contrast, arbitrary decision is bounded to desire and has been criticized by Plato for not being stable. Cicero translated the term with *voluntas* and thereby influenced Augustine. In *De libero arbitrio I*, Augustine convinces Evodius that good will (*bona voluntas*) is based on prudence (*prudentia*). Here, Augustine connects good will with reason, echoing the intellectual tradition.

As for *liberum arbitrium*, it differs from *voluntas* and means a faculty of decision. Christoph Horn has illustrated the features of *liberum arbitrium*. I would like to summarize them here: (1) Ultimate and sufficient causality; (2) Consciousness; (3) Self-motion; (4) Inescapability; (5) Arbitrariness.<sup>[10]</sup> When it comes to the turning of an individual from eternal law toward temporal law, the will in the sense of free decision must play a role. Otherwise how can we interpretate the rational will as it turns voluntarily from eternity when intellectual desire is always oriented to the

[9] Vernon J. Bourke, *Will in Western Thought: An Historico-Critical Survey*, (Sheed and Ward -New York, 1964).

[10] Christoph Horn, “How close is Augustine’s *liberum arbitrium* to the concept of *ep’hêmin*?” in: P. Destrée/R. Salles /M. Zingano eds., *What is Up to Us? Studies on Agency and Responsibility in Ancient Philosophy*, (Sankt Augustin: Academia 2014), 308.

eternal good?

With this distinction in mind, we can understand the basic ideas of Augustine. *Voluntas* means inclination, while *liberum arbitrium* refers to free decision. As Den Bok clearly summarizes, “ ‘will’ in Augustine’s understanding usually means (1) inclination which can be stronger or weaker, directed to this or to that. As such Augustine calls it ‘free’ (*libera*) to the degree what is ‘good’. This inclination is accompanied by (2) a movement of acceptance or consent which can be given to or can be withheld from this or that. Because of this second aspect, the will can be called ‘free’ (*liberum*) with respect to this alternativity, which is a lasting feature of the will.”<sup>[11]</sup>

With the distinction between will and free decision, we can firstly claim that Augustine is not simply an intellectualist or voluntarist. Rather Augustine combined this two traditions. Additionally, with the help of this distinction, we can better understand the different states of human being. Adam and Eve had a free will capable to sin (*posse peccare*); the postlapsarian has a free will not to sin (*non posse non peccare*); people in heaven have a free will not to sin (*non posse peccare*). All of them have free decision. Only Adam and Eve could have the power to choose between good and evil. The postlapsarians are oriented to evil and have only a false freedom. In contrast, people in heaven are only oriented towards the good, which would be called true freedom.<sup>[12]</sup>

### III. Voluntary sin

*De libero arbitrio* begins with Evodius’s question, whence comes evil (*unde malum*). His aim is to prove that it is not God but the human will that is the creator of evil. Augustine presents his solution in the form of a dialog. The dialog is not a historical one; rather, Augustine develops it philosophically. Augustine uses the method of *maieutics*, leading Evodius to approach the truth. We can see that Augustine proceeds from external action to moral psychology and even to a metaphysical construction of the world.

Now we begin to describe Augustine’s efforts in three steps, in order to find the definition of evil. Namely, from the evil actions to the psychological analyze of desire and lastly to the metaphysical structure of the world. In the first book of *De libero arbitrio*, Augustine begins with different kinds of evil actions. Augustine takes adultery (*adulteria*) as an example. Evodius points out that it is evil not because it is forbidden by the law. Instead, it is forbidden by the law because it is evil. From then on, Augustine reminds Evodius to turn to the inner world, in order to find the definition of evil. That means evil is not restricted to outer actions. Rather the evil is related to desire, which is not seen from the outside.

In the second step, Augustine turns to the inner world and regards “lust” (*libido*) as the cause of the evil actions, which is the synonym of desire (*cupiditas*). We should note that Augustine does not claim that desire is *per se* blameful at a first glance. Both good people and bad people have desires.

[11] Den Bok Nico W. “Freedom of the Will: A systematic and biographical sounding of Augustine’s thoughts on human willing,” *Augustiniana* 44, 3/4 (1994), 245.

[12] Marianne Djuth, “Liberty”, in Allan Fitzgerald eds., *Augustine through the Ages*, (Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2009), 496-497.

Augustine introduces the concept of blameworthy desire (improbanable cupiditas). But what kind of desire is blameworthy? Augustine raises an example. When a slave kills his master in order to protect himself, should this desire for living be taken as blameworthy? In what follows Augustine raises a Stoic criteria of desire: "Good people pursue this by turning their love away from things that cannot be possessed without the risk of losing them. Evil people, on the other hand, try to remove hindrances so that they may securely attach themselves to these things to be enjoyed."<sup>[13]</sup> From this passage we can see the contrast between the things which we will necessarily lose and those things which we will not. Similarly, the Stoics hold that people should desire things in their power (in potestate), for example, virtue, wisdom and so on. On the other hand, people should not desire those things which are beyond their control, e. g. riches, fame. This comparison belongs also to the distinction of *ta eph'hemina* or in potestate.

With this distinction, Augustine can finally answer the question whether the slave, who kills his master, is blameworthy. At first glance, the slave was driven without doubt by his desire to continue living. However, life will be eventually lost. Therefore, the slave desires things which he will lose. He is blameworthy. Yet, Evodius also points out that the law permitted such action, in order to avoid greater evils. Here the conflict arises between the definition of evil and the requirement of the law - the law allowed the slave to kill his master in this situation, while the slave should not kill the master to keep his life.

From this point on, the dialog turns to the metaphysical realm in the third step. To strengthen the contrast, Augustine directs the discussion to a metaphysical one, by introducing the distinction between eternal laws and temporal laws. According to the eternal law, the soul is higher than desire: "since (a) anything equal or superior to a governing mind possessed of virtue does not make it the servant of lust, on account of justice, and since in addition (b) anything inferior to it could not do this, on account of weakness, as the points we have agreed on between us establish, we are left with this conclusion: Nothing makes the mind a devotee of desire but its own will and free decision."<sup>[14]</sup>

In this passage, Augustine gives his final answer to the *unde malum* question. For him, the will and free decision are the cause of the evil. Nothing other than they themselves could force them to be the servant of lust. Moreover, we could see that Augustine appeals to the concept of order (*ordo*) implicitly. Here, he mentions the inferiority of the mind or reason to desire. And he expounds on the conception of order in the following two books. In *De libero arbitrio* II, Augustine presents in which sense free will is good. He uses a lot of ink to prove the existence of God. Based on this proof, Augustine shows to Evodius that all things that come from God are good. In order to explain the order, Augustine appeals to the neo-platonic worldview and sees the world as a hierarchy of the good: great goods (*magna bona*), intermediate goods (*media bona*) and lesser goods (*minima bona*). As the intermediate good, the will could either become greater or lower. As Augustine writes,

[13] *De libero arbitrio* I, 4. 10. "boni appetunt avertendo amorem ab his rebus, quae sine amittendi periculo nequeunt haberi; mali autem ut his fruendis cum securitate incubent, removere impedimenta conantur." For the English translation of this work, I mainly quote from *On the Free Choice of the Will*, ed. and trans. by Peter King, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

[14] *De libero arbitrio* I, 11. 21. "quidquid par aut praelatum est, non eam facit servam libidinis propter iustitiam; quidquid autem inferius est, non possit hoc facere propter infirmitatem, sicut ea quae inter nos constiterunt docent; nulla res alia mentem cupiditatis comitem faciat, quam propria voluntas et liberum arbitrium."



“Therefore, when the will adheres to the common and unchangeable good, it achieves the great and fundamental goods of a human being, despite being an intermediate good. but the will sins when it is turned away from the unchangeable and common good, towards its private good, or towards something external, or towards something lower. The will is turned to its private good when it wants to be in its own power; it is turned to something external when it is eager to know the personal affairs of other people, or anything that is not its business; it is turned to something lower when it takes delight in bodily pleasures.”<sup>[15]</sup>

Obviously, we can see the platonicharacter of Augustine’s thought. We should note that Plotinus has not raised the notion of will. However, Plotinus grounds the basic structure of Augustine’s understanding on the world - order. The free will, as an intermediate good, is given by God. When it turns toward God, it will become greater. But when it turns away from God, it becomes lower. Augustine completes the proof for the independence of the will in the *De libero arbitrio* III. “... the mind becomes a slave to lust only through its own will; It cannot be forced to this ugliness by what is higher or by what is equal, since it is unjust; nor by what is lower, since it is unable.”<sup>[16]</sup> The just God would not force human beings to sin, and the lower things cannot force him to sin. In this sense, only the will decides itself and could choose between a better or a lesser good. No doubt, Augustine has established his understanding of the free will. Nothing can force the will except itself.

In *De libero arbitrio* II, 20, 54, when it comes to questioning whether the movement of the will comes from somewhere beyond itself, Augustine gives a negative answer. It is worthwhile to mention here that some commentators would claim that Augustine could not explain where the first will to sin comes from. Based on this text, they would see Augustitne as an agonist.<sup>[17]</sup> However, it is not proper. As far as I can see, what Augustine wants to emphasize is that the will is the first cause. In other words, the will determines itself and hence can be seen as the first-mover.

#### IV. The will of fallen man

In the previous section, we have seen that Augustine provides a general discussion of voluntary sin and concludes that the human will, rather than God, is the author of sin. The theodicy question could be finally answered by introducing the notion of will. However, the will has only been presented in a normative way. Metaphysically, the will is independent. But Augustine has not yet

[15] *De libero arbitrio*, II, 19, 52. “Voluntas ergo adhaerens communi atque incommutabili bono, impetrat prima et magna hominis bona, cum ipsa sit medium quoddam bonum. Voluntas autem aversa ab incommutabili et communi bono, et conversa ad proprium bonum, aut ad exterius, aut ad inferius, peccat. Ad proprium convertitur, cum suae potestatis vult esse; ad exterius, cum aliorum propria, vel quaecumque ad se non pertinent, cognoscere studet; ad inferius, cum voluptatem corporis diligit.”

[16] *De libero arbitrio*, III, 1. 2. “nulla re fieri mentem servam libidinis, nisi propria voluntate: nam neque a superiore, neque ab aequali eam posse ad hoc dedecus cogi, quia iniustum est; neque ab inferiore, quia non potest.”

[17] 花威 Hua Wei, 《意志的创造与堕落——奥古斯丁〈论自由决断〉的内在统一》[The Creation and Fall of Voluntas: Rethinking the Continuity of Augustine’s *De libero arbitrio*], 《哲学门》Zhexue men [Beida Journal of Philosophy], No. 28, 北京 Beijing: 北京大学出版社 Beijing daxue chubanshe [The Press of Peking University], 2013, 50.

advanced to the discussion of the will of fallen people, which we could name as a non-normative will. This difference can also be reflected from the scheme of the book. Notoriously, Augustine starts to change his strategy from metaphysical argument to a historical-theological one from the text of *De libero arbitrio* III 18, 51. Based on this abrupt change, Alflatt claims that Augustine does not have a consistent position. Besides, he names the sin of fallen people as “involuntary sin”.<sup>[18]</sup>

The distinction between the normative and non normative description of will finds its roots in the Christian understanding of original sin. As we know, Augustine gives his classification of evil, namely, the sin and the punishment of sin. From the historical-theological perspective, the first is related to Adam and Eve, while the second is related to fallen people. Adam and Eve have freedom to sin (*posse peccare*). They have a perfect state of free will in the sense of free decision between good and evil. In contrast, fallen people would sin necessarily (*necessitate*). That is to say, they have only freedom to sin. (*non posse non peccare*).

How does Augustine describe the human situation after the fall? It comes to ignorance (*ignorantia*) and trouble (*difficultas*). As Augustine writes,

“For there really are two penalties for each sinful soul; ignorance and trouble. Through ignorance the soul is dishonored by error; through trouble it is afflicted with torments. But to approve falsehoods as truths so that one errs against one’s will, and to not be able to hold oneself back from lustful actions due to the relentless and tortuous affliction of carnal bondage, is not human nature as originally established, but the penalty after being damned.”<sup>[19]</sup>

As we can see, ignorance and trouble are two determinations of fallen people. The notion of ignorance is ambiguous, which has been interpreted from different points of view. One of these points of view relates it to practical wisdom, which echoes the Aristotelian prudence (*phronesis*). The other is the knowledge of God.<sup>[20]</sup> Regarding trouble, it means the affliction of carnal bondage and relates to the weakness of will in this paragraph. It reflects what Paul says, “I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want.” (Rom 7:19)

Now, how should we understand the relationship between ignorance and trouble? According to T. Y. Wu, some scholars have ignored the analysis of trouble or tried to reduce trouble to ignorance.<sup>[21]</sup> Wu criticizes that this intellectualist reading and claims that it has not considered the independence of the will. I agree with Wu’s critics and want to emphasize the relationship between trouble and will from two different perspectives. First, as we have mentioned in the first section, free decision as the faculty of decision can act against reason. This means that even if we have knowledge, either practical knowledge or knowledge of God, people could still sin. Second, Augustine defines

[18] Malcome Alflatt, “The development of the idea of involuntary sin in St. Augustine. *Revue d’Etudes Augustiniennes Et Patristiques*, 20(1-2), 1974, 113-134.

[19] *De libero arbitrio*, III, 18, 52. “Nam sunt revera omni peccanti animae duo ista poenalia, ignorantia et difficultas. Ex ignorantia dehonestat error, ex difficultate cruciatus affligit. Sed approbare falsa pro veris, ut erret invitus, et resistente atque torquente dolore carnalis vinculi, non posse a libidinosis operibus temperare, non est natura instituti hominis, sed poena damnati.”

[20] See Yang Xiaogang, *Der Begriff des malum in der philosophischen Psychologie Augustins*, (Paderbon, Ferdinand Schöningh, 2016), 163.

[21] 吴天岳 Wu Tianyue, 《意愿与自由: 奥古斯丁意愿概念的道德心理学解读》*Yiyuanyuziyou: aogusiding yiyuan gainian de daode xinlixue jiedu* [Voluntas et libertas; a philosophical account of Augustine’s conception of the will in the domain of moral psychology], (北京 Beijing: 北京大学出版社 Beijing daxue chubanshe [Peking University Press], 2010), 138-139.

trouble as carnal habit (*consuetudo carnalis*) or carnal bandage (*vincula carnalis*) in this paragraph.<sup>[22]</sup> What Augustine says is not that the desire of the body causes the trouble, but rather that it is the consent (*consensus*) of the will toward the desire that causes trouble. This phenomenon cannot be interpreted in the intellectualist tradition. For the intellectualist would appeal either to lack of knowledge or to the overriding of desire over reason. Augustine would not agree that desire is the source of evil and he would point out that the consent of the will is the source of sin. For in this consent the will loses its order, namely aversion from the better good and attraction to the lower good.

Now we can turn to the question of whether fallen people are still free and should take their responsibility for ignorance and trouble. At first glance, it is worth mentioning a rhetorical solution. As O'Connell puts it, Augustine has made use of the word "proprie". It means that voluntary sin is proper sin.<sup>[23]</sup> Accordingly, the involuntary sin is sin in a weaker sense. However, we need to find more plausible reasons for the involuntary sin.

Moreover, we should notice the distinction between punishment (*poena*) and sin (*peccatum*). It does not mean that the punishment has cancelled free will. As Augustine writes,

"If of its own will the soul neglects this progress in the best studies and in religiousness, the ability for which has not been denied to it, then it is justly cast into more serious ignorance and trouble (which is already a penalty). It is placed among inferior things by the most fitting and suitable governance. The soul is not held guilty because it is naturally ignorant and naturally incapable, but rather because it did not make an effort to know, and because it did not work enough to acquire the ability to act rightly."<sup>[24]</sup>

We can see in this passage that fallen people still have a will (*propria voluntas*) and the power over themselves. As Augustine emphasizes, sin does not originate in ignorance and trouble, which are normal in the state of fallen nature. Rather human souls ignore their power to search for true life. When the soul does not make an effort to know, the soul would be seen as sinful. For the effort to know lies in the power of the will.

After making this argument, Augustine turns to his Christology to explain his ideas concerning ignorance and trouble. Augustine shows that Jesus as a person has overcome ignorance and trouble. This functions as an example to show that fallen people can also do what Jesus has done. Hence, the power to do the good lies in the belief in Christ. The belief in Christ still lies in the power of will.

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[22] Augustine's understanding of carnal habit is related to his conception of sexuality and marriage. See, Gao Yuan, "Augustine's Conception of Sexuality and Marriage: A Defense against Alignment of Human Merits on Continence", *International Journal of Sino-Western Studies*, Vol. 12, (2017), 73-79.

[23] Robert J. O'Connell "'Involuntary Sin' in the *De Libero Arbitrio*", *Revue d'Etudes Augustiniennes et Patristiques* 37. 1 (1991), 23-36.

[24] *De libero arbitrio* III, 22. 64. "Quem profectum in studiis optimis atque pietate, quorum facultas ei non negata est, si propria voluntate neglexerit, iuste in graviolem, quae iam poenalis est, ignorantiam difficultatemque praecipitatur, decentissimo et convenientissimo rerum moderamine in inferioribus ordinata. Non enim quod naturaliter nescit et naturaliter non potest, hoc animae deputatur in reatum; sed quod scire non studuit, et quod dignam facilitati comparandae ad recte faciendum operam non dedit."

Here I want to claim that Augustine does not claim for fideism by introducing Jesus here, rather he still emphasizes the moral meaning of Jesus Christ. In a word, Augustine shows that fallen people could still have the freedom to be saved and seek true freedom. “even in their ignorance and trouble He did not take away their free will to ask and inquire and strive.”<sup>[25]</sup> Now we can see that fallen people are still free and have to take responsibility for their sin. This understanding of human nature in this work is still optimistic. Augustine’s pessimistic understanding on human nature has not yet been formulated.

## V. Conclusion

Through this study we can conclude here with two remarks. First, Augustine has successfully replied to the classical question of the problem of evil, by introducing the concept of will and free decision. On the one hand, Augustine establishes the independence of the will by appealing to the neo-platonic order. On the other hand, Augustine has also established the relationship between will and evil or sin. Second, by analyzing the text on ignorance and trouble, we can see that even fallen people still have free decision. On the one hand, they carry the responsibility for their ignorance and trouble. On the other hand, they could still seek for their happy life through their own efforts. In this sense, *De libero arbitrio* could be seen as a whole. There is no fundamental distinction between the different books.

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[25] *De libero arbitrio* III, 20, 58 “quibus etiam in ipsa ignorantia et difficultate liberam voluntatem petendi et quaerendi et conandi non abstulit.”

中文题目:

## 奥古斯丁论意志与罪

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**摘要:** 奥古斯丁作为第一个意愿哲学家与他对恶之由来(unde malum)这一问题的思考及回答密切相关。在《论自由决断》这部著作中, 奥古斯丁通过引入意愿(voluntas)/自由决断(libenum arbitrium)回应了这一问题。本文首先澄清意愿与自由决断这两者概念的区别并简单重构奥古斯丁对意愿独立性的论证; 其次本文将罪解释为对上帝的背离; 最后本文将指出处于无知(ignorantia)与困苦(difficultas)状态中的人仍然具有自由决断的能力, 并具有道德责任。

**关键词:** 奥古斯丁; 意愿; 自由决断; 罪



**中西经典与圣经**  
**Chinese and Western Classics**  
**and the Bible**



# The First Treatise on Aristotelian Ethics in China and its Origin

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**Abstract:** The first treatise on the Aristotelian Ethics in the Chinese language can be traced back to “Xiushen Xixue” (修身西学: Western Learning on Personal Cultivation) in the Late Ming, a work from Alfonso Vagnone S. J. (1566-1640), albeit exchanges between Aristotelian ethics and Confucian ethics may have happened in other forms before this. Unfortunately, this work has not been given due attention in modern theological and secular academic circles, and thus it sunk into oblivion. This article is an attempt to do justice to his endeavor of making Aristotelian ethics known to Chinese at that time. There are two issues in this paper: the first one is concerned with the sources of “Xiushen Xixue”, and the second one deals with his Christianized interpretation of Aristotelian ethical principles. I will approach the second issue mainly by examining the two fundamental ethical concepts, happiness (εὐδαιμονία) and virtue (ἀρετή), and examining how Vagnone adapted Aristotelian ethics to Chinese culture. At a minimum, we can say that it is meaningless to argue if XSXX is just a mixture or hodgepodge of different ethical traditions adapted to the Chinese context, because the meaning and value of XSXX as the first treatise on Aristotelian ethics in the history of Western Learning spreading to East already goes far beyond that question.

**Key Words** Alfonso Vagnone, Late Ming, Xiushen Xixue, Happiness, Virtue

## 1. The Targets

Western Learning on Personal Cultivation (in Chinese:《修身西学》, Xiu Shen Xi Xue, henceforth as XSXX), written by Alfonso Vagnone S. J. (1566-1640) between 1637-1639 in Shanxi Province, is seen as the first treatise on the Aristotelian ethics in China<sup>[1]</sup>. Thus, XSXX can represent the first encounter between Aristotelian ethic as one of the most popular and choice-worthy moral philosophy in the West till today and Confucian ethic as one of the most authoritative and widespread moral thoughts in East Asia. Vagnone was very familiar with the two ethical traditions and especially a

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[1] Other Chinese intellectuals had also taken part in this work by amending, editing or polishing the stylistic formulations in Chinese, such as Lin Han (韩霖), Gun Duan (段袞) and Doushu Wei (卫斗枢) ect. All the citations and extracts are based on the newly published commentary work on XSXX, edited by Thierry Meynard, Jie Tan and Shufeng Tian. 高一志, Xiushen xixue jin zhu《修身西学今注》(Modern Commentaries on Western Learning on Personal Cultivation), (Beijing 北京: Shangwu yinshuguan 商务印书馆 [Beijing, Commercial Publishing House], 2019). Some ideas of this paper come from the article, which I wrote for the commentary work. Please see: pp. 72-129.

faithful partisan of the positive strategy of Mateo Ricci SJ. concerning the attitude towards Confucianism and Chinese philosophical strands. However, the main target of the XSXX does not lie in comparative studies between Aristotelian ethic and Confucian ethic, but rendering the main ethical propositions and Aristotelian ethical tenets into Chinese culture, which was mainly influenced and shaped by Confucianism. [2]

From the analyses of the texts of XSXX, we can know that Vagnone relied mainly on the following two kinds of sources, the first one can be called the direct sources, which are either commentaries on Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethic* or paraphrases on Aristotelian ethics and can be ascribed to three different authors: the commenatry work *Sententia Libri Ethicorum* of Thomas Aquinas and his *Summa Theologica* in the Middle Ages (1), and the Coimbra commentary work on the *Nicomachean Ethics* written by the Jesuits at Coimbra, Portugal published between 1592 and 1606 called the *Conimbricenses* (2) [3]; and the *De iustitia et iure caeterisque virtutibus cardinalibus* of Leonardus Lessius (1554-1623) published in 1605; the second kind should be called the indirect sources, because Vagnone did not make any direct fererence to that in XSXX, but they are believed to be the direct sources for the commentators of the Aristotelian ethics, certainly the *Nicomachean Ethic* must be this kind, and probably other works of Augustinian and Franciscan ethical tradition also included. The fifth volume of the *Conimbricenses* dealt with the EN, intituled *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Jesu; in libros Ethicorum ad Nichomachum aliquot Conimbricensis cursus disputationes*, 1593 (henceforth as CCEN). In this paper, I will analyze the basic structure of XSXX and deal with the question of how Vagone introduced and rendered the Aristotelian ethics into Chinese culture by examining the two key Aristotelian concepts of happiness (*εὐδαιμονία*) and virtue (*ἀρετὴ*). The threefold relation of XSXX to EN of Aristotle, to Thomas' commentaries (*Sententia Libri Ethicorum*) and CCEN, to the Chinese philosophy in the context of Confucian ethical system, will be treated as the backdrop. Firstly, I will present the basic structure of the XXSX and a brief introduction to its sources; the scholastic tradition presented in *Summa Theologica* of Thomas Aquinas and his commentaries work on EN (*Sententia libri ethicorum*) and CCEN; secondly, I will mainly analyze the two main ethical concepts in XSXX, the happiness and the virtue, in order to see in what sense the Aristotelian basic ethical principles are introduced into Chinese culture, and I will also

[2] Paulos Huang, "Dialogue and Critique: The 16<sup>th</sup> Century Religious Reform and Modernity", *International Journal of Sino-Western Studies*, vol. 12, 1-12. (<https://www.sinowesternstudies.com/back-issues/vol-12-2017/>)

[3] Regarding the relation between the three works, please see: Mei Qianli (梅谦立), (Thierry Meynard), *Wanming zhongxi lunxue de xiangyu; cong Nigemake lunxue dao wanming Xiushen xixue* 晚明中西伦理学的相遇: 从《尼各马可伦理学》到晚明《修身西学》(Encounter between Chinese and Western Ethics in the Late Ming dynasty: From the *Nicomachean Ethics* to Late Ming's Western Study of Personal Cultivation), *Zhongguo wenzhe yanjiu jikan* 中国文哲研究集刊 (Journal of Chinese literature and philosophy), 39, 2011, pp. 99-141.

The Coimbra Commentaries are constituted by 8 volumes: (1) *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Jesu in octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae* (Commentaries of the Coimbra College of the Society of Jesus on the Eight Books of the Physics of Aristotle the Stagirite, 1592); (2) *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Jesu in quatuor libros de Coelo Aristotelis Stagiritae* (Commentaries ... on the Four Books of the *De Coelo* of Aristotle, 1592); (3) *Commentarii Collegii ... in libros meteorum Aristotelis* (... on the Books of the *Meteorology*, 1592); (4) *Commentarii ... in parva naturalia* (... on the *Parva Naturalia*, 1592); (5) *Commentarii ... in libros Ethicorum ad Nichomachum* (... on the Books of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1593); (6) *Commentarii ... in duos libros De Generatione et corruptione* (... on the Two Books, *On Generation and Corruption*, 1595); (7) *Commentarii . in tres libros De Anima* (on the Three Books of the *De Anima*, 1595); (8) *Commentarii ... in universam dialecticam Aristotelis* (Commentaries ... on the Whole Logic of Aristotle, 1606).

insert some reflections on the question of how Vagnone made use of the Confucian ethical tenets to illustrate his thoughts and what kind of justification can be brought for his doing so.

## 2. Introduction to XSXX and its Sources

Before returning to the structure of XSXX, we should have a glimpse into the context, in which the XSXX is embedded. The first thing is that Thomas' understanding and commentaries of EN played a determining role in the reception of Aristotle's ethics in the world of thoughts of the late period of the Middle Ages. We can say that Aristotle's EN was one of the most interpreted or commented philosophical works in the Middle Ages<sup>[4]</sup>, nearly every ten years a new commentary work was written<sup>[5]</sup>. Thomas Aquinas has devoted himself in his early academic career nearly ten years to interpret Aristotle's philosophy and writing commentaries on nearly all of the works of Aristotle. Based on the *Super ethica* written by Albertus Magnus (1200-1280), his teacher, Thomas has written a new commentary work on Aristotle's EN, which is *Sententia libri ethicorum*<sup>[6]</sup>. Besides, Thomas has also used Aristotelian ethical principles in his exposition of the moral theology in *Summa Theologica*, especially in the first part of the second part (*prima secundae, I - II*). We will see that XSXX bears more similarities with ST. I - II rather than with the CCEN in terms of the basic structure of the text. In the 16<sup>th</sup> Century, Jesuits has established the *Ratio atque Institutio Studiorum Societatis Iesu* (known as *Ratio Studiorum*; 1565-1599) for their schools. As regards to philosophy, they widely used the Coimbra commentaries on Aristotle's works known as *Conimbricenses* in 8 volumes, the fifth volume is the commentaries on the EN, written based on the commentaries work on EN and *Summa Theologica* of Thomas Aquinas.

The second point I want to mention here is that Thomas and Vagnone had used the same positive strategy in dealing with the other non-Christian philosophical tradition or culture. Thomas was searching for the commonalities and complementarity between Christian moral theology and Aristotelian ethical tradition, although some modern scholars criticized him for baptizing Aristotle in his way of interpreting his philosophy, and they pointed out that what Thomas said in the *Sententia libri ethicorum* is not what Aristotle intends to say but his own<sup>[7]</sup>; the same thing turned out to be in the case of Vagnone, who has relentlessly endeavored to integrate Christian moral thoughts or theological understanding about the human happiness into Chinese culture, which was mainly shaped

[4] Bobonich, Chris, 'Aristotle's Ethical Treatises', in: *The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics*, ed. by Richard Kraut (Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2006), 15.

[5] Kenny, A., *The Aristotelian Ethics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press 1978. pp. 1-50; Rowe, C. J., *The Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics: A Study in the Development of Aristotle's Thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge Philosophical Society. 1971. pp. 9-60.

[6] Thomas Aquinas, *Sententia libri ethicorum*, translated by C. I. Litzinger, O. P., *Commentary on the NICOMACHEAN ETHICS* (Henry Regnery Company Chicago Nihil Obstat, 1964).

[7] As regards to the pro and contra positions towards the relation between Thomas's commentaries and Aristotle's EN, please see: Ralph McInerney, *Aquinas on Human Action: A Theory of Practice*, Washington, D. C. : Catholic University of America Press, 1992; René Antoine Gauthier, *The Leonine edition of the Sententia libri ethicorum, Opera omnia 47*, Rome: Leonine Commission, 1969; Francis Cheneval and Ruedi Imbach, *Thomas von Aquin, Prologe zu den Aristoteleskommentaren*, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1993; Thomism and Aristotelianism, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952; Mark D. Jordan, "Thomas Aquinas's Disclaimers in the Aristotelian Commentaries," *Philosophy and the God of Abraham: Essays in Memory of James A. Weisheipl, OP*, ed. R. James Long, *Papers in Mediaeval Studies* 12, (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1991), 99-112.



by Confucian ethics and anthropology, and we can understand his intention by looking into his works and know how eagerly he did strive to make a dialogue possible between Confucianism and the Christianized Western ethical, political, anthropological and pedagogical tradition deeply rooted in the Aristotle's philosophy<sup>[8]</sup>. Although Thomas and Vagnone lived in different time and space, they were facing the same challenge and task. Indeed, both of them went beyond a pure religious ethics (based on the Decalogue and the Gospels) but attempted to give a broader philosophical and cultural basis. However, their motivation was different; Aquinas attempted to give Christian ethics a philosophical foundation through the pagan Aristotle; whereas Vagnone expresses Christian ethics through the Confucian discourse. For Aquinas, the choice of a pagan philosopher was a philosophical option; for Vagnone, there was no real choice since he had to conform to the cultural and political imperative of China.

The Christianization of Aristotelian ethical philosophy can be demonstrated in Aquinas's understanding on the main topics in Aristotle's ethics, especially on the concept of the human happiness. For Aristotle, the human being can bring human nature into a full-fledged fulfillment or completion maximally in the activities of contemplation ( $\theta\epsilon\omega\rho\iota\alpha$ ) in this life down on the earth, which he called  $\beta\iota\omicron\varsigma\ \theta\epsilon\omega\rho\eta\tau\iota\kappa\acute{o}\varsigma$  (*vita contemplativa*), the most choice-worthy, the most pleasurable, the most self-sufficient and the most enduring form of life for human being, but also for divine beings<sup>[9]</sup>. Aquinas agreed with Aristotle's goal of setting the contemplative life in this world as human happiness, i. e. the highest and best form of human life, but he disagreed with Aristotle insofar as he said that in the life on the earth human being can only reach imperfect happiness, no matter through the life of ethical virtues or through the life of contemplation; as regards to the perfect life, we can reach only it after death, because for Thomas the goal of contemplation or speculation and even all the human desires is God himself, He is the highest and best Good after all<sup>[10]</sup>. Contemplation is to become united with God. Apparently, the strategy of Thomas is to find possibilities to graft the Christian doctrines into the Aristotle's philosophy, so that the differences might not turn out to be distortions of the latter, but complementary contributions. Aristotelian ethics and Christian moral teachings are not incompatible with each other, but complementary with each other in the sense that Aristotle's philosophy provides basic metaphysical, anthropological and moral psychological grounds, and Christian theological understanding of the happiness was of great help in resolving the classical problem whether the happiness is only to be found in *vita*

[8] Besides XXXX, Vagnone has written also some other works in the field of the ethics: Qijia Xixue (齐家西学, Western Learning on Managing the Family, 1638), Zhiping Xixue (治平西学, Western Learning on Governing the Country and Pacifying the World, ca. 1638), Dadao Jiyan (达道纪言, Aphorisms and Illustrations of the Grand Dao, 1636). Concerning the Works written by Jesuits in the 17<sup>th</sup> century in Chinese, please see also: Meynard, T., "Aristotelian Works in Seventeenth-century China", *Monumenta Serica* (2017), 65:1, 61-85.

[9] EN X 8-9.

[10] Thomas has presented his views on the happiness in the ST. I-II. Q1-5. They are: De ultimo fine hominis (1), De his in quibus hominis beatitudo consistit (2), Quid sit beatitudo (3)? De his quae ad beatitudinem exiguntur (4), De adeptione beatitudinis (5). Based on the texts, René Antoine Gauthier has compared Thomas' views with the Aristotle's ones. Please see: René Antoine Gauthier et Jean Yves Jolif, *Aristote, L'Éthique à Nicomaque, Introduction, Traduction et Commentaire, deuxième édition avec une introduction nouvelle*, vol. I, Louvain-Paris: Publications Universitaires, 1970; quoted by Ralph McInerney, *Aquinas on Human Action, A theory of Practice* (Washington D. C. : Catholic University of America, 1992), 166-168.

contemplativa or also in vita activa including necessary external goods<sup>[11]</sup>.

The earliest reference of X<sup>SXX</sup> in the modern research field can be traced back to an article written by a French scholar, named Hubert Verhaeren, C. M. published in 《Bulletin Catholique de Pékin》 in 1935<sup>[12]</sup>, and his views can be summarized in the next two points: (1) Apart from translating the theological works, the Jesuits in Late Ming have also written some commentaries on Aristotle's philosophy depending on the Coimbra commentaries. Besides the X<sup>SXX</sup>, they have also written Lingyan lishao (《灵言蠹勺》: a humble discourse on the soul) derived from Conimbricenses Volume on De anima of Aristotle, Huanyouquan 《寰有论》(Explanations of heaven and earth), derived from the Conimbricenses Volume on Aristotle's De Coelo, and Minglitan 《名理探》(Inquiries into the principles of names), derived from the Conimbricenses Volume on Aristotle's Categories. (2) After comparing the structure or the contents of X<sup>SXX</sup> with that of Conimbricenses on EN, he found that there was an apparent homogeneity or coincidence between the two with some unimportant differences. In X<sup>SXX</sup>, Vagnone has used the threefold distinction concerning the ethical ranges following the Confucian pattern: the personal cultivation (xiushen 修身), the arranging of the family (qijia 齐家) and the governance of the country (zhiguo 治国). This was a kind of coincidence with Thomas's trilogy of the ethical ranges, which were divided into personal ethics, the family ethics and political ethics<sup>[13]</sup>.

Thierry Meynard does not agree with Verhaeren in point 2, and he shows that the structure of X<sup>SXX</sup> bears more homogeneity with that of Summa Theologica (Ia IIae and IIa IIae) rather than with that of Conimbricenses<sup>[14]</sup>. Moreover, we can see that Vagnone in X<sup>SXX</sup> has dealt with the human feelings or passions first before turning to the ethical definition of the human action, while the Summa Theologica and Conimbricenses both deal first with human action and then with human feelings. Apart from that, Thierry Meynard has observed that the eleven passions discussed in book 4 of X<sup>SXX</sup> have no corresponding part in the Conimbricenses, rather they were taken directly from Summa Theologica. Vagnone has made some adjustments in order to be well tuned with the Confucian way of thinking about the ethical issues, because Confucian ethics attribute to passions or feelings much more importance in explaining the human virtues and actions. In order to have a clearer view, the chart can be of a help:

[11] J. L. Ackrill, "Aristotle on Eudaimonia," Amelie Oksenberg Rorty ed., *Essays on Aristotle's Ethics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 15-34.

[12] Verhaeren, Hubert, *Aristote en Chine*, in *Bulletin Catholique de Pékin*, a. 1935, pp. 417-429. Besides the *Xiushen xixue*, the three other works are the *Lingyan lishao*, the *Huanyouquan* and the *Minglitan*.

[13] the ethics of the individual (*ethica monastica*), the ethics of the family (*oeconomica seu familiaris*) and political ethics (*politica seu civilis*, p. 3). Cf. Aquinas, *Sententia libri ethicorum*, *Lectio 1. 6*.

[14] Mei Qianli (梅谦立), (Thierry Meynard), *Wanming zhongxi lunlixue de xiangyu; cong Nigemake lunlixue dao wanming Xiushen xixue* 晚明中西伦理学的相遇: 从《尼各马可伦理学》到晚明《修身西学》(Encounter between Chinese and Western Ethics in the Late Ming dynasty: From the Nicomachean Ethics to Late Ming's Western Study of Personal Cultivation), *Zhongguo wenzhe yanjiu jikan* 中国文哲研究集刊 (Journal of Chinese literature and philosophy), 39, 2011, p. 103.

Xiushen xixue	Coimbra commentary	Summa Theologica Ia Ilae
juan 1: 人意定有所向 Human will determines that it exists an end; 好美 The Good	Disputatio 1: The Good Disputatio 2: The End	Q. 1: Man's Ultimate End
juan 2: 人所向福 Happiness as human end	Disputatio 3: Happiness	Q. 2: The Things that Man's Beatitude lies in. 3: What Beatitude is. Q. 4: What is required for Beatitude? Q. 5: The Attainment of Beatitude
juan 3: 司明 Intelligence; 司爱 Sensitive appetite	Disputatio 4: Three principles of human acts: will, intelligence and sensitive appetite	Q. 9-Q. 21: Action
juan 4: 情 Feelings	Disputatio 6: Feelings of the souls, also called passions	Q. 25-Q. 48: Passion
juan 5: 动行 Actions	Disputatio 5: Goodness and evil of the human acts in general	Q. 49-Q. 54: Habit
juan 6: 德论 General virtues	Disputatio 7: Virtues in general	Q. 51-Q. 61: virtues
juan 7: 智德 Virtue of wisdom	Disputatio 8: Prudence	Q. 55-Q. 61: virtues
juan 8: 廉德 Temperance	Disputatio 9: Other moral virtues: justice, courage and temperance	Q. 55-Q. 61: virtues
juan 9: 毅德 Courage		Q. 55-Q. 61: virtues
juan 10: 义德 Justice		Q. 55-Q. 61: virtues

The question which resource the order of XSCX coincides at most, is not our primary concern, because it is clear as shown in the chart that XSCX has kept the basic structure of Aristotle's ethic and discussed the most important issues of EN such as the happiness as the highest good, the elementary constituents of the human action as the intelligence and the desires or appetites, the definition of the action and the virtues. We should not forget the original intention of Vagnone, which did not lie in the exact introduction of the Aristotle's ethics as such, but in making a dialogue possible by using this Christianized interpretation of Thomas Aquinas. That is why he did not use the exact scholastic mode of disputationes in exposing the ethical principles, but argued in a much simplified way of disputationes<sup>[15]</sup>, because his goal is to make his interpretations easily understood and the complicated argumentation much clearer for the Chinese<sup>[16]</sup>. So he hoped that

[15] With respect to the mode of disputationes, see: Wadell, Paul J. (C. P.), *The Primacy of Love: An Introduction to the Ethics of Thomas Aquinas* (Eugene 1992), 29.

[16] German Philosopher and Thomist, Josef Pieper, has made a conclusion, which caught the spirit of the complicated mode of writing disputationes. In true disputation this other person is neither ignored by the speaker, nor bluffed, nor merely "worked over," spellbound, misled or, to put it crudely, "done in." Men who want not so much to clarify as to create a sensation are unfitted for debate and they will avoid it. That point was, as a matter of fact, made as early as the twelfth century in defense of the disputatio. The disputation, it was held, was an excellent means of unmasking empty noise, oratory, "belletristics," and rhetoric, of keeping such devices from obstructing the search for truth and of repressing those who were not interested in the scire but in the sciri, not in knowing but in being known. See: Pieper, J., *Guide to Thomas Aquinas* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987), 87.

XSXX could function as a kind of preparation work for introducing the moral theology derived essentially from Bible and the Gospels to the Chinese.

### 3. The Christianized Reading of the Happiness as Beatitude

Vagnone's first step is to determine happiness as the ultimate end of human life by using the teleological arguments in Juan 1 and 2. In order to do this, he began with the concept of "end" and "good" as the Aristotelian ethical tradition usually has done. According to this tradition, we have to begin with the concepts of end and good, if we want to talk about ethics, because it reflects theories about the human good, and the good can be called good for human being, only when it belongs to or has a connection with the end of human desire or intention. To sum up, the human good must be an end desired by human being. Two sides are necessary: one is the subjective desire or psychological capacities, the other is the objective goals, facts and beliefs. If we look into the argumentation of Juan 1 and 2 of XSXX, we find that Vagnone used the same teleological framework to begin his work Western learning on personal cultivation. Vagnone made the claim in Juan 1 that the human intentions and desires must have ends, and these ends are the goods<sup>[17]</sup>. Certainly Vagnone was not the first one to find the equivalence of Aristotle's philosophical terminologies in Chinese, but indeed was the first one to craft the central Aristotelian ethical terms. For example, hao mei "好美" was used to refer to the goods. Then he divided hao mei into three kinds: the goods of the soul, the goods of the body and the external goods. I think that Vagnone was indirectly inspired by the Greek idea of "καλοκἀγαθος", which represents the perfect ethical character of a man, even though he did not give any hint to this Greek idea in XSXX. As we know the Greek philosophy and literature had experience such a revitalization, it is highly possible that every well-educated person should have known what "Καλοκἀγαθία" signified. "Καλοκἀγαθία" entails both the goodness and the nobleness of a action. Vagnone might find that hao "好" could refer to goodness, and "美" to nobleness, so hao mei "好美" combines both and could be used for indicating the things, which the human beings desire in a broader sense. Indeed "κάλος" has not an aesthetic denotation in this combination form, but an ethical one, "noble" or "nobleness". Therefore, his translation hao mei is not the ideal rendering of the Greek word "καλοκἀγαθος", because mei "美" has not an ethical denotation in the first place. Nevertheless it is the first attempt to render the Aristotelian concept of "τὸ ἀγαθόν" into Chinese context. (above you discuss only "τὸ ἀγαθόν", but not the Chinese translation of "τέλος")

But it led also to the question, what is the ultimate end for human being among so many different goods. In Juan 2, he has done the most important work in his whole project, that is he has justified the claim that the human happiness is the ultimate end. Here he rendered the Aristotelian concept of εὐδαιμονία into Chinese "an fu 安福" (tranquil happiness) or "zhen fu 真福" (real happiness). Vagnone must have translated the word from the Latin "beatitudo", which bore from the beginning religious denotation of divine blessings. "Beatitudo" is not something, which we can attain and retain within our own powers, but something beyond as divine grace from Above. We will not wonder in Juan 2 that Vagnone tried to identify the essence of beatitude with the Creator (God). But

[17] XSXX 2019, pp. 145-150.

before making such a conclusion, he has made a very important hierarchical distinction between the different ends and goods. He called the ultimate or complete end as “zong wei” (宗为) and the subordinate ends as “shu wei”(属为)<sup>[18]</sup>. He said that “zong wei”(宗为) is the completion of the happiness of the whole human life, the fulfillment of all the desires of the heart (宗为者, 全生之福之终, 安其心之趋向者也). According to Aristotle, the ends are not more or less the same, but they are hierarchically ordered in such a pyramid-like form with happiness at the top as the most complete end, the instrumental ends at the bottom and the intermediary ends in the middle. The ultimate end is to be desired in its own right and for its own sake; the instrumental goods are always for the sake of other goods, e. g. the money, while the intermediary ends can be desired for their own sake and also for the sake of other ends, e. g. pleasure and intellect<sup>[19]</sup>. The order of the ends and goods can be also understood in a circle-like form, in which the ultimate good function like the central good, and other goods depend on it. Without the central good, the other goods will turn out to be not goods at all.

Vagnone has succeeded in establishing the happiness as the ultimate end of human life through the teleological arguments. Next, he tried to delineate that happiness does not depend on external and bodily goods, but only on the goods of soul. His christianized reading of the happiness does not lie in the fact that he located the complete happiness in the good or excellence of the soul, because the other Greek schools and all the commentaries of Aristotelian ethics shared the common view that the soul is the true self, not the body, and the happiness lied in the activities of the soul<sup>[20]</sup>. This is also in line with the interpretation of Conimbricenses, “Primum. Esse hominis continetur animo & corpore & esse corporis pendet ab animo, atque ipsum corpus propter animum est. Disp. 3. q. 2. a. 2, p. 23, see also ST Ia. IIae. q. 2. a. 5. ).”(Utrum beatitudo consistat in animi operatione; Disp. 3. q. 3, p. 25, and see also ST Ia. IIae. q. 2. a. 7). What characterized Vagnone’s Christianized interpretation of Aristotelian happiness is his illustration of the Christian understanding of happiness by using the Confucian pattern of “体-用”(ti-yong). Basically ti“体” means the essence or principle of a thing, and yong“用” manifests the function of a thing. He said:

“真福之体, 至切实, 至美善; 真福之用, 归于司明、司爱二司焉。至真之美, 非人自有, 自外致之; 然非系神外也, 神自备而致之…至言真福之体, 西之古今圣贤默契焉, 而以造物主当之。盖既为万物所造始, 则必为万物所依归。吾神明知切怀, 则亦将获真福之妙而快足矣。(The essence of the beatitude is the most real, the best with the noblest nature; as regards to the function of the beatitude, it is ascribed to the two capacities, the intelligence and the will…Concerning the nature or essence of the beatitude, the ancient and modern sages in the West unanimously agree with the claim, that Creator God is the ultimate end. Because God was the Creator of the

[18] XSXX 2019, pp. 154-165.

[19] EN I 7, 1197b1-7.

[20] Socrates, Plato and Aristotle all agree with the doctrine, that the soul represents the true self. For Socrates, we should turn to and pursue the virtues by taking care of the soul, while for Plato, the soul is immortal and preexisted before incorporated into the body, thus the virtues are formed by being free from the bodily desires and non-rational appetites. Aristotle has restricted the virtues also into the activities of the soul, not of the body. See: EN II 6. 1107a1-7.



created universe, He must be also the end of the whole universe...)<sup>[21]</sup>”.

It is clear that Vagnone followed Thomas' interpretation of the Aristotelian eudaimonism, that is essentially to be found in becoming united with God. Later Vagnone understood the essence of happiness as knowing and loving God, while the function of the happiness was thought to be the activities of the intellect and the will. Here he followed also the scholastic tradition, that according to Thomas, human being can only attain the imperfect beatitude through the activities of intellectual and ethical virtues in this world, and the perfect beatitude can be reached only after our death in the heaven with God. The distinction between the perfect and imperfect beatitude is tantamount to that between the beatitudo supernaturalis and beatitudo naturalis, and Vagone called the imperfect happiness as “zhen fu” (真福, real happiness), the perfect happiness as “quan fu” (全福, complete happiness), because he believed that perfect happiness can we attain exclusively in the Jenseits after death.

Based on this distinction, the scholastic interpretation of the Aristotelian eudaimonism has helped to resolve the tickling problem of which form of life corresponds most to the intention of the eudaimonia in Aristotle. Aristotle has defined the human happiness as the activities of the soul in accordance with the virtue, when there are many virtues, then with the best or the most complete one<sup>[22]</sup>. Incontrovertibly the best virtuous activity of the soul is contemplation, therefore Aristotle must refer to the life of contemplation ( $\beta\iota\omicron\varsigma\ \theta\epsilon\omicron\rho\eta\tau\iota\kappa\acute{o}\varsigma$ ), when he spoke of eudaimonia. But the problem is what should we do with the life of ethical and political practices ( $\beta\iota\omicron\varsigma\ \pi\omicron\lambda\iota\tau\iota\kappa\acute{o}\varsigma$ )? And how should we understand the range of the contemplation? Does the life of contemplation also include the activities of the ethical virtues or only refer to the pure activity of contemplation? Nowadays there are two kinds of interpretations about contemplation, the one is the inclusive reading and the other one is the dominant reading<sup>[23]</sup>. The dominant reading identified the Aristotelian happiness with the contemplation alone, and all the other goods and human activities had worth only

XSXX2019,juan 2. Chapter 7. p. 163.

[22] EN I 7,1098a15-20.

[23] For the dominant reading, see: Heinaman (1988), Kraut (1989), and for the inclusive reading, see: Ackrill (1980), Crisp (1994), Cooper (1999), Devereaux (1981), Irwin (1985), Keyt (1983), Roche (1988), White (1990), Whiting (1986). I give a long list of authors, who are interested in this problem, to show that how intensive the debate about the issue is, and each of them tried to make Aristotelian concept of happiness consistent in his ethics, but it remains till today not resolved. They have simply ignored or sidestepped the christian scholastic solution. Heinaman, R. , “Eudaimonia and Self-Sufficiency in the Nicomachean Ethics.” *Phronesis* 33 (1988): 31-53; Kraut, R. , *Aristotle on the Human Good* (Princeton, N. J. : Princeton University Press, 1989); Lear, G. Richardson, *Happy Lives and the Highest Good, An Essay On Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004). Ackrill, J. , “Aristotle on Eudaimonia,” in *Essays on Aristotle's Ethics*. Edited by A. O. Rorty. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980, pp. 15-33; Crisp, R. , “Aristotle's Inclusive Reading,” *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 12 (1994): 111-136; Cooper, J. , “Contemplation and Happiness: A Reconsideration.” In *Reason and Emotion*, 212-236. Princeton and N. J. : Princeton University Press, 1999. (Originally in *Rationality in Greek Thought*, ed. by M. Frede and G. Striker. ); Devereaux, D. , “Aristotle on the Essence of Happiness.” In *Studies in Aristotle*. Edited by D. O'Meara, 247-260. Washington D. C. : Catholic University of America Press 1981; Irwin, T. , “Permanent Happiness: Aristotle and Solon.” *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 3 (1985): 89-124; Keyt, D. , “Intellectualism in Aristotle,” in *Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy*, vol. 2, ed. J. P. Anton and A. Preus, 364-387. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983; Roche, T. , “The Perfect Happiness.” *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 27 (1988) supp. , *Aristotle's Ethics*, 103-125; White, S. , “Is Aristotelian Happiness a Good Life or the Best Life?” *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 8 (1990): 103-143; Whiting, J. , “Human Nature and Intellectualism in Aristotle.” *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 68 (1986): 70-95.

or not only depending on the fact, if they could promote or make contribution to the contemplation. The inclusive reading becomes widely accepted by the scholars<sup>[24]</sup>. It insists on the assertion that indeed the life of contemplation is the happiness, the most pleasurable, most self-sufficient and most enduring life, but since the human being is a composite being with body and soul, he cannot live such a life without the external and ethical goods, and therefore the life of contemplation includes necessarily the external goods. Since the target of the ethic is to become good in human practices and actions in the primary sense, the objects of the ethic must be about the practical things in human life rather than the divine life of God in the Jenseits. In the Middle Age this problem did not turn out to be a big issue, because we cannot attain perfect happiness either in this world through the ethical virtues, or in the life of contemplation, and thus, perfect happiness must be reserved for us after death, because God is the ultimate end of the whole universe.

However it is noteworthy that Vagnone did not show us the process of the argument or the justification behind Thomas' theological or Christian interpretation of Aristotelian happiness, rather he just took the conclusion of this scholastic interpretation. I think the reason for doing this is the consideration that XSSX was a work about the Western ethic in the primary sense, and therefore should function only as a preparatory book for introducing moral theology after that. Hence he would not go too far to interpolate too much theology of creation, sin, grace and Trinity into the work, because doing so would bring him into the danger of being misunderstood and make the XSSX a pure Christian moral work.

#### 4. The Theory of Virtue

For Vagnone and all the proponents, ancient and modern, of Aristotelian ethics, the virtues are the unavoidable path towards the happiness both in the sense of the imperfect beatitude in the Diesseits of this world before death and in the sense of perfect beatitude in the Jenseits after death. The virtues are sine qua non for attaining the happiness in both senses. Hence Vagnone began to deal with the theory of virtue, which could be seen as the pillar of the whole Aristotelian ethical theories in *juan 3, 5 and 6*. In this part, I will focus on the two points with regards to the features of Vagnone' presentation of the theories of the virtue: (1) the primacy of the non-rational desires (the will) in explaining the human action and in the formation of the ethical virtues; (2) the correspondence between the cardinal virtues and the desires of the soul in the scholastic tradition and the special position of the prudence.

In *juan 3*, he analyzed the two conditions for producing the virtues from the perspectives of anthropology and moral psychology: one is the intellect, which he called *si ming* “司明”; the other is the appetite or the will, which he called *si'ai* “司爱”<sup>[25]</sup>. The *si ming* should refer to the practical reason ( $\nu\omicron\tilde{u}s\ \pi\rho\alpha\kappa\tau\iota\kappa\ \eta$ ), and the *si yu* “司欲” should correlate with the  $\delta\rho\epsilon\tilde{\xi}\iota\varsigma$  or  $\delta\rho\rho\epsilon\kappa\tau\iota\kappa\acute{o}\nu$ . Vagnone has also made a differentiation in *si yu*, one was called the sensitive appetite or desire (血气之司欲)

[24] Kraut, R., *Aristotle on the Human Good*, Princeton University Press 1989. Ackrill, J. L., “Aristotle on Eudaimonia” in: *Essays on Aristotle's Ethics*, ed. by Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (University of California Press 1980), 15-34.

[25] XSSS 2019, pp. 166-174.

and the other rational desire *zhiqi zhi siyu* (志气之司欲), and further he subdivided the sensitive appetite into the anger *fen si* (忿司) and bodily desire *yu si* (欲司). These three kinds of appetites are exactly in accordance with the three forms of the desire in Aristotle: the bodily desire *yu si* “欲司” refers to  $\epsilon\pi\theta\upsilon\mu\iota\alpha$ , the anger *fen si* (忿司) is tantamount to  $\theta\upsilon\mu\acute{o}\varsigma$  and the rational desire *zhiqi zhi siyu* (志气之司欲) correlates with  $\beta\omicron\upsilon\lambda\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$ . Although we can find an exact correspondence between Vagnone’s three kinds of “*si yu*” and Aristotle’s three forms of the desire of the soul, it does not mean that what Vagnone understood under the term of the “*si’ ai*” was exactly what Aristotle expressed through the non-rational or rational desires. Vagnone identified the “*si’ ai*” with the concept of *voluntas* (the will) in the Augustinian and Franciscan traditions of the Middle Ages. For Aristotle, the desiderative part of the soul, i. e. all the three forms of the desires (the bodily desires, the anger and the wish or the rational desire), are not an independent faculty of the soul, because the non-rational desires depend on the sense-perceptions, especially of the pleasure of the pain and the passions or feelings ( $\pi\alpha\theta\eta$ ) of the soul, and the rational desires depend on the reason. Whereas in the Augustinian and Franciscan ethical tradition, the “*si yu*” or the *voluntas* is an independent faculty of the soul like the reason.

Plato and Aristotle have used the dichotomy of the soul into the rational part and non-rational part to delineate the ethical virtues, but the non-rational desiderative part of the soul cannot be regarded as an independent volitional faculty of the soul, the *voluntas*. Neither Plato nor Aristotle had made the action of the choice a further part besides the rational and non-rational part of the soul. Based on the concept of  $\beta\omicron\upsilon\lambda\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$  (rational desire or wish) of Aristotle, Augustine has developed the concept of the *voluntas*, which was used by him to refer to an independent faculty of the soul of assenting or not assenting to our non-rational desires. The act of choice or assent and not assent depends on the act of the will. The will can be understood as a second-order identification or endorsement, and that we choose this good rather than that means we identify ourselves with that greater good and we are not moved by desires which we refuse to endorse<sup>[26]</sup>.

This conception of the will inspired the voluntarists very much in the Middle Ages, and finally it gave rise to the controversy of the primacy of the two faculties, the will and the reason. The question is, which one played the primary role in explaining the virtuous or ethical action. There are three positions concerning the problem of the primacy, the first position is an intellectual one, and the proponents of this position persistently stood on the claim that the reason was the primary cause of human ethical actions, whereas the *voluntas* was but an intermediary cause. The intellectualists seemed to replace the *voluntas* by appealing to the practical reason, because the cognitive grasp of the nature of the universal good could be the adequate condition for an ethical action. The second position is the absolute voluntarism, which firmly highlighted the primacy of the will. The voluntarists insisted that the will was the primary cause, because the act of choice or assent of the will preceded every act including the act of knowing or thinking. The third position was represented by Thomas Aquinas, who opposed the intellectualists and the voluntarists and tried to find a middle way between the two extreme positions. He opposed the intellectualism, because the intellect alone cannot move or impart movements, and he opposed the voluntarism, because the will itself was a kind of rational

[26] Irwin, T., *The Development of the Ethics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 405-420.

desire, and there was no will completely independent of reason. Therefore, he strongly argued for an inter-dependence of the will and the reason in ethical action; reason provides some certain goals or objects as good, and the will has the force to move or give impetus to act. Reason relates to the will like its final cause, and the will relates to reason like its efficient cause (ST. Ia, q82. a4).

If we look into the argumentation of XSXX, we will find that Vagnone seemed to have adopted the position of the voluntarism and favored the priority of the will. He said that the will (si'ai) was the "decision-maker of the heart" (心之主张) and had the power of control over the body and soul (揽心身之权). In Juan 3, Chapter 2, he affirmed that only the will was the autonomous faculty, and although the intellect knew what the good and the bad, what true and false was, but it did not have sovereignty over the faculties of the soul and body, because its function lied only in deliberation. In order to illustrate the priority of the will, he compared it to the king sitting on the throne to command, and the commands of the will were like the commands of the king, which could move the other faculties to act, while the commands of the reason are analogous to those of teachers, which cannot impart the movements or made other faculties move.

“司爱者, 揽心身之权, 立诸司之中, 正如大君端拱堂皇.. The will has the power of control over the mind and the body, and amid all the faculties it establishes, it is like a monarch on his throne. 司明既啓, 司爱始专志动属司之力, 行命成功焉。是司明之命, 师命也, 弗能动下司之力; 司爱之命, 君命也, 嵩以勅属司之从。属司奉命成功, 司明所酌, 与司爱所欲, 全美矣。(… The will commands all the subordinate faculties to move, and it succeeds in commanding. However, the commandments of the intellect are like ones from the teachers, and cannot move the subordinate faculties, whereas the commandments of the will are like coming from the king, to whom all the faculties subject. <sup>[27]</sup>)”

The picture of the will as a monarch on his throne clearly showed that Vagnone layed more weight on the will in explaining the human actions and virtues, so that we can speak of a kind of priority of the will. This can tell us at least two things: first, the way that Vagnone stressed the importance of the will in the formation of the ethical virtues is in accordance with the way that Aristotle highlighted the importance of the non-rational desire in the genealogy of the ethical virtues. The ethical virtues are the results of the achievements of the non-rational passions and desires by listening to the reason, but not of the reason directly. Although Aristotle had not a clear concept of voluntas, but for him, practical reason and desire (ὁρῆσις or ὁρεκτικόν) are the two fundamental elements in the formation of the human action, and thus he did not have the problem of the hierarchical order of the desire and the practical reason. Practical reason makes judgments about the factors for actions, and the desiderative part provides the motivational force, and only the combined work of both can give rise to an action<sup>[28]</sup>. Thus the ethical virtues are the results of the harmonization between the rational part of the soul and the irrational desiderative part of the soul, i.

[27] XSXX 2019, Juan 3, Chapter 3-4. pp. 169-170.

[28] EN III 5., VI 7.

e. the results of the non-rational passions or feelings listening to the commandments or orders of the intellect after a long process of habitualization. Therefore, the ethical virtues are not the achievements of the rational part of the soul at all or at least not substantially. In this sense, Aristotle opposed strongly the Socratic tradition that the ethical virtues were identified with knowledge, because having the knowledge of what justice is could not make one act justly.

Second, the priority of the will, on the other hand, makes Vagnone fall into the voluntarism, because he said in *XSSX* several times, that happiness lied in loving God, the act of will, not in knowing God, the activity of the reason. Thomas followed Aristotle, that the activity of the theoretical reason should be regarded as the higher one than that of the practical reason. Although the position of Aquinas is already a complicated issue in itself, but basically we can say that he held the happiness to be the activities of the speculative intellect, not those of the practical intellect. In *ST I-II Q. 3.*, he gave three reasons derived from Aristotle's *Metaphysics* to testify that the beatitude consists especially in an act of contemplating divine things (in *contemplatione divinorum*), the first reason is that the speculative intellect is the best power and its best object is the divine good, which is an object of the speculative intellect and not of the practical intellect; the second reason is that contemplation is especially sought after for its own sake, by contrast, an act of the practical intellect is sought after not for its own sake, but for the sake of an action; the third reason is that the contemplative life is common to both man and higher beings, viz., God and the angels, to whom man is assimilated through beatitude. And Aquinas made a conclusion later that the ultimate and perfect beatitude which we wait for must lie in one's seeing God's very essence (in *visione ipsius divinae essentiae*). Aquinas' responses are undoubtedly inspired by Aristotle's philosophy. Aristotle had also made a differentiation inside the reason, one is the practical reason directed to the things of being pursued or avoided, which can be otherwise; and the other is the theoretical reason directed to the things of eternal truths, which cannot be otherwise<sup>[29]</sup>. For Aristotle, theoretical reason is per definitionem superior to the practical, because the objects of theoretical reason are unchangeable, necessary and divine, whereas the objects of practical reason are changeable, contingent and perishable. Thomas and the authors of *Conimbricenses* had also adopted the consequence of this doctrine about the reason, that the theoretical reason had the priority over the practical reason both in the sense of the objects and of the grades of the happiness, because the activity of the theoretical reason represents the much more complete form of the happiness, and the virtuous activities of the practical reason fulfill the criteria of the happiness in a secondary sense<sup>[30]</sup>. On the contrary, Vagnone chose the Augustinian and Franciscan ethical tradition and turned away from the Thomas and Jesuit interpretation of the Aristotelian ethics, emphasizing the supremacy of the will.

Concerning Vagnone's presentation of the virtues, two things are worth of mentioning. The first thing is that Vagnone has followed the Aristotelian and scholastic tradition in terms of the division of virtues. The intellectual virtues (*ἀρετὴ διανοητικὴ ἢ*) can be divided into six kinds, and the ethical virtues (*ἀρετὴ ἠθικὴ ἢ*) mainly in four kinds. The six intellectual virtues are the intellect (*νοῦς*), knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*), wisdom (*σοφία*), consciousness (*synderesis*), prudence (*φρόνησις*) and art (*τέχνη*).

[29] EN VI 1139a3-15, De anima, III 9. 432b5-7.

[30] EN VI 13. 1145a7-14.



εχνη), while the cardinal ethical virtues are prudence, justice, bravery and temperance. Clearly we can see that, on one hand the twelve ethical virtues listed by Aristotle are contracted or subdivided into four<sup>[31]</sup>, and on the other hand, one more virtue was added to the list of the intellectual virtue, the consciousness (synderesis). The cardinal virtues can be traced back to Plato, and they were accepted by Ambrose (340-397) till systematically developed by Thomas Aquinas. Why did the scholastic tradition stress so much the cardinal virtues? According to Vagnone, there are mainly two reasons, the first one is that he believed that the virtues are the necessary and adequate conditions for attaining the imperfect happiness in the Diesseits of this world, and the second one is that cardinal virtues except prudence correspond with the three forms of the desires: the temperance is the virtue of the bodily desires, the bravery is the virtue of the anger and the justice is the virtue of the rational desire<sup>[32]</sup>. Prudence has a special position because of its double nature. On the one hand, it belongs to the virtues of the intellect, on the other hand it is also inseparably bound with the ethical virtues, because the prudence is per definitionem the knowledge about the good and the bad for ethical actions in different situations. Therefore prudence spans or stretches over the intellectual and ethical virtues.

The second point is that Vagnone can be considered as the first Western scholar, who tried to render the theories of Aristotelian virtues into Chinese. Although his translation is not popular any longer, yet his endeavour helped the Aristotelian virtues ethic to become understandable for the Chinese literati of that time. The mutual understanding of different cultures and philosophies does not happen in the level of the abstract theories and concepts, but is only possible through the personal dialogues and immersion into the culture, in which one lived as a stranger. This can be applied to Vagnone, and through his translations we can see how deeply he was immersed into Chinese culture, e. g. ling zhao “灵照” for the intellect (νοῦς), jin zhi “近知” for knowledge (ἐπιστήμη), zong zhi “宗知” for wisdom (σοφία), zhi “智” and yi “艺” for prudence (φρόνησις) and art (τέχνη) respectively. All of these words could be of great help for the Chinese readers to catch the meaning as the names suggested. Ling zhao literally refers to the spiritual enlightenment like intuitive knowledge without ratiocination, and means the grasp of the principles of the nature; jin zhi literally means the knowledge won by getting near to the natural things, and he interpreted it as the discursive knowledge about the necessity of the things; “宗知” denotes the knowledge about the final cause of all the natural things; zhi was concerned with the governance of the inner desires and inner emotions, and yi was concerned with the controlling of the outer crafts. All these five words can reflect exactly what Aristotle intended to say under νοῦς, ἐπιστήμη, σοφία, φρόνησις and τέχνη. This shows that Vagnone really spared no efforts to try to write about the Aristotelian ethics into Chinese context.

However, Vagnone has made no direct references to the Confucian cardinal virtues: benevolence, justice, rites, prudence and trustworthiness or faithfulness although he found that the virtues were the crucial points, which the Confucian ethics and Aristotelian ethics have most in common. I think

[31] According to Aristotle, the twelve ethical virtues are: bravery (ἀνδρεία), temperance (σωφροσύνη), liberality (ἐλευθεριότης), generosity (μεγαλοπρέπεια), magnificence (μεγαλοψυχία; which Vagnone translated as 宏德 hong de), tenderness (πραότης), truthfulness (ἀληθεία), wittiness (εὐτραπεία), friendship (φιλία), shame-feeling (αἰδώς), righteous indignation (νέμεσις), justice (δικαιοσύνη).

[32] XSXX 2019, Book VI, Chapter 5, p. 211.

the reason for his refraining from doing so is his worry about the fact that the Confucian and Aristotelian ethics have different approaches to virtues. The virtues are generally inborn and exist in the human mind from the nature according to the Confucian tradition, whereas the Aristotelian tradition showed a less optimistic view about the human nature, that the human being has the capacity to develop the virtues, but not possess the virtues from the nature. That is why he doubted on comparing the both and instead only focused on the Western scholastic tradition, otherwise that would make the issue more complicated and the Chinese literati more confused.

## 5. Conclusion

We do not know or we have too limited text witnesses or references that tell us what kind of influences Xsxx had exerted on his contemporary Chinese intellectuals or literati and on those after him. One reason might be that he had focused too much on the presentation of the scholastic Aristotelian ethics and provided too little space for the dialogue with the Confucian ethics in the text, so that it might have seemed to his contemporaries too hard or alien to begin with. However, through the examination and the analyses of the texts, we can see what kind of endeavors he had invested to render the Aristotelian ethics into Chinese culture in Xsxx, although what he had presented was a Christianized interpretation of the Aristotelian ethics based on the scholastic tradition, specifically on the interpretations of Thomas Aquinas. However, Vagnone has drawn on the scholastic interpretations only then, when it did not damage the basic structure based on the philosophical argumentation. Clearly he did not intend to write a moral theology, otherwise he would have talked about the theological themes, such as the original sin, grace, freedom, salvation etc. On the contrary, he protected his views usually by using philosophical arguments based on human reasoning in Xsxx, instead of relying on the authority of the Bible. On the other hand, he could be seen as the first Western scholar, who tried to render the basic Aristotelian ethical terms into Chinese by using some Confucian already-existing terms. Although his translations do not find largely accepted then and now, yet the value of Xsxx already goes beyond that. Therefore it is meaningless or not fair to Vagnone to argue if Xsxx is just a mixture or hodgepodge of different ethical traditions written into Chinese contexts, because Xsxx as the first treatise on the Aristotelian ethics in China in the history of the Western Learning Spreading to East will be never questioned.

**中文题目:**

## **亚里斯多德伦理学在中国的最早传播**

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**提要:** 意大利耶稣会会士高一志 (Alfonso Vagnone, 1566-1640) 所着的《修身西学》可谓是第一部分介绍亚里斯多德伦理学的中文著作, 但是, 这部著作并未受到学界的足够关注, 以至于陷入无人问津之地。本文可视为是对高一志把亚里斯多德伦理学介绍给中国人这件历史的和学术的事件的一个研究尝试, 它主要处理两个问题, 第一个问题是关于《修身西学》的思想来源, 第二个问题主要是关于神学化的亚里斯多德伦理学注释。我主要以两个核心的伦理概念 (幸福与德性) 为线索来探究高一志是如何在中国文化中介绍亚里斯多德伦理学的。经过分析, 我们发现, 对于《修身西学》是否是在中国文化语境中写成的、并融合了不同的伦理学传统的大杂烩的争论是毫无意义的, 因为高一志的《修身西学》作为在西学东渐的历史上首部介绍亚里斯多德伦理学的中文著作所蕴含的意义和价值早已超越了这个争论本身。

**关键词:** 高一志 (Alfonso Vagnone); 《修身西学》; 伦理学; 幸福; 德性

# 《名理探》与《穷理学》关于逻辑推理的讨论<sup>〔1〕</sup>

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**摘要:**《名理探》与《穷理学》为明末清初最早系统性介绍西方逻辑学的教科书。前者介绍了逻辑推论和三段论的基本构成形式,而现存的《穷理学》的《理推之总论》中详细讲述了三段论的形式、其不同的格与有效式、以及其有效性之证明。《穷理学》中的“理推”为拉丁文“*sylogismus*”的译名,现代汉语中常将后者译为“三段论”,然而就希腊文词根而言,“理推”要比三段论更加准确。本文讨论了《名理探》和《穷理学》中阐述逻辑推理的部分,并讨论了“*sylogismus*”在具体上下文中的翻译问题。文中结合文献中实例指出,“*sylogismus*”广义上指推理,而只有具体到推理之有效形式的讨论之语境中才指三段论这一特殊推理形式。

**关键词:**推理,三段论,李之藻、傅汎济、南怀仁

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## 一、文艺复兴时期亚里士多德逻辑在中国的传播

逻辑学一直是西方传统教育体系中的一门学科,依照它属于所谓“自由七艺”(septem artes liberales)中关于语言的三艺(trivium)。自从波爱修将亚里士多德的《范畴篇》和《解释篇》,以及新柏拉图主义者波菲利的亚里士多德逻辑导言(Isagoge)翻译为拉丁文之后,这几部著作就构成了讲拉丁文的西方的学校中逻辑学的主要教学内容,在哲学史上被称作“旧逻辑”(logica vetus),与十二世纪之后包含了陆续途径阿拉伯世界传到西方的亚里士多德之《前后分析篇》的“新逻辑”(logica nova)相区分。但无论如何,亚里士多德的逻辑构成了学校和后来兴起的大学的基础教学内容。意大利文艺复兴第一阶段的人文主义开始对亚里士多德逻辑发起了质疑和批判。例如像彼得·拉姆斯(Petrus Ramus, 1515—1572)和洛伦佐·瓦拉(Lorenzo Valla, 1405/1407—1457)这样的人文主义者们指出,这种逻辑不注重实在本身以及内容,所以趋于空洞。<sup>〔2〕</sup>然而文艺复兴并没有因为此类批评而抛弃亚里士多德主义和亚里士多德的逻辑。随着古希腊学习在西方的兴起,亚里士多德的逻辑著作在人文主义阶段获得了新的翻译,比如约翰·阿尔基罗普洛斯(John Argyropulos, 1415—1487)的翻译。这些翻译者们也强调了古代亚里士多德注疏者的重要性,例如辛普利丘(Simplicius, 公元 5—6 世纪)、

〔1〕 本文获得中山大学西学东渐文献馆所属的“三大建设”专项资助。Cf., Paulos Huang, “Dialogue and Critique: The 16<sup>th</sup> Century Religious Reform and Modernity”, *International Journal of Sino-Western Studies*, vol. 12, 1-12. (<https://www.sinowesternstudies.com/back-issues/vol-12-2017/>)

〔2〕 Frederick Copleston, *A History of Philosophy, Volume III: Late Medieval and Renaissance*, (New York etc.: Doubleday), 217-219.

阿芙罗迪西亚斯的亚历山大(Alexander of Aphrodisias, 公元 2—3 世纪)等。<sup>〔3〕</sup> 出版于 1592 和 1606 年间的《科英布拉注疏系列》(Conimbricenses)是葡萄牙科英布拉学院的教科书系列,由一系列对亚里士多德著作的注疏组成,作者是科英布拉学院的耶稣会教授们。系列中的《亚里士多德逻辑注疏》(In Universam Dialecticam Aristotelis)是最晚出版的一部。这一系列是文艺复兴亚里士多德主义的代表著作之一,其中,人文主义的语文学与传统的经院哲学相结合,在书中分别得到讨论的问题(quaestio)中,也不时地穿插讨论了神学问题,因为耶稣会的教学延续经院学中使用哲学方法来讨论神学的传统,也是为了在天主教改革运动中(Counter reformation<sup>〔4〕</sup>)中推进天主教神学。科英布拉注疏系列在十六世纪和十七世纪备受欢迎,新教地区也得到使用,各部著作均多次再版,其逻辑注疏甚至在出版之前就被盗版。<sup>〔5〕</sup>

明末之际,耶稣会士陆续来华,并在罗明坚(Michele Ruggieri, 1543—1607)和利玛窦(Matteo Ricci, 1552—1610)的努力之下,在中华大地各处建立了驻地。当时耶稣会士广泛地与明末士大夫交往,采取文化传教的测量,积极地进行知识传播。<sup>〔6〕</sup> 来华比利时传教士金尼格(Nicolas Trigault, 1577—1628)受当时耶稣会省长龙华民(Niccolò Longobardo, 1559—1654)的委托 1613 年回到欧洲,为耶稣会在北京和中国其它地方已经创立的驻院收集藏书,当他 1620 年返回中国的时候,传说他带来了 7000 卷书,不过事实上可能为 757 部著作左右。他带来的藏书中包含着科英布拉系列。逻辑在耶稣会的教学大纲(Ratio Studiorum)中为其他各门学科的预备学科,按规定,耶稣会学院第一年需学习逻辑,每天要分别在早上和下午各上一次时长一小时的逻辑课,内容主要以亚里士多德著作的诠释为主。学生要学会神学和自然科学上运用逻辑,三段论构成了逻辑教学的很大部分,并且也在自然科学和数学教课书中出现。<sup>〔7〕</sup>

来华的耶稣会士从而也关注对西方逻辑学的传播。利玛窦的《天主实义》(1595 年)中已经介绍了亚里士多德的十范畴,<sup>〔8〕</sup>高一志(Alphonsus Vagnoni 1566—1640)在其《西学》中将逻辑(文中使用音译“落日加”)介绍为哲学(文中使用音译“费罗所非亚”)中的一支。按他的解释,“落日加者,译言明辨之道,以立诸学之根基而贵辨是于、实与虚、里与表。盖开茅塞而于事物之隐蕴不使谬误也”。<sup>〔9〕</sup> 据考证,《西学》大约撰写于 1615 年,后来被作为一章纳入到高一志的《童幼教育》一书中。<sup>〔10〕</sup> 艾儒略(Guilio Aleni, 1582—1649)向明代中国读者介绍西方教育制度的专著《西学凡》(1623 年在杭州出版)中大致重复了高一志对逻辑学的描述,并添加了对其分支的描述,例如关于词项的五谓词和十范畴的

〔3〕 Lisa Jardine, “Humanistic Logic”, in *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy*, edited by C. B. Schmitt et alii, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 194.

〔4〕 Counter reformation 有时也汉译为“反宗教改革”,但由于其本质是由于新教的发展而激发起的天主教内部的改革运动,此译法不免会引起歧义,故在此采用另一译法,即“天主教改革”。

〔5〕 Cf. Jill Kraye, “Coimbra Commentators”, in *Cambridge Translations of Renaissance Philosophical Texts. Moral and Political Philosophy*, edited by Jill Kraye, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 80-88.

〔6〕 Cf. R. Po-chia Hsia, “Christianity and Empire: The Catholic Mission in Late Imperial China”, in *Studies in Church History* vol. 54 (2008), 213.

〔7〕 Joachim Kurtz, *The Discovery of Chinese Logic*, (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2011), 23.

〔8〕 朱维铮 Zhu Weizheng 编,《利玛窦中文著译集》Li Madou zhongwen zhuzuo yiji [Collected works and translations by Matteo Ricci], (上海 Shanghai: 复旦大学出版社 Fudan daxue chubanshe [Fudan University Press], 2012), 18.

〔9〕 参见黄兴涛 Huang Xingtiao、王国蓉 Wang Guorong 编,《明清之际西学文本·第一册》Mingqing zhiji xixue wenben diyice [Literature of Western Learnings from the Ming and Qing Dynasty. Vol. 1], (北京 Beijing: 中华书局 Zhonghua shuju [Zhonghua Press], 2013), 219.

〔10〕 王彩芹 Wang Caiqin,《艾儒略与相关学科用语的创制及传播——通过比较〈西学〉与〈西学凡〉》Airulue yu xiangguanxueke yongyu de chuangzhi ji chuango — tongguo bijiao Xixue he Xixuefan [The creation and dissemination of Aleni's translated terms for new disciplines: a comparison of Xixue and Xixuefan], 载《东アジア文化交渉研究》[Journal of East Asian Cultural Interaction Studies] vol. 4 (2011), 329.



理论,以及关于心灵中概念的理论,和用于辩论的理论(文中称之为“辩学之论”),即“辩是非得失之诸确法”,以及关于知识论的学问。<sup>[11]</sup> 天启七年(1627),葡萄牙传教士傅汎际(Franciscus Furtado, 1587-1653)与李之藻(1565-1630,字振之,教名 Leo)开始合作翻译科英布拉亚里士多德逻辑大全注疏,1631年第一次以《名理探》为书名在杭州刻印出版。此书却只包含了科英布拉亚里士多德逻辑大全注疏中的对波菲利《导言》和对亚里士多德《范畴篇》的翻译,分别名为“五公篇”和“十伦篇”。据钟鸣旦(Nicolas Standaert)的看法,他们已经翻译了的《前分析篇注疏》被收录到南怀仁编撰的《穷理学》中,而傅汎际或许也已经翻译了《后分析篇注疏》中的《论证明》。<sup>[12]</sup> 南怀仁(Ferdinand Verbiest, 1623-1688)是比利时耶稣会传教士,清初年间来华,在钦天监供职,1670年康熙授其职务名曰“治理历法”。南怀仁编撰《穷理学》,收集了以往耶稣会士翻译的作品,内容覆盖了逻辑学、形而上学、数学、天文学、力学与机械(包括弹道测量)、生物学与医学等,实为一部百科全书。《穷理学》这一书名体现了明末清初时期之“格物穷理之学”的概念,此书同时代的拉丁文文献称之为“Cursus Philosophicus”(《哲学系列》)。<sup>[13]</sup> 南怀仁的目的是想要将其作为数学和天文学教学的基础,亦想让《穷理学》成为中国科举考试的必要内容。<sup>[14]</sup> 1683年他将手稿进呈康熙,写《进呈〈穷理学〉奏》称“从西字已翻译而未刻者,皆校对而增修之、纂集之;其未经翻译者,则接续而翻译,以加补之,辑集成帙”,<sup>[15]</sup> 奏中他向康熙提到使用西方逻辑之三段论进行推理的重要性。<sup>[16]</sup> 然而在南怀仁进呈《穷理学》之后,康熙将此书交付给礼部和翰林院评审,按《康熙起居注》记载,评审结果却对南怀仁不利。<sup>[17]</sup> 其中可读到:“又会同翰林院题覆治理历法南怀仁疏,所请以西洋穷理学书刊刻颁布,议不准行。上曰‘此书内文辞甚悖谬不通。’明珠等奏曰:‘其所云人之知识记忆皆系于头脑等语,于理实为舛谬。’上曰:‘部覆本不必发南怀仁,所撰书着发还。’”<sup>[18]</sup>《穷理学》也就没有获得南怀仁期待中的官刻。<sup>[19]</sup> 至今为止,《名理探》的文本保持良好,有存在巴黎国家图书馆的明刻本(BNP Chinois No. 3413 and 3414),也有民国时期(1935年)商务印书馆出版的现代版本,此版本在1959年在上海三出版社得到重印。相比之下,《穷理学》却剩下了一个手抄的孤本,而且也仅仅保留下来了部分,现存于北京大学图书馆,2016年得到整理出版。

《天主实义》和《西学凡》出版之后流传广泛,且均被李之藻收录仅他编撰的文集《天学初函》中。西方逻辑学作为一门推理的学科已经被中国读者所认识,例如徐光启在《译〈几何原本〉引》中推崇一

[11] 参见黄兴涛 Huang Xingtiao、王国蓉 Wang Guorong 编,《明清之际西学文本·第一册》Mingqing zhiji xixue wenben diyice [Literature of Western Learnings from the Ming and Qing Dynasty. Vol. 1], 224-225.

[12] Nicolas Standaert, “The transmission of Renaissance culture in seventeenth-century China”, in Renaissance Studies Vol. 17 No. 3 (2003), 385.

[13] Kurtz, The Discovery of Chinese Logic, 66.

[14] Ibid., 69.

[15] 徐宗泽 Xu Zongze, 《明清间耶稣会士译著提要》Mingqingjian yesuhuishi yizhuyiyao [Summary of the content of Jesuit writings and translations from the Ming and Qing Dynasty], (上海 Shanghai: 上海书店出版社 Shanghai shudian chubanshe [Shanghai Bookstore Publishing House], 2006), 147.

[16] Cf. Martha Cheung: An Anthology of Chinese Discourse on Translation (Volume 2): From the Late Twelfth Century to 1800, edited by Robert Neather, (London: Routledge, 2016), . 127-128.

[17] A. Dudink and Nicolas Standaert, “Ferdinand Verbiest’s Qiongli Xue,” in The Christian Mission in the Verbiest Era, ed. Noël Golvers, (Leuven: Leuven University Press 1999), 16-17.

[18] 中国第一历史档案馆整理 Zhongguo diyi danganguan [First National Historical Archive of China]: 《康熙起居注》Kangxi qijuzhu [Daily Records of the Emperor Kangxi’s Life], 卷二 Vol. 2, (北京 Beijing: 中华书局 Zhonghua shuju [Zhonghua Press], 1984), 1104.

[19] Cf. Benjamin Elman, “Some Comparative Issues in the World History of Science and Technology”, in 《清華學報》Qing hua xue bao [Tsing Hua journal of Chinese studies] vol. 41, no. 1 (March 2011), 149.

种新的格物致理的精神,<sup>[20]</sup>而这也就是利玛窦所描述的“因既明,累推其未明”<sup>[21]</sup>的建立在三段论证明上的亚里士多德方法论。但是作为系统性介绍西方逻辑学的《名理探》和《穷理学》的译著,在明末清初的时候却缺乏读者。至今还没有确切的迹象表明《名理探》在其刻印后,被李之藻亲密圈子之外的读者接纳过。而《穷理学》但是根本就没有得到出版。只有到了民国时期,中国知识分子开始又一次接受西学的时候,《名理探》才得到了重版。尽管如此,由于《名理探》是中国首次系统性介绍亚里士多德哲学的著作,其重要性不可忽视,为“中国科学史、思想史或逻辑史上常要提的一件要事”。<sup>[22]</sup> 由于逻辑之核心为推理,下文将详细讨论《名理探》与《穷理学》中关于推理的讨论。

## 二、《穷理学》与《名理探》的关系

杜鼎克(Ad Dudink)和钟鸣旦(Nicolas Standaert)曾对《穷理学》残抄本进行了描述,它由以下几个组成部分:一、《理推之总论》(共五卷);二、《形性之理推》(共九卷);三、《理辩之五公称》(共五卷)、四、《坤舆图说》(上、下卷)。杜鼎克和钟鸣旦试图借助南怀仁的同代人的报道重构过《穷理学》的完整结构,茨博特(Thomas Ignatius Dunyn-Szpot, 1644—1716)在大约 1700 年记载过《穷理学》的部分内容,按他的报道,《穷理学》包括了傅汎际和李之藻的《名理探》(De Logica)、艾儒略(Giulio Aleni, 1582—1649)的《性学述》、毕方济(Francesco Sambiasi, 1582—1649)的《灵言蠹勺》和艾儒略的《万物真原》(此三部作品一并在拉丁文献中称为 De Anima eiusque potential deque rerum omnium origine)、高一志(Alfonso Vagnone, 1568—1640, 又名王丰肃)的《斐禄答汇》(De aliis philosophicis quaestionibus)和利类思(Ludovic Bugli 1606—1682)的《万物原始》(De rerum omnium principium)。<sup>[23]</sup> 按照这样的描述,《穷理学》的内容似乎局限在逻辑学、灵魂论和形而上学/自然神学上,然而我们知道,事实并非如此,此书也包含了很多科学技术内容。<sup>[24]</sup> 按后来冯承钧的描述,他还见到有《轻重之理推》一卷,并按惟考狄的《中国的中欧印刷术书目》记载,还有《光向异验理推》一卷(360 号)、《理推各图说》一卷(364 号)、《理辩之引启》二卷。<sup>[25]</sup> 但因南怀仁本人提到《穷理学》有六十卷,最终残留十四卷,最终得出结论认为即便是加上茨博特(Dunyn-Szpot)的《集成》(Collectanae historiae Sinensis)中所提到《穷理学》的与其不重复的十九卷,也仅获得了此书一半的内容,从而最终得出结论认为,此书完整确切内容是仍然未知的。<sup>[26]</sup>

[20] 就徐光启对“格物致知”的新的理解请参见姚爱娟 Yao Aijuan, 冷天吉 Leng Tianji, 《格物致知在明清的意义转换》Gewuzhizhi zai mingqing de yizhuanghuang [The change of meaning of “gewu zhizhi” in Ming and Qing Dynasty], 载《合肥学院学报(社会科学版)》Hefei xueyuan xuebao shehui kexueban [Journal of Hefei University (Social Sciences), vol. 23, No. 2 (2006), 11. 就徐光启本人的论述见徐光启 Xu Guangqi: 《徐光启集:上册》Xu Guangqi wenji shangce [Collected Works of Xu Guangqi, Vol. 1], 王重民 Wang Chongmin 辑校, (上海 Shanghai: 上海古籍出版社 Shanghai guji chubanshe [Shanghai Publishing House for ancient sources], 1984), 75.

[21] 利玛窦 Li Madou [Matteo Ricci], 《译几何原本引》Yi jihyuanben yin [Preface to the translation of the Elementa Geometrica], 载《利玛窦中文著译集》, 朱维铮 Zhu Weizheng 编, 《利玛窦中文著译集》Li Madou zhongwen zhuzuo yiji [Collected works and translations by Matteo Ricci], (上海 Shanghai: 复旦大学出版社 Fudan daxue chubanshe [Fudan University Press], 2012), 298.

[22] 徐光台 Xu Guangtai, 《明末西方〈范畴篇〉重要词语的传入与翻译》Mingmo xifang fanchou pian zhongyao ciyu de chuanguo he fanyi [Ming transmission and translation of some important Western terms related to the Categories], 载《台湾 Taiwan》《清华学报》Qinghua xuebao [Tsing Hua journal of Chinese studies] No. 2 (2005), 246.

[23] Dudink and Standaert, “Ferdinand Verbiest’s Qiongli Xue”, 11-12.

[24] Ibid., 31.

[25] 尚智丛 Shang Zhicong, 《南怀仁〈穷理学〉的主体内容和基本机构》Nan Huairen Qionglitue de zhutineirong he jibenjiegou [Main content and structure of Ferdinand Verbiest’s the Fathom of Principles], 载《清史研究》Qingshi yanjiu [Studies of history of Qing Dynasty], No. 3 (2003), 74.

[26] Dudink and Standaert, “Ferdinand Verbiest’s Qiongli Xue”, 30.

按南怀仁的《进呈〈穷理学〉书奏》所述,编撰这一巨著的目的在于使治历者求名理。徐宗译误以为《穷理学》即一部逻辑学著作,为《名理探》之续译。<sup>[27]</sup>此谬误被《中国文化史年表》沿袭,其中说到“传教士南怀仁对傅汎际续译的《名理探》后二十卷进行校补,并继续翻译,至此译成《穷理学》六十卷进程”。<sup>[28]</sup>但在编辑后的《穷理学存》的二十一卷中,仅有十卷涉及到逻辑,即《理推之总论》和《理辩之五公称》这两个部分。

杜鼎克和钟鸣旦还指出,《穷理学》中关于逻辑的部分不仅包含了已经刊刻的《名理探》的内容,另外其它两章则为李之藻与傅汎济已经译出却未得到刊刻的部分。<sup>[29]</sup>顾有信也持类似的看法,在他看来,《穷理学》中的《理推之五公称》即傅汎际和李之藻的《名理探》之再版,而《理推之总论》,在拉丁文献中有时被称作“De syllogismo”则为傅汎际和李之藻所著却未得到刊印的部分,因为其文风、术语和形式皆与《名理探》类同。按他的看法,南怀仁在此的作用也是一个“集述者”而非翻译者。尽管按顾有信的猜测,他或许亲自着手翻译了一部分科因布拉大学亚里士多德逻辑学。<sup>[30]</sup>傅汎际在李之藻去世之后,继续翻译科因布拉亚里士多德逻辑注疏一书的事,在《中国文化史年表》中,也有记载,其中提到,傅汎际与李之藻合译十卷,后傅汎际续译二十卷。就此书所述,这二十卷被南怀仁收录入《穷理学》。<sup>[31]</sup>杜鼎克和钟鸣旦也他们文章的一个脚注中,也提到这一说法,但这或许来源于方豪的猜测。<sup>[32]</sup>《穷理学》中的《理辩之五公称》在对比下可证实即为《名理探》,然而《理推之总论》是否出于相同译者之手,却仍需论证。不过既然南怀仁自称为“集述者”,那么《理推之总论》亦应至少大部分出于前人之手。

据顾有信看来,南怀仁有意用“理推”和“理辩”来替代傅汎际和李之藻所使用的“名理探”一词,从而掩盖他所使用的文本来源。<sup>[33]</sup>另外他还认为,南怀仁系统性地使用“理推”一词,来引诱中国人习惯使用三段论。<sup>[34]</sup>这一看法却未免有些偏颇。因为《穷理学存》中,有关逻辑的分为两大部分,一部分以“理推”为总标题,另一部分则以“理辩”为总标题,前者涉及到亚里士多德《工具论》中的《前分析篇》与《后分析篇》,后者则包含了《名理探》得到刊印的部分。《名理探》中解释到“名理”包含了辩证法(dialectica)和严格意义上的逻辑(logica):“穷理者(即哲学家)兼用此名,以称推论之总艺云,依此释络日伽为名理探,即循所已明,退而通诸为明之辩也”。<sup>[35]</sup>据此,名理探即为关于推论的学科,而“理推”一词,即为南怀仁给“syllogismus”的中文译名,两者都兼顾“推”这一逻辑功能。上文也曾提到徐光启和利玛窦在翻译《几何原本》(1606年出版)的时候,就已经提到过逻辑推理在西方科学研究上的重要性,很难说“理推”一词是南怀仁的发明,至少它并不比耶稣会士在南怀仁之前的文献中对逻辑方

[27] 尚智丛 Shang Zhicong,《南怀仁〈穷理学〉的主体内容和基本机构》Nan Huaren Qionglxue de zhutineirong he jibenjieou [Main content and structure of Ferdinand Verbiest's the Fathom of Principles], 74.

[28] 虞云国 Yu Yunguo、周育民 Zhou Yumin 编,《中国文化史年表》Zhongguo wenhua nianbiao [Chronology of the history of Chinese culture], (上海 Shanghai: 上海人民出版社 Shanghai renmin chubanshe [Shanghai People's Publishing House], 2009), 607.

[29] 参见张西平 Zhang Xiping、侯乐 Hou Le,《简析〈名理探〉和〈穷理学〉中的逻辑学术语》Jianxi minglitan he qionglxue zhong de luojixueshu [An Analysis of Logic Terminology in Mingli Tan and Qiongli Xue], 载《唐都学刊》Tangdu xuekan [Tangdu Journal] Vol. 27, No. 2 (2011), 109, 第 110-111 页.

[30] Kurtz, The Development of Logic in China, 70.

[31] 虞云国 Yu Yunguo、周育民 Zhou Yumin 编,《中国文化史年表》Zhongguo wenhua nianbiao [Chronology of the history of Chinese culture], 575, 607.

[32] Dudink and Standaert, “Ferdinand Verbiest's Qiongli Xue”, 30.

[33] Kurtz, The Development of Logic in China, 71.

[34] Ibid., 72.

[35] 傅汎际 Fu Fanji [Franciscus Furtado]、李之藻 Li Zhizao,《名理探》Mingli tan [The Pattern of Names], 姚大勇 Yao Dayong、胡沈舍 Hu Shenshe 校点, 载《明清之际西方传教士汉籍丛刊·第二辑》Mingqingzhijie xifang chuangujiaoshi hanji congkan dierkan [Series Chinese Writings by Western Missionaries to China during the Ming and Qing Dynasty, series 2], vol. 5, 周振鹤 Zhou Zhenhe 主编 [南京 Nanjing: 凤凰出版社 Fenuang chubanshe [Phoenix Publishing House], 2017], 27.

法论的描述更具有诱惑力或蒙蔽性。使用“理”一词来引入西方哲学的方式是利玛窦所开启的, 也被部分中国士大夫接受, 使用“理推”延续了这一传统, 并非是南怀仁暗藏的把戏或伎俩。

实际上, 张西平和侯乐在 2011 年发表的一篇文章中探讨过《穷理学》中的逻辑术语以及其汉译列出一系列主要概念的拉丁文、英文和古文汉译名的对照表, 其中给出《穷理学》中“理推”所对应的拉丁文为“ratiocinatio”与“syllogismus”。<sup>[36]</sup> 也就是说, 在《穷理学》中“理推”一词着重的是亚里士多德逻辑中演绎和证明的部分, 南怀仁以此术语来区分亚里士多德逻辑中关于本体论和概念的部分, 这一部分他称之为“名理”。由于“名理探”是这门学科的总译名, 但《穷理学》中却没有将逻辑中有关推理和概念的部分整合成一个整体, 而是将其分别编排为《穷理学》这部百科全书中的独立部分, 从而“名理探”在此没有得到使用, 是很容易理解的。

### 三、《名理探》中对亚氏之“syllogismos”的译介

尽管《名理探》只包含了对科因布拉注疏对波菲力的《导论》(Isagoge) 和亚里士多德之《范畴篇》的讨论, 而不涉及到亚里士多德讨论推理(syllogismos)的部分, 即《前分析篇》, 但是里面还是可以找到一点相关“syllogismos”的阐述的。因为《名理探》中的五公卷之一为《科英布拉亚里士多德逻辑大全注疏》中“导言”(Prooemium)的翻译。这一章主要讨论的是逻辑学在哲学的体系中的位置、逻辑学之研究对象、其作为一门学科的定义和本质等。其中可以读到推理在逻辑学中的核心地位, 逻辑学之对象(向界)是“明辨”的“规式”。<sup>[37]</sup> “明辨”指的是“由所已明, 推通吾所未明。曰解释、曰剖析、曰推论。”<sup>[38]</sup> “明辨”指的一种基础在逻辑操作上的获得新的知识的过程, 所涉及的逻辑操作有三种: 解释, 指的是定义; 剖析这是一种来自于柏拉图、后来在亚里士多德《范畴篇》以及波菲利的《导言》中得到进一步发展的概念分析和划分的逻辑操作; 而推论则涉及到建立在不同命题的结合上获得新的结论的推理。而推论的模式即所谓的“syllogismos”, 《名理探》中以音译称之“细禄世斯模”。<sup>[39]</sup>

五公卷一的“名理探向界”一节中所提到了所谓的“细禄世斯模”(syllogismos)被解释为“推论一规式”, 《名理探》的作者们且提到在后文中将会对此进行进一步的阐述(“详在后”)。<sup>[40]</sup> 在随后的“欲通诸学先须知名理探”一节中对其做了更加详细的解释, “推辨之论三端: 一首列, 一次列, 一收列也。如云, 凡生觉者, 亦为自立者。凡人, 皆生觉者也, 则凡人, 必皆自立者也。生觉云者, 是首列; 凡人生觉云者, 是次列; 人皆自立云者, 是收列也。首次二列, 总谓之先。总三者言, 是谓推辨之论。西云细落世斯模。其收内所括之义理, 谓之括义”。<sup>[41]</sup> 这一段引文是译者添加的注释, 而非科因布拉逻辑大全中本有的部分, 引文中“推辨之论”即为上述的“推论”, 文中给出的例子即我们现在所说的三段论, 因为有着三个命题: 即首列(现在所谓的大前提)、次列(小前提)、收列(结论)。文中的例子可以如此体现为(右列为所对应的现代汉语表述):

凡人, 皆生觉者也。	所有的人都是生物。
凡生觉者, 亦为自立者。	所有生物都是实体。
凡人, 必皆自立者也。	所有的人都是实体。

[36] 参见张西平 Zhang Xiping、侯乐 Hou Le, 《简析〈名理探〉和〈穷理学〉中的逻辑学术语》Jianxi minglitan he qionglixue zhong de luojixueshuy [An Analysis of Logic Terminology in Mingli Tan and Qiongli Xue], 109, 110-111.

[37] 傅汎际 Fu Fanji [Franciscus Furtado]、李之藻 Li Zhizao, 《名理探》Mingli tan [The Pattern of Names], 42.

[38] 同上.

[39] 同上书, 44.

[40] 同上.

[41] 同上书, 50.



据《名理探》中关于推理和三段论的阐述来看,两位译者在此是想将科因布拉逻辑大全注释完整翻译的,从而指引到后面的部分,尽管在《名理探》的两次刊印版中都没有包含这一部分。

《名理探》中也提到了三段论推理在其他科学上的作用,文中写到“用他学固然之质于推论间,其所用之规,非其学所自作之规也。惟名理探先设,然后他学得借之以为用也”。<sup>[42]</sup>也就是说,名理探即逻辑学所制定的推论的规范为其他科学进行获得新知识的探索和推理的模式。逻辑学为其他科学的工具和基础。而作为推论之规式的三段论则提供了一种从已知推导到未知的科学探讨形式。

#### 四、《穷理学》之《理推之总论》中对逻辑推理的介绍

顾有信在他的《中国逻辑之发现》(The Discovery of Chinese Logic)一书的第72页至88页对《穷理学》中的《理推之总论》加以了描述,并且在页80—81的图表1.5中列出了《穷理学》中对科因布拉逻辑中的一系列核心概念的译名。按他的描述,《理推之总论》的第一卷给出了前提(premise)以及三段论诸组成部分的定义;第二和三卷讨论不同类型的前提以及它们的主谓项之换位(conversion);第四卷讨论三段论之三个格中的有效式;第五卷则讨论模态三段论。顾有信也提到,《穷理学存》中《理推之总论》五卷覆盖了亚里士多德《前分析篇》两部书的全体内容,虽然在讨论之详尽上有所区分。<sup>[43]</sup>他随后对《穷理学》中使用中文对西方传统逻辑学术语和思想加以表述的方式加以了详细的讨论。他将《穷理学》中关于三段论之组成部分以及命题中系词的翻译方案作为例案,指出十七世纪的中国对耶稣会亚里士多德逻辑的译介并没有语法上和技术上的根本困难。<sup>[44]</sup>如顾有信已指出的那样,<sup>[45]</sup>《理推之总论》结构上大体依从科因布拉亚里士多德逻辑注疏关于亚里士多德《前分析篇》的那一部分的结构和顺序。科因布拉本的这一部分其实是对亚里士多德三段论的系统性阐述,并从命题的组成部分开始讨论。亚里士多德《前分析篇》的第一卷第一章中讨论的是前提、词项和三段论的定义和说明,第二章讨论的是命题的主谓项换位,或“转换”。顾有信认为,《理推之总论》中并未阐明“理推”<sup>[46]</sup>之概念。<sup>[47]</sup>但实际上《理推之总论》卷一中就已引用亚里士多德《前分析篇》中对“syllogismos”(希腊文拼写)的定义,此定义在历史上亦影响深远,<sup>[48]</sup>即“三段论(syllogismos)是一种论证,其中只要确定某些论断,某些异于它们的事物便可以必然地从如此确定的论断中推出”。<sup>[49]</sup>《穷理学》之《理推之总论》中相应“夫理推者也,乃是言论属而从所先设,据其为某义,必推收他义”<sup>[50]</sup>这样的定义。顾有信认为这仅是种部分性的描绘(partial description),<sup>[51]</sup>但比较之下可见这在亚里士多德传统中是“syllogismos”之公认定义。

[42] 同上书,51.

[43] Kurtz, The Development of Logic in China, 73.

[44] Ibid., 73-79.

[45] Ibid., 72.

[46] 对应拉丁文: syllogismus 或 ratiocinatio, 前者是希腊词的拉丁文拼写形式, 后者则为拉丁文中对希腊文的意译, 参见下文.

[47] Kurtz, The Development of Logic in China, 73.

[48] 欧文·M·柯皮 Irving M. Copi, 卡尔·科恩 Carl Cohen, 《逻辑学导论》Luoji xue Daolun [Introduction to Logic], 张建军 Zhang Jianjun, 潘天群 Pan Tianqun 等译, (北京 Beijing: 中国人民大学出版社 Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe [Publishing House of Renmin University], 2007), 253.

[49] 亚里士多德 Aristotle, 《前分析篇》Qian Fenxi pian [Prior Analytics], 余纪元译 Yujiyuan, 载《亚里士多德全集·第一卷》Yalishiduode Quanji diyi juan [Complete Works of Aristotle] Vol. 1, 苗力田 Miao Litian 主编, (北京 Beijing: 中国人民大学出版社 Zhongguorenmin daxue chubanshe [Renmin University Press], 1990), 84-85.

[50] 南怀仁 Ferdinand Verbiest 集述, 《穷理学存》Qiongli xue cun [Remaining parts of the Fathom of Principles], 宋兴无、宫云维等点校, 杭州 Hangzhou: 浙江大学出版社 Zhejiang daxue chubanshe [Zhejiang University Press], 2016), 5.

[51] Kurtz, The Development of Logic in China, 74.

顾有信的描述基础在北京大学珍藏的残抄本上。此抄本于 2016 年进过整理、编辑、校点, 得以首次印刷出版。按编者的说法, 馆藏的残抄本“计存十六本十四卷: 第一本《穷理学理推总目》, 第二至第六本为《理推之总论》五卷, 第七至十本为《形性之理推》四卷, 第十一至十六本为《理推之五公称》五卷。”<sup>[52]</sup> 新编辑出版的《穷理学存》将《理推之总论》放在最先, 而属于《名理探》部分的《理辩之五公称》置在《形性之理推》之后, 这是一部自然哲学的著作, 只遗留下来第六卷至第九卷<sup>[53]</sup>, 包含关于空间、无限、轻重和气的讨论, 很显然来自于亚里士多德《物理篇》中讨论到的主题。《名理探》中的《十伦》没有遗存在《穷理学》残抄本中, 但它实际上被收录入《名理探》的可能性是很大的。尽管未能考证南怀仁原初对《穷理学》各部分的排序, 从名称上可以推论, 在讨论了逻辑的理推之后, 进入到推论规式在自然哲学上的运用是合理的, 因此自然哲学则被名为对“形性之理推”。而《名理探》以及其相应部分《理辩之总论》所覆盖到的《范畴篇》和《导言》实际上属于形而上学, 因而将其置在自然哲学之后, 也有一定道理, 特别是在《科英布拉注疏系列》中并没有亚里士多德之《形而上学》的注疏的情况下, 这一部分可以替代形而上学的内容。当然, 对此很难找到确证, 但是从义理上可发现《穷理学存》中各部分排序的一定合理性。

参照编辑出版的《穷理学存》, 可以确定《穷理学存》中《理推之总论》中到底讨论到了亚里士多德《前分析篇》里的哪几章, 因为这一部分沿袭了科因布拉亚里士多德逻辑注疏的结构。科因布拉本使用的结构是对《前分析篇》中的每一章进行逐行逐句的诠释 (commentarius), 然后在随后的诸问题中 (Quaestiones) 讨论涉及到这一章内容的专题问题, 这也就不再是严格意义上的注疏, 而是独立的论文, 虽然从主题和内容上来看, 都与亚里士多德所提到的内容相关。注疏和问题都是中世纪经院学中常用的体裁。在《穷理学存》的《理推之总论》中, 这个结构则得到相应的体现: 所谓的“commentarius”为“第……篇”, 表述这里所诠释的是亚里士多德《前分析篇》中的第几章, 而随后的“辩”则对应了科因布拉本中的“Quaestio”, “支”则“Quaestio”下所划分出来的“articulus”。这个结构也符合《名理探》的结构。将《穷理学》中在“辩”之前的诸篇与亚里士多德之《前分析篇》相对照, 则可见《穷理学存》之《理推之总论》的开头三卷都依次讨论了《前分析篇》中前三章, 每一卷讨论一章, 而《理推之总论》的第四卷则讨论了《前分析篇》第一卷之第四至第七卷, 内容是讨论三段论的三个格。卷五讨论的是《前分析篇》第一卷之第八章至第十二章, 然后突然进入到二十八至《前分析篇》的第一卷末, 并仅仅提供了简短的内容概要, 第二十八和二十九章还分别给出概要, 后面的数章则是非常简略地笼统地一起概述。《前分析篇》的第二卷在《穷理学存》中则以“古论究先者”题笼统概况, 在最新编辑成文的《穷理学存》中只占了五页。

在我们继续深入讨论《穷理学》中对三段论的描述之前, 先必须澄清希腊文“syllogismos”一词的翻译问题: 余纪元将亚里士多德之表述“syllogismos”直接翻译为“三段论”其实并不是很妥当。因为“三段论”仅表达了论证的形式, 即两个前提加结论, 却未表达其内涵。亚里士多德在《前分析篇》第一章里所给出的定义却是对其内涵的定义, 其中包含了前提以及从中推导出来的结论间含义的区分, 且推导之必然性。所以在巴纳斯 (Jonathan Barnes) 编辑的《剑桥亚里士多德全集》(The Complete Works of Aristotle) 中, 把这个词英译为“deduction”。<sup>[54]</sup> 在科因布拉本则将亚里士多德的“syllogismos”一词则译为“ratiocinatio”, 其词根为“ratio”, “理性”, 即使用理性进行推理行为。<sup>[55]</sup> 《穷理学》将其译为“理推”其实更为恰当。只有在随后对亚里士多德对“syllogismos”的定义加以进一步

[52] 南怀仁 Ferdinand Verbiest 集述, 《穷理学存》Qiongli xue cun [Remaining parts of the Fathom of Principles], 2.

[53] 2016 年出版的《穷理学存》中有印刷错误, 将《形性之推理》第六卷至第八卷的页边标题标称了《理推之总论》。

[54] Aristotle, Prior Analytics, trans. A. J. Jenkinson, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. 1, ed. Jonathan Barnes. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 40.

[55] Collegium Conimbricense, In universam Dialecticam, (Cologne: Bernardus Gualterius, 1611), 238.



诠释的时候,《穷理学》才随着科因布拉本的做法在结构和组成上对其加以描绘,而此描绘即我们所说的三段论形式:“【解】前解理推所收成之质,为题列与限界明矣,兹乃解明理推也者之本理也。三段各有本论”。<sup>[56]</sup>“题列”是对拉丁文“propositio”的翻译,即我们现在所说的“命题”,而“限界”是对拉丁文“terminus”的翻译,现在所说的“词项”。这两者的译名与《名理探》中对同样名称的译名相吻合。而在对《前分析篇》随后的一句的诠释中,《穷理学》之《理推之总论》第一篇《论题列与限界及理推也者》提供了关于上述理推之定义的内涵的解释:“解所云理推也者,据其为某义推他义,其旨未尽明,故复悉云。所收之义非有他因,但因先者所函之限界,以推其为然而已。凡先者所函之限界,其所安设之次第,原自可影子推收固然之义,不须更改,或又加他限界以推收也”。<sup>[57]</sup>这一段所想阐明的意思是理推或演绎是一种形式性的推理,从而也是必然的,而这样的特性是与词项间的蕴含关系相关。随后在同一篇中也区分了亚里士多德在《前分析篇》第一章中提到了“完满”和“不完满”的形式推理之间的区别,《穷理学》中称之为“成全”和“非成全”。<sup>[58]</sup>

直到《理推之总论》第四卷,“理推”才被具体化为三段论,即由两个前提一个结论所组成的论证,故其名曰“三段论”,这也是大多数现代学者对亚氏之。因为这一卷讨论的是亚里士多德三段论的有效式,从而也就以逻辑形式为着重点。从而可读到“理推者,明辨之要规式,西语所谓细录世斯模者也”。<sup>[59]</sup>《穷理学存》之《理推之总论》卷四中对作为基本理推形式的三段论加以分析:按照亚里士多德之形质说的传统,以质料和形式来分析三段论。其质料为“一近质”和“一远质”,分别对应科因布拉本中的“materia proxima”和“materia remota”。<sup>[60]</sup>所谓“近质”指的是“题列”(即大小前提)，“远质”指的是“限界”,即“词项”。形式为“形”和“规式”。所谓“形”,是我们现在所说的“格”,即三段论的三个格,而“规式”则为三段论中的式。《穷理学》中解释到,“形”为“限界当然之位置”,也就是说,三个词项之排序的方式。这样的说明却在亚里士多德本人的《前分析篇》中是没有的,那里,亚里士多德采用词项间的语义蕴含关系来定义三段论的格,例如,他就第二格写到:“如果相同的词项属于一个主项的全部,而不属于另一个主项的任何部分,或者属于两个主项的全部,或者不属于两个主项的任何部分,我就把这个格叫做第二格”。<sup>[61]</sup>而《穷理学》中这样的形式化描述则对应西方古代和中世纪的逻辑教学传统,在学校里,三段论已经被形式化表达,其中,第一格为: $A * B, B * C: A * C$ ( $*$ 代表两个词项之间的关系,例如全称否定、全称肯定、部分肯定或部分否定);第二格: $B * A, B * C: A * C$ ;第三个: $A * B, C * B: A * C$ 。<sup>[62]</sup>(在此,使用了亚里士多德自己的三段论中命题的表述顺序,即“……属于……”,也就是说,谓词在先,主词在后。从而在 $A * C$ 中, $A$ 是谓词, $C$ 为主词。)可见,这是按词项之分布来区分不同的格的。这要比亚里士多德的描述要更加容易记忆,因为纯粹机械化了。不足为其,后人为了教学的便益而将亚里士多德逻辑中的有效式关于容易记忆的名称的做法,在这同样得到了译介,例如,第二格中的 Cesare 式在这里得到了音译,成为“恻撒勒”。<sup>[63]</sup>然而翻译后却失去了其功能,因为 Cesare 式是利用词中的元音来记忆此式三个命题的形式的,而在中文中则毫无意义可言。

《穷理学》中引入了三个概念“大限界”(我们现在所说的三段论的“大词”)、“小限界”(中词)和“中限界”(中词)。这三个概念是按其在三段论中的位置来命名的。“大、小限界”是出现在结论中的词

[56] 南怀仁 Ferdinand Verbiest 集述,《穷理学存》Qiongli xue cun [Remainging parts of the Fathom of Principles], 5.

[57] 同上, 5-6.

[58] 同上, 6.

[59] 同上, 68.

[60] Collegium Conimbricense, In Universam Dialecticam, 523.

[61] 亚里士多德 Aristotle,《前分析篇》Qian fenxi pian [Prior Analytics], 92-93.

[62] Cf. David Sedley (ed), Cambridge Companion to Greek and Roman Philosophy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 136.

[63] 南怀仁 Ferdinand Verbiest 集述,《穷理学存》Qiongli xue cun [Remainging parts of the Fathom of Principles], 75.

项,并且分别分布在两个前提里。“大限界”由于在“先题列”(即大、小前提)中而“居第一位”,则为“大”,“居次位”的话则是出现在小前提中,则为“小”,而为“中”是因为不出现在结论中。对比上面的形式化表达,“大限界”即 A 作为结论中的谓词的确就是出现在三段论最上行的大前提里的,而 C 作为结论中的主词则为“小限界”,并出现在第二行的小前提中。《穷理学》中也举了一个例子来对此加以说明,这个例子也是科因布拉本中例子的翻译:

“凡德皆为可赞美。

凡义皆为德

则凡义皆为可赞美”<sup>[64]</sup>

Omnis virtus est la(u)danda.

Sed omnis iustitia est virtus;

Ergo omnis iustitia est laudanda.<sup>[65]</sup>

如顾有信已经指出的那样,《穷理学》中对西方逻辑结构的处理是很得当的,<sup>[66]</sup>这里使用“凡……皆为”就很恰当和自然地表达出了全称肯定命题的结构。“凡”表述了拉丁文中的全称量词“omnis”。那么,按上述,“德”即为“中限界”,“义”为“小限界”(小词),“赞美”为“大限界”(大词)。值得注意的是,《穷理学》中似乎将三段论视为唯一的有效和必然的推理形式,因为其中说到“若有理推,而所具之限界不止于三者,则其形必非当然,必不能推收其义也”。<sup>[67]</sup>不仅如此,三个词项的位置必须要按上述加以排列,才会得到有效的推理。得出有效推理的其它必要条件是“何似”(质性)与“几何”(量)之“当然之序”,也就是按特定的顺序得到安排的前提和词项。一个命题的质性在亚里士多德逻辑中指的是它是否定的还是肯定的,而量则为全称或单称。经过计算,每一个“形”(即现在所说的“格”,figure)有十六个“规式”(即现在所说的“式”,mode)。<sup>[68]</sup>

## 五、总结

在明末清初之际,西方逻辑学已经通过由利玛竇为始几代传教士的介绍为中国读者所知晓。但作为逻辑学的系统教科书,《名理探》和《穷理学》却少为人接纳。这与当时的历史状况或许相关:李之藻去世于明崇祯三年,即公历 1630 年,明朝已经陷入危机,离清兵入关的崇祯十七年(1644 年)仅距十四年之远,作为一门中国传统教育中缺乏的学科,《名理探》对西方逻辑学的介绍必然需要使用大量当即创造出来的译名,要使得中国读者克服对其的陌生度,需要一个更好的传播条件。然而在明朝灭亡时,士大夫阶层在西学传播上能起到的作用就变得很小了。清朝初期,汤若望和南怀仁变成了朝臣,致力修历,缺乏与宫廷之外的中国知识分子的互动。《穷理学》也只能依赖朝廷的决策才能得以传播,由于翰林院的负面审议,就完全截断了其传播的渠道。从行文和内容上来看,《名理探》和《穷理学》在将西方逻辑学转换成汉语表达的时候还是相当成功的。《名理探》的五公称卷一中讨论了逻辑推理的形式和作用,而《穷理学存》中的《理推之总论》是对科因布拉亚里士多德逻辑注疏之《前分析篇》部分的选择性译介。与《名理探》相比,这一部分在行文上更加通顺。《理推之总论》的前三卷都是在讨论三段论之组成部分,即词项和大、小前提,直到第四卷才是对三段论本身的讨论。理推本身并不是直接就指的是三段论,而是逻辑推理。但由于亚里士多德逻辑中,有效的逻辑推理形式是三段论,从而在具体的形式讨论上,“理推”一词指的是三段论的论证形式。

[64] 同上书,68.

[65] Collegium Conimbricense, In Universam Dialecticam, 523.

[66] Kurtz, The Development of Logic in China, 77.

[67] 南怀仁 Ferdinand Verbiest 集述,《穷理学存》Qiongli xue cun [Remainging parts of the Fathom of Principles], 68.

[68] 同上, 69.

**English Title:**

**The Treatment on Logical Reasoning in Mingli tan and Qiongli xue**

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**Abstract:** Mingli tan and Qiongli xue are textbooks written during the late Ming and early Qing periods, and are the earliest examples of a systematic introduction to western logic. The former describes logical reasoning and the basic structure of syllogism. In Verbiest's Qiongli Xue (Study of Fathoming Principles) in its surviving form there is a section titled "General introduction to logical reasoning". In Qiongli xue, the expression "litui" (reasoning) is used as the translation for the Latin word "syllogismus", while in modern Chinese the word "syllogism" is often translated as "sanduan lun" (argument with three parts). Looking at the Greek epistemology of this word, "litui" is a more accurate translation than "sanduan lun." This article considers the sections in Mingli tan and Qiongli xue on logical reasoning, and discusses the problem with translation of "syllogismus" in different contexts. It is pointed out with the help of concrete examples from Qiongli xue that "syllogismus" means "reasoning" in a wider sense, while in the context of valid forms of reasoning, it means the particular structure of Aristotelian logical reasoning in three parts.

**Key Words:** Reasoning; syllogism; Li Zhizao; Franciscus Furtado; Ferdinand Verbiest

教会历史  
与中西社会  
**Church History**  
**in the West and in China**





# Marius Victorinus' influence on Augustine's Trinitarian theology

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**Abstract:** In spite of Augustine's indebtedness to Marius Victorinus as a role model for his own conversion (conf. 8, 3), it has been widely held in scholarship, since Pierre Hadot, that Victorinus did not influence Augustine's theological thinking. Although there are more recent attempts to demonstrate the traces of Victorinian influence on Augustine, their focus is primarily on the exegetical works. This article argues that Victorinian influence can indeed also be found in Augustine's Trinitarian theology. It will first critically evaluate the scholarly views (in particular Pierre Hadot and Nello Cipriani) on this topic, and then demonstrate the Victorinian influence by examining the resemblances between these two thinkers in the Trinitarian triads that they use in their Trinitarian theology, namely Victorinus' *esse, uiuere, intellegere* in *Aduersus Arium* and Augustine's Trinitarian triads in *Confessiones* and *De trinitate* 9-10.

**Key Words:** Marius Victorinus; Augustine; Trinity; Pierre Hadot; De trinitate

## 1. Marius Victorinus in the Augustinian scholarship

This article examines Marius Victorinus' influence on Augustine's Trinitarian theology (especially his theological expressions in *De trinitate*).<sup>[1]</sup> I do not intend, however, to argue for an exclusive influence of

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[1] The first draft of this article has been presented at the Augustinus-Kolloquium held by Volker Henning Drecoll and Johannes Brachtendorf on 21 January 2017 in Tübingen. I have also dealt with the relationship between Victorinus and Augustine in my dissertation Colten Cheuk-Yin Yam, *Trinity and Grace in Augustine: An Analysis of De trinitate 8-10 in Light of De spiritu et littera* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh/ Brill, 2019), especially p. 104-7, 173-86, 278-83, and 311-22. This article is an expansion of my previous arguments and it articulates the topic in a more thorough and systematic way. I am also thankful to David DeMarco who has read the final draft of this article.

For the critical editions of the primary texts used here: Marius Victorinus' *Aduersus Arium* follows *Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum* 83. 1 (CSEL 83. 1, ed. Henry/Hadot); Augustine's *Confessiones* follows *Corpus Christianorum Series Latina* 27 (CCSL 27, ed. Verheijen); Augustine's *De trinitate* follows *Corpus Christianorum Series Latina* 50 (CCSL 50, ed. Mountain). Hereafter, I will provide book and chapter number of the text and then the page and line number of the critical edition in bracket. For instance, conf. 8, 2 (CCSL 27, 114/3-6 Verheijen) means: *Confessiones* book 8 chapter 2 in the critical edition of Verheijen (CCSL 27) page 114, lines 3-6.

Victorinus on Augustine. Concerning the sources of Augustine's thought, I support the convergence-theory which recognizes Augustine as an original thinker,<sup>[3]</sup> whose thought is characterized by the convergence of various traditions, such as Manichaeism,<sup>[4]</sup> Neoplatonism,<sup>[5]</sup> Stoicism<sup>[6]</sup> and Pelagianism.<sup>[7]</sup> That being said, an investigation of the Victorinian influence on Augustine is a scholarly desideratum because of the unique role that Victorinus plays, not only in transferring the Greek literature to the Latin context,<sup>[8]</sup> but also in Augustine's own conversion. According to Jerome's *De uiris illustribus* 101<sup>[9]</sup> and Augustine's *Confessions* 8, 2-5,<sup>[10]</sup> the two main records we have for the life of Victorinus, he was a renowned rhetorician in Rome (*uir clarissimus and rhetor urbis Romae*)<sup>[11]</sup> and was honoured by a statue dedicated to him in the Forum of Trajan in his lifetime.<sup>[12]</sup> Augustine also tells us in *Confessions* that Victorinus' dedication to Christianity (which leads him to resignation of the official post) deeply influenced him and was a model for his own conversion.<sup>[13]</sup>

[3] This view is proposed by such scholars as Goulven Madec, Erich Feldmann and Volker Henning Drecoll. See Goulven Madec, "Christus," *Augustinus-Lexikon* 1, ed. Cornelius Mayer, 845-908 (Basel; Schwabe, 1986-), especially 859; Erich Feldmann, "Konvergenz von Strukturen? Ciceros Hortensius und Plotins Enneaden im Denken Augustins" in *Congresso Internazionale su S. Agostino nel XVI centenario della conversione Roma*, 15-20 Settembre 1986, *Studia Ephemeridis Augustinianum* 24, vol. 1 (Roma 1987), 315-33; Volker Henning Drecoll, "Review of Augustine and the Trinity, by Lewis Ayres," *Scottish Journal of Theology* 66 (2013): 88-98.

[4] The classic for this is Eric Feldmann, *Der Einfluß des Hortensius und des Manichäismus auf das Denken des jungen Augustinus von 373*, 2 Bände (S. I.; Westfälischen Wilhelms-Universität, 1975). For more recent study on this topic see Volker Henning Drecoll and Mirjam Kudella, *Augustin und der Manichäismus* (Tübingen; Mohr Siebeck, 2011), especially 207-21.

[5] Representing studies include: Olivier Du Roy, *L'intelligence de la foi en la Trinité selon saint Augustin. Genèse de sa théologie trinitaire jusqu'en 391* (Paris: Études augustiniennes, 1966); Johannes Brachtendorf, *Die Struktur des menschlichen Geistes nach Augustinus: Selbstreflexion und Erkenntnis Gottes in "De Trinitate"* (Hamburg; Meiner, 2000); Laela Zwollo, *St. Augustine and Plotinus: The Human Mind as Image of the Divine* (Leiden; Brill, 2018).

[6] Representing studies include: Gérard Verbeke, "Augustine et le stoïcisme," *Recherches augustiniennes et patristiques des études augustiniennes* 23 (1977), 245-64; Marcia L. Colish, *The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages. Volume 1, Stoicism in Classical Latin Literature* (Leiden; Brill, 1985).

[7] This is a central theme of my dissertation in which I demonstrate the influence of early Pelagian controversy on Augustine's Trinitarian theology. See Yam, *Trinity and Grace* (see note 1), especially 596-658.

[8] See Augustine, *conf.* 8, 2 (CCSL 27, 114/3-6 Verheijen); *ubi autem commemorauit legisse me quosdam libros Platonicorum, quos Victorinus quondam, rhetor urbis Romae, quem christianum defunctum esse audieram, in latinam linguam transtulisset.*

[9] The whole text of *De uiris illustribus* 101 is: "Victorinus, an African by birth, taught rhetoric at Rome under the emperor Constantius and in extreme old age, yielding himself to faith in Christ wrote books against Arius, written in dialectic style and very obscure language, books which can only be understood by the learned. He also wrote Commentaries on the Epistles." (NPNF 3, translation by Ernest Cushing Richardson).

[10] Stephen Andrew Cooper points out that besides Jerome and Augustine, our sources for the *uita et opera* of Victorinus also include Boethius and Cassiodorus, although he does not indicate which works he means. Stephen Andrew Cooper, "Marius Victorinus," in *The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity*, vol. 1, ed. Lloyd Gerson, 538-551 (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 2010), 538.

[11] See Jerome, *De uiris illustribus* 101 (ed. Ceresa-Gastaldo, 206) and Augustine, *conf.* 8, 2 (CCSL 27, 114/5 Verheijen). See also Volker Henning Drecoll, "Marius Victorinus" in: *Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*<sup>4</sup>, band 9, ed. Hans Dieter Betz, 122-147 (Tübingen; Mohr Siebeck, 1998), 123.

[12] See Augustine, *conf.* 8, 3 (CCSL 27, 115/13-19 Verheijen); *habet enim magnam laudem gratiae tuae confitentem tibi, quemadmodum ille doctissimus senex et omnium liberalium doctrinarum peritissimus quique philosophorum tam multa legerat et diudicauerat, doctor tot nobilium senatorum, qui etiam ob insigne praeclari magisterii, quod ciues huius mundi eximium putant, statuam Romano foro meruerat et acceperat.* See also Robert Markus, "Marius Victorinus and Augustine" in: *The Cambridge History of Later Greeks and Medieval Philosophy*, ed. in A. H. Armstrong, 327-419 (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1967), 331; Cooper, "Marius Victorinus (see note 9)," 538.

[13] See Augustine, *conf.* 8, 3 (CCSL 27 114/1-115/27 Verheijen). See also Drecoll's exposition of this text in Volker Henning Drecoll, "Die Bedeutung der Gnadenehre Augustins für die Gegenwart" in: *Augustinus-Ethik und Politik, Zwei Würzburger Augustinus-Studententage: "Aspekte der Ethik bei Augustinus"* (11. Juni 2005) and "Augustinus und die Politik" (24. Juni 2006), ed. Cornelius Mayer, 129-147 (Würzburg; Augustinus-Verlag, 2009), 113.

In spite of the common consensus of Augustine's affiliation to Marius Victorinus,<sup>[14]</sup> it is difficult to give a definite account of the extent to which Victorinus influenced him. The case is, I think, similar to the famous one-century-debate on the contents of the libri Platoniorum Augustine refers to in Confessions 7,<sup>[15]</sup> a study which we can never have a definite answer.<sup>[16]</sup> As regards the investigation of the Victorinian influence, there are three limitations that have to be recognized: 1) Many of Victorinus' works, in particular his translations, have been lost;<sup>[17]</sup> 2) No substantial textual parallels between Victorinus and Augustine can be found; 3) Augustine never quotes Victorinus explicitly in his works. All this leads many to doubt whether Augustine read Victorinus at all.

The view that Augustine was not influenced by Victorinus is best represented by Pierre Hadot, an eminent French scholar whose legacy has been influential in both the Victorinian and Augustinian scholarship.<sup>[18]</sup> Hadot's view is that due to 1) the lack of textual parallels and 2) the obvious differences discerned between Victorinus and Augustine, we cannot explain the similarities between them as a direct influence of Victorinus on Augustine.<sup>[19]</sup> Rather, according to Hadot, their resemblances should be explained as an existence of a common source between them.<sup>[20]</sup> He claims this source is the Anonymous Commentary on Parmenides, which he attributes to Porphyry.<sup>[21]</sup> Hadot's position has long been a dominant view on the relationship between Victorinus and Augustine and has thus blocked attempts of understanding a direct Victorinian influence on Augustine.

Recently, however, Hadot's view has been challenged and deconstructed in various ways. The Anonymous Commentary on Parmenides which Hadot attributed to Porphyry has now been regarded

[14] For instance, Adolf von Harnack has highly recognized Victorinus' influence on Augustine, naming him as "Augustinus ante Augustinum." See Adolf von Harnack, *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte*, vol. III (Tübingen, 1932), 34.

[15] See Augustine, *conf.* 7, 13 (CCSL 27, 101/4-6 Verheijen); *procurasti mihi per quendam hominem immanissimo typho turgidum quosdam Platoniorum libros ex graeca lingua in latinam uersos.*

[16] Scholars can be classified into three groups as regards the contents of these Platonic books (libri Platoniorum): 1) wholly Plotinian; Grandgeorge, Alfarić, Nørregaard, Henry, O'Connell, etc.; 2) wholly Porphyrian; Theiler, O'Meara, etc. and 3) a mixture of both; Courcelle, Solignac, Du Roy, Matthews, etc. I am inclined to the third position. For a good review on this topic see Pier Franco Beatrice, "Quosdam Platoniorum libros. The Platonic Readings of Augustine in Milan," *Vigiliae Christianae* 43 (1989): 248-81 and Robert Crouse, "Paucis mutatis uerbis; St Augustine's Platonism" in: *Augustine and His Critics; Essays in honor of Gerald Bonner*, ed. Robert Dodaro and George Lawless (London/New York 2000), 37-50. I have also offered a succinct account of the scholarly positions on this topic in *Yam, Trinity and Grace* (see note 1), 28 note 74.

[17] See Cooper, "Marius Victorinus (see note 9)," 539; Drecoll, "Marius Victorinus (see note 10)," 123.

[18] In the studies of Victorinus, the groundbreaking work is Pierre Hadot's *Porphyre et Victorinus*, 2 vols (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1968). Hadot's further research, namely Pierre Hadot, *Marius Victorinus; Recherches sur sa vie et ses oeuvres* (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1971) and Pierre Hadot, *Commentaire; Marius Victorinus, Traités théologiques sur la Trinité, Sources Chrétiennes* 69 (Paris: Cerf, 1960) are also scholarly classics.

[19] For a detailed analysis of the thesis, see Hadot's influential work *Porphyre et Victorinus*, 2 vols (see note 17). For a condensed form of his thesis, see Pierre Hadot, "L'image de la Trinité dans l'âme chez Victorinus et chez saint Augustin," *Studia Patristica* 6 (1962): 409-42 (especially 433-42).

[20] See Hadot, "L'Image de la trinité (see note 18)," 433; "Mais, pour la doctrine trinitaire, je penserais plus volontiers à une commune influence du néoplatonisme sur Victorinus et sur Augustin, qu'à une influence directe du premier sur le second."

[21] *Ibid.*, 437. Hadot draws upon Theiler's thesis in arguing that Augustine's Trinitarian triad *mens, notitia, amor* is Porphyrian (*Sententiae* 40).

as more likely pre-Plotinian instead of post-Plotinian,<sup>[22]</sup> meaning that the common elements between Victorinus and Anonymous Commentary on Parmenides can only indicate that he has referenced some materials in middle Platonists such as Cronius and Numenius.<sup>[23]</sup> Moreover, concerning Victorinus, it has now been shown that Porphyry is not likely the one dominant source for him since a) parallel passages between Victorinus' writings (in particular *Aduersus Arium* 1,49-50) and the Nag Hammadi treatise *Zostrianos* (NHC VIII,1) have been found that indicate that the previous so-called Porphyrian elements in Victorinus indeed likely comes from Gnostic materials,<sup>[24]</sup> and b) the philosophical fragments found in Victorinus can hardly belong to one source.<sup>[25]</sup> All this shows that we cannot simply use Porphyry to explain the common elements found in Victorinus and Augustine; the commonality may well be a direct Victorinian influence.

Indeed, there have been more attempts to claim a Victorinian influence on Augustine in recent decades. The representatives on this are Nello Cipriani,<sup>[26]</sup> Eric Plumer<sup>[27]</sup> and Stephen Andrew Cooper.<sup>[28]</sup> Their point is that, despite the lack of literal parallel, a direct Victorinian influence on

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[22] A pre-Plotinian view is held by Bechtle, Corrigan, and Turner. See Gerald Bechtle, *The Anonymous Commentary on Plato's 'Parmenides'* (Bern/Stuttgart/Wien: Verlag P. Haupt, 1999), 77-91; Kevin Corrigan, "Platonism and Gnosticism. The Anonymous Commentary on the Parmenides: Middle or Neoplatonic?" in: *Gnosticism and Later Platonism: Themes, Figures, and Texts*, ed. John D. Turner and Ruth Majercik (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2000), 141-77; John Turner, *Sethian Gnosticism and the Platonic Tradition*, BCNH 6 (Québec: Presses de l'Université Laval and Louvain-Paris: Éditions Peeters, 2001), 724-36. For a succinct review of the discussions see Tuomas Rasimus, "Porphyry and the Gnostics: Reassessing Pierre Hadot's Thesis in Light of the Second and Third-Century Sethian Treatises" in: *Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage. Volume 2, Reception in Patristic, Gnostic, and Christian Neoplatonic Texts*, ed. John D. Turner and Kevin Corrigan, 81-110 (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2010), 85-6.

[23] See Kevin Corrigan, "Platonism and Gnosticism (see note 21)," 141-77.

[24] The parallels were first detected by Michel Tardieu in *Recherches sur la formation de l'Apocalypse de Zostrien et les sources de Marius Victorinus*, *Res Orientales IX* (Bures-sur Yvette, 1996), 12-113. Further explorations see Catherine Barry and others, *Zostrien* (nH VIII,1), *Bibliothèque copte de Nag Hammadi [section «Textes»]* 24 (Leuven/Quebec: Presses de l'Université Laval, 2000), 483-662.

[25] See Volker Henning Drecoll, "Is Porphyry the Source Used by Marius Victorinus?" in: *Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage. Volume 2, Reception in Patristic, Gnostic, and Christian Neoplatonic Texts*, ed. John D. Turner and Kevin Corrigan, 65-80 (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2010), 71-75. Delineating Victorinus' argument with substantial textual support (especially *Aduersus Arium* 1B,49-62), Drecoll convincingly shows that the so-called philosophical fragments found in Victorinus' work can hardly belong to one source or author.

[26] See Nello Cipriani's series of articles: Nello Cipriani, "Le fonti cristiane della dottrina trinitaria nei primi dialoghi di S. Agostino," *Augustinianum* 34 (1994): 253-312; Nello Cipriani, "La retractatio agostiniana sulla processione-generazione dello Spirito Santo (Trin. 5, 12, 13)," *Augustinianum* 37 (1997): 431-39; Nello Cipriani, "Agostino lettore dei commentari paolini di Mario Vittorino," *Augustinianum* 38 (1998): 413-28; Nello Cipriani, "La presenza di Mario Vittorino nella riflessione trinitaria di S. Agostino," *Augustinianum* 42 (2002): 261-313. A summary of his arguments can be found in his shorter lexicon-article: Nello Cipriani, "Marius Victorinus" in: *Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia*, ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald and others (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 533-5.

[27] See Eric Plumer, *Augustine's Commentary on Galatians: Introduction, Text, Translations and Notes* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 5-33.

[28] See Stephen Andrew Cooper, *Marius Victorinus' Commentary on Galatians: Introduction, Translation, and Notes* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 182-246.

Augustine can still be proved through conceptual parallels.<sup>[29]</sup> However, the focus has been more on comparison between the commentaries of Victorinus and Augustine, in particular their commentaries on Galatians.<sup>[30]</sup> As for the Trinitarian theology, Cipriani is the only one who has attempted to demonstrate a Victorinian influence on Augustine's Trinitarian theology, though the influence is articulated in a rather indirect and peripheral way.<sup>[31]</sup>

Indeed Victorinian influence on Augustine's Trinitarian theology can be detected not only in some peripheral places, but also at the core of the Trinitarian discourses of these two theologians.<sup>[32]</sup> This article aims to shed light on this by, first, reviewing the theses of Hadot and Cipriani, and, second, investigating the resemblances demonstrated in the Trinitarian triads, namely Victorinus' *esse, uiuere, intellegere* in *Aduersus Arium* and Augustine's Trinitarian triads in *Confessiones* and *De trinitate* 9-10.

## 2. The theses of Hadot and Cipriani and their limitations

I shall begin the discussion by engaging with the French scholar Pierre Hadot and the Italian scholar Nello Cipriani, two most prominent scholars on this topic whose views have frequently been cited but not critically discussed. In critically reviewing their theses, I seek to summarize what have been discussed and, more importantly, show what needs to be further discussed in order to advance scholarship in both Victorinian and Augustinian studies.

In 1962, Hadot published an impressive article "L'Image de la trinité dans l'âme chez Victorinus et chez Saint Augustin,"<sup>[33]</sup> which argues against a direct Victorinian influence on Augustine. Hadot's view in this article has widely been adopted and his analysis there remains the best in the

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[29] Stimulating is Plumer's use of the so-called Newman's "antecedent probability" in doing the comparison between Victorinus and Augustine on their commentaries on Galatians. By "antecedent probability" Plumer argues that apart from direct evidence, the question also hangs on the likelihood that Augustine would have consulted Victorinus' commentary. Plumer, *Augustine's Commentary on Galatians* (see note 26), 8: "As applied in this case, the method involves beginning with the question: Apart from any direct evidence that might be gleaned from a comparison of their commentaries on Galatians, what is the likelihood that Augustine would have consulted Victorinus' commentary? To estimate this likelihood we need to draw upon all we know about Augustine and Victorinus, and especially upon what Augustine himself tells us about Victorinus in the Confessions. If this likelihood can be estimated, even roughly, then it will provide an interpretative framework in which to view whatever direct evidence can subsequently be adduced from the commentaries themselves."

[30] For Plumer and Cooper see notes 26 and 27; for Cipriani, see his "Agostino lettore dei commentari paolini (see note 25)," 413-28.

[31] Namely (see note 25): Cipriani, "Le fonti cristiane," 253-312; Cipriani, "La retractatio agostiniana," 431-39; Cipriani, "La presenza di Mario Vittorino," 261-313.

[32] The Trinitarian writings of Victorinus consist of nine treatises (composed between 357 and 363) and three hymns. The first four treatises are framed as an epistolary exchange between Victorinus and an Arian named Candidus. After the modern edition, the treatises now appear to us as *The First Letter of Candidus*, *The Letter to Candidus*, *The Second Letter of Candidus*, *Against Arius IA*, *IB*, *II*, *III* and *IV*. For a succinct account on this see Drecoll, "Marius Victorinus (see note 10)," 130-32.

[33] Pierre Hadot, "L'image de la Trinité dans l'âme chez Victorinus et chez saint Augustin," *Studia Patristica* 6 (1962): 409-42.



literature.<sup>[34]</sup> Although this article has frequently been cited, its content has not received due attention.<sup>[35]</sup> In short, Hadot argues that Victorinus and Augustine can be compared because both propose a Trinitarian structure of the soul<sup>[36]</sup>—the *esse, uiuere, intellegere* (Victorinus) and *mens, notitia, amor* (Augustine). From this central point he explores to what extent we can see the similarities and differences between the two systems. Hadot's arguments can be summarized into the following four points:

1) *Imago dei*. Hadot points out that Victorinus and Augustine understand this concept in different ways. While Victorinus regards the Son as the *imago dei* (image of God) and the human person as only *imago imaginis* (image of the image) because he is the image of the Son, Augustine regards the human person directly as the *imago dei*. The difference between Victorinus and Augustine on the doctrine of image has recently received further attention by Gerald Boersma, who argues that Augustine's doctrine of image is an advancement upon that of Victorinus.<sup>[37]</sup> According to him, Augustine is able to conceive of human person as the image of the whole Trinity while Victorinus cannot.<sup>[38]</sup> Indeed, Hadot has interpreted this point differently and I think Hadot is right. Victorinus' *imago imaginis* also refers, so claims Hadot, to the image of the Trinity at the same time because the *Logos* (i. e., the *imaginis* in *imago imaginis*) and the Father are of the same substance in Victorinus.<sup>[39]</sup> As such, the difference between Victorinus and Augustine on *imago* is not that

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[34] After Hadot, Mary T. Clark has also written an article on this topic. See Mary T. Clark, "Victorinus and Augustine: Some Differences," *Augustinian Studies* 17 (1986): 147-60. If we read the two articles together, it is not difficult to see that many points mentioned by Clark have already been dealt with (some even in more detail) by Hadot, although the point of Augustine's critique of Victorinus on the feminine aspect of the Holy Spirit is unique in Clark's article. Moreover, the style of presentation is also similar in both articles. Kany even criticizes Clark on her way of handling the secondary literature. Roland Kany, *Augustins Trinitätsdenken; Bilanz, Kritik und Weiterführung der modernen Forschung zu „De trinitate“* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), 106 note 531.

[35] Here I will give the examples of Kany, Cooper and Cipriani. 1) Kany summarizes this article only in one sentence: "In einem sehr dichten Aufsatz zeigte Hadot, daß Augustinus zwar ebenso wie Marius Victorinus ein Bild der Trinität in der Seele gesucht habe, daß bei beiden Autoren die Triade »Sein - Leben - Denken« eine Rolle spiele und auch sonst mit einer Reihe gleicher Begriffe operiert werde, daß aber dennoch völlig unterschiedliche Konzeptionen vorlägen." Kany, *Augustins Trinitätsdenken* (see note 33), 105. Kany only describes Hadot's article as a "thick essay" but has not paid attention to his arguments. I am also not able to agree with Kany's judgement in *Augustins Trinitätsdenken* (see note 33), 106 that Clark's discussion is less speculative, and is thus better, than Hadot's. 2) In his detailed account of Victorinus' influence on Augustine concerning their commentary on Galatians, Cooper also mentions Hadot's article superficially, without really entering into the central discussion of Hadot. See Cooper, *Marius Victorinus' Commentary on Galatians* (see note 27), 183: "Hadot pointed out another coincidental conceptual parallel; prior to Augustine, Victorinus taught that the soul had a Trinitarian structure; he has maintained that Victorinus' influence upon Augustine was more likely to have been through the Paul commentaries than the Trinitarian treatises, and to pertain to the subject of grace rather than the Trinity." 3) Cipriani takes Hadot's article as point of departure in doing his analysis on the Victorinus' influence on Augustine's commentary on Galatians, yet without going into any detail of Hadot's argument. See Cipriani, "Agostino lettore dei commentari paolini di Mario Vittorino (see note 25)," 413: "Sembra comunque prevalente il parere di un autorevole studioso come P. Hadot, il quale in uno studio comparativo sulla dottrina trinitaria dei due autori, dopo aver espresso l'opinione che dalla lettura del *De trinitate* è praticamente impossibile affermare se Agostino ha conosciuto o no l'opera di Vittorino, continuava: "Je serais moins réservé pour les ... Augustin."

[36] Hadot, "L'image de la Trinité (see note 18)," 409: "un type de structure ternaire et de multiplicité consubstantielle."

[37] Gerald Boersma, *Augustine's Early Theology of Image* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 72-86.

[38] *Ibid.*, 51-86. For a summary of Boersma's thesis and arguments as well as some critical notes on this work in general, see my review on this book: Colten Cheuk-Yin Yam, "Review of Augustine's Early Theology of Image, by Gerard Boersma," *Augustiniana* 66 (2016), 253-7.

[39] Hadot, "L'image de la Trinité (see note 18)," 413: "L'âme est donc l'image propre du Logos, c'est-à-dire du Fils, et elle n'est image de la Trinité que parce que le Logos, grâce à l'unité de la substance, a en lui-même la Trinité; comme chacun des Trois, il est les Trois."

Augustine can refer to the Trinity but Victorinus cannot. The crucial difference lies on their different understanding of the nature of imago; for Victorinus imago means substance but for Augustine it means relation.<sup>[40]</sup>

2) *Esse, uiuere, intellegere*. Hadot notes that Augustine has used *esse, uiuere, intellegere* but has not considered it as representing the Persons of the Trinity as in Victorinus' use. The reason is, Hadot suggests, because Augustine's Trinitarian doctrine emphasizes the dimension of relation while Victorinus draws on the principle of predominance ("le principe de prédominance").<sup>[41]</sup> In other words, Augustine does not use *esse, uiuere, intellegere* because this triad does not sufficiently display the distinction between each element in respect of relation. Hadot also points out that the fact that *esse, uiuere* and *intellegere* are intransitive verbs makes it difficult for them to convey a sense of a mutual relationship.<sup>[42]</sup>

3) *Mens*. Hadot notes the subtle difference between Victorinus and Augustine in regards to where the imago is situated. For Victorinus, the imago is the soul. The essence of the imago is its being and its activities (movement), and hence the triad *esse, uiuere, intellegere*. For Augustine, however, the imago is not equal to the soul but only to a part of the soul, namely the *mens*, which Hadot considers to be synonymous to "l'esprit." According to Hadot, the difference revealed here is that the three powers of the imago in Victorinus are the existence, the life, and the thinking, while in Augustine these three powers are restricted to the thinking since *mens* is  $\nu\omicron\tilde{\upsilon}\zeta$ , i. e., the intellectual power.<sup>[43]</sup>

4) The notion of generation. According to Hadot, the notion of generation differs between the two theologians in that Marius Victorinus takes it as "une autoposition, une autodéfinition," whereas Augustine regards it as "une pure relation."<sup>[44]</sup>

Let us now turn to Cipriani, the representing voice in supporting a direct Victorinian influence on Augustine concerning the Trinitarian theology. Apart from arguing that Augustine's use of certain Trinitarian terms (i. e., *tripotens* and *principium sine principio*) reveals traces of his reading of theological treatises from Marius Victorinus,<sup>[45]</sup> Cipriani's main arguments revolve around two themes: a) *imago dei* and b) the generation of the Holy Spirit, both of which, according to Cipriani, demonstrate a kind of reaction to Victorinian theology. I generally agree with Cipriani's observation, yet I think his evidence is not as strong as he claims.

For the account of *imago dei*, Augustine discusses the distinction between *imago dei* and *ad*

[40] Ibid., 427.

[41] Ibid., 427, especially: "A ce principe de distinction hypostatique, Augustin substitue un autre principe de distinction; non plus le prédominance, mais la relation."

[42] Ibid., 427: "C'est surtout, je crois, l'intransitivité des verbes être et vivre qui a dû conduire Augustin à éviter d'utiliser la triade être, vivre, penser, pour rendre compte des relations trinitaires."

[43] Ibid., 425 and 428. "Chez Victorinus, le lieu propre de l'image, c'est l'âme, en son être, en sa substance la plus profonde, et le lieu propre de la ressemblance, c'est l'activité de l'âme, son mouvement ou son Logos. Chez Augustin, le lieu propre de l'image, c'est cette partie de l'âme qu'il appelle *mens*, qu'il serait commode de pouvoir appeler  $\nu\omicron\tilde{\upsilon}\zeta$ , qu'il est en tout cas indispensable de nommer l'esprit ou la puissance intellectuelle. Il en résulte que l'image se trouve dans une partie de l'âme, que l'âme elle-même n'est pas véritablement image." (p. 425)

[44] Ibid., 429.

[45] See Cipriani, "Le Fonti Cristiane (see note 25)," 264-5.

imagine dei in trin. 7, a view that he says is held by previous church fathers.<sup>[46]</sup> Here Cipriani reasonably suggests that Augustine has Victorinus in mind since the latter is an obvious example of one who held a difference between *imago dei* and *ad imagine dei* before time of Augustine. For Victorinus, *imago* signifies the same substance rather than something inferior. The human being, therefore, cannot be *imago dei*, a term Victorinus regards as sharing the same substance with God. Rather, drawing on the phrase *secundum imagine* of Gen. 1:26, Victorinus claims that the human person is created not as image of God but according to the image—which is the Son, the only image of God. In other words, the human person is not *imago dei* but *imago imaginis* (image of the image) because he is created *ad imagine*.<sup>[47]</sup> Augustine explicitly refutes the distinction between *imago dei* and *ad imagine dei* in trin. 7,<sup>[48]</sup> and I agree with Cipriani that here Augustine probably has Victorinus in mind. Yet Cipriani goes too far to treat this point as a determinate Victorinian influence. We have to note that 1) Augustine refers to “several authors” (*nonnulli*) instead of one,<sup>[49]</sup> and 2) Victorinus uses *secundum imagine*<sup>[50]</sup> while Augustine uses *ad imagine*<sup>[51]</sup> in expressing “according to the image of God,” which shows that at least here cannot be a direct quotation of Marius Victorinus.<sup>[52]</sup>

For the account of the generation of the Holy Spirit, Cipriani has also rightly observed that Augustine makes an explicit distinction between “beget” (*generare*) and “proceed” (*procedere*) in comparison with the blurry distinction in Victorinus, which is another piece of evidence demonstrating Augustine's reaction to Victorinus' Trinitarian theology.<sup>[53]</sup> I am again sympathetic to

[46] See Augustine, trin. 7, 12 (CCSL 50, 266/152-267/154 Mountain): *sunt enim qui ita distinguunt ut imagine uelint esse filium, hominem uero non imagine sed ad imagine.*

[47] Victorinus, adu. Ar. I 20 (CSEL 83. 1, 85/5-6 Henry/Hadot): *Solus enim Iesus imago dei, homo autem secundum imagine, hoc est imago imaginis.*

[48] See Augustine, trin. 7, 12 (CCSL 50, 267/154-159 Mountain): *refellit autem eos apostolus dicens: uir quidem non debet uelare caput cum sit imago et gloria dei, non dixit ad imagine sed imago, quae tamen imago cum alibi dicitur ad imagine non quasi ad filium dicitur quae imago aequalis est patri; alioquin non diceret ad imagine nostram.* That is to say, Augustine refutes this view with Apostle Paul's statement in 1 Cor. 11:7 (*refellit autem eos apostolus*). For a fuller discussion of Augustine's arguments on this point see Yam, Trinity and Grace (see note 1), 104-6.

[49] See Augustine, trin. 12, 7 (CCSL 50, 361/16-19 Mountain): *sunt enim tales usitatae in illis litteris locutiones quas nonnulli, etiamsi catholicam fidem asserunt, non tamen diligenter aduertunt ut putent ita dictum, fecit deus ad imagine dei, quasi diceretur, fecit pater ad imagine filii.* Concerning this *nonnulli*, I am aware that sometimes Augustine uses the plural even when referring to a single author, as has been pointed out by Berthold Altaner, “Augustinus Methode der Quellenbenützung; Sein Studium der Väterliteratur,” in: *id., Kleine patristische Schriften* (ed. Günter Glockmann; Texte und Untersuchungen 83; Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1967), (164-73) 165-67. However, this case here is fairly certain since apart from Marius Victorinus we can find the distinction between *imago dei* and *ad imagine dei* in Hilary of Poitiers and Ambrose, both of whose thought Augustine was familiar.

[50] See Victorinus, adu. Ar. I, 20: *Dicit Moyses dictum dei: faciamus hominem secundum imagine nostram et secundum similitudinem. Deus dicit ista. Faciamus cooperatori dicit, necessario Christo. Et secundum imagine dicit, Ergo homo non imago dei, sed secundum imagine. Solus enim Iesus imago dei, homo autem secundum imagine, hoc est imago imaginis. Sed dicit: secundum imagine nostram. Ergo et pater et filius imago una. Si imago patris filius est et ipsa imago pater, imagine ergo ὁ μὴ ὁμοῦ ὁμοῦ. Ipsa enim imago substantia est*

[51] Augustine uses *ad imagine* consistently. For example, Augustine, trin. 12, 7 (CCSL 50, 361/16-19 Mountain): *sunt enim tales usitatae in illis litteris locutiones quas nonnulli, etiamsi catholicam fidem asserunt, non tamen diligenter aduertunt ut putent ita dictum, Fecit deus ad imagine dei, quasi diceretur, 'Fecit pater ad imagine filii,'*; Augustine, trin. 7, 12 (CCSL 50, 267/156-158 Mountain): *Non dixit ad imagine sed imago. Quae tamen imago cum alibi dicitur ad imagine non quasi ad filium dicitur quae imago aequalis est patri; alioquin non diceret ad imagine nostram.*

[52] For a fuller discussion see Yam, Trinity and Grace (see note 1), 182-3.

[53] See Cipriani, “La presenza di Mario Vittorino (see note 25),” 274.

Cipriani's argument, but I have to point out that Augustine's concern in distinguishing between the Son and the Holy Spirit is not necessarily anti-Victorinian since 1) he is, in fact, following tradition in using *procedere*,<sup>[54]</sup> and 2) he mentions, again, *multos* (instead of one) are involved in this issue,<sup>[55]</sup> showing that even if Victorinus is probably in Augustine's mind in treating this issue, he is not the exclusive triggering factor. In short, I would say that Cipriani's thesis opens up a wider horizon for exploring the Victorinian influence on Augustine's Trinitarian theology. Yet his arguments are indirect since he can only argue for the existence of Augustine's counter-reaction against Victorinus but not explicit similarities between these two theologians.

### 3. A more direct Victorinian influence on Augustine

Indeed, the comparison between the Trinitarian theology of Victorinus and Augustine can go beyond the frameworks set up by Hadot and Cipriani. I will show that the differences proposed by Hadot are not insurmountable and that we can, in fact, see similarities beneath the surface. This also means that I will go beyond Cipriani to argue for more explicit similarities between these two thinkers. In the following, I will elaborate my arguments in three respects, namely: a) Augustine's *notitia* and Victorinus' conception of the Son, b) the oneness dimension in their Trinitarian theology, and c) the relation of Victorinus' *esse, uiuere, intellegere* to Augustine's own Trinitarian triads.

#### 3.1 Augustine's *notitia* and Marius Victorinus' conception of the Son

In comparing the Trinitarian triads of Marius Victorinus and Augustine, an obvious point of contact is the element of knowledge—the *intellegere* of Victorinus' triad *esse, uiuere, intellegere*<sup>[56]</sup> and the *notitia* of Augustine's triad *mens, notitia, amor*. Note the different position of knowledge in the triads. Victorinus regards *intellegere* as representing the Holy Spirit, which is an inward movement of the existent towards itself, whereas he regards *uiuere* as representing Christ, which is an outward movement of the existent. Different from Victorinus, Augustine regards *notitia* as Christ, which is the Son and the eternal light of truth. Indeed, the difference between them is not as big as it seems to be. However, the parallel to the *notitia* in Augustine is not simply *intellegere* in Marius Victorinus, but rather his conception of the Son as a movement, which covers both Christ and the Holy Spirit. Their resemblance is especially manifest in Augustine's *trin.* 6, 11; 9, 4; 9, 12-15 and 9, 18. Let us look at them in detail.

1) In *trin.* 6, 11, Augustine quotes Hilary of Poitiers' words: "aeternitas in patre, species in imagine, usus in munere" and then makes a further elaboration. His elaboration is quite Victorinian. He first says that a perfect image is equal to the original (*ipsa coaequatur ei non illud imagini*

[54] The language of *procedere* is also present, for instance, in Hilary of Poitiers, *De trinitate* 2, 29, Ambrose, *De spiritu sancto* 1, 11 and in the Nicene Creed.

[55] See Augustine, *trin.* 15, 5 (CCSL 50, 222/7 Mountain): *quod solet multos mouere*. As mentioned above, the *multos* may well include Hilary of Poitiers and Ambrose.

[56] Two texts are particularly illuminating to Victorinus' *esse, uiuere, intellegere*, namely: *adu. Ar.* IV 16 (CSEL 83, 1, 248/12-15 Henry/Hadot) and *adu. Ar.* IV 25-26 (CSEL 83, 1, 265/44-47 Henry/Hadot). For a detailed analysis of these two texts see Yam, *Trinity and Grace* (see note 1), 278-80.

suae),<sup>[57]</sup> then says that this image possesses the primal and supreme life (*est prima et summa uita*).<sup>[58]</sup> This description of image is similar to Marius Victorinus who also says that *imago* is equal to the original and that this *imago* is a life.<sup>[59]</sup>

2) *Intrin.* 9,4, Augustine describes knowledge as a kind of life in the reason of the knower (*illa enim uita quaedam est in ratione cognoscentis*).<sup>[60]</sup> This is similar to Marius Victorinus' statement that *uiuere* is the movement of *esse*. In both cases, the life is of equal substance to the subject, the knower and the being. Moreover, Augustine also uses the language of perfection to describe the life of *notitia*,<sup>[61]</sup> which again is similar to Marius Victorinus.

3) *Intrin.* 9,12-15, Augustine brings forth the concept of *uerbum* in elaborating *notitia*. There he consistently describes *uerbum* on two levels, the conception of a word (*conceptus*) and the birth of a word (*natus/partus*). The former refers to the state in which the word is not yet formed or cannot yet be expressed, whereas the latter refers to the state in which the word can be perceived. Augustine also points out that these two states are different in corporeal things<sup>[62]</sup> but the same in spiritual things<sup>[63]</sup>. These two levels of *uerbum* are very similar to Victorinus' paradigm of act and potency in speaking about God.<sup>[64]</sup> In Victorinus' Trinitarian theology, he describes the relationship between the Persons of the Trinity with two aspects. On the one hand, the Father is *esse*, the Son *uiuere*, and the Holy Spirit *intellegere*. In this aspect, the Father is depicted as the being in repose (*esse*), while Christ and the Holy Spirit are the movement of the *esse* (the same movement, different only in direction). On the other hand, however, Marius Victorinus also emphasizes that the triad *esse*, *uiuere*, *intellegere* exists in each Person of the Trinity. The difference between the Father and the Son (Christ and the Holy Spirit) is not revealed in the differing characteristics of the individual *esse*, *uiuere*, *intellegere*, but in the form of potency (*esse*) and act (*agere*). In other words, the Father is God in potency and the Son is God in act or manifestation. The Father is the *actus*; the *esse*, *uiuere*, *intellegere*, while the Son (Christ and the Holy Spirit) is the *forma*; the *existentia*, *uita*, *intellegentia*.<sup>[65]</sup>

[57] Augustine, *trin.* 6,11 (CCSL 50,241/10-12 Mountain).

[58] Augustine, *trin.* 6,11 (CCSL 50,241/16-17 Mountain).

[59] Victorinus, *adu. Ar.* I 20 (CSEL 83,1 85/7-86/9 Henry/Hadot): *Ergo et pater et filius imago una. Si imago patris filius est et ipsa imago pater, imagine εἰκόμοῦ ὕστατο.*

[60] Augustine, *trin.* 9,4 (CCSL 50,297/17-18 Mountain).

[61] See Augustine, *trin.* 9,4 (CCSL 50,297/13-17 Mountain): *item notitia si minor est quam est illud quod noscitur et plene nosci potest, perfecta non est, si autem maior est, iam superior est natura quae nouit quam illa quae nota est, sicut maior est notitia corporis quam ipsum corpus quod ea notitia notum est.*

[62] See Augustine, *trin.* 9,14 (CCSL 50,305/5-7 Mountain): *In amore autem carnalium temporaliumque rerum sicut in ipsis animalium fetibus alius est conceptus uerbi, alius partus.*

[63] See Augustine, *trin.* 9,14 (CCSL 50,305/1-3 Mountain): *conceptum autem uerbum et natum idipsum est cum uoluntas in ipsa notitia conquiescit, quod fit in amore spiritualium.*

[64] On Victorinus' use of act and potency see Boersma, *Augustine's Early Theology of Image* (see note 36), 58-60.

[65] See Victorinus, *adu. Ar.* IV 25-26 (CSEL 83, 1,265/44-7 Henry/Hadot): *Etenim deus uiuit. Id autem est esse et intellegere, quae ista unum tria faciunt potentias tres, existentiam, uitam, intellegentiam, sed quia illa tria unum - quomodo sunt, docui: ut unum quodlibet tria sit, sic et ista tria unum sunt, sed in deo haec tria esse sunt, in filio uiuere, in spiritu sancto intellegere - ergo esse, uiuere, intellegere in deo esse sunt, existentia autem, uita, intellegentia forma sunt, actu enim interiore et occulto eius quod est esse, uiuere, intellegere. See also Hadot's illustration in his *Marius Victorinus, Traités Théologiques sur la Trinité II*; *Commentaire* (see note 17), 925-6 and 975-7.*

4) In trin. 9, 18, Augustine attempts to show that *notitia* is different from *amor* since the former can be perceived in the process of *conceptus - partus* while the latter cannot. He further makes use of this difference between *notitia* and *amor* to explain why only the Son (but not also the Holy Spirit) is described as “begotten (*genitus*).” Here we can see similarities and differences between Augustine and Marius Victorinus. In portraying how *notitia* and *amor* can be distinguished, Augustine introduces the role of will (*uoluntas/inquisitio*) in bringing forth knowledge. According to him, knowledge is the result of the movement of will in seeking, and knowledge is said to be born when the will rest in its goal.<sup>[66]</sup> In a similar fashion, will is also an important element for Marius Victorinus concerning the begetting of the Son. He says that the begetting of the Son from the Father is not by necessity of nature but by the will of the Father (*non a necessitate naturae, sed uoluntate magnitudinis patris*).<sup>[67]</sup> In other words, the concept of generation is always a willed generation. He even says that every will is a birth (*omnis enim uoluntas progenies est*)<sup>[68]</sup> and that the will of the Father is the Logos, the Son Himself (*Pater ergo, cuius est uoluntas; filius autem uoluntas est et uoluntas ipse est λ ὁ γ ο ς*).<sup>[69]</sup> Of course, there are differences between Victorinus and Augustine. Marius Victorinus regards will as the Son Himself. For Augustine, however, will is not the Son but an element closely related to love; will is therefore linked with the Holy Spirit. As the previous scholarship (Cipriani<sup>[70]</sup>, Clark<sup>[71]</sup>, etc.) has shown, Augustine is not satisfied with the Victorinian model since it mixes up the Son and the Holy Spirit. In light of this, it is understandable why Augustine draws on the will to elaborate the Son as a movement, on the one hand, while, on the other hand, distinguishing himself from Victorinus by identifying the will with the Holy Spirit instead of with the Son.

### 3.2 Oneness in their Trinitarian thought

In *adu. Ar.* 1B 48, Victorinus uses five terms to explain the Trinity, namely: *spiritus, λογος, νοῦς, sapientia, substantia*.<sup>[72]</sup> He continues the discussion of these five terms, though not systematically, up to *adu. Ar.* 1B 60.<sup>[73]</sup> At first sight, *adu. Ar.* 1B 48-53 is not concerned with these five terms at all, since Victorinus does not mention them in a clear manner. Yet we can still find them

[66] See Augustine, *trin.* 9, 14 (CCSL 50, 305/1-3 Mountain); *cum uoluntas in ipsa notitia conuiescit*; *trin.* 9, 18 (CCSL 50, 309/52-310/53, Mountain); *quod saepe praecedit inquisitio eo fine quietura*.

[67] Victorinus, *adu. Ar.* 1A 31 (CSEL 83. 1, 110/18-19 Henry/Hadot).

[68] Victorinus, *adu. Ar.* 1A 31 (CSEL 83. 1, 110/23-24 Henry/Hadot).

[69] Victorinus, *adu. Ar.* 1A 31 (CSEL 83. 1, 111/30-31 Henry/Hadot).

[70] Cipriani, “La retractatio agostiniana (see note 25),” 431-9.

[71] Clark, “Victorinus and Augustine (see note 33),” 147-60.

[72] Victorinus, *adu. Ar.* 1B 48 (CSEL 83. 1, 142/4-10 Henry/Hadot); *Spiritus, λ ὁ γ ο ς, νοῦς, sapientia, substantia, utrum idem omnia an altera a se inuicem? Et si idem, communique quadam an universitate? Si communique quadam, quid primum, quid ex alio et qua communique? Si universitate, et ista et quae differentia et quae communitio? Si a se inuicem altera, omnimodo altera, an alia ut subiectum, alia ut accidens, an iuxta alium alterum modum?*

[73] For example, Victorinus, *adu. Ar.* 1B 55 (CSEL 83. 1, 152/3-12 Henry/Hadot); *spiritus substantiae nomen est vel existentiae, quod quidem esse significat et in eo quod quid est et appellatur et intellegitur. Si uoles nosse quid est deus, spiritus eius quod sit esse significat. Ergo deus et spiritus quod est esse significat. Rursus quid est uita? Quod spiritus, Spiritus erto et uita quod est esse significat. Sic et spiritus sanctus quod est esse secundum istud ipsum nomen significat cum differentia duorum primorum uno nomine significat cum differentia duorum primorum uno nomine nominatorum. Quae differentia, substantialis cum sit, quod est esse significat. . . .*



scattered in the argument; adu. Ar. 1B 49 on λόγος<sup>[74]</sup>, adu. Ar. 1B 50 on spiritus<sup>[75]</sup>, adu. Ar. 1B 51 on λόγος, sapientia and spiritus,<sup>[76]</sup> adu. Ar. 1B 52 on λόγος and νοῦς.<sup>[77]</sup>

The central point of these passages is to investigate whether these five terms are identical to or different from one another.<sup>[78]</sup> The discussion is interesting because although Victorinus seems to claim that these five terms are different from each other, his argument leads him to consider them to be nearly synonyms.<sup>[79]</sup> Two features of Victorinus' Trinitarian doctrine are apparent in the discussion of these five terms. First, the Victorinian model tends to emphasize the oneness over the threeness of the Trinity. One may even argue that this model is unable to properly speak of the threeness of the Trinity. This can be seen in the fact that Victorinus does not distinguish between Christ and the Holy Spirit with a clear boundary. For him, the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of Christ and is, accordingly, Christ Himself. The second feature is that the Victorian model is Christ-centred. Although he has mentioned here and elsewhere that sapientia and νοῦς should be identified with the Holy Spirit, he refers back to Christ in the conclusion. For instance, he says that the Son is “both word and voice, he is life, he is Logos, he is movement, he is Nous, he is wisdom, he is existence and first substance” (adu. Ar. IB 56).<sup>[80]</sup> He also makes it clear that the Logos himself and the Holy Spirit and Nous and Wisdom are all the same thing (adu. Ar. IB 59).<sup>[81]</sup>

There are certain similarities in Augustine as far as expressing the oneness of the Trinity is concerned. All these five terms of Victorinus also appear in *De trinitate* and they all tend to refer to the oneness of the Trinity. In *trin.* 9, 5-6, Augustine explains in detail how *notitia* and *amor* is *substantia* by itself,<sup>[82]</sup> thus designating *substantia* with the meaning of oneness in the Trinity. This is also the case for *mens* (= νοῦς) and *spiritus* in *trin.* 9, 6 in which he explains the difference

[74] Victorinus, adu. Ar. 1B 49 (CSEL 83. 1, 143/29-31 Henry/Hadot): De deo et λόγῳ, hoc est de patre et filio, dei permissu, sufficienter dictum, quoniam unum quae duo. Dictum et de λόγῳ, hoc est de filio et de sancto spiritu, quod in uno duo.

[75] Victorinus, adu. Ar. 1B 50 (CSEL 83. 1, 145/1-11 Henry/Hadot): perfectus super perfectos, tripotens in unalitate spiritus, perfectus et supra spiritum; non enim spirat, sed tantum spiritus est in eo quod est ei esse, spiritus spirans in semet ipsum ut sit spiritus, quoniam est spiritus inseparabilis a semet ipso, ipse sibi et locus et habitator, in semet ipso manens, solus in solo, ubique existens et nusquam, simplicitate unus qui sit, tres potentias conueniens, existentiam omnem, uitam omnem et beatitudinem ...

[76] Victorinus, adu. Ar. 1B 51 (CSEL 83. 1, 146/1-6 Henry/Hadot): Sed unum istud quod esse dicimus unum unum, uita est, quae sit motio infinita, effectrix aliorum, uel eorum quae uere sunt, existens λόγος ad id quod est esse quae sunt omnia, a se semet mouens, semper in motu, in semet ipsa habens motum, magis autem ipsa motus est. Victorinus, adu. Ar. 1B 51 (CSEL 83. 1, 147/22-24 Henry/Hadot): Sed quoniam, sicut demonstratum, ista motio, una cum sit, et uita est et sapientia, uita conuersa in sapientiam et magis in existentiam patricam. Victorinus, adu. Ar. 1B 51 (CSEL 83. 1, 147/27-28 Henry/Hadot): Descensio enim uita, ascensio sapientia. Spiritus autem et ista, spiritus igitur utraque, in uno duo.

[77] Victorinus, adu. Ar. 1B 52 (CSEL 83. 1, 148/14-15 Henry/Hadot): hoc autem per ministrantem λόγον, hoc est per uitam, quae omnibus praestat uiuere. Victorinus, adu. Ar. 1B 52 (CSEL 83. 1, 149/41-46 Henry/Hadot): ab eo qui νοῦς est, potentiam fontanam et uiuersalem accipiens, iuxta motionem et intus et foris est - motio enim νοῦς est - sic et uita, iuxta quod motio est, filius est factus, manifesta motio a motione patrica, quae in occulto est, quae secundum primam potentiam existentia est.

[78] Victorinus, adu. Ar. IB 48 (CSEL 83. 1, 142/4-10 Henry/Hadot). Text see above.

[79] See Victorinus, adu. Ar. 59-60.

[80] Victorinus, adu. Ar. IB 56 (CSEL 83. 1, 154/15-17 Henry/Hadot): Verbum igitur et uox filius est, ipse uita, ipse λόγος, ipse motus, ipse νοῦς, ipse sapientia, ipse existentia et substantia prima ...

[81] Victorinus, adu. Ar. IB 59 (CSEL 83. 1, 159/13-14 Henry/Hadot): Ex his apparet quod λόγος ipse et spiritus sanctus et νοῦς et sapientia id ipsum.

[82] See Augustine, *trin.* 9, 5 (CCSL 50, 298/37 Mountain); sed substantialiter etiam ista sunt sicut ipsa mens ... *trin.* 9, 6 (CCSL 50, 298/45-46 Mountain); substantia sit scientia, substantia sit amor ...

between absolute terms and relative terms in expressing the Trinity. Here, Augustine contrasts *mens* and *spiritus* with the relative terms of the lover - love and the knower - knowledge, saying explicitly that *mens* and *spiritus* are not relative terms.<sup>[83]</sup> In other words, he regards *mens* and *spiritus* as absolute terms which denote the oneness of the Trinity. As for the term *sapientia*, he uses this term in a highly Christological sense on the one hand,<sup>[84]</sup> and uses it to denote the oneness of the Trinity, on the other. This dimension of oneness is manifest in *trin.* 15, 6-9, where Augustine reduces the twelve terms<sup>[85]</sup> that he used to describe God the Trinity to three terms<sup>[86]</sup> and then finally to one term: *sapientia*. As such, Augustine's emphasis of the dimension of oneness in *sapientia* is obvious.<sup>[87]</sup> The case of *uerbum* (*trin.* 9, 15-18 and 15, 17-24) is also similar, although this term does not always refer to oneness of the Trinity.

### 3.3 The relation of *esse, uiuere, intellegere* to Augustine's own triad

The most crucial respect in determining the degree of Victorinian influence on Augustine's Trinitarian theology is the relationship between Victorinus' *esse, uiuere, intellegere* and Augustine's Trinitarian triads. Do they share the similar features? If so, can we say that Augustine has copied Victorinus? On the other hand, if there exists substantial difference, can we accordingly exclude Victorinian influence on Augustine's Trinitarian theology? This issue has been a decisive factor for scholars to argue for or against the presence of Victorinian influence, and we can find both positions in the scholarship. As mentioned above, Hadot argues against a direct influence due to the difference he discerns between Victorinus' *esse, uiuere, intellegere* and Augustine's *mens, notitia, amor*.<sup>[88]</sup> On the other hand, some scholars, for instance Cipriani, tend to simply claim a Victorinian influence, not on the basis of a comparison between Victorinus' *esse, uiuere, intellegere* and Augustine's *mens, notitia, amor* (or *memoria, intellegentia, uoluntas*), but on the fact that *esse, uiuere, intellegere* are present in both theologians.<sup>[89]</sup> Indeed, the Victorinian influence is present and a more sophisticated analysis than that of Hadot (and of Cipriani) is needed. First, Augustine has also used *esse, uiuere, intellegere* but never in a Trinitarian sense like Victorinus. Therefore, we cannot simply claim, as Cipriani does, the presence of Victorinian influence because the triad *esse, uiuere, intellegere* also appears in Augustine. It should be noted that Augustine's use of this triad is mainly to demonstrate the certainty of the mind's self-knowing (cf. *sol.* 2, 1, *lib. arb.* 2, 7, *trin.* 10, 6, *trin.* 10, 13, etc),<sup>[90]</sup>

[83] See Augustine, *trin.* 9, 6 (CCSL 50, 298/48-49 Mountain): *mens uero aut spiritus non sint relatiua sicut nec homines relatiua sunt*

[84] Augustine first uses *sapientia* to represent Christ's relation to God the Father by explaining 1 Cor 1:24 "Christ, the power and the wisdom of God" (*Christum dei uirtutem et dei sapientiam*). See *trin.* 6, 1-2 and *trin.* 7, 1-2, etc. He then regards *sapientia* as a linkage between man and God: The wisdom of man (*hominis sapientia*) is somehow related to the wisdom of God (*sapientia dei*) which makes us possible to participate in God. See *trin.* 14, 1-3; 14, 11-15, etc.

[85] The twelve terms in *trin.* 15, 8: *aeternus, immortalis, incorruptibilis, immutabilis, uiuus, sapiens, potens, speciosus, iustus, bonus, beatus, spiritus*

[86] I. e., *aeternus, sapiens, beatus*

[87] See Augustine, *trin.* 15, 8 (CCSL 50, 471/13-16 Mountain): *quis itaque disputandi modus, quoniam tandem uis intellegendi atque potentia, quae uiuacitas rationis, quae acies cogitationis ostendet, ut alia iam taceam, hoc unum quod sapientia dicitur deus quomodo sit trinitas?*

[88] Hadot, "L'image de la Trinité (see note 18)," 427. See note 40 above.

[89] See Cipriani, "La presenza di Mario Vittorino (see note 25)," 283-5.

[90] For a detailed discussion of Augustine's use of *esse, uiuere, intellegere* and the traditions before him, see Yam, *Trinity and Grace* (see note 1), 271-84.

which demonstrates a notable difference to Victorinus' Trinitarian interpretation of *esse, uiuere, intellegere*. Second, Hadot is also not completely correct in denying any parallel between the Trinitarian triads of Marius Victorinus and Augustine. Although he is right that Marius Victorinus' *esse, uiuere, intellegere* demonstrates substantial difference to Augustine's *mens, notitia, amor*, he has overlooked the possibility of the Victorinian influence on the intermediary stages of Augustine's Trinitarian triads. Indeed, I argue that there is striking similarity between Marius Victorinus' *esse, uiuere, intellegere* and Augustine's *esse, nosse, uelle* in *conf. 13,12* and *uita, mens, substantia* in *trin. 10,18*, which I will explain below.

The triad *esse, nosse, uelle* can be seen as an intermediate stage in Augustine's development of his Trinitarian triads. This triad has been used in *conf. 13,12* (written in 397-401)<sup>[91]</sup> but is no longer in use in *De trinitate* where Augustine expounds his two most famous Trinitarian triads: *mens, notitia, amor* and *memoria, intellegentia, uoluntas*.<sup>[92]</sup> While the elements of *esse, nosse, uelle* are similar to that of *mens, notitia, amor* and *memoria, intellegentia, uoluntas*, Augustine's arguments on their Trinitarian structures demonstrate substantial differences. In *esse, nosse, uelle*, he emphasizes the ability of "immersion" of the three elements/activities, focusing on how the other two activities are present in each of the three: "I am and I know and I will: knowing and willing I am, I know that I am and I will, I will to be and to know."<sup>[93]</sup> In *memoria, intellegentia, uoluntas*, however, Augustine emphasizes the ability of referencing in the elements. *Memoria, intellegentia* and *uoluntas* reflect the Trinity not only because these three activities can be one and three at the same time, but also because each of these activities can demonstrate a twofold referencing-*ad se ipsam dicitur* (referring to itself) and *ad aliquid dicitur* (referring to another)-which is an ability pertinent to be a subject. When one remembers (i. e., in the case of *memoria*), he can remember himself as well as remember that he is thinking and willing something. This twofold referencing also applies to *intellegentia* and *uoluntas*, but cannot be found in *esse, nosse, uelle*, at least not apparent in Augustine's own explanation (cf. *conf. 13,12*). In other words, it seems that Augustine has abandoned *esse, nosse, uelle* in his mature conception of the Trinity because, although *esse, nosse, uelle* can demonstrate how one is present in three, this triad cannot demonstrate how one relates to three.

Indeed, this intermediate stage of Augustine's Trinitarian thought is very similar to what Victorinus proposes through *esse, uiuere, intellegere*. Marius Victorinus says that the three (*esse, uiuere, intellegere*) are one because they are all contained in *esse*. In this *esse*, moreover, is this *uiuere*, this *intellegere*, all as to substance, subsisting as one (*omnia substantialiter ut unum*

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[91] For the dating of Confessions see Frederick Van Fleteren, "Confessiones" in: *Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia*, ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald and others, 227-232 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 227 and James O'Donnell, *Augustine. Confessions I* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), xii.

[92] *Mens, notitia, amor* and *memoria, intellegentia, uoluntas* are discussed mainly in *trin. 9-15* which was likely not written before 413. For details see Yam, *Trinity and Grace* (see note 1), 22-5.

[93] See Augustine, *conf. 13,12* (CCSL 27, 247/7-8 Verheijen): *sum enim et scio et uolo; sum sciens et uolens et scio esse me et uelle et uolo esse et scire*.

subsistentia).<sup>[94]</sup> He also says that none of these three is not the three (nam nihil horum est quod non tria sit), and that these three elements are a mingling (mixta) and are simple with a simplicity which is triple (triplici simplicitate simplicia).<sup>[95]</sup> Note that Victorinus' explanation of esse, uiuere, intellegere is very similar to Augustine's esse, nosse, uelle. Both emphasizes the ability of how one activity can "immerse" into the other two so that all three activities can be present in one single moment. Similarly, both keep silent on how one can be related to the other two.

Another piece of evidence for the influence of Victorinus' esse, uiuere, intellegere is Augustine's use of uita, mens, substantia in his Trinitarian discussion. Strictly speaking, uita, mens, substantia is not a triad, but three terms that Augustine uses together to explain the unity/oneness of memoria, intellegentia, uoluntas in trin. 10, 18, where he says; memoria, intellegentia, uoluntas are not tres uitae but una uita, not tres mentes but una mens, and consequently (consequenter) not tres substantiae but una substantia.<sup>[96]</sup> Note that uita, mens, substantia is, in fact, the nominal representation of uiuere, intellegere, esse, and Augustine's emphasis on their oneness is similar to Victorinus' esse, uiuere, intellegere. For Victorinus, the Father can be best represented by esse, and the Son is the movement of the Father as denoted by uiuere and intellegere (one single movement of opposite direction). He also argues insistently that the Son, being imago dei, is of equal substance to the Father. In other words, the oneness is highlighted in Victorinus' system, not only the oneness between uiuere and intellegere, but also between the Father (esse) and the Son (uiuere and intellegere). More specifically, Victorinus also emphasizes that uiuere and intellegere refer to one substantia, hence in the same sequence as Augustine's uita, mens, substantia. We should also note that the sequence of first uita (uiuere) then mens (intellegere) in Augustine's uita, mens, substantia is Victorinus' usual practice. To name a few: "Life and knowledge are the Logos which is Christ ... The Logos is, therefore, both life (uita) and knowledge (intellegentia);"<sup>[97]</sup> "life and knowledge are movement (uita atque intellegentia motus sunt);"<sup>[98]</sup> from God and from one same substance come substance (substantia) and life (uita) and knowledge (intellegentia).<sup>[99]</sup>

## 4. Conclusion

In this article, I have argued that it is indeed possible to see a more direct influence of Marius Victorinus on Augustine's Trinitarian theology than previous scholars have suggested. The similarity

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[94] See Victorinus, adu. Ar. III 4 (CSEL 83. 1, 197/6-11 Henry/Hadot): Etenim cum sint ista existentiae uiuentes intellegentesque, animaduertamus haec tria esse uiuere intellegere, ita tria esse, ut unum semper sint atque in eo quod est esse, sed in eo quod esse dico, quod ibi est esse. In hoc igitur esse, hoc est uiuere, hoc intellegere, omnia substantialiter ut unum subsistentia. Viuere enim ipsum id est quod esse.

[95] See Victorinus, adu. Ar. IV 5 (CSEL 83. 1, 231/41-45 Henry/Hadot): Nam nihil horum est quod non tria sit. Esse enim hoc est esse, si uiuat, hoc est in uita sit. Ipsum uero uiuere; non est uiuere, quod uiuat intellegentiam non habere. Quasi mixta igitur et, ut res est, triplici simplicitate simplicia.

[96] Augustine, trin. 10, 18 (CCSL 50, 330/29-32 Mountain).

[97] Victorinus, adu. Ar. III 2 (CSEL 83. 1, 193/49-51 Henry/Hadot): Quoniam autem haec uita et intellegentia λόγος est, qui Christus est, ... Est ergo λόγος et uita et intellegentia.

[98] Victorinus, adu. Ar. III 2 (CSEL 83. 1, 194/26-27 Henry/Hadot).

[99] Victorinus, adu. Ar. III 2 (CSEL 83. 1, 194/26-27 Henry/Hadot): unde de deo atque ex eadem substantia est et substantia et uita et intellegentia ...

between Victorinus' esse, uiuere, intellegere and Augustine's Trinitarian triads is more than the fact that both base their argument on the Trinitarian structure of the soul. In fact, we can see resemblances in their conception of knowledge as movement, their emphasis on oneness in the Trinitarian discussion, and their similar Trinitarian argument (as demonstrated in esse, uiuere, intellegere and esse, nosse, uelle). In view of all this, I am convinced that Augustine must have known Victorinus' Trinitarian theology before his own conception. He does not completely agree with Victorinus, as he never follows Victorinus in using esse, uiuere, intellegere in a Trinitarian sense, yet Augustine's intermediate way of discussing the Trinity in the development of his Trinitarian triads is strikingly similar to that of Victorinus. This intermediate stage strongly suggests that Augustine considered the Trinitarian argument proposed by Victorinus and then adapted it to his own situation.

中文题目:

## 维克托利努斯对奥古斯丁三一神学的影响

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**摘要:** 本文探讨马里乌·维多里努斯(Marius Victorinus)对奥古斯丁(Augustine)的三一神学的影响。虽然在《忏悔录》以来学者普遍认为维多里努

斯对奥古斯丁的思想影响不大。即使近来多了人主张探讨奥氏与维氏的关联, 研究重点主要集中在两位思想家的释经上, 对他们神学思想之间的关联, 着墨仍然不多。本文将提出理据, 证明维多里努斯对奥古斯丁三一神学的影响实比以往学者所认为的更明显。笔者先会检视及评论以往的主流观点(特别是法国学者 Pierre Hadot 及意大利学者 Nello Cipriani), 然后会透过详细分析两位思想家的三一类比, 即维多里努斯的「存有、活着、认知」(esse, uiuere, intellegere) 及奥古斯丁在《忏悔录》及《论三位一体》中的三一组合, 将维氏对奥氏的影响具体地呈现出来。

**关键词:** 马里乌·维多里努斯; 奥古斯丁; 三位一体; Pierre Hadot; 《论三位一体》



# Dante's Hell as Civitas Diaboli<sup>[1]</sup>

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**Abstract:** Dante's hell represents the totality of the sins which the protagonist cannot bypass on his own. And the three beasts that appear in the prologue scene show in miniature hell's structure, patterned according to the order of corrupted appetites in the soul. Malice, violence, and incontinence, incarnated as the three beasts respectively, correspond to the threefold division of hell in reverse order. This paper investigates three episodes, i. e. Inferno 5, 15, 24-25, respectively, from the perspective of these three sins. It tries to show how Dante's hell, built upon a Thomastic moral system, is a civitas diaboli, the very opposite of Augustine's city of God. The paper also offers a glimpse of the allusions to Augustine which are at work in Dante's contexts, no matter how ironical those allusions may be.

**Key Words:** Dante, Inferno, Civitas

Dante's hell as a whole is the very opposite of Augustine's City of God. The evil shades, who lived according to their misdirected love, throw themselves down into hell. The disordering of their soul, which has brought about their condemnation, extends from their mortal existence into their afterlife.<sup>[2]</sup> Such a disordering is the very trait of infernal citizenship.

In this paper, I shall follow the triple division of Dante's hell, as is foreshadowed by the three

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[1] Matthew Oseka, "How the Emerging Protestant Theology Took Shape in the Reformation Concept of Theological Studies as Enunciated by Philip Melanchthon in His Prolegomena to All Latin and German Version of Loci", *International Journal of Sino-Western Studies*, vol. 18, 77-99. (<https://www.sinowesternstudies.com/latest-volumes/vol-18-2020/>)

[2] A special place in hell is Limbo, of a different order of culpability, where people who are of great worth but lived before Christianity are "suspended."

beasts in the prologue scene.<sup>[3]</sup> Three episodes, respectively, from the sins of incontinence, of violence, and of malice, are chosen for analysis. They are *Inferno* 5 on lust, *Inferno* 15 on sodomy and *Inferno* 24-25 on thieves, the most “erotic” cantos of the *Inferno*. I shall investigate how, in these cantos, corrupted love leads to corrupted citizenship.

## 1. The Circle of the Lustful

In the Circle of the Lustful, the pilgrim encounters carnal sinners who are driven by an infernal whirlwind. The whirlwind, which never rests, is a figure for the power of passion. Among those sinners is Dido, whose incontinent love once impeded Aeneas’ journey and brought about her own death. Two sinners from Dido’s company are bent by the wind toward Virgil and the pilgrim. The female sinner is Francesca, the major speaker of *Inferno* 5. The male is Paolo, Francesca’s lover, who says nothing at all. It is from Francesca’s mouth that we hear some of the most renowned speeches of the *Commedia*:

Amor, ch’al cor gentil ratto s’apprende,  
 prese costui de la bella persona  
 che mi fu tolta, e ’l modo ancor m’offende.  
 Amor, ch’a nullo amato amar perdona,  
 mi presedel costui piacer sì forte  
 che, come vedi, ancor non m’abbandona.  
 Amor condusse noi ad una morte.  
 Caina attende chi a vita ci spense.  
 Queste parole da lor ci fuor porte.

Love, which is swiftly kindled in the noble heart, seized this one for the lovely person that was taken from me; and the manner still injures me.

Love, which pardons no one loved from loving in return, seized me for his

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[3] *Inferno* begins with a vision of a pilgrim who came to himself in a dark wood (*selva oscura*, v. 2), has lost the straight way (“ché la diritta via era smarrita” v. 3), then the frightened man, reaching the foot of a hill, looks up and sees the rays of the sun, the revealer of knowledge and wisdom, and to some extent is quieted. And having his weary body rested for a while, he took his way again along a deserted slope and kept his “halted foot” (*piè fermo*) (v. 30) lower. Freccero has traced the allegorical meaning of “*piè fermo*” back to the Aristotelian tradition. As Aristotle observed, man naturally begin to walk by lifting the right foot, so that the “fixed foot” is the left one. When it came to Thomas, the act of walking is compared to the movement of the mind, and the two feet of body are compared to the two chief powers within the soul. Those powers are the intellect and the will, which in the broadest sense can be subdivided into three forces: rational, irascible, and concupiscent. The will is the left foot and the intellect is the right. The harmonious cooperation of the two existed before the Fall, when there was original justice in the soul. Such a justice is symbolized by the hill which the pilgrim cannot climb. Both intellect and will are afflicted by Adam’s Fall. This condition is symbolized by the Dante-character in the dark wood, enmeshed in fear and sin with neither of his feet correct or rectus. Once he beholds the rays of the sun, he undergoes an intellectual conversion, and is healed in his right foot. Yet the will, remaining wounded, drags behind intellect just as the character’s left foot is dragging behind the right. The three afflictions that have been suffered by each part of the will are revealed by the three animals that appeared. Therefore the leopard symbolizes malice, the lion, violence, and the wolf, incontinence. Although there are many interpretations of this allegory, this one seems to be more reasonable. For Freccero’s analysis of “*piè fermo*” and the allegorical meaning of the three beasts, see his “The Firm Foot on a Journey without a Guide,” in *Dante: the Poetics of Conversion*, ed. and introduction by Rachel Jacoff (Harvard University Press, 1986), pp. 29-54.

beauty so strongly that, as you see, it still does not abandon me.

Love led us on to one death. Caina awaits him who extinguished our life, These words were borne from them to us. (Inf. 5. 100-108, emphasis added)<sup>[4]</sup>

This passage is composed of three tercets, and each begins with the word *amor* (love). The first *amor* refers to Paolo's love for Francesca, the second refers to Francesca's love for him, and the last refers to the result of their mutual passion: *una morte* (a death). In the phrase "*una morte*" we find the word for love already buried in the sounds of "*una*" and "*morte*".<sup>[5]</sup> Lust, rather than leading one to real happiness, brought the couple to an eternal death. Such misdirected love,<sup>[6]</sup> as its smashed spelling in "*una morte*" implies, proves to be meaningless.

In response to the pilgrim's questioning how the couple first knew of their love for one another, Francesca relates a story of reading. One day, Paolo and Francesca read the story of Lancelot and Guinevere. They took delight in it without "*alcun sospetto*" ("any suspicion," Inf. 5. 129). When they read that "*il disiato riso esser baciato da cotanto amante*" ("the yearned-for smile was kissed by so great a lover," Inf. 5. 133-34), Paolo surrendered to passion and kissed Francesca's mouth. The result of that reading is disastrous, as the literature of romance plays into their passion and ultimately leads to their murder by Paolo's brother/Francesca's husband.

Many interpretations have been devoted to this passage, since there appears to be a misreading in Francesca's narration. As commentators have noticed, in the surviving Old French Lancelot romance, it is invariably Guinevere who kisses Lancelot, while Francesca relates the story in reverse: it is she who is kissed by a trembling Paolo. Some commentators take this misreading to be an accidental one, but others such as Renato Poggioli, takes the misreading as Dante's poetic choice for the sake of structural symmetry; since it is Paolo who kissed first in 'reality,' there must be the male who kissed first in the 'story.' But Mark Musa, in a more rigorous reading, found the misreading to be Francesca's cunning. According to Musa, it is Francesca who kissed first, but in order to shirk her responsibility as the enticer, she reported Paolo as the major sinner and made the intentional misreading correspondingly.<sup>[7]</sup> For me, this passage primarily recalls two moments recorded in the Confessions. In both moments, Augustine looks back upon his early reading experience. One is in the Confessions 2. There, the young Augustine ignores the moral teaching of Dido's and Aeneas' love story in Aeneid 4. While the primary intention of Virgil is to praise Aeneas' fortitude against temptation, the young Augustine indulges in Dido's passion and sheds tears of pity for her. In Inferno 5, Dante, like Augustine, also tells a story of reading. In this story he shows how reason is subjected to emotion in a kind of incorrect reading. Francesca, out of her amorous desire, takes the romantic story as a model. Motivated by her vanity, she might also have reversed the narrative order of the

[4] All the original text and translation of Inferno are from Inferno, ed. and trans. Robert M. Durling, introduction and notes by Ronald L. Martinez and Robert M. Durling (Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 529.

[5] See Poeti del dolce stil nuovo, ed. Contini, Gianfranco (Milan: Mondadori, 1991), p. 87.

[6] As Hawkins points out, this phrase is repeated by Dante only once throughout the Commedia, in Purg. 28. 79. See Hawkins, "Watching Matelda," in his Dante's Testament: Essays in Scriptural Imagination. (Stanford University Press, 1999), p. 177.

[7] Cf. Renato Poggioli, "Paolo and Francesca" in Dante: a Collection of Critical Essays, ed. John Freccero, Englewood Cliffs, (N. J., Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965); Mark Musa, "Behold Francesca Who Speaks So Well (Inferno V)" in Dante's Inferno: the Indiana Critical Edition, ed. and trans. Mark Musa (Indiana University Press, 1995), pp. 310-324.

story so as to cover her fault. At the end of this canto, the pilgrim, having heard Francesca's story, "caddi come corpo morto cade" ("fell as a dead body falls" Inf. 5. 142). The symbolic death imitates Francesca's and Paolo's surrender to passion, just as the couple has imitated the book of Lancelot. The end of Francesca's speech—"quel giorno più non vi leggemmo avante" ("that day we read there no further," Inf. 5. 138)—recalls another moment in the Confessions 8 where Augustine relates how one day he randomly took up the text of the Bible and discovered a passage in Romans,

Let us live honorably as in the day, not in reveling and drunkenness, not in debauchery and licentiousness, not in quarreling and jealousy. Instead, put on the Lord Jesus Christ, and make no provision for the flesh, to gratify its desires. (Romans 13. 13-14)

However brief the passage Augustine is changed by it, and no more reading is needed. "Nec ultra volui legere nec opus erat" ("I had no wish to read further, nor was there need," writes Augustine.<sup>[8]</sup> The statement marks Augustine's conversion from sin to virtue. In *Inferno* 5, however, the similar statement ironically marks the fall of Francesca and Paolo.

Paolo keeps silent during the entire episode. It is only at the end of Francesca's speech that we realize he has been weeping for a long time. During the whole speech of Francesca, his name is not mentioned. Otherwise, she merely points to a nearby figure: *costui* (that one there), *questi* (this one here). Love changes him into a woman's shadow, and renders him a slave to, rather than a master of his desire.

Francesca, in contrast, holds the center of the stage during the scene. She is the only female in the *Inferno* allowed to speak and is the first speaker in hell, the first sinner. This identity relates her to Eve, the first sinner in Judeo-Christian history. In the dramatic episode that takes place in *Inferno* 5, this Eve even tries to seduce the pilgrim, who stands for everyone, for the offspring of Adam.

As Musa carefully points out, Francesca does not seem to be enjoying her inseparability from Paolo in hell. She never turns to him, nor does she even for a little while address him. Her constant companionship with her lover represents not the free choice of the two, but the force of the infernal. Here repentance is impossible. Lust, as misdirected love, becomes the exact *contrapasso* for her.<sup>[9]</sup> Such anguished inseparability is a reflection of the consorted *civitas* in all of hell.

The story of Francesca and Paolo implies the destruction of a family, which is the basic unit of human society and the miniature version of citizenship. As Francesca tells the pilgrim earlier, Caina awaits her husband, their killer. Caina is in the lowest circle of the hell, while the circle of the Lustful occupies the highest location in hell proper, after Limbo. The death of the family extends over the whole moral structure of hell. Lust becomes the killer of good citizenship, in part, by destroying families.

[8] Confessions 8. 12. 29. For the original Latin text see: <http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/august.html>.

Peter S. Hawkins in the prologue of his *Dante's Testaments: Essays in Scriptural Imagination* mentions this episode, *op. cit.*, p. 1-15.

[9] In his essay "Behold Francesca who Speaks so Well," Musa, refutes the romantic reading presented by Grangent. According to such a reading, Francesca's words shows a fierce loyalty to her lover, to her love, to her sin. To refute this reading, Musa asserts that, rather than enjoying her eternal togetherness with Paolo, what Francesca found in such inseparability is the deepest anguish. To support his assertion, Musa lays out two reasons. Firstly, the eternal togetherness between Francesca and Paolo is the result of force rather than free choice. Secondly, Francesca cannot possibly glory in their naked exposure in the hell.

## 2. The Sin of Brunetto Latini

Coming down to the burning sand, the pilgrim encounters the sins of blasphemy, usury and sodomy. As a punishment for the flames of their false desires, broad flakes of fire fall down slowly onto the sinners. The sodomites are forced to keep walking or running on the burning sand. Their endless movement, like the endless wind in *Inferno* 5, symbolizes their homosexual desire. Among the sodomites there is a particular shade who recognizes the pilgrim and seizes him by the hem of his robe (*Inf.* 15. 23-4).<sup>[10]</sup> The shade is Brunetto Latini, the author of *Il Tesoro* and once Dante's teacher.

As recorded by Villani, Brunetto was a "worthy citizen" of Florence. During the pre-Renaissance age, he made a determined effort to revive antiquity. It was he who "began to teach the Florentines to be less coarse, and to make them skilled in speaking well, and in knowing how to guide and rule our republic according to political science."<sup>[11]</sup> In short, he is remembered as a distinguished master of politics and rhetoric—a good citizen.

According to historians, there is no evidence that Brunetto was a homosexual sinner. He was a family man and strongly condemned homosexuality in his works.<sup>[12]</sup> But in *Inferno* 15, Brunetto appears in an unworthy place and shares the punishments of the sodomites. Such suspicious treatment has aroused many disputes among scholars. Some of them insist that Brunetto's sin is a sexual one. According to John Boswell, the term "sodomy" referred exclusively to homosexual activity in the High Middle Ages. The very sin was reputedly popular among the learned circle to which Brunetto belonged, and therefore it is possible that Brunetto had been 'infected' by it. The reason for the absence of the records of Brunetto's homosexual activity, argues Boswell, might be that sodomy by Dante's time was the unmentionable sin.<sup>[13]</sup> Boswell's idea, although it makes some sense, cannot provide positive evidence that Brunetto was a homosexual sinner.

I would support those who consider Brunetto's sin to be something other than homosexuality. I would stress one initial moment from which the whole episode develops. When the pilgrim recognizes Brunetto, he is amazed by seeing him among the sodomites "Siete voi qui, ser Brunetto?" ("Are you here, ser Brunetto?" *Inf.* 15. 30). This is the only time in hell that the pilgrim shows surprise over the sinners he encounters. Such a surprise is inexplicable if Dante knew that Brunetto was a sodomite.

Among those who consider Latini's sin to be non-sexual one is Peter Armour. According to his study, Brunetto's sin lies in his Stoic pessimism. In the course of his main speech (*Inf.* 15. 55-78), Dante's Brunetto expresses two kinds of determinism that might be considered as unorthodox beliefs. Firstly, he shows an inclination towards astrological determinism in attributing Dante's

[10] As is pointed out by Durling, Augustine's *Confessions* 8. 11. 26 suggests a context and meaning for this gesture: "My love of old, trifles of trifles and vanities, held me back. They plucked at my fleshly garment, and they whispered softly: 'do you cast me off?'" *Inferno*, op. cit., p. 239.

[11] All the citations of Villani are from John M. Najemy's "Brunetto Latini's 'Politica,'" *Dante Studies*, CXII (State University of New York Press, 1994), p. 33-52.

[12] See Peter Armour, "Brunetto, the Stoic Pessimist," in *Dante's Studies*, CXII, p. 1-18.

[13] The severity of the medieval public's opinion on homosexuality did not prevent clerics from going on about it in their condemnations. See John E. Boswell's "Dante and the Sodomites," in *Dante's Studies*, CXII, p. 63-76.

promising earthly destiny to the stars,

Se tu segui tua stella,

Non puoi fallire a glorioso porto

If you follow your star, you cannot fail to reach a glorious port. (Inf. 15, 55-56)

With the ignorance of the power of free will, Brunetto asserts that the pilgrim, born under the sign of Gemini, is destined by his constellation to win brilliant glory. Such a negation of free choice puts Brunetto at odds with Christian teaching on love and free choice.

Brunetto also identifies another sort of determinism, the genetic or racial one. In the conversation that follows, Brunetto ascribes the Florentine's degeneracy to the heredity from their Fiesolan ancestors,

Ma quello ingrato popolo maligno  
 che discese di Fiesole ab antico  
 e tiene ancor del monte e del macigno,  
 ti si farà, per tuo ben far, nimico;  
 ed è ragion, ché tra li lazzi sorbi  
 si disconvien fruttare al dolce fico.  
 Vecchia fama nel mondo li chiama orbi;  
 gent' è avara, indiviosa e superba;  
 dai lor costumi fa che tu ti forbi.

But that ungrateful, malicious people who came down from Fiesole of old, and still smack of mountains and the granite, will become your enemies because of your just actions; and that is reasonable, for among the sour crab apples it is not fitting that the sweet fig bear its fruit. Ancient fame in the world calls them blind; they are a people avaricious, envious, and proud; see that you keep yourself clean of their customs. (Inf. 15. 61-9)

Here Latini is alluding to the legend of Florence. Fiesole was once led by Catiline's sympathizers to revolt against Rome. After Fiesole had been razed by Julius Caesar, Florence was built on the Arno not far away, and the surviving Fiesolans, including descendants of Catilines' followers, were mixed in with the Roman colonists.<sup>[14]</sup> Therefore Florence had both a noble origin as well as a base one. Both the noble descendents of Rome and the base offspring of its enemy dwell in the city. The evil will fight with the just, and the pilgrim is destined to suffer an exile. Taking pagan Rome as the model and source of glory, Latini warns the pilgrim to protect the holy seed of Rome, which is the mission of a great 'Latin' poet.

Faccian le bestie fiesolane strame

Di lor medesme, e non tocchin la pianta,

[14] See *Inferno*, op. cit., p. 241.



s'alcuna surge ancora in lor letame,  
 in cui riviva la sementa santa  
 di que' Roman che vi rimaser quando  
 fu fatto il nido di maliziatanta.

Let the Fiesolan beasts make straw of each other, but let them not touch the plant, if any still sprout in their manure, in which may live again the holy seed of the Romans who remained there when that nest of so much malice was built. (Inf. 15. 73-8)

Brunetto attributes the origin of Florentine evil to a genetic nature and therefore contradicts the Christian (and Augustinian anti-Manichaean) doctrine of the essential goodness of human nature. Moreover, when he talks about the pilgrim's mission, he ignores the grace of God and urges the pilgrim to pursue earthly glory.<sup>[15]</sup> Both kinds of determinism, according to Armour, are in compliance with the idea of Stoicism refuted by Augustine in the fifth book of the *City of God*. It is Stoic pessimism that earns Brunetto his eternal fate in hell. However insightful Armour's reading may be, he ignores the sins of other shades that are also running naked on the burning sand. Are they all supposed to be guilty of stoic pessimism?

In order to specify Latini's sin, commentaries have tried to investigate the life history of other "sodomites" who have been mentioned directly or indirectly in *Inferno* 15 (Priscian, Francesco d'Accorso and Andrea de'Mozzi) and *Inferno* 16 (three Guelphs: Guido Guerra, Tegghiaio Aldobrandi and Jacopo Rusticucci). They only find the fact that these men were all great political writers or rhetoricians and not actual sexual sinners.<sup>[16]</sup> The historical evidence is supported by textual ones. At the end of *Inferno* 15, when Latini introduces his "compagni più noti e più sommi" ("more famous and accomplished companions," Inf. 15. 102) to the pilgrim, he describes them as "che tutti fur cherchi/e litterati grandi e di gran fama, / d'un peccato medesimo al mondo lerci" ("they were all clerks and great men of letters, of great fame, all fouled with the same sin in the world" Inf. 15. 106-108). It may be implied by Latini that the three men he introduces are punished for their writings. In *Inferno* 16, when the pilgrim addresses the three Guelphs, he says "sempre mai/l'ovra di voi e li onorati nomi/con affezion ritrassi e ascoltai" ("always your works and your honored names I

[15] To some extent, Latini's speech in *Inferno* 15 parallels Cacciaguida's speech in *Paradiso* 15-17. Both are not so off on their politics; but while Cacciaguida considers the pilgrim's mission as a poet to be a sacred one, Latini ignores the divine dimension of human wisdom. See Schnapp, Jeffrey T., *The Transfiguration of History at the Center of Dante's Paradise* (Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 40.

[16] See Richard Kay, "The Sin(s) of Brunetto Latini" *Dante's Studies*, CXII, p. 19-32.

have repeated and heard with affection” Inf. 16. 58-60).<sup>[17]</sup> In particular, one of the three Guelphs, Tegghiaio Aldobrandi, is called by Jacopo Rusticucci as “la cui voce nel mondo sù dovria esser gradita” (“whose words should have been more pleasing in the world above,” Inf. 16. 41-42). All of these details imply the possibility that the ‘sodomites’ are sinners with respect to intellectual actions.

But are there substantial evidences that there is an intellectual dimension in the meaning of “sodomy”? If so, how to reconcile the literal meaning of “sodomy” as homosexuality and the possible allegorical meaning of the word in the context of *Inferno* 15? In order to investigate the exact meaning of sodomy, Richard Kay in his monograph on *Inferno* 15 makes an exhaustive study of all the appearances of the term “Sodom” in the Bible.<sup>[18]</sup> As he points out, the first appearance of this word is in Genesis 19. According to the narration of that episode, the men of Sodom once surrounded Lot’s house and urged him to hand over the two angels who are disguised as men. “Where are the men who came to you tonight? Bring them out to us, so that we may know (yada‘) them,” (Genesis 19. 5) shout the men of Sodom. As Kay analyzes, in this episode there is no clear homosexual insinuation, and sex enters the story only when Lot offers his daughters as an exchange. In other biblical episodes, according to Kay, Sodom is an image of a community that has been perverted by its leaders. In other words, the allegorical meaning of the sin of Sodom in the Bible is a sin committed by false prophets who, with their perverse teachings, have misled God’s people into profaneness. The perversion attributed to Sodom in the Bible is not primarily sexual and in fact may not be sexual at all. It is Philo Judaeus who first associates Sodom with homosexual practices, and in the centuries that follow, both meanings of the word (the sin of homosexuality and the sin of giving false teaching) are retained by the interpretative tradition. In *Inferno* 15 Dante, according to Kay, is playing with both meanings of Sodom. Therefore Latini, sharing punishment with sodomites, is a false prophet whose sin lies in misleading Florence and other Italian communities in their political life. It is for the corruptive influence of his teachings on Florentine politics that Dante regards his sin as contrary to nature.

Kay’s critique sheds a new light onto the reading of *Inferno* 15. But what kinds of perverse teaching had Latini given? Many answers have been provided. Some commentaries retrace Latini’s own works: *Il Tesoro*, *Il Tesoretto*; and in these works they find that Latini’s political belief is at odds with Dante’s. As Richard Kay understands, for Dante the natural political order is the worldwide monarchy, while Latini rejects monarchy in favor of the independence of city-states. It is Latini’s insistence on the unnatural political order that makes him share the punishment of sodomy, which is an activity that violates the natural, heterosexual desire of human being. Kay’s idea is

[17] Susan Noakes, in her interpretation of canto 16 discusses the similarity and difference between Latini and other sodomites in the seventh circle of hell. “Brunetto distinguishes two subgroups in this zone of Hell: the file of the professionally lettered whom he allows temporarily to ‘pass on ahead’ (15. 33) and the other subgroup, which almost catches up with him and from which he emphatically wishes to keep himself separate; ‘with whom I must not be’ (15. 118). Brunetto thus forms a bridge that almost links the two subgroups but, for an important reason, does not completely do so. This second subgroup includes those who have, like Brunetto, served the Florentine city-state, at precisely the same period in its history as Brunetto did, and from within the same political party; all are prominent Guelphs of the third quarter of the thirteenth century. All three may be said to have been rhetoricians, in the sense that they provided political counsel for or against certain actions or served as political negotiators; they were unlike Brunetto in that they were not professional men of letters, and their rhetorical contributions were entirely oral, oratorical, while his was also written.” See also Dante della Terza, “Canto XV: the Canto of Brunetto Latini.” trans. Charles Ross, in *Lectura Dantis; Inferno*, eds. Allen Mandelbaum, Anthony Oldcorn, Charles Ross (University of California Press, 1998), pp. 191-212.

[18] See Richard Kay, *Dante’s Swift and Strong: Essays on Inferno XV*. (Lawrence: Regents Press of Kansas, 1978), pp. 209-290.

supported by Susan Noakes. According to her study, the condemnation of the sodomites in *Inferno* marks Dante's break from his earlier Guelphism which is based on the notion that the city is a more natural form of government than empire,

Thus, the Guelph ideal of civic autonomy is attractive on the surface, but ultimately unsatisfying to one who reflects on politics deeply. The notion that fellow citizens can, through deliberative rhetoric, create an autonomous state that will make possible earthly happiness is definitively rejected. What Brunetto Latini and the other three Guelph rhetoricians represent is a beautiful but ultimately superficial political ideal. Dante's placement of these counselors of civic autonomy with those who have done violence to nature has meaning not only in the erotic but also in the political domain. <sup>[19]</sup>

The erudite etymological analyses of Kay and Noakes are worth admiration. I also agree with him on the point that the unnatural aspect of Brunetto's sin is in thought, rather than in his sexual activity. But their conclusions still seems somewhat untenable, since as I have stated in the first chapter, Dante's thought on worldwide monarchy is a spiritual ideal, rather than a feasible policy. The freedom of city-states might not necessarily contradict Dante's idea of the ultimate end of the whole human race. For my part, I would like to stress the concluding episode of Brunetto's speech, when he entrusts his own book to the pilgrim,

Sieti raccomandato il mio Tesoro,  
nel qual io vivo ancora, e più non cheggio.

Let my Treasure be commended to you, in which I live still, and I ask no more.  
(*Inf.* 15. 119-120)

These verses, I believe, are the punch lines for characterizing Latini. It is by his excessive love of earthly glory and the inappropriate admiration of humaningegno that Brunetto is condemned as guilty of sodomy.

The ignorance of God that Latini shows in his seemingly right but actually wrong speech causes the pilgrim to give an ambiguous response to his teacher,

ché 'n la mente m'è fitta, e or m'accora,  
la cara e buona imagine paterna  
di voi quando nel mondo ad ora ad ora  
m'insegnavate come l'uom s'eterna;  
e quant' io l'abbia in grado mentr'io vivo  
convien che ne la mia lingua si scerna.  
Ciò che narrate di mio corso scrivo,

[19] Susan Noakes "Canto XVI: From Other Sodomites to Fraud" in *Lectura Dantis: Inferno*, op. cit., pp. 219-220.

e serbolo a chiosar con altro testo  
a donna che saprà, s'a lei arrivo.

for in my memory is fixed, and now it weighs on my heart, the dear, kind paternal image of you when, in the world, from time to time you used to each me how man makes himself eternal; and how grateful I am for that, as long as I live must be discerned in my language. What you narrate about my path I am writing down and keeping to be glossed, with other texts, by a lady who will know, if I reach her. (Inf. 15. 82-90)

Here the pilgrim's response turns out to be an ironic celebration of Latini. Taking the pilgrim to be a spiritual fruit of his intellectual culture, Latini urges the pilgrim to take care of the "la sementa santa di que' Roman" ("the holy seed of the Romans," Inf. 15. 76-77), but the dialogue takes place on the barren sand; in the memory of the pilgrim, Latini's image is fixed, but his burned appearance defaces the good memory. He teaches the pilgrim how fame makes a man eternal, but the dialogue is in hell, where he suffers an eternal death. Latini acts as an educator, but as the pilgrim says, his words are to be glossed by a higher educator in heaven, that is, Beatrice.<sup>[20]</sup>

Having finished his speech, Latini turns back to his way like "quelli che vince, non colui che perde" ("the one who wins, not the one who loses," Inf. 15. 124) — but there is no winner in hell. As infernal citizens, all the sinners in the città are eternal losers. With his excessive love of earthly glory, Brunetto becomes a model of the citizen of Cain's city. As a "worthy citizen" of Florence, his blasphemous teachings mislead young people. Just as the sodomites corrupt the bodies of others, so thinkers like Latini corrupt the souls of his fellow-citizens. His ingegno of writing and teaching, like the love of sodomites, is fruitless.

### 3. The bolgia of Thieves

At first glance, the Thomastic understanding of love of neighbor is the most obvious subtext of Inferno 24 and 25, the cantos of the thieves.<sup>[21]</sup> In *Summa Theologica* II — II, q. 66. a. 6, theft is defined as the fraudulent appropriation of other's property. Since this kind of fraud does harm to neighbors' belongings, it thereby damages the love of neighbor and the order of human society. It is by the reason of its harm to the common good that theft is considered to be a mortal sin. In light of this it is not accidental that at the beginning of Inf. 26, when the pilgrim leaves the bolgia of thieves, he makes a lamentation for the corrupted citizenry of Florence:

[20] Cf. Par. 14-17, where Cacciaguida's speech has been "glossed" by Beatrice for three times.

[21] The sin of theft has a particular importance for Dante, for he devotes two cantos to this topic. In Inf. 24 and Inf. 25, he displays great literary virtuosity in describing the metamorphoses of the souls of the thieves, and asserts in canto 25 that his art of writing about shape-changing has surpassed two of his major classical models, Ovid and Lucan. Many studies have been made of the Malebolgia of Thieves and different kinds of theft presented in these cantos have been discovered. According to these studies, Dante is concerned not only with the stealing of material goods, but also with the intellectual goods that are others' words. Dante the good thief, steals other classical poets' words to pursue his divine mission, while the bad thieves, the souls bound in the moat, steal public or sacred goods to satisfy their greed. What interests me more about the episode of thieves, however, are the biblical allusions in the text, and, only secondarily, Dante's relationship to the classical poets.

Godi, Fiorenza, poi che se' sì grande  
 che per mare e per terra batti l'ali  
 e per lo 'nferno tuo nome si spande!  
 Tra li ladron trovai cinque cotali  
 tuoi cittadini onde mi ven vergogna,  
 e tu in grande orranza non ne sali.

Rejoice, Florence, since you are so great that on sea and land you beat your wings, and your name spreads through Hell! Among the thieves I found five such citizens of yours that I feel shame, and you do not rise to honor by them. (Inf. 26. 1-6)

Yet the relationship between common good and theft cannot explain the poetic technique that Dante displays in the two cantos. In particular, why does Dante choose to represent the nature of theft by a series of metamorphoses?

For all the diversity in the three metamorphoses displayed in Inferno 24 and Inferno 25, there are two significant similarities. In the first place, in all three cases Dante uses a serpent as the punishment of the thieves. Vanni Fucci's metamorphosis happened after a serpent transfixed him at the crossing point of the spine and the shoulders (Inf. 25. 97-99). In Agnello's metamorphosis, after a serpent threw itself on the thief, both creatures lost their original form and combined to make a new, perverse image (Inf. 25. 51-72). In Cianfa's metamorphosis, the serpent pierced the thief's navel; later, the thief and the serpent exchanged their forms; the serpent is transformed into a thief and the thief into a serpent.

During the descriptions of these metamorphoses there are many direct allusions to sex and generation.<sup>[22]</sup> Soon after his reconstitution, Vanni Fucci made a scandalous gesture with his hands (Inf. 25. 2) with the intention of offending God: "Togli Dio, ch'a te le squadro!" ("Take them, God, I'm aiming at you," Inf. 25. 3) Fucci's gesture, signifying female genitalia, is considered sacrilegious and is forbidden in Dante's time by the laws of many Italian cities. With a gesture that imitates sexual intercourse, Fucci shows his attitude as a breaker of human law, the legitimacy of which, according to St. Thomas, comes from Divine Law.

Agnello's metamorphosis is of no less sexual reminiscence than Fucci's. It is like a portrait of sexual union,

li diretani a le cosce distese,  
 e miseli la coda tra' mbedue  
 e dietro per le ren sù la ritese.

Its hind feet it spread along his thighs, and put its tail between them, extending  
 it up along his loins (Inf. 25. 55-57)

and in Ciafa's metamorphosis, sexual organs are mentioned implicitly,

[22] Anthony Oldcorn has written an essay to analyze Vanni Fucci's scandalous gesture. See his "Perverse Image" in *Lectura Dantis: Inferno*, op. cit. pp. 328-347.

Poscia li piè di rietro, insieme attorti,  
diventaron lo membro che l'uom cela,  
e 'l miserodel suo n'avea due porti.

Then the hind feet, twisted together, became the member which a man hides, and the other wretch out of his had extended two feet. (Inf. 25. 115-7)

It would make more sense if these sexual allusions appeared in the cantos of the lustful or of sodomy. But why do they appear in the bolgia of thieves?

The appropriateness of the snakes to the punishment of thieves, as Robert Durling points out, derives from the devil's temptation of Adam and Eve in Eden.<sup>[23]</sup> The devil, who stealthily entered the garden and took the shape of a serpent, is the first thief in Judeo-Christian history. By temptation the devil steals mankind from God. Following the devil's temptation and Eve's succumbing to it, Adam picked the forbidden fruit and thereby committed theft and all the other sins that followed.<sup>[24]</sup>

After the fall, man begins to suffer the tortures of sexual desires, and, deprived of eternal life, he can expect to obtain his immortality only by way of sexual union, which leads to the propagation of offspring. The concupiscent love between male and female after the fall, and the pain of sexual generation, therefore, are degradations of the right love that once existed between Adam and Eve. Such degradations are perfectly portrayed by Fucci, Agnello and Cianfa's metamorphoses, in which insinuations of generative organs and sexual intercourse are obviously included. It is exactly in reference to the original sin that Dante can legitimately put theft, copulation, and procreation together in his poetic mimesis.

The story recorded in Genesis, however, might not be the only subtext of the sexual descriptions in cantos 24 and 25. As I have mentioned in chapter 2, in the second book of the Confessions Augustine explicates his adolescent theft of pears as a type of Adamic transgression. In that context Augustine stresses his sin as one of a misdirected love.

The malice was loathsome, and I loved it. I was in love with my own ruin, in love with decay; not with the thing for which I was falling into decay but with decay itself, for I was depraved in soul, and I leapt down from your strong support into destruction, hungering not for some advantage to be gained by the foul deed, but for the foulness of it.<sup>[25]</sup>

As Augustine understands, his boyhood theft of pears is a copy of the theft of forbidden fruit committed by the first parent. It is by the memory of the original sin that the action of theft, the profane desire for transgression, and the sexual love that originates after the fall are placed together.

[23] Cf. *Inferno*, op. cit., pp. 374.

[24] The thief is also identified by Jesus as the devil. See John 10. 1-18.

[25] *Confessions* 2. 9.



Dante's bolgia of thieves, then, strongly resounds with both biblical and Augustinian teaching.

As a result of the original sin of the first parent, there begins the cycling of life and death, as is stated in Genesis 3. 19: "for dust thou art, and into dust thou shalt return." Such a human life-circle is perfectly acted out in Fucci's metamorphosis:

NéO sì tosto mai né I si scrisse  
 com el s'accese e arse, e cener tutto  
 convenne che cascando divenisse;  
 e poi che fu a terra sì distrutto,  
 la polver si raccolse per se stessa  
 e 'n quel medesimo ritorno di butto.

Neither O nor I has ever been written so fast as he caught fire and burned and was all consumed, falling, to ashes; and when he was on the ground, destroyed, the dust gathered together by itself and instantly became the same one again. (Inf. 24. 100-105)

In the verses cited above, the combination of O and I, in reverse, forms the pronoun "io," and expresses the most personal form of individual existence: I or the self. The soul of the thief, destructured in fire, regains his self from his own ash in a flash. The life-circle is forever rotating in him.

The thief, as is presented by Fucci, can never attain a state of permanent identity. Nor can any corrupted political entity. The thieves' native cities, Pistoia and Florence, also undergo continual flux, destruction and renewal, to no purpose. The meaningless rotations of political coups are precisely what Fucci proclaims in prophecy:

Pistoia in pria d' i Neri sì dimagra;  
 Poi Fiorenza rinova gente e modi.  
 Pistoia first thins itself of Blacks; then Florence makes new its laws and  
 people. (Inf. 24. 143-44)

As Joan Ferrante points out, it is noteworthy that Fucci, the only one who remains in human shape after the metamorphosis, describes himself as a beast and his city as a lair:<sup>[26]</sup>

Vita bestial mi piacque e non umana,  
 sì come a mul ch' i' fui; son Vanni Fucci  
 bestia, e Pistoia mi fu degna tana.  
 Bestial life pleased me, not human, mule that I was; I am Vanni Fucci the beast,  
 and Pistoia was a worthy lair for me. (Inf. 24. 124-6)

[26] Among all the commentators on the bolgia of thieves, Joan Ferrante seems to be the most sensitive one towards its political meaning. See her "Thieves and Metamorphoses," in *Lectura Dantis: Inferno*, op. cit., pp. 316-327.

For Fucci, from a corrupted city like Pistoia, bestial life is preferred, because Pistoia is set up for beasts and bestiality. In such a city one could be nothing but a beast in such a city. That is the very portrait of Dante's Italy, the earthly hell.

\*                                 \*                                 \*

Besides the cantos investigated above, reminiscence of *civitas* diabolic can be found here and there in *Inferno*.<sup>[27]</sup> The depiction of the infernal *civitas* culminates in the lowest circle of hell. There, the pilgrim hears Ugolino's story. Ugolino, the traitor of his city, was imprisoned with his sons in a tower by Ruggieri, the Pisan Archbishop. Over a final period of six days without food, the children fall one by one because of hunger. The father, in grief, "a brancolar sovra ciascuno" ("took to cropping over each of them," *Inf.* 33. 73), but later "più che 'l dolor, poté 'l digiuno" ("fasting had more power than grief," *Inf.* 33. 75).<sup>[28]</sup> In the afterlife he is allowed by the justice of hell to gnaw forever upon the skull of the Archbishop. Ugolino, a former citizen of Pisa, becomes the father wolf he dreamed about in prison. Imprisonment in the tower coincides with Ugolino's situation in hell and combines earthly life and the afterlife into a hopeless duration. Ugolino's story shows us how a man, when the civic order is destroyed, ceases to be a human political animal and instead becomes a beast. We see in him that the outcome of self-love is the negation of citizenship.

In *De Civitate Dei* 14 and 15, Augustine relates will or love (*amor*) to the coming into being of two kinds of *civitas*, the earthly by the love of self, even to the contempt of God and the heavenly by the love of God.<sup>[29]</sup> The earthly city, moved by "invidentia illa diabolica (by the diabolical, envious hatred),<sup>[30]</sup> will finally end with eternal strife and destruction, which has been revealed by the moral system of Dante's *Inferno*.

[27] In the circle of the avaricious and the prodigal, for example, the pilgrim sees the two groups of sinners, dancing their round, break over each other as they collide. When they reverse directions after this impact, they look back and cry "Perché tieni?" ("why do you hold?") and "Perché burli?" ("why do you toss?") (*Inf.* 7. 22-31). Cursing each other's crime, the two groups cannot come to reconciliation, and no round is completed in their dance. In the waves of the river Styx, the souls of the irate "si percocean, non pur con mano/ma con la testa e col petto e coi piedi, / troncandosi co' denti a brano a brano" ("kept striking each other, not only with/hand, but with head and breast and feet, tearing/each other apart with their teeth, piece by piece" *Inf.* 7. 112-4). The anger which used to kindle their desire to fight still tortures them in the world below. In many cases like these, pride, self-love and disordered desire become the very punishments (*contrapasso*) of the sinners.

[28] I quote the original text here because there has been much debate about this line. It is not sure whether this line may mean Ugolino fed on his children's bodies. See *Inferno*, ed. and trans. Robert M. Durling, introduction and notes by Ronald L. Martinez and Robert M. Durling (Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 529.

[29] Cf. *De Civitate Dei*. 14. 28: "Terrenam scilicet amor sui usque ad contemptum Dei, caelestem vero amor Dei usque ad contemptum sui. Denique illa in se ipsa, haec in Domino gloriatur. Illa enim quaerit ab hominibus gloriam; huic autem Deus conscientiae testis maxima est gloria." (the earthly by the love of self, even to the contempt of God; the heavenly by the love of God, even to the contempt of self. The former, in a word, glories in itself, the latter in the Lord. For the one seeks glory from men; but the greatest glory of the other is God, the witness of conscience.) The original Latin text of *De Civitate Dei* is from website: <http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/august.html>. The translation is Marcus Dods'. See *The City of God*, trans. Marcus Dods, D. D. (Random House, 1950), pp. 477.

[30] *Ibid.* 15. 5, p. 482.

**中文题目:**

**魔鬼之城: 但丁的地狱**

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**关键词:** 但丁; 地狱篇; 城

**摘要:** 但丁的地狱代表着从原罪而来的所有罪过, 仅凭主人公自己的力量是无法克服这些罪过的。《地狱篇》序篇中出现的三只野兽体现了地狱的微缩结构, 即灵魂内在秩序中三种堕落的欲望: 恶意、暴力和不节制。本文考察了《地狱篇》中分别出自这三种罪过的三个片段, 第 5 歌, 第 15 歌, 第 24-25 歌, 试图论证, 奥古斯丁“上帝之城”相反, 建立在托马斯式道德体系上的地狱是一个“魔鬼之城”。论文同时考察了三个片段对奥古斯丁文本的暗用, 不论这些用典是多么讽刺, 它们都在文本中起着重要作用。



比较宗教文化研究

**Comparative Religious and Cultural Studies**





# Henry of Ghent and the Inevitable Failure of Divine Illumination<sup>[1]</sup>

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**Abstract:** Henry of Ghent attempted to integrate an Aristotelian empiricism, Platonic exemplarism and an Augustinian doctrine of Divine Illumination, to form a firm philosophical basis for Augustine's theory of knowledge, meanwhile trying to restore its theological connotations. However, his new synthesis was doomed to fail, because the tensions between the Christian metaphysical worldview and the epistemological requirements of the Aristotelian system were unsolvable. The need for divine illumination was waning in the face of encroaching Aristotelianism at the end of 13<sup>th</sup> century.

**Key Words:** Divine Illumination, Augustine, Platonism, Aristotelianism, exemplar

## 1. Introduction: Divine Illumination-Augustinian Epistemology before 13 Century

Divine Illumination is the theory of knowledge which St. Augustine appropriated from the Neo-Platonism and combined with Christian faith, to decipher human's cognitive activities. As Timothy Noone put in *The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy* (Vol. I): "(Divine Illumination is) the theory of how God's light is required to account fully for how humans are capable of attaining the truth that they manage to attain through their intellectual activities."<sup>[2]</sup> St. Augustine developed his view of Divine Illumination in his various writings, but he never systematically illustrated the theory, which results in many conflicting interpretations by both his followers and opponents.

The influence of Neo-Platonism is evident in Augustine's theory of knowledge. Just as Plotinus understands the reality in orders or levels, Augustine's ontology takes an hierarchical structure of reality with God its creator, at the apex and the world of bodies at the lowest level.<sup>[3]</sup> In contrast to his ontology proceeding downward, Augustine's epistemology rising upwards, from corporeal (senses), spiritual (imagination), to intellection (reasons). He claims that man begins with sensation

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[1] Cf. ,Pan-chiu LAI, "Divine Love and Human Love", *International Journal of Sino-Western Studies*, vol. 12, 109-119. (<https://www.sinowesternstudies.com/back-issues/vol-12-2017/>)

[2] Timothy Noone, "Divine Illumination," vol. 1 of *The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy*, ed. Robert Pasnau (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 369.

[3] Ronald H. Nash, *The Light of the Mind: St. Augustine's Theory of Knowledge* (Lexington: The University of Kentucky, 1969), 5.

but attempts to climb by way of reason to the eternal ideas in the mind of God.<sup>[4]</sup> In *Soliloquia*, Augustine observes that as in the sensible world all objects to be seen must be illumined, so also in the intelligible world. The analogy of sun is applied. “About this corporeal sun notice three things. It exists. It shines. It illuminates. So in knowing the hidden God you must observe three things. He exists. He is known. He causes other things to be known.”<sup>[5]</sup> Therefore, without the light of the sun, our eyes, even if purified, cannot see anything. Without divine illumination, there is no human knowledge, either sense knowledge or intellectual one. It is God that makes knowledge possible just as the light of the sun make it possible to see.

In Augustine’s three early works, *De magistro*, *Soliloquia*, *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus* 46, he suggested that the function of illumination were threefold. “Illumination is the source of the cognitive capacity; it sustains the ongoing process of cognition; and it supplies the very content of thought.”<sup>[6]</sup>

However, it seems that St. Augustine never intends to develop a systematic system. Noone claims that before the thirteen century, one might only speak of the theme of Divine Illumination, not the theory of Divine Illumination.<sup>[7]</sup> Despite being unsystematic and ambiguous, Augustine’s view of Divine Illumination is rich and appealing, especially to the thirteenth century philosophers and theologians. Undoubtedly, it permeates the medieval Christian tradition. Until Thomas Aquinas, the theory of Divine Illumination had played a prominent role in all the most influential medieval theories of knowledge, including those of Anselm, Albert the Great, Roger Bacon, and especially Bonaventure.<sup>[8]</sup>

St. Bonaventure believed that the divine light actually guided human’s intellectual cognition as regulating and moving cause, present in all our acts of intellectual knowledge. He didn’t deny the role of sense knowledge and abstraction, which are partial causes, cooperating with the divine light. This is the standard Franciscan interpretation. Simply put, a priori concepts coming from Divine Illumination do not afford the actual knowledge, but regulate the process of cognition to ensure the concepts generated by mind correspond to the divine ideas about reality and are therefore absolute certain.

The introduction of Aristotle’s most important works to the medieval west Europe brought on revolutionary changes in the thirteenth-century thought, but at the expense of declines of some doctrines. The growing dominance of the Aristotelian theory of cognition quickly made Augustinian theory of Divine Illumination seem superfluous.<sup>[9]</sup> However, the condemnation of 219 propositions by Etienne Tempier, the year of 1277 witnessed a revival of Augustinian thought and a move away from the increasingly popular Aristotelianism. Henry of Ghent was the most representative of such

[4] Ibid. ,5.

[5] J. H. S. Burleigh, ed. , *Augustine, Early Writings* (London: SCM, 1953 ) ,32.

[6] Lydia Schumacher, “Illumination, Divine.” In *The Oxford Guide to the Historical Reception of Augustine.* : Oxford University Press, 2013. Accessed on Nov. 5, 2018. <http://www.oxfordreference.com.ezproxy.library.ubc.ca/view/10.1093/acref/9780199299164.001.0001/acref-9780199299164-e-390>.

[7] Timothy Noone, “Divine Illumination”, 369.

[8] Robert Pasnau, “Henry of Ghent and the Twilight of Divine Illumination”, *The Review of Metaphysics*, Vol. 49, 1 (1995): 50.

[9] Ibid. ,49.

Neo-Augustinian thought in the late thirteenth century.

## 2. Henry of Ghent's New Synthesis

Henry of Ghent (? -1293), also known as Doctor Solennis, was secular master in the Faculty of Theology at the University of Paris from 1276 to 1292. As a panel member of the papa commission under Etienne Tempier, Bishop of Paris, in 1277, he has long been viewed as the leading conservative philosophical force at the University of Paris in last quarter of the 13<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>[10]</sup> In his epistemology, he attempted to integrate an Aristotelian empiricism, Platonic exemplarism and an Augustinian doctrine of Divine Illumination. He also tried to restore the theological connotation to Divine Illumination. In the years between Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus, Henry of Ghent is certainly most influential philosopher. His work became the starting point and the target of criticism for Duns Scotus. It should also be noted that it is John Dun Scotus who virtually brought the theory to the end. It's reasonable to proclaim Henry of Ghent as the last forceful defender of the theory of Divine Illumination in the Medieval Ages. However, Henry's adaption of Divine Illumination is doomed partly in his own theoretical synthesis.

The years around and after the condemnations, the defenders of Augustinian tradition, in particular the theory of Divine Illumination, were faced up the increasingly critical and controversial climate. Various attempts were made to explain how the divine light interacted with ordinary powers of human understanding. Henry of Ghent, as Tempier's panel member in 1277 and a leading influence at Paris between 1277 to 1293, was fully aware of the difficulties of the traditional philosophy. It is interesting to note that Henry began his Summa with a question whether it is possible to know anything at all. It signals a departure from his predecessors, since they had begun their works with questions on God's nature. After Henry, it became common for Franciscans to follow, asking the question about the possibility of knowledge at the outset of major theological works.<sup>[11]</sup> Logically, the question "can man know truth?" is prior to investigations into the subject of how man know truth.

### 2.1 The Knowledge of the True and the Knowledge of Truth

Henry thinks that apparent superfluity of Divine Illumination is merely apparent and tries to build a solid epistemological basis for maintaining the theory. Different from Augustine, however, Henry claims that Divine Illumination is not required for all knowledge. His defense of the theory of Divine Illumination rests on a distinction between the knowledge of the true and the knowledge of the truth (*veritas syncera*).

To the first argument on the other side, that human beings can through their

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[10] John Marenbon, ed. *Medieval Philosophy*. Routledge History of Philosophy, v. 3. London; New York: Routledge, 1998, P. 483. CF: Pasquale Porro, "An Historiographical Image of Henry of Ghent", *Henry of Ghent: Proceedings of the International Colloquium on the Occasion of the 700<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of His Death (1293)*, ed. W. Vanhamel (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1996), P. 393.

[11] Lydia Schumacher, *Divine Illumination: The History and Future of Augustine's Theory of Knowledge* (West Sussex, UK; Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 187.

own activity acquire knowledge, it should be said that this is true [as regards knowledge] of natural things in knowing what is true as regards the thing. But God teaches this, by giving a natural capacity for judgment through which one discerns the things to be known. Pure truth, however, or any truth that must be cognized supernaturally, or perhaps any truth at all, cannot be known without God himself doing the teaching. <sup>[12]</sup>

Henry thinks human being is capable of acquiring knowledge of the true, that is, what is true as regards natural things. It is likely that Henry has had Aquinas in mind in his original efforts to face up with the challenges. Explicitly, Henry opposed Aquinas' position that ordinary (or natural) Divine Illumination amounts merely to a naturally innate capacity to know the truth. <sup>[13]</sup> For Aquinas, the first principles come from the divine light by the impressing its light on human agent intellect. This happens at the creation of the human soul and it is the natural endowment of the agent intellect. Aquinas denies any further need for the divine light to concur with the human intellect beyond the creation. For Henry, Aquinas overestimates the power of human intellect and fails to distinguish between the truth that can be obtained from sense-based images and the eternal truth. <sup>[14]</sup> Henry does recognize the dignity and perfection of the created intellect. He believes that natural objects can be known purely naturally, while the knowledge of the truth is acquired on the indispensability of the Divine Illumination. In contrast, acknowledging the natural illumination and special illumination, Thomas Aquinas believes that the very nature of the rational soul enables us to know certain kinds of truths through sensible things, and other truths such as future contingents and truths of faith that transcend the faculty of reason cannot be naturally known without special illumination-prophecy, in other words, or revelation. <sup>[15]</sup>

To justify his claims, Henry first distinguishes between the two sorts of knowledge as follows:

...still it is one thing to know of a creature what is true with respect to it, and another to know its truth. So, there is one cognition by which a thing is cognized, another by which its truth is cognized. For every cognitive power that through its cognition apprehends a thing just as it has existence in itself, outside the cognizer, apprehends what is true in it. But through this it does not apprehend the thing's

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[12] "Ad primum in oppositum, quod homo potest proprio motu acquirere scientiam; dicendum quod verum est de rebus naturalibus, sciendo id quod verum est in re; quod tamen deus docet; dando naturale iudicium quo scienda discernit. Sinceram autem veritatem, aut aliquam veritatem super naturaliter cognoscendam, aut forte veritatem quamcumque, non potest scire sine ipso proprio docente"; Gheint, *Summa* 1. 7 ad 1; 17rM. Henry of Ghent, *Summa (Questiones Ordinariae)*, art. 1-5, in Henrici de Gandavo *Opera Omnia*, ed. G. A. Wilson (Leuven; Leuven University Press, 2001). Article one and two of Henry's *Summa* have been translated by Robert Pasnau in *The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts*, Vol. 3: *Mind and Knowledge* (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 2002); all five questions of article one have been translated by Roland J. Teske in Henry of Ghent's *Summa of Ordinary Questions (Article One): The Possibility of Human Knowledge* (South Bend; St. Augustine's Press, 2008). The quotations used in this paper are taken from *The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts*, Vol. 3: *Mind and Knowledge*, translated by Robert Pasnau.

[13] Robert Pasnau, "Henry of Ghent and the Twilight of Divine Illumination", 55.

[14] Noone, "Divine Illumination", 1:382.

[15] *Ibid.*, 52.

truth. For the senses even in brute animals apprehend well enough concerning a thing

what is true in it—for instance, a true human being, true wood, a true stone, and especially the proper objects with respect to which the senses are necessarily true. But still they apprehend or cognize the truth of no thing, because they cannot judge regarding any thing what it is in actual truth—e. g., concerning a human being, that it is a true human being, or concerning a color, that it is a true color?<sup>[16]</sup>

Accordingly, to know the knowledge of the true involves a cognition that represents the object as it is, based on the senses or natural conception. According to Henry, both humans and animals which lack of reason can grasp something in this way.

## 2.2 The Created Exemplar and the Divine Exemplar

To know the truth, however, is more complicated. It involves the mechanism of two exemplars: human ideas and divine ideas. Henry explains that the truth of a thing “can be cognized only by cognizing the conformity of the cognized thing to its exemplar.”<sup>[17]</sup> Therefore, there are two ways of grasping the truth.

A thing’s truth has two ways of being cognized by a human being, with respect to two exemplars... The first exemplar of a thing is its universal likeness [species] existing within the soul, through which the soul acquires a cognition of all the individuals it stands for. This exemplar is caused by the thing. The second exemplar is the divine art containing the ideal formulations of all things.<sup>[18]</sup>

The first exemplar is created by human intellect on the basis of sense experience. The second is an uncreated one that subsists in the divine intellect. On the one level, the truth of a thing requires a conformity of a cognition of that thing in human intellect to the thing. On the another level, the truth of a thing requires the thing’s conformity to the divine intellect. In other words, the thing matches the divine exemplar. It is a little misleading when Henry says a thing’s truth may be cognized in two ways. It suggests we might know the truth of a thing either by comparing our own ideas to the

[16] “Aliud tamen est scire de creatura id quod verum est in ea et aliud est scire eius veritatem: ut alia sit cognitio qua cognoscitur res, alia qua cognoscitur veritas eius. Omnis enim virtus cognoscitiva per suam notitiam apprehendens rem sicuti habet esse in se extra cognoscentem apprehendit quod verum est in ea. Sed non per hoc apprehendit eius veritatem. Sensus enim etiam in brutis bene apprehendit de re quod verum est in ea. Sed tamen nullius rei veritatem apprehendit sive cognoscit; propter quod de nullo potest iudicare quid sit in rei veritate, ut de homine quod sit verus homo, vel de colore quod sit verus color”; Ghent, *Summa* 1. 2; 4vC. Translated by Robert Pasnau, *The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts*, Vol. 3; *Mind and Knowledge*, 115.

[17] “Intentio enim veritatis in re apprehendi non potest nisi apprehendendo conformitatem eius ad suum exemplar”; Ghent, *Summa* 1. 2; 5 vE. Translated by Robert Pasnau, *The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts*, Vol. 3; *Mind and Knowledge*, 117.

[18] “Dupluciter ad duplex exemplar veritas rei habet ab homine cognosci... Primum exemplar rei est species eius universalis apud animam exis teras, per quam acquirit notitiam omnium suppositorum eius; et est causata a re. Secundum exemplar est ars divina continens omnium rerum ideales rationes”; *Summa* 1. 2; 5vE. Translated by Robert Pasnau, *The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts*, Vol. 3; *Mind and Knowledge*, 118.

thing, or by comparing the thing to the divine ideas. However, it is the latter conformity that makes the thing true.<sup>[19]</sup> The truth of a thing lies in the relationship between the thing and divine intellect. The match between a thing and the divine exemplar is that of the things' essence with the exemplar. "And so since every creature is a kind of image of a divine exemplar, the truth of every creature is cognized most truly and completely in its quiddity by seeing the divine essence uncovered."<sup>[20]</sup> For Henry, the truth of an object just is the object's essence. Knowing the truth is the grasping the essences of the object. Therefore, the image can be cognized (a priori) through an exemplar, and conversely, the exemplar can also be cognized (a posteriori) through the image. Henry concedes that human beings have the ability to know what is true. He even concedes that our sense are reliable and thus give us veridical awareness of the external world.<sup>[21]</sup> However, Henry still claims that we are unable to go beyond superficial appearances by senses and grasp the essence of what it is to be a certain kind of thing. He accepted the Aristotelian position that "we do have fixed knowledge of changeable, particular, sensible, natural things through their universals existing in the intellect."<sup>[22]</sup> However, Henry denies that this effort could lead to the essences of a object. It is not possible for human beings on their own to go beyond the senses and progress to the deepest understanding of the essences of creatures.<sup>[23]</sup> The knowledge of truth is possible for human beings, only on the condition of the aids from Divine Illumination.

In the process of cognition, Henry distinguishes two ways of utilizing the exemplar as the object of knowledge or as the means of knowing. According to Henry, the divine exemplars of Being, unity, truth, and goodness, are imprinted or poured on the mind through special illumination.<sup>[24]</sup> These uncreated exemplars check the truth of the exemplars that have been created by the mind and thus confirm that they are absolutely certain. That is to say, Divine Illumination doesn't offer knowledge, but regulates the cognition.

The claim that we are unable to grasp naturally the truth of things distinguishes Henry from Aquinas and the Aristotelianism of his age. Aquinas believes that the natural light of agent intellect suffices to get behind the appearance and reach the true nature of reality.

### 2.3 Three Ways of How Divine Illumination Works

As mentioned above, the classic form of Divine Illumination attempted to resolve the dual problems of how the mind generates the ideas and how the mind makes the judgment of the true and certain knowledge from the false one. As Gilson points out, the intellect operations involve criteria and ideogenesis. To Augustine, the judgmental function of Divine Illumination far outweighed ideogenesis.<sup>[25]</sup> In other words, the light plays more important normative role in human knowledge of

[19] Robert Pasnau, "Henry of Ghent and the Twilight of Divine Illumination", 58.

[20] Henry, *Summa*, translated by Robert Pasnau, *The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts*, Vol. 3: *Mind and Knowledge*, 124.

[21] Robert Pasnau, "Henry of Ghent and the Twilight of Divine Illumination", 60.

[22] Henry, *Summa*, translated by Robert Pasnau, *The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts*, Vol. 3: *Mind and Knowledge*, 105.

[23] Robert Pasnau, "Henry of Ghent and the Twilight of Divine Illumination", 62.

[24] Schumacher, *Divine Illumination*, 190.

[25] Etienne Gilson, "Sur quelques difficultés de l'illumination augustinienne," *Revue néoscholastique de philosophie* 36 (1934), 321-31.



the pure truth. It seems that Henry was well aware of Augustine's statements and tied to integrate them into three ways of explication of how Divine Illumination works in human's knowledge of true truth. According to Henry, the function of God performed in human's cognition serves as spiritual light, a form or species and a figure or mark, a kind of divine art.<sup>[26]</sup> Steven Marrone thought that Henry didn't reject the multiple functions of Divine Illumination he found in the writings of Augustine, and however, took much greater care to be precise of the explication.<sup>[27]</sup>

First, God acts as an intellectual light illuminating the mind, not directly enabling it to see the pure truth, but sharpening and cleansing it to see clearly<sup>[28]</sup>. The divine light doesn't get involved in man's actual cognitive process, but prepares the way for it. The mind is believed to be clouded by the base affection of the flesh and sin, just as the bodily eyes need to be purged so that they could receive the visible images. Interestingly, it is noted that purging the receptive cognitive power is one of two roles Henry attributed to the agent intellect. Moreover, in his later works, Henry did describe God as the second agent intellect in the natural processes of coming to know the objects in the world.<sup>[29]</sup> Such agent intellect is external of the mind, and God illuminated the intellect indirectly. As Steven Marrone presumed that in Henry's understanding, what happened was that the divine light diffused itself on the intelligible species of things, and they carried it to the mind, where it then did its work of cleansing and healing.<sup>[30]</sup>

Second, God acts as a form and species, which actually engages in mind's cognitive process and transforms the mind to see the pure truth.<sup>[31]</sup> Unlike the spiritual light elaborated above, the second role offers the mind the species and forms to come to know the pure truth. Henry used the analogy of blurred vision. The eyes would know only that there are some object presented to them, but would not know what they are actually seeing. In the context of Henry's theory of truth, it isn't hard to understand. There are two species, one is taken from the external object by the senses; the other is the exemplar in God, the cause of the thing. The mind has to compare the two species in order to form the perfect word, the actual psychological manifestations of the pure truth in its understanding.<sup>[32]</sup> The knowledge of truth is the conformity of the object to its divine exemplar in the divine mind. The impressed species drawn from the object is not perfect and precisely correct, accounting for the mind's initial confrontation via senses. The mind is still insufficient to come to the pure truth, still relying on the Divine Illumination for the second species, the divine exemplar to flow into it. There is a contradiction. According to Henry, the mind in this life normally couldn't see the divine exemplar as an object, instead, means of cognition.

Third, God acts as a figure or a mark. God contains the eternal reasons of all things in the world,

[26] Summa, art. 1, q. 3 (I, 9r-v[D]).

[27] Steven J. Marrone, *Truth and Scientific Knowledge in the Thought of Henry of Ghent*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, The Medieval Academy of America, 1985, 31.

[28] Summa, art. 1, q. 3 (I, 9vD). "Est enim primo ratio cognitionis ut lux, mentem solummodo illustrando; ut ad intuendum sinceram veritatem rei acuatur; non ut team intueatur et iam videat."

[29] Summa, art. 58, q. 2 (II, 129v-130r[E]).

[30] Steven J. Marrone, *Truth and Scientific Knowledge in the Thought of Henry of Ghent*, 32.

[31] Summa, art. 1, q. 3 (I, 9vE and F). "Secundo modo dicitur est ratio cognitionis ut forma et species mentem immutans ad intuendum."

[32] Summa, art. 1, q. 3 (I, 10rG). See also Summa, art. 1, q. 4 (I, 12vD).

like a storehouse of exemplars or divine ideas. In this way, God is like an art (ars), impressing, sealing and marking the mind with its images.<sup>[33]</sup> This is, Henry believed, more direct and perfect than the first two modes. However, it is hard to explain how this mode is distinct from the other two. Using the traditional analogy to a signet ring, which made its mark on the sealing wax, Henry echoed Augustine in *De Trinitate*, literally indicating the divine illumination impressing the image onto the mind through an impression. Henry believed that the knowledge of truth is a word or concept drawn from the object in conformity with divine exemplar. The word or the concept is simply the noetic marker for the knowledge of similitude that constitute truth. The pure truth turns out to be the adequation between the concept in the intellect and God. However, this is not what Henry intended. He took pains to emphasize that the perfect concept of truth was formed in the mind by divine exemplar, but the whole process could not occur without the use of a created exemplar drawn from the external object in the world.<sup>[34]</sup> Therefore, Henry claimed that once the mind had attained the knowledge of an external object by means of the created species, the divine exemplar shone upon this knowledge and thus led the mind to perceive the pure truth.<sup>[35]</sup> Here the function of God in the cognitive process is defined as “art”, not offering new species to form concepts, instead, molding the concepts the mind had already devised from the created exemplar. To be more precise, the mind takes two steps, first using the created exemplar taken from the external object to form an incomplete concept or word (imperfect and still in need of adjustment), and then by impressing the second divine exemplar molding and shaping the word to be the perfect word of pure truth. The external object is the impression in the material world of the divine exemplar; the concept in the mind receives the impression from the same exemplar from God, and thus the truth which the concept signifies reflects the creative relationship between the created object and God. As Henry explained that once the word in the intellect had been marked by the seal of God’s divine exemplar, it became the more perfect similitude of the object, because both of them were now impressions left by the same seal.<sup>[36]</sup>

So far, Henry had developed a general outline of the theory of human knowledge. Based on the distinction between the knowledge of the true and the knowledge of truth, Henry offered his solution to skepticism. On the level of truth in the light of two exemplars, Henry believed the mind could enter the realm of science and with aid of the special illumination, the mind could attain the knowledge of truth of varied certitude and perfect sense. Only in the divine light could the human intellect reach the pure truth (*sincera veritas*). As Henry himself claimed, his philosophy offers a synthesis of Aristotle and Plato in the Augustinian tradition.<sup>[37]</sup> Clearly, Henry is a true Augustinian, but he didn’t make concessions to an ever-encroaching Aristotelianism. Instead, he perceived the inadequacy in Aristotelian theory of knowledge and turned to Divine Illumination for the solution.

[33] *Summa*, art. 1, q. 3 (I, 10rF). “Tertio modo est ratio cognitionis ut exemplar atque transfigurans mentem ad distincte intelligendum: et hoc ratione aeternarum regularum in divina arte contentarum.”

[34] Steven J. Marrone, *Truth and Scientific Knowledge in the Thought of Henry of Ghent*, 36.

[35] *Summa*, art. 1, q. 3 (I, 10rF and 10vG).

[36] *Summa*, art. 1, q. 3 (I, 10rG).

[37] *Summa*, art. 1, q. 4 E.

### 3. The Ontological Basis for Henry's Synthesis

It's evident that Henry believed that the mind can reach some kind of truth, but had a problem explaining how that could be. In Aristotelian terms, our natural way of acquiring knowledge is through sensation. An exemplar created by abstracting from phantasms would be sufficient to know the truth for Aristotle, while Henry wouldn't accept it because Henry and his contemporaries inhabited a different metaphysical universe than Aristotle; their theological commitments entailed that they would have different starting points than those of Aristotle.<sup>[38]</sup> The divine exemplar would be required for Henry for the knowledge of pure truth, and divine illumination which was pervasive in the Christian tradition could help solve the dilemma.

Many scholars have noticed that Henry's thoughts had went through changes. Theophilus Nys first detected Henry's move and reorientation in his stance on noetics and epistemology. Nys demonstrated that Henry made extensive use of the Aristotelian notion of an intelligible species impressed on the mind in intellection as a means of knowing simple objects in his first twenty articles of *Summa*. In *Quodlibet IV*, Nys showed, Henry for the first time definitely and irrevocably, rejected the recourse to impressed intelligible species.<sup>[39]</sup> In *Quodlibet V*, Henry laid out his mature theory of word (*verbum*) to substitute the intelligible species. Steven P. Marrone proposed a three-stage development hypothesis: the first stage revealing Henry as an Augustinian; the second manifesting a turn to Aristotelian formalism; the last presenting an exquisite integration of the previous two.<sup>[40]</sup> Another convincing proof is Henry's silence on Divine Illumination in his middle years. However, Henry seems simply to have reverted to his earliest position, going back on the Aristotelian innovations of the middle years to reaffirm the purely Augustinian doctrine of a divine light.<sup>[41]</sup> In his most mature thoughts, Henry had come full circle. He returned to the image of illumination and the idea of godly intervention in his very early works, but it was not to repeat and resurrect the same image and idea. The new synthesis of Divine Illumination is somehow old and new at the same time. Henry tended to elaborate God's action as an art (*ars*), a storehouse of forms working on the material of the artifact.<sup>[42]</sup> Henry's metaphysics insights are supposed to be examined to account for the development in Henry's epistemology.

From the beginning, Henry took a stance other than Thomas Aquinas, firmly rejecting any real distinction between being and essence. They are different, but not different enough to refer to two different things (*res*) to form a third or composite one.<sup>[43]</sup> As to the reality of created things, Henry proposed two kinds of state of being: the being of essence (*esse essentiae*) and the being of existence (*esse existentiae*). The former indicated it participated in a divine exemplar through its essence, while

[38] Patrick J. Connolly, "Henry of Ghent's Argument for Divine Illumination Reconsidered", *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 89, No. 1, 65-66.

[39] See Theophilus V. Nys, *De psychologia cognitionis humanae secundum Henricum Gandavensem*, Rome, 1949, 9, 34, and 42.

[40] Steven P. Marrone, "Henry of Ghent in Mid-career as Interpreter of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas", *Henry of Ghent: Proceedings of the International Colloquium on the Occasion of the 700<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of His Death (1293)*, 194-195.

[41] Steven J. Marrone, *Truth and Scientific Knowledge in the Thought of Henry of Ghent*, 99.


[42] *Quod. IX. q. 15* (ed. Macken, P. 265): "…agens enim qui Deus est, agit sicut ars quae ponit formam in materialia artificii; agens vero qui est potentialis animae, agit sicut lumen circa phantasmata…"

[43] *Summa*, art. 21, q. 4 (I, 127vS).

the latter means each thing has a real object existence in the world, as an effect of divine creative act based on the exemplars. Very uniquely, it seemed Henry also proposed a third level of reality, that is the cognitive being (*esse rationis*). Simply put, the cognitive being indicates the created things existed in the mind.

By using the broadest metaphysical category that Henry formulated a framework to analyze the reality. The most inclusive thing (*res*) includes being (*ens*) and non-being (*non ens*), which was identified by Henry as *res a reor reris*. There were things which could have existed in the world, because they all possessed or related to the exemplars in the divine mind, which are the basis for all creation and the foundation for actual being in the world. Henry associated this level with nature (*natura*) and essence (*essentia*), and identifying as *res a raturidine*. A third level lay within the second one, including things which had actual existence in the real world, either in the real world or in the mind. Henry identified it as *res existens in actu*.

A diagram can best explain Henry's metaphysical framework:



In the second circle, things being an essence possessed exemplars in God, therefore, and are objects of the intellect. The essence didn't mean that it had been actualized. In the third circle, with being of existence added, things are made actually existing objects. On the level of essence, there was a relation with God, consisting the core of the created things. With Henry's metaphysical framework, let's examine how his theory of being and essence was integrated into his epistemology. Essence reflected a correspondence to a divine exemplar, and also gave each thing its truth. If essence offered the foundation for things' truth, it also provided the basis for the truth of human knowledge. In other words, essence not only lay at the ontological core of the things, but at the core of human knowledge. The mind perceived the truth with the ultimate ontological basis in God. Therefore, the mind didn't have to shift from two different things; the created exemplar and the divine exemplar, to obtain the pure truth, but pushed further towards the ultimate metaphysical basis, the absolute essence. God acted as a divine art, impressing a form on the mind. Coming to truth is grasping the essence, which was at heart perceiving the relation to God. The mind could only seek the truth from the being of essence, instead of being of existence. All in all, taking the Aristotelian path to the scientific knowledge entailed coming to recourse the traditional Augustinian terms and theology. Henry had pushed a way to resolve the conflicts between the Aristotelian path and the Augustine one of explaining truth. By incorporating his innovative theory of distinction of essence and being, he found the unity of the path from the existing object to the essence and finally to God. To some extent, he was genuine Platonism, using explicitly Augustinian language. With the analytical tools from

Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, Henry still maintain his theological and epistemological position. Steven P. Marrone was quite right in claiming the theory of being and essence had not only bridged the gap between the created world and God's ideas, thereby eliminating the need for any explicit theory of two exemplars in the mind; it has also made Henry's two types of truth, the scientific truth of the analytical mind and the pure truth of the illuminated intellect, the same. <sup>[44]</sup>

#### 4. Conclusions

Being an Augustinian, but with a considerable difference, Henry was willing to accept Aristotle when no essentials are at stake and is a sympathetic reader of Avicenna. <sup>[45]</sup> In his epistemological system, he abides by the Augustinian principle that no pure truth can come by means of the senses, while the natural knowledge acquired based on senses is, in normal circumstances, true, despite being not pure and full truth. Still, it becomes increasingly difficult to defend the theory of Divine Illumination philosophically. Despite Henry's challenge to the growing influence of the Aristotelian account and his synthesis of an Aristotelian empiricism, Platonic exemplarism and an Augustinian theory of knowledge, the theory of Divine illumination declined inevitably. The tension between the Christian metaphysical worldview and the epistemological requirements of the Aristotelian system is unsolvable. The need for divine illumination is waning in face of encroaching Aristotelianism. Henry would never thought his synthesis had a limited influence in the coming age. His theory of Divine Illumination is, to certain extent, doomed. In the predicament of later 13<sup>th</sup> century, the conservative theologians, or at least those of their number who belonged to the order of Friars Minor, began to receive an assistance from the genius of Duns Scotus. <sup>[46]</sup> John Duns Scotus is an empirical Aristotelian, who rejected the role of Divine Illumination in ordinary cognition, and limit it as the source of knowledge about God. That is, in natural cognitive processes, Divine Illumination ceases to get involved. The mind attains knowledge by abstracting the essence from the objects presented by the senses, thus attaining the concept. Scotus claimed that human intellect was competent to attain the truth without any direct divine illumination. Virtually, the theory of Divine Illumination declined after John Duns Scotus. Historically speaking, the non-illuminationist account of mind, first advocated by Aquinas and developed into a thoroughgoing theory by Scotus, displaced illuminationism. The focus of epistemology shifted from the problem of eternal truth and certainty to the topic of universal knowledge analyzed through competing versions of intuitive and abstractive cognition. <sup>[47]</sup>

[44] Steven J. Marrone, *Truth and Scientific Knowledge in the Thought of Henry of Ghent*, 140.

[45] David Knowles, *The Evolution of Medieval Thought*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. D. E. Luscombe and C. N. L. Brook (London and New York: Longman, 1988), 275.

[46] *Ibid.*, 276.

[47] Noone, "Divine Illumination", 1:382.

**中文题目:**

## **根特的亨利和注定失败的光照论**

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**摘要:**根特的亨利试图整合亚里士多德的经验主义、柏拉图的范型主义和奥古斯丁的光照论, 为奥古斯丁的认识论建立坚实的哲学基础, 同时试图恢复其神学内涵。然而, 他的新综合是注定失败的, 因为基督教形而上学的世界观和亚里士多德体系的认识论要求之间的张力是无法解决的。在 13 世纪末, 面对不断侵蚀的亚里士多德哲学, 对神圣光照的需求日趋衰减。

**关键词:**光照论; 奥古斯丁; 柏拉图主义; 亚里士多德主义; 原型



# 加尔文三一论与教父传统<sup>〔1〕</sup>

孙 帅

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**摘要:** 如何理解加尔文的三一论及其与教父传统之间的关联,是现代学界争论的焦点之一。本文旨在探讨加尔文三一论中的位格区分和经世思想,以便准确呈现这位改革家在三位一体问题上的神学创见。首先,在笔者看来,加尔文区分位格所用的核心概念来自希腊传统中的“自存体”与“特性”,而非学者们通常所认为的“关系”。其次,加尔文将德尔图良的“经世”观念引入三一论,从而使位格的区分被诠释为三位一体的内在秩序,并被放进神意经世的宏大视野。由此可见,经世问题的重要性与加尔文对世界秩序的重新理解密不可分。

**关键词:** 加尔文;三位一体;教父;德尔图良;经世

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## 一、引言:加尔文与三一论

从加尔文的整个神学体系来看,三一论在其中的位置显得非常悖谬:一方面,三位一体并未像“神意”、“律法”、“称义与成圣”、“教会”等问题那样成为加尔文最核心的关切之一,另一方面,在这位日内瓦的改革家构建自身神学工程的过程中,他关于三位一体的论述却不断面对各种各样的批评。如果说三一论对加尔文而言仅仅是一个次要问题,而且(正如学界通常所认为的)他在此问题上并未发展出系统性的创见,那么,其著作中为数不多的三一论内容何以会致使他陷入与不同阵营的激烈争论呢?在三位一体问题上,加尔文的观点到底是什么?三一论在他的思想世界中到底意味着什么?

我们看到,在 1536 年初版的《基督教要义》中,三一论作为对《使徒信经》的解释被加尔文安排在讨论“信心”问题的第 2 章。到了 1559 年的最终版,三一论所占篇幅相比之前所有增加,却仍未成为《基督教要义》的核心议题,而是隶属于加尔文对“造物主”的讨论,作为圣经启示出来的神圣知识出现在第 1 卷第 13 章。在写作这部巨著的二十几年间,加尔文在三位一体问题上先后与许多论敌针锋相对,其中最重要的人物包括指责加尔文为阿里乌主义的洛桑牧师 Pierre Caroli,极端主义者 Michael Servetus,以及流亡到日内瓦的意大利反三一论者,诸如 Giovanni Valentino Gentile、Giorgio Blandrata、Matthias Gribaldi、Gianpaulo Alciati。学界的相关研究表明,加尔文三一论的形成深受这些争论的推动。<sup>〔2〕</sup>

〔1〕 本文是中国人民大学科学研究基金项目《奥古斯丁〈创世记〉注解著作的翻译与研究》(项目编号:2018030089)的阶段性成果。Cf., Chengfeng LIANG, “Revisit the Thought of Natural Law - Martin Luther and John Calvin”, *International Journal of Sino-Western Studies*, vol. 13, 13-23. (<https://www.sinowesternstudies.com/back-issues/vol-13-2017/>)

〔2〕 参见 Brannon Ellis, *Calvin, Classical Trinitarianism, and the Aseity of the Son*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) d.

如果联系《基督教要义》写作过程中出现的争论,就会发现加尔文三一论的学说与立场有多么扑朔迷离。首先,为了维护三位一体教义,《基督教要义》首版已经明确从尼西亚信经的“同质”(homoousios)概念出发批判阿里乌主义,可既然如此,Pierre Caroli 当时为什么还要指责加尔文为阿里乌主义者呢?在对手的要求下,加尔文又为什么拒绝赞同尼西亚信经与阿塔纳修信经呢?其次,根据正统三一教义,子通过永恒受生的方式分有上帝的独一本质,但根据加尔文的“自存性”(aseity)理论,子的本质并非出自父,而是出自自身,凭自身就拥有这一本质,虽然子与父的本质是同一的。可要是这样的话,加尔文不就否定了正统三一论中的永恒受生与本质相通(communicatio essentiae)了吗?因为,从尼西亚信经和阿塔纳修信经来看,子出自父的不只有位格,还包括本质。加尔文“自存性”理论的形成与前文提到的反三一论者密不可分,后者认为子的本质是父产生的,因此,子必然低于父。为了批判反三一论者的“次位论”(subordination)倾向,保障父与子在本质上的平等性,加尔文才日益强调子的自存性,结果却可能陷入有违正统教义中“生与受生”原则的危险。<sup>[3]</sup>在正统与异端之间,加尔文的立场变得微妙而复杂。在《基督教要义》反复修订的漫长历程中,作者有充分的时间和机会进一步明确和完善三一论,但从 1559 年的终极版来看,加尔文似乎无意对自己的学说做实质的调整,反而故意保持这种微妙而复杂的张力,如此便给现代学者的研究造成巨大的困难。

现代学者通常认为,若要理解加尔文三一论,就必须追溯这位改革家所诉诸的教父资源,考察他更依赖拉丁传统还是希腊传统。以 Benjamin. B. Warfield 为代表的学者认为,加尔文主要采纳奥古斯丁的“关系”(relation)进路来界定三个位格之间的区分。<sup>[4]</sup>T. F. Torrance 提供的另一种解释则认为加尔文倚重的主要是阿塔纳修(Athanasius)与卡帕多西亚教父(Cappadocians)的希腊传统,其中纳西昂的格列高利(Gregory Nazianzus)对加尔文的影响尤为重大。Torrance 认为,加尔文用来区分位格的“关系”进路直接来自格列高利而不是奥古斯丁,而且奥古斯丁在该问题上也曾受格列高利影响。<sup>[5]</sup>Warfield、Torrance 等学者的研究让我们看到,声称从圣经出发构建三一论的加尔文不仅不排斥外在于圣经的古代传统,而且非常自觉地吸收东西方教父的思想资源。<sup>[6]</sup>

不过,从《基督教要义》文本来看,加尔文对待教父三一论的态度却并不是特别明确:一方面,他援引众多前后尼西亚的教父著作,除了奥古斯丁、卡帕多西亚教父和阿塔纳修,还有德尔图良、希拉利(Hilary)、克里索斯托(Chrysostom),等等;另一方面,加尔文却没有明确告诉我们他是用哪位教父的思想来理解三位一体的,且他对这些教父的引用并不等于毫无保留的赞同,而是时常伴随或多或少的批评。比如,加尔文在讨论三一术语的必要性时指出,“我注意到,古代神学家虽然谈论这些问题时非常敬畏,他们的观点却彼此矛盾,甚至时常自相矛盾。希拉利(Hilary)为大公会议所用的程式辩护,那都是什么程式啊?奥古斯丁的解释有时多随意啊?希腊教父与拉丁教父的差别多大啊?”<sup>[7]</sup>

所以,勾勒加尔文三一论背后的教父谱系或许只是第一步,更重要的是进而理解他的思想本身,

[3] 关于“子的自存性”,参见 Ellis, Calvin, Classical Trinitarianism, and the Aseity of the Son.

[4] Benjamin B. Warfield, “Calvin’s Doctrine of the Trinity”, in Samuel G. Craig ed., Calvin and Augustine, (Philadelphia: Presbyterian & Reformed Publishing, 1956), 189-284.

[5] T. F. Torrance, “Calvin’s Doctrine of the Trinity”, Calvin Theological Journal 25/2 (1990), 165-193, esp. 49-50, 58; “The Doctrine of the Holy Trinity in Gregory Nazianzen and John Calvin”, Sobornost 12/1 (1990), 7-24.

[6] 关于晚近学者对 Warfield 与 Torrance 的矫正,参见 John T. Slotemaker, “John Calvin’s Trinitarian Theology In The 1536 Institutes: The Distinction Of Persons As A Key To His Theological Sources”, in Philosophy and Theology in the Long Middle Ages, Kent Emery, Russell Friedman and Andreas Speer eds., (Brill, 2010), 781-810. 关于加尔文三一论,进一步参见以下研究: Wilhelm Niesel, The Theology of Calvin, tr. by Harold Knight, (Cambridge: James Clarke & Co., 2002), 54-60; Helm, John Calvin’s Ideas, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 35-57. 在汉语文献方面,可参见林鸿信 Lin Hongxin:《加尔文神学》Jiaerwen shenxue [Calvin’s Theology], (台北 Taipei: 校园书房出版社 Xiaoyuanshufang chubanshe [Campus Evangelical Fellowship Press], 2011), 63-97.

[7] Calvin, Institutio Christianae religionis, 1. 13. 5. 除特殊说明外,本文对《基督教要义》的引用均出自 1559 年版,译文为笔者从拉丁文自行翻译。

即,从这位改革家自身的问题意识出发揭示其三一论的特质,及其与加尔文整个学说之间的关联。不是说教父资源对加尔文不重要,而是说在研究加尔文三一论与教父传统的关系时,我们应该把重心放在考察加尔文如何利用教父传统服务于自身的神学构架。我们注意到,正是为了矫正此前进路的偏颇,晚近西方学者逐渐开始将研究重心放在全面探究加尔文自身的学说上面,比如,Philip Walker Butin 从神人关系和经世三一入手对加尔文的研究,以及荷兰学者 Arie Baars 对加尔文三一论所作的细致梳理。<sup>[8]</sup>

本文旨在围绕 1559 年版《基督教要义》第 1 卷第 13 章及其他相关文本,结合教父传统分析加尔文三一论的基本思路及其思想关切,以便准确、深入地呈现这位改革家自身的理论及其特色。在下面的讨论中,我们将重点探究两个问题,一是加尔文对位格所作的界定及其哲学基础,二是加尔文三一学说背后的经世逻辑。笔者认为,在界定位格及其差异时,加尔文更多借用了希腊教父传统中的“自存体”与“特性”(而非“关系”)概念,而其三一论中的“经世”面向则主要来自德尔图良。在现有的加尔文研究中,德尔图良始终没有得到足够充分的重视,这既导致我们无法全面把握加尔文与古代三一论之间的关联,(更重要的是)又导致我们错失了加尔文三一论背后的“秩序”(ordo)关切。我们认为,加尔文试图重构一套不同于天主教和中世纪世界的现代“秩序”,<sup>[9]</sup>这一秩序在很大程度上奠基于三位一体的内在秩序。

## 二、位格:加尔文与希腊传统

1559 年版《基督教要义》第 1 卷第 13 章是加尔文三一论的核心文本,也是他一生思考的总结。第 13 章在整体上隶属于第一卷“认识造物主”的大主题,而从分析进路来看,这一章与前后几章一样,均旨在探讨“圣经”关于上帝所给出的启示。第 13 章的标题说得很清楚:“圣经自创世本身以来就教导,上帝有一个本质,却在自身中包含三个位格(unicam Dei essentiam... quae tres in se personas continet)”。从具体内容来看,我们可以将这一章的结构划分为四部分:一,古代三一论术语及其适用性(1. 13. 1-6);二,圣子和圣灵的神性及其证明(1. 13. 7-15);三,三个位格的区分与合一(1. 13. 16-20);四,对异端的反驳,尤其是塞尔维特与意大利反三一论者(1. 13. 21-29)。在笔者看来,第一、三部分是整个第 13 章的关键,加尔文在此给出了其三一论中最重要的观点。

众所周知,三一论通常包含两个方面的问题,一是上帝的“合一”,二是位格的“区分”。表面上,加尔文坚持正统的三位一体教义,认为上帝是独一的,同时拥有三个位格。正因此,他才会不遗余力地既批判古代异端,比如阿里乌派的“次位论”和撒伯里乌派(Sabellius)的“形态论”,又批判当时的塞尔维特和意大利反三一论者。不过,关键不在于加尔文是否坚持三一教义,而在于他如何理解父、子、灵的合一与区分。

首先需要注意的是,在三一术语的使用上,加尔文倾向于将希腊传统和拉丁传统结合在一起。我们知道,以卡帕多西亚教父为代表的希腊传统将三位一体表述为 *mia ousia, treis hypostases*,而以奥古斯丁为代表的拉丁传统则表述为 *una substantia/essentia, tres personas*。加尔文认为希腊表述中的 *ousia* 与 *hypostasis* 分别相当于拉丁表述中的 *substantia* 与 *persona*,同时将 *ousia* 与 *substantia* 理

[8] Philip Walker Butin, *Revelation, Redemption, and Response: Calvin's Trinitarian Understanding of the Divine-Human Relationship*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); Arie Baars, *Om Gods verhevenheid en Zijn nabijheid. De Drie-eenheid bij Calvijn*, (Kampen: Kok, 2004).

[9] 关于这一问题的专门讨论,参见孙帅 Sun Shuai,《治理秩序:加尔文神思想初探》*Zhilizhixu: Jiaerwen shenxue sixiang chutan* [Governmental Order: Providence in John Calvin],《比较经学》*Bijiao Jingxue* [Journal of Comparative Scripture] No. 1, (2016), 177-204.

解为“本质”(essentia),将 hypostasis 与 persona 理解为“位格”。<sup>[10]</sup> 由此看来,加尔文有意综合希腊和拉丁两个传统的三一论表述。不过,他具体是如何理解三位一体的“合一”与“区分”的呢?

有趣的是,加尔文对上帝的“合一”似乎不怎么感兴趣,他真正关心的毋宁说是位格的区分。经过一番关于三一论术语的检讨之后,加尔文终于在《基督教要义》1. 13. 6 从正面给出了自己的理解,其中的关键恰恰落脚在三个位格的区分上面。加尔文写道,

因此,我将位格称为上帝本质中的自存体(personam igitur voco subsistentia in Dei essentia)。虽然每个位格都与其他两个位格相互关联,但却由于无法传达的特性(proprietate incommunicabili)而区别开来。我们用“自存体”一词指不同于本质的某种东西。因为如果言纯粹是上帝,没有任何特性,那么,约翰说言与上帝同在就是错误的,但当他紧接着说言是上帝本身时,就是提醒我们上帝本质的合一。如果不住在父里,言就无法与上帝同在,“自存体”就是这样产生的。虽然自存体与本质通过纽带结合在一起,毫不分离,自存体却仍有某种特征使之与本质区分开来(specialem tamen habet notam qua ab ipsa differat)。三个自存体彼此相关(ad alias relatam),同时因各自的特性而区别开来。“关系”(relatio)在此得到清晰的表达:当我们简单地提到“上帝”时,这一名称同时包括子、灵和父。其次,每当父与子相比时,二者就因各自的特性彼此区别开来。再者,我认为,每个位格的特性都是不可共享的,因为那属于父并使他被区别出来的特征,不可能传递给子。<sup>[11]</sup>

这段话是加尔文就“位格”所作的标准界定,其中涉及四个核心概念,即,本质(essentia)、自存体(subsistentia)、特性(proprietas)与关系(relatio)。加尔文首先明确从“自存体”出发理解“位格”,将父、子、灵三个位格界定为三个自存体。“自存体”是与“本质”相对的概念:一方面,自存体无法脱离本质,因为自存体是共同本质的体现或个体化,但另一方面,自存体又不同于本质,因为每个自存体都拥有无法共享和传递的“特性”。正因此,加尔文在 1. 13. 19 说,“(上帝的)整个本性应该被理解为存在于每个位格中,只是每个位格都有自身的特性”。<sup>[12]</sup> 自存体由于自身独特的特征而是自存体。本质是三个位格共有的东西,自存体却是个别的,因为自存体之为自存体是由自身的特性规定的;特性不仅使自存体与本质区别开来,更使拥有共同本质的父、子、灵彼此区别开来。由此出发,加尔文进而将三位一体内部的“关系”与“特性”联系起来,正如上面这段话所言,他认为“关系”表示父与子“因他们各自不同的特性”而区别开来。

把握加尔文“位格”思想的关键,首先在于从教父传统出发为其找到准确的定位,确定加尔文的观点是拉丁式的还是希腊式的。从上面这段话来看,其中提到的“关系”概念可谓是加尔文与拉丁传统之间最明显的关联,因为自从奥古斯丁用“关系”来界定位格的区分以来,这一概念便成为拉丁三一论最重要的特色之一。不过笔者认为,奥古斯丁意义上的“关系”对加尔文来说并不那么重要。首先,加尔文位格定义的核心概念是“自存体”和“特性”而非“关系”,后者只是他用解释位格定义(位格即自存体)时提到的附属概念。其次,更重要的是,加尔文对“关系”的理解与奥古斯丁并不完全相同。根据奥古斯丁《论三位一体》中的经典理论,<sup>[13]</sup>当上帝就自身而言(ad se)被称呼时,说的是实体或本质,比

[10] Calvin, *Institutio Christianae religionis*, 1. 13. 5.

[11] Calvin, *Institutio Christianae religionis*, 1. 13. 6.

[12] Calvin, *Institutio Christianae religionis*, 1. 13. 19.

[13] 参见奥古斯丁 Augustine, 《论三位一体》Lun Sanweiyiti [On Trinity], Book 5-7, 周伟驰 Zhou Weichi 译, (上海 Shanghai: 上海世纪出版集团 Shanghai shiji chubanshituan [Shanghai Century Publishing co., Ltd], 2005).



如,上帝被称为永恒的。当某个位格就他者而言(ad aliquid)被称呼时,说的则是“关系”,比如,父被称为“非受生的”是相对“受生的”子来说的,反之亦然。奥古斯丁认为,无论父、子、灵,还是“生”、“受生”与“发出”,都是关系谓词,亦即都是相对他者而言的。“关系”一定是相互的,父相对于子是父,必然同时意味着子相对父是子,反之亦然;换言之,父或子,都不是就自身(实体)而言的。在一定意义上,我们可以说父是父之为父的“特性”(虽然奥古斯丁很少用“特性”概念),但这一“特性”首先必须奠基于父与子之间的相互“关系”,因为抛开“关系”不可能有位格的“特性”。换言之,在奥古斯丁那里,“关系”在位格的区分中是首要的,而在加尔文这里,“自存体”及其“特性”才是首要的。就此来看,奥古斯丁以降的拉丁传统并非加尔文“位格”定义诉诸的主要资源。

我们认为,相比拉丁传统,加尔文界定“位格”时主要依据的是希腊传统。如何理解位格的区分是东西方三一论最大的差异之一,如果说以奥古斯丁为代表的拉丁教父主要从“关系”出发区分位格,希腊传统则主要从自存体的“特性”出发区分位格——这正是加尔文“位格”定义的关键所在。根据东方教父的三一范式,“实体”指父、子、灵共有的同一本质,“位格”则侧重指父、子、灵各自的特性;正是不可变、不可传递的特性,使父、子、灵彼此区分开来,成为各不相同的三位。三者最根本的差异在于:父是非受生的,子是受生的,灵是发出的。正如大马士革的约翰(John of Damascus)所言,子与灵的存在都来自父,父所拥有的他们也都拥有,

但非受生、受生与发出除外,因为只有通过这些位格的特性,三位一体的三个神圣位格彼此才能区分开来;以不可分的方式将他们区分开的,不是本质,而是每个位格各自的特性。<sup>[14]</sup>

对奥古斯丁而言,“非受生”与“受生”首先表示父与子彼此相对称呼的“关系”,但对大马士革的约翰身后的希腊传统而言,则首先表示父与子各自的特性。看到这一点,我们便能理解加尔文为什么要将“位格”定义为 *substantia*(自存体)。

在拉丁文中,希腊三一范式中的 *hypostasis* 有两个翻译,一是 *substantia*,一是 *subsistentia*(自存体)。在 *substantia*(实体)意义上, *ousia* 与 *hypostasia* 的意思几乎相同,但希腊人显然并非在相同意义上使用两个词,根据他们的理解, *hypostasis* 直译成拉丁词 *subsistentia* 显然更为合适。 *subsistentia* 来自动词 *subsistere*, 字面含义为“站在下面”,进一步引申为“自身持存的东西”,强调存在的现实性和个体性。准确地说,作为与 *ousia/substantia* 相对的概念, *subsistentia* 指的是那些具有不可共享和传递之特性的、自身持存的个体。当希腊教父将 *essentia* 与 *subsistentia* 放在一起使用时,前者强调普遍本质,后者强调与本质相对的个体性。正因此,大马士革的约翰才会认为, *hypostasis* “指的是依靠自身、持存在自身中的存在;在这个意义上,位格指的是个体,即在数量上区别于他者的东西,比如彼得、保罗、某匹特定的马”。<sup>[15]</sup> 彼得与保罗都是人,拥有作为共同“本质”的人性,但使他们成为两个个体的东西不是本质,而是 *hypostasis*。同理,父、子、灵被称为三个“位格”,也是要突出他们作为自存体相对于共同本质的个体性。

根据加尔文的分析,位格的区分被进一步归结为每个位格自身的 *proprietas*(特性)。<sup>[16]</sup> 本质是三个位格共同拥有的东西,特性则是每个自存体独有的,不能变更和替代的东西;也就是说,本质与自存体之间是普遍性与特性的关系,本质是三个位格的同一性,特性则是三个位格的差异性。只有从同

[14] John of Damascus, *Expositio accurata fidei orthodoxae*, PG 94, 824B.

[15] John of Damascus, *Dialectica*, PG 94, 612A-B.

[16] *poprietas* 是希腊三一论概念 *τὸ ὄντως* 在拉丁文中的翻译。

一性与差异性出发,我们才能真正理解加尔文神学的基本原则——“区分但不分离”(distinctio sed non separatio)——在三一论中的运用。加尔文写道,“我们并没有将位格与本质分开,而是将位格区分(distinctionem)开来,尽管他们处在本质之中。如果位格真与本质分离……就成了三个上帝,而不是一个上帝之中包含三个位格”。<sup>[17]</sup>与此类似,加尔文在另一个段落中说,不能认为父、子、灵是空洞的称呼,因为他们揭示了“真正的区分”(veram... distinctionem),亦即,“区分但不分裂”(distinctionem non divisionem):“前述引文表明子有不同于父的特性,因为,除非子不同于父,否则言就不会与父同在,而且除非不同于父,否则他就不会与父共荣耀”。<sup>[18]</sup>因此,具体到三位一体问题,“区分但不分离”无非是指三个位格各自拥有不可传递的特性,同时却由于共有同一个本质而不可分离。

总之,笔者认为,加尔文三一论,尤其是对位格的界定,所诉诸的教父资源首先来自希腊传统,但这并不像 Torrance 所认为的那样,是由于他深受纳西昂的格列高利“关系”进路的影响,相反,上文的讨论充分表明“关系”范畴并非加尔文三一论的核心。为了区分三个位格,加尔文依据的主要概念是希腊传统中的“自存体”和“特性”。不过,希腊三一范式虽然可以帮助加尔文界定位格的区分,却无法全面呈现父、子、灵之间的关系,而正是为了解决这个问题,他才进一步发展出了经世三一的相关思想。

### 三、经世:加尔文与德尔图良

在梳理三一论的概念争论后,加尔文紧接着提到了德尔图良《驳帕克西亚》(Adversus Praxeam)中的一个定义:“只要我们正确地理解,我并不反对德尔图良的定义:在上帝里面有某种配置或经世,丝毫不改变本质的合一(esse quandam in Deo dispositionem vel oeconomiam quae de essentiae unitate nihil mutetur)。”<sup>[19]</sup>随后,当看到反三一论的异端同样诉诸德尔图良的权威时,加尔文再次引用《驳帕克西亚》中的观点,在证明德尔图良坚持三一论的基础上,进一步将后者的经世三一放进自身的神学框架。这两次引用对加尔文三一论具有非常重要的意义,为了理解这一点,我们有必要先来考察一下德尔图良的相关思想。

《驳帕克西亚》是基督教神学史上第一部较为系统的三一论著作,德尔图良写作这本书的目的是为了驳斥一位一体论者帕克西安(Praxeas)。根据“一位一体论”,只有一个上帝,且上帝只有一个位格。来自小亚细亚的帕克西安是一位一体论的最初倡导者,他的思想通常被进一步总结为“形态论”(Modalism)<sup>[20]</sup>和“圣父受难说”(Patripassianism)。具体言之,帕克西安为了维护一神论而走向否定三位一体的极端,认为上帝是独一的,上帝就是父;在这个意义上,上帝只有一位而非三位,因为子或灵与父之间并无内在区分,而只有外在区分。所谓“外在区分”,是指父在时间中以三种不同的历史形态向世界和人显现,当他创造世界的时候显现为造物主,当他拯救人的时候显现为救主即子,当他施加恩典使人圣化的时候显现为灵。换言之,根本不存在不同于父的子和灵,子和灵只是父的两种显现形态,本质上就是父,正因此,当子在十字架上受难的时候,父也在受难。

为了批判帕克西安,德尔图良引进一个对后世三一论具有深远影响的概念,即“经世”(oeconomia)。与一位一体异端一样,德尔图良也承认只存在一个真正的上帝,但他认为同时必须相

[17] Calvin, *Institutio Christianae religionis*, 1. 13. 25.

[18] Calvin, *Institutio Christianae religionis*, 1. 13. 17.

[19] Calvin, *Institutio Christianae religionis*, 1. 13. 6.

[20] “形态的一位一体论”在东方被称为撒伯里主义(Sabellianism),这也是加尔文反复批判的异端。



信这“一个”上帝拥有自身的“经世”(cum sua oeconomia esse credendum)。一位一体论之所以不承认三位一体,是因为他们担心三个位格在“数量上的经世和配置”(oeconomiam numerum et dispositionem)会分裂神性的合一,从而导致出现三个上帝,但在德尔图良看来,“从自身产生出三位一体的合一,没有被三位一体破坏,反而被它所掌管”(unitas ex semetipsa derivans trinitatem non destruat ab illa sed administratur)。<sup>[21]</sup> 德尔图良试图将对“合一”的理解建立在经世的分配之上,以便表明三位一体的“一”与“三”不但不矛盾,反而相辅相成。用他自己的话说,我们确实应该相信只有“一个上帝”,但也应该相信这同一个上帝“处于我们称为‘经世’的分配之中”(sub hac tamen dispensatione, quam ο οικονομία dicimus)。<sup>[22]</sup>

在德尔图良看来,他的对手主张独一上帝的统治,即“主制”(μοναρχία,亦可译为“帝制”),但拒绝理解这种统治的展开形式,即“经世”(ο οικονομία)。所谓“经世”,就是上帝在统治世界时进行的“分配”或“配置”。从创造和救赎的历史来看,“经世”指的是子和灵被父所差遣:首先,子从父生出,藉以创造万物,并生于童贞女,然后经历受难、死亡、复活、升天,直至将来再次降临以审判众人;其次,子根据他的应许,从父那里将作为保惠师的圣灵差遣下来,成为信仰三位一体之人的圣化者。简单地说,历史的经世是神意在时间中的展开,不过,这并非德尔图良三一论的核心所在,因为他关心的首先或主要不是创造和拯救的外在经世,而是上帝自身的内在经世,即,上帝三个位格中配置的内在结构。<sup>[23]</sup> 在此意义上,三位一体的“三”主要不是指上帝在历史中展开的行为,而是指三位一体上帝本身的经世结构。用德尔图良自己的话说,

经世的奥秘通过安排“三”的秩序,即父、子、灵,将“合一”配置进三位一体,但在保障经世奥秘的同时,“三”指的不是状态而是等级,不是实体而是形式,不是能力而是表现(tres autem non statu sed gradu, nec substantia sed forma, nec potestate sed specie);相反,上帝是一个实体、一个状态、一个能力,因为他是一个上帝,而从上帝那里,我们可以在父、子、灵的名称之下认出这些等级、形式和表现。<sup>[24]</sup>

这段话非常清楚地表明,德尔图良理解的“位格之三”既不同于希腊教父所讲的“自存体或特性之三”,也不同于奥古斯丁所说的“关系之三”,因为在德尔图良这里,位格的区分意味着上帝自身的内在秩序。这种秩序化的“三”便是经世意义上的“三”,德尔图良将其理解为三个位格之间的“分配”或“配置”。上帝需要将其实体性的“合一”配置成“三”的经世秩序。这不是说,上帝本身的状态(status)、<sup>[25]</sup> 实体或能力有任何不同,而是说,上帝的同一个状态需要展开在不同的等级中,同一个实体需要展开在不同的形式中,同一个能力需要展开在不同的表现中。上面这段话提到了德尔图良经世三一的几个核心概念,其中 gradus 侧重指三个位格之间的等级性和秩序性,而 forma 与 species 则侧重指神性通过三个位格启示出的不同形式或样态。

为了驳斥一位一体论,德尔图良三一论重在基于内在经世建构三个位格之间的秩序,而不是在哲学上论证上帝本质的合一。问题在于,上帝自我配置的经世秩序到底意味着什么?或者说,因经世需

[21] Tertulian, Adversus Praxeam, 3.

[22] Tertulian, Adversus Praxeam, 2.

[23] 参见 Kevin B. McCrudden, “Monarchy and Economy in Tertullian’s Adversus Praxeam”, *Scottish Journal of Theology* 55 (2002): 325-337.

[24] Tertulian, Adversus Praxeam, 2.

[25] 在德尔图良笔下, status 的意思接近“本性”,同时包含“地位”的含义。Jean Daniélou, *The Origins of Latin Christianity*, tr. by David Smith and John Austin Baker, (London: Westminster Press, 1977), 352-356.

要而出现的不同“等级”、“形式”或“表现”之间是什么关系?若要澄清这一点,我们需要进一步分析德尔图良对“主制”(μοναρχία)问题的理解。关于这一点,他写道,

我知道,主制(monarchiam)无非是指单独的统治(singulare et unicum imperium),但不能因为是独一者的统治,就规定统治者不能有子,或不能使自己成为自己的子,或不能通过他所意愿的人掌管自己的主制。相反,我要说,没有什么支配(dominationem)只是独一者自己的,只是单个人的,只是君主的,而不通过最亲近的他人(personas),即提供给他的那些官员来管理(administretur)。如果掌管主制者有一子,主制并非立刻被分裂,如果被子所分享,主制并非不再是主制;相反,它在本原(principaliter)上同样是那与子共享者的,由二者一同掌握的统治是他的,也是主制。<sup>[26]</sup>

德尔图良认为,主制的神圣统治与三位一体并不矛盾,其原因在于,虽然“主制”在定义上是指独一者的统治,但君主(上帝或帝王)的统治不一定仅仅由他一个来实施,而必然借助“官员”或“使者”来管理;作为管理者的“官员”具体实施独一者的统治,从而可以说是主制的分享者。因此,三个位格的经世和配置意味着,上帝的独一统治不是通过一个位格来完成的,而是展现为一种具体的管理秩序。就此而言,子和灵都是父(君主)的管理者,正如天使也是父的管理者一样。“神圣的主制并不因为由千千万万的天使管理(administratur)……而不再是独一者的统治,并不因为由众多的力量实施而停止是主制”;同样,我们也“不能认为上帝在处于第二、三位的子与灵中发生了分裂与分散”。<sup>[27]</sup>从“管理”角度来说,经世秩序并未破坏上帝的主制,反而在根本上保障了这种独一者统治得以展开的可能性。没有统治,管理就没有权威和根据;没有管理,统治就无法实施。

不过我们同时看到,在统治与管理经世秩序中,父的地位明显高于子和灵,因为父是独一的统治者,子和灵是具体的管理者、执行者,或(最多可以说)统治权的分享者,他们的管理来自“父权”进行的经世安排。正因此,德尔图良说,子在地上、父在天上并不是一种“分离”,因为上帝靠他的“力量和权能”无处不在;相反,天上地上的安排是“神圣的配置”(dispositio divina),这种配置的根据源于父的意志,因为“在经世中,父愿意子在地上,自己在天上”(tamen in ipsa oeconomia pater voluit filium in terris haberi, se vero in caelis)。<sup>[28]</sup>父与子在经世秩序中的统治与管理关系,仅仅是二者不平等地位的具体表现,因为在德尔图良这里,父始终是不可见的,子始终是可见的,后者以可见的方式启示不可见的前者。在经世中,不可见的是父的统治,可见的是子的管理。

我们认为,德尔图良的经世三一深刻影响到了加尔文对三位一体的理解,下面这个段落对《驳帕克西安》的援引与辩护就是最直接的证据:

上帝确实是一,但他的言因分配或经世(dispensatione tamen vel oeconomia)而存在。就实体的合一来说,上帝是一,但合一通过分配的奥秘被配置在三位一体之中。三不是状态,而是等级,不是实体,而是形式,不是权能,而是次序。德尔图良说他为子次于父辩护,但他仅仅是在区分(distinctione)的意义上理解的……因此君主制并未被位格的区分所破坏……但他的确将圣言和圣灵称为整体的部分,该说法

[26] Tertulian, Adversus Praxeam, 3.

[27] Tertulian, Adversus Praxeam, 3.

[28] Tertulian, Adversus Praxeam, 23.

很勉强,但有情可原,因为这关涉的不是实体,而仅仅是指只与位格相关的配置与经世。<sup>[29]</sup>

三位一体的内在结构是神圣配置的结果,是因经世需要而安排的等级、形式和次序。对经世而言,三位一体的秩序安排是必然的。如果没有父、子和灵之间的区分,上帝的合一与主制就无法展开成为三个位格的内在秩序,所以,统治世界的上帝必然先行将自身配置为一种管理秩序,子和灵好比是执行父之意志的两位使者。正因此,加尔文说,救主基督的功德(meritum)并非源于他自身,而“要追溯到上帝的秩序化安排,即第一因”(Dei ordinationem, quae prima causa est)。<sup>[30]</sup>

进一步研究不难发现,加尔文将希腊三一模式与德尔图良的经世学说结合在了一起。前文指出,位格被加尔文界定为上帝本质中的自存体,三个自存体的区分在于每一个都拥有各自不可传递的特性。从经世和配置来看,自存体的“特性”与三位一体的“内在秩序”密不可分,因为位格的“特性”本身就蕴含内在的三一秩序:

因为位格里的特性自身带有某种秩序(ordinem),比如,本原与起源(principium et origo)在父里面,所以当同时提到父和子或灵时,上帝之名就特指父。这样,本质的合一就得到了保持,秩序的安排就得到了维护,但并未减少子与灵的神性。<sup>[31]</sup>

加尔文在此将父的“特性”理解为“本原”或“起源”(而不是通常所说的“非受生”),也就是说,父是子与灵由之而来的源头,但作为起源的父自身则没有任何起源。“本原或起源”便是父在内在经世秩序中的地位。当父相对于子和灵被称为上帝的时候,指的正是他的本原性,而非三位一体的本质性或实体性。换句话说,父在三位一体中的本原性,主要不是指子和灵的本质来自父,而是指他们在经世秩序的意义上来自父。所以,当从位格的关系出发称父为上帝时,目的在于强调他是“神性的本原”(deitatis est principium),但“不是由于本质……而是由于秩序”(non essentiando... sed ratione ordinis)。<sup>[32]</sup> 只有从内在的经世秩序出发将父理解为本原或起源,加尔文才能真正澄清父与子的区分。他在另一个段落中告诉我们,

父在秩序上是最初的,他的智慧生于他,正如上文所言,他应该被认为是整个神性的本原和源头。因此,上帝在不加限定的意义上是非受生的,父则在位格方面是非受生的……因此我们说,在绝对意义上神性的存在是自存的(deitatem ergo absolute ex se ipsa esse dicimus)。这样一来我们说,就其是上帝而言,子的存在是自存的,但在位格方面并非如此。就子是子而言,我们说他的存在出于父。因此,子的本质缺乏起源,其位格的起源则是上帝自己。<sup>[33]</sup>

上帝本身和父都是非受生的,因为他们的存在都是自存的(ex se ipsa),因而非受生的,虽然上帝非受生说的是三位一体的本质,父非受生说的是父的自存体或位格。在非受生和“自存”意义上,父依然是最能体现上帝之特点的位格。不过,我们应该如何理解父在加尔文笔下的本原性地位呢?如

[29] Calvin, *Institutio Christianae religionis*, 1. 13. 28.

[30] Calvin, *Institutio Christianae religionis*, 2. 17. 1.

[31] Calvin, *Institutio Christianae religionis*, 1. 13. 20.

[32] Calvin, *Institutio Christianae religionis*, 1. 13. 26.

[33] Calvin, *Institutio Christianae religionis*, 1. 13. 25.

果说, 加尔文从德尔图良的经世三一与“主制”观念出发, 将父与子(或灵)的地位分别理解为“统治”与“管理”, 那么, 他又如何在“本原”与“秩序”的关系中界定位格之间的区分呢?

加尔文分析指出, 三位一体本身遵循着某种“秩序”(ordinis observatio): “父被视为最初的(primus), 然后子出于他, 最后灵出于父和子。因为每个人的心灵都自然倾向于先想到上帝, 然后想到从上帝而来的智慧, 最后想到上帝用来执行其计划的旨意的力量。正因此, 我们说子只来自父, 而灵则同时来自父与子。”<sup>[34]</sup>表面上, 加尔文这里说的无非是正统三一论的基本常识, 即子生/发自父、灵发自父和子, 但他其实故意避免直接使用这些概念,<sup>[35]</sup>因为, 父、子、灵构成的“三一秩序”并非简单的“生”或“发”的关系, 而是神圣“行为”的内在机制, 只有在这个意义上, 我们才能理解加尔文为什么会选择将子说成由父而来的“智慧”, 将灵说成执行旨意的“力量”。

如此, 父、子、灵便分别对应“本原”、“智慧”与“力量”: “归给父的, 是行为的本原(principium agendi)、万事的起源和源头; 归给子的, 是智慧、计划, 以及行事时的分配本身(ipsaque in rebus agendis dispensatio); 而归给灵的, 则是行为的权能和效力(virtus efficacia... actionis)。”<sup>[36]</sup>这句话从 1536 版开始就出现在《基督教要义》中,<sup>[37]</sup>由此可知从“行为”(ago/actio)出发所作的位格区分对加尔文三一论来说是何等重要。我们看到, 加尔文在此颇具创造性地从神圣行为的内在结构, 即行为的根据、内容与效能, 来界定三个位格之间的区分, 这种区分向我们揭示出了三一上帝的内在秩序。之所以将其称为“内在秩序”而不是通常所说的“经世三一”, 是由于这里的位格区分所根据的, 不是父、子、灵在具体的救赎历史中担任的不同职能; 相反, 上帝从创世到救赎的每个行为, 都内在地蕴含这样的三一秩序, 都需要父的本原、子的计划和灵的力量。之所以将其称为“内在秩序”而不是“内在三一”, 则是由于这里的位格区分强调的主要不是上帝的存在或属性, 而是三个位格本身所展现的行为秩序, 或者说, 是作为外在经世之根据的内在经世。

加尔文之所以强调三位一体内在的行为秩序, 与其对整个世界秩序的重新理解密不可分。关于加尔文对世界秩序的理解, 笔者曾专门撰文分析,<sup>[38]</sup>这里不拟赘述, 仅仅简单概括一下文中的基本观点: 加尔文笔下的世界秩序已经主要不再是“存在秩序”或“存在巨链”(Great Chain of Being), 不再是高低不等的存在者基于充实性、连续性和充足理由律组成的自然序列,<sup>[39]</sup>而是成了一种统摄整个宇宙的“治理秩序”, 即, 成了上帝藉由意志和权力对万物所作的安排、分配、管理与配置。正因此, 加尔文才会在《基督教要义》中突出“神意”(providentia)和“秩序”(ordo)问题的重要性, 才会强调上帝对世界的“照看”、“管理”和“治理”(gubernatio)。

联系加尔文对“治理秩序”的构建, 我们便能理解他为什么如此重视德尔图良的“经世”思想, 又为

[34] Institutio Christianae religionis, 1. 13. 18.

[35] Arie Baars, “The Trinity”, tr. by Henry J. Baron et al., in Herman J. Selderhuis ed., The Calvin Handbook, (Michigan: Eerdmans, 2009), 245-256.

[36] Institutio Christianae religionis, 1. 13. 18. Torrance 认为, 加尔文在这个问题上可能受到了大巴西尔的影响, 参见 Torrance, “Calvin’s Doctrine of the Trinity”, p. 56.

[37] 加尔文 Calvin:《虔敬生活原理》Qianjing shenghuo yuanli(《基督教要义》1536 年版 Jidujiao yaoyi)[Institute of the Christian Religion, 1536 Edition], 2. 1. 9, 王志勇 Wang Zhiyong 译, (北京 Beijing: 三联书店 Sanlian shudian [SDX Joint Publishing Company], 2012, 53. 笔者在别处简短地讨论过这句话的含义, 及其与加尔文整体思想之间的关联, 这里不再重复, 可参见孙帅 Sun Shuai, 《治理秩序: 加尔文神意思想初探》Zhilizhixu: Jiaerwen shenxue sixiang chutan [Governmental Order: Providence in John Calvin], 《比较经学》Bijiao Jingxue [Journal of Comparative Scripture] No. 1, (2016), 190-191.

[38] 孙帅 Sun Shuai, “治理秩序: 加尔文神意思想初探” Zhilizhixu: Jiaerwen shenxue sixiang chutan [Governmental Order: Providence in John Calvin].

[39] 诺夫乔伊 Lovejoy: 《存在巨链: 对一个观念的历史的研究》Cunzai julian: dui yige guannian de lishi de yanjiu [The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea], 张传友 Zhang Chuanyou、高秉江 Gao Bingjiang 译, (南昌 Nanchang: 江西教育出版社 Jiangxi Jiaoyu Chubanshe [Jiangxi Education Publishing House], 2002.

什么进一步将父、子、灵三个位格的区分诠释为一种“内在秩序”。上述引文提到的“行为”显然侧重指神意对世界的照看和治理。作为世界的管理者，上帝不仅在治理世界的时候将“秩序”赋予万事万物，而且，他作为三位一体本身就包含与外在治理秩序相应的“内在秩序”。上帝对整个世界的保存和管理无疑奠基于三位一体内部的经世秩序，离开了作为本原和起源的父，作为智慧、计划和分配的子，以及作为权能和效力的灵，上帝的“行为”就无法展开，神意的经世及其对世界的照看也就变得不再可能。只有首先将三一理解为与经世相关的内在秩序，加尔文才能在解构“存在秩序”的基础上重构现代世界的新秩序。

#### 四、结语

综上所述，如果说“自存体”和“特性”是加尔文三一论的起点，“经世”和“秩序”则是加尔文三一论的终点和目的。关于第一个方面，本文考察了加尔文和希腊传统之间的关联。我们认为，加尔文所受希腊教父的影响，并非像 Torrance 所认为的那样主要来自纳西昂的格列高利的“关系”学说，因为，加尔文用来区分位格的核心概念是“自存体”和“特性”，而非“关系”。如果说“关系”倾向于指位格相对彼此的称呼，“自存体”及其“特性”则是本质在位格中的个体化。关于第二个方面，我们主要讨论了加尔文对德尔图良经世学说的接受和发展。我们看到，加尔文将德尔图良《驳帕克西亚》中的“经世”观念引入自身的三一论，位格的区分由此被放到更大的经世或治理秩序之中。如果说加尔文从自存体和特性角度对位格的界定是静态的，那么，他从经世角度对位格的界定则是动态的。只有澄清上帝“行为”背后的内在逻辑，我们才能真正看到加尔文三一论的实质及其创造性，并进而看到他如何用三位一体的经世秩序为现代世界的新秩序重新奠基。



**English Title:**

## **Calvin's Doctrine of the Trinity and Patristic Tradition**

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**Abstract:** How to understand Calvin's doctrine of the Trinity and its connection with patristic tradition is a matter of academic debate. The purpose of this article is to explore the distinction of the three persons and the economic Trinity in Calvin, and then to accurately present his creative ideas regarding the issue of the Trinity. The author argues that the core concept Calvin uses to distinguish the three persons is not "relatio" as scholars usually believe, but "subsistentia" and "proprietas", which are from the Greek tradition. Secondly, Calvin introduces Tertullian's conception of oeconomia into his doctrine of the Trinity so that the distinction of persons is interpreted as a Trinitarian immanent order, and is placed within the grand perspective of providential oeconomia. Thus, the importance of oeconomia is inseparable from Calvin's re-understanding of the world order.

**Key Words:** Calvin; Trinity; Church Fathers; Tertullian; oeconomia



书评与通讯

Reviews and Academic Reports



# 新托马斯主义思潮和教会权力话语变动<sup>〔1〕</sup>

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**摘要:**本文将探寻引发和推动“新托马斯主义”这一门宗教哲学诞生及其初期发展外在于纯粹思想义理结构和诠释的因素。对这一系列因素的探讨将从此一思想脉络所植根的天主教会官方权力话语表达入手,旨在从宗教生存社会性角度探寻一条对“宗教哲学”理论进行“宗教生存现象”还原的进路。本文的切入点将定位在从经典托马斯主义到新托马斯主义过渡过程中教会所建构的权威表述的性质转变和彼此间微妙关联。

**关键词:**新托马斯主义;中世纪;罗马天主教;神学;宗教哲学

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新托马斯主义是天主教从19世纪下半期至20世纪上半期重要的思想运动。究其字面含义,所指的自然是中世纪经院哲学家托马斯·阿奎那的神哲学,乃至经院哲学所属的特色思辨论说方法在现代天主教语境中的复兴。这一思潮的成因错综复杂,发展脉络支流众多<sup>〔2〕</sup>,教会思想者与教会外思想者之间的学理互动和“冲突”张力可谓是推动其生成和发展的重要因素。思想概念论述和体系结构明晰化自然是支撑一种思潮得以有效存在的基础,从纯粹学理主义(intellectualism)的角度对这一思想事件进行研究也是常见的进路,可是,一种与宗教实践和实存息息相关的学理,除却纯粹义理解析的部分,是否存在另一个维度的张力在左右和牵引着它呢?宗教哲学是否完全与政治性和社会性的因素毫无关联?对19世纪下半叶已降的新托马斯思潮的整体性研究,也有观点主张应该更为关注纯粹哲学和神学学理<sup>〔3〕</sup>分析和诠释以外的历史生存境遇。代表这一观点的学者忧虑,“我们赋予天

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〔1〕 Paulos Huang,“Dialogue and Critique: The 16<sup>th</sup> Century Religious Reform and Modernity”, International Journal of Sino-Western Studies, vol. 12, 1-12. (<https://www.sinowesternstudies.com/back-issues/vol-12-2017/>)

〔2〕 新托马斯主义并非某个单一的哲学学派或团体,而有着清晰的思想纲领和师承关系,毋宁说,它是一场天主教思想界复兴传统理念和方法的运动,其内部包含了形形色色具有自己独立风格的学派和次运动,席卷欧陆和英美各个哲学流派,其中代表有历史托马斯主义、先验托马斯主义、存在论托马斯主义和分析托马斯主义等。界定托马斯主义者本身也是模棱两可,争议颇多的工作,关于界定托马斯主义者或新托马斯主义者的困难性,参阅:Romanus Cessario, A Short History of Thomism, (Washington, D. C.: Catholic University Press, 2005), 20-22. 关于新托马斯主义在天主教当代神学的独特地位,参阅:Gerhard Müller (Hrsg.), Theologische Realenzyklopädie, Band 33, (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2001), 461-464. 关于新托马斯主义者最为完整、系统和严谨的界定可参阅: Battista Mondin, La metafisica di S. Tommaso d'Aquino e i suoi interpreti, (Azienda: Edizioni Studio Domenicano, 2002).

〔3〕 由于此处论说的对象关涉天主教经院哲学、基础神学和系统神学,其践行者的哲学论述常与神学论述紧密结合,区分的标准意见不一,所以本文常用“神哲学”这一用语,或根据上下文需要用“义理”一词指示。关于这一问题的辨析,请参阅: Anthony Kenny, A New History of Western Philosophy, Volume II: Medieval Philosophy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), XII-XV; John Marendon (ed), Routledge History of Philosophy, Volume III: Medieval Philosophy, (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 2-4; Walter Kasper (Hrsg.), Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche, neuntes Band, (Freiburg im Breisgau: Verlag Herder, 2000), 200-201.

主教的“学理历史”过多的整体性和连贯性,超过其所应当拥有的。”〔4〕这种超越宗教历史性的学理主义文本-解释路径若仅是罗列和铺陈各个思想家的理论和观点,即便将之按时间顺序排列,也无法还原其思想-生存历史全貌。本文旨在尝试把某种“宗教哲学”思想现象解析成宗教现象,探究影响新托马斯主义的学理以外的因素,展现其诞生和初期发展与教会权力话语表达的关系。这样的“话语”建构在宗教和信仰社会实践上,更体现在天主教会权威的政治性指引和导向上。这种宗教威权的“非理论理性”式导引作用对特定宗教哲学学理发展起到了相当微妙的作用,却又无法直接体现在理论结构本身。本文的探讨将分为三个部分,分别从经典托马斯主义和新托马斯主义背后的教会制度化权力表达的性質差异入手,分析其中潜藏的权力转化问题,最后再试图以前文的分析为基础,试图解释新托马斯主义和新经验哲学两重概念趋向同义化背后的因由。

## 一、道明会主导的经典托马斯主义

何为托马斯主义?若仅是托马斯·阿奎那一人的思想尚不足以构成一种“主义”,它需要在历史中形成一种传统,也需要捍卫、解释和发展这一传统的践行者。由此,托马斯主义者的思想并不必然等同于托马斯本人的思想,同一时期的托马斯主义在不同践行者那儿可能会有不同的变体,彼此间也会相互抵触,甚至由此也会产生更多的理论形态。然而,不管其内部理论形态如何多样化,只要这一传统具有历史延续性和连贯性,并且发展的方向没有偏离其经典主轴,则给托马斯思想传统冠以“主义”之名并无不妥。然而,亦有学者,如 G ery Prouvost 质疑托马斯思想传统是否真的具有这种连贯性。他认为,托马斯思想体系的整全性并没有真的延续下去,后世的所谓托马斯主义者通常只是选取其体系中的某些要点进行理论推演,同时又忽略了另外一些要点。此外他还宣称经典托马斯主义在后笛卡尔时代已经被消解,此时的托马斯主义者对其的理论发展已经偏离经院哲学的传统风格〔5〕。依据他的观点,撰写一部连贯的托马斯主义史的工作实质上很不可靠。这样的观点自然没有取得普遍的认同,著名道明会托马斯学者 James A. Weisheipl 则认为托马斯传统即便在中世纪结束后哲学思潮迎来转向而衰落,即便受到人文主义思潮和宗教改革的冲击而在主流思想界被边缘化,在托马斯本人所属的修会一道明会(Ordo Praedicatorum)中,却依然得以代代传承,而所凭借的正是历代道明会修士们对托马斯思想的研究、解释和教育。由此,即便在人文主义兴起后托马斯主义面临低谷,在道明会的学术传统内依旧有着生命力和传统的连贯性〔6〕。

即便上述两种学界代表意见截然对立,我们亦可寻找其中的共通点。第一,托马斯传统自诞生起在历代一直有其维护者和注疏者,分歧仅在于中后期的托马斯思想“维护者”多大程度还在固守着本真的托马斯思想,而非一味追求与同时代哲学思潮的融合而产生学理上的偏离;第二,托马斯思想随着时代精神的转变以及教会对欧洲主流思想掌控力的减弱,在教会外逐渐被边缘化,但在教会内的部分修会中,依然有着生命力和影响力。从中我们可以注意到,托马斯主义经历了哲学精神的转折(学界通常以笛卡尔主体性哲学为界),从哲学思想界的主流现象逐步转成宗教内的思想现象。随着文艺复兴后宗教与世俗领域分离日渐明晰,若托马斯主义在世俗知识界吸引力减弱,则它的持存更需要依托教会内部的制度维护。

〔4〕 Marcia L. Colish, St. Thomas Aquinas in Historical Perspective: The Modern Period, Church History, Vol. 44, No. 4 (1975), 434.

〔5〕 参见: Romanus Cessario, A Short History of Thomism, 11-12.

〔6〕 参见: James A. Weisheipl, The Revival of Thomism: An historical Survey, (Programmata scholarum et status personalis, 1963), p. 11-12.

其中最为典型的的就是托马斯出身的道明会。道明会的总会〔7〕和修会宪章(General Chapters and Constitution of the Order)规定会士和修士需对托马斯思想“忠诚”、“尊崇”以及不可背弃〔8〕。“任何攻击托马斯形象和学理的僧侣都会被剥夺会职和逐出会省……1279年,(道明会)总会要求修士们不可对托马斯和他的著作发表不敬之辞,这一点增加了他们的不满……1280年,总会要求讲师(lectors)和导师(magistri)将他们的辩论课(Disputationes)限制在道德神学上面……在这一点上,总则规定所有的道明会士必须捍卫和推广托马斯的学理。”〔9〕我们虽然无法否定道明会中可能存在不少会士或修士出于真正兴趣和学理认同而推崇和捍卫托马斯的思想,然而修会权威机构基于特定目的并通过制度手段要求教师和学生仅教授和学习托马斯的学理,修士和会士们必须与其思想步伐一致,这一点其实已凌驾于哲学的学理论辩之上从而进入到权力化表达的语境。回溯前文提及的哲学传统延续和连贯之有效性问题,则可发现,道明会虽起到了在低潮期保护和传承托马斯主义的作用,但这样的工作却并非全然建立在学理上的论证和说服,而是要仰赖修会制度和法令的强制性来确保其内部的托马斯思想不会像在世俗学界那而被逐渐边缘,或是因为教廷官方学理取向的变动而在宗教内被压制。然而需要承认的是,不管道明会内部对托马斯的制度性维护多么地严苛,多么地将权力表达凌驾于学理讨论的自由之上,至少这一律令尚未覆盖到整个教会官方层面,最多只是在这一特定修会内才有效。是否加入道明会,天主教信徒亦有选择权,即便不加入也不会影响其宗教信仰的正统性。由此,仅靠道明会内部制度来维系托马斯主义传承的连贯性,并不足以构成某种干预特定哲学义理成型和发展的泛宗教政治话语表达。但是,它却为日后教廷在19世纪末基于反现代主义需要,通过制度性举措复兴托马斯主义提供了范本,简言之,通过泛宗教权力话语塑造“托马斯主义”的做法,可谓是始于道明会的举措。为了更好地理解这一举措的意义,我们需回溯早期托马斯主义形成的历史性因素。

公元13世纪到14世纪初期是经院哲学的鼎盛期、高潮期(Hochscholastik),或曰“花期”(Blütenzeit),根据Hans Wolter的观点,经院哲学之“花期”恰好出现在这个时间段,有三个因素需考量:其一是西方学者通过与同期亚里士多德思想的阿拉伯注疏家和犹太思想家交流而确立的西欧亚氏解释传统;其二则是同时期巴黎、牛津和博洛尼亚等地大学(Universitates)的纷纷建立;最后则是教会内部各类致力于科学研究和学术保护的修会团体(ordines religiosi)贡献越趋显著〔10〕。托马斯·阿奎那(1225-1274)的哲学思想恰好就在这个历史背景下诞生,且较大程度上分有以上所言及的三个因素。托马斯从早年的求学生涯起就已经接触并且熟识亚氏的哲学。从初期对亚氏《论灵魂》(De Anima)的评注开始,其一生都致力于将亚氏的思想与基督教的基础教理相结合。如前文所述,托马斯本人从属于天主教修会道明会,作为该修会的年轻僧侣,他曾暂别修院的教育,而到由政府建立,不隶属于教会的那不勒斯大学深造。由此,他既熟悉修院内的学术传统(包含受奥古斯丁主义哲学化的新柏拉图主义),同时也熟悉修院外的异教及世俗哲学(包括由阿拉伯等非基督教文化圈传入西欧的亚氏哲学)〔11〕。得益于巴黎大学浓厚的亚氏哲学研究氛围,托马斯在该校神学系授课的期间,也是其

〔7〕“总会”(General Chapter)也可翻译作“总会议”,是道明会最高的权力中心,由修会各个会省的会士代表组成的会议团,会定期聚会讨论修会内部事务和制定相关的规定。详见道明会官网对这一机构的界定:<http://www.op.org/en/content/general-chapters-order-preachers>

〔8〕参见:Elizabeth Lowe, *The Contested Theological Authority of Thomas Aquinas: The Controversies Between Hervaeus Natalis and Durandus of St. Pourcain, 1307-1323*, (New York: Routledge, 2003), 76, 80, 107.

〔9〕Ibid, 54.

〔10〕Hans Wolter, *Handbuch der Kirchengeschichte, Band III/2, die mittelalterliche Kirche: Vom Mittelalter bis zum Vorabend der Reformation*, herausgegeben von H. Beck, K. A. August, J. Glazik, E. Iserloh, H. Wolter, (Freiburg im Breisgau: Verlag Herder, 1985), 318.

〔11〕Fergus Kerr, *After Aquinas: Versions of Thomism*, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002), 3-5.

哲学生涯颇具成果的成熟期。托马斯一边试图消除当时亚氏主流哲学研究中的伊斯兰神学的色彩<sup>[12]</sup>, 另一边则有意修正西欧大学内经常教授的新柏拉图主义化的亚氏哲学, 还原其原初形态<sup>[13]</sup>。托马斯对亚氏哲学注解所呈现的内在张力为: 一方面想要还原被其他流派“扭曲”的亚氏哲学原貌而使其纯粹化, 另一方面则力求让亚氏哲学成为基督教神学新的哲学基础。总体而言, 以托马斯为代表的 13 世纪经院哲学“花期”可以这样概括: 它是形而上学的黄金年代, 神学在其影响下变得思辨化, 但也没有丢失其与圣经和教父传统的联系<sup>[14]</sup>。

然而托马斯去世后, 他的神哲学并未立即得到教会官方的认可和推崇, 更远未成为各大神学院的必修课程。实际上在他去世后的几年, 其神哲学主张也受到某些大学神学系的批判甚至教会官方的谴责, 当中最有名的案例就是 1277 年由巴黎主教 Étienne Tempier 在教宗若望二十一世的支持下所发起的针对亚氏思想的谴责, 原因在于亚氏哲学所带起的“理性主义”和“自然主义”倾向可能会凌驾基督教信仰原则, 并危害信仰生活<sup>[15]</sup>。所以热衷教授亚氏哲学的巴黎大学被当作首要调查对象。这一公开谴责牵涉到的 219 条哲学命题中, 就包含有托马斯哲学的某些原则<sup>[16]</sup>。因为这一次事件, 托马斯的名望遭受到极大的损害。而起到在这一困难时期依旧捍卫和维护托马斯哲学教理的, 正是前面提及的道明会成员, 他们通过文献整理和目录编撰的方式学习和研究托马斯神哲学, 某种意义上也构造了经典托马斯主义学派的雏形。托马斯哲学在这个时期非但未获得教廷的认同而反遭其批评, 可是这一切负面因素并未妨碍早期托马斯主义在道明会的支持和辅助下获得发展。由此可见, 能如此快速地达致整个修会上下一心顶住官方谴责的压力, 保护尚处襁褓期的托马斯思想传统, 仅靠会士和修士对这一思想的兴趣和认同是远远不够的, 相反, 从制度和法令上采取必要的威权手段, 是托马斯主义不会刚一成型就遭扼杀并得以长久发展的重要因素。教会官方层面的谴责在此并非永久性的, 在托马斯逝世将近 50 年后, 事情获得转机。1323 年 7 月 18 日他被教宗若望二十三世册封为圣人, 200 多年后, 在 1567 年 4 月 12 日他又被教宗庇护五世封为“教会圣师”(Doctor ecclesiae)<sup>[17]</sup>。自此, 托马斯主义的发展至少扫除教会内的不利因素, 甚至获得教会官方一定程度上的推崇。在往后各个世代, 托马斯学派皆有优秀代表人物出现。

即便如此, 这一阶段的托马斯主义尚未从教会官方层面上得到制度性确立和普遍学院化推广, 依然没有彻底消除道明会的学术色彩, 所以历代托马斯主义的代表人物多是道明会成员, 如曾在宗教改革时期与马丁·路德交锋的神学家 Thomas Cajetan 就是出身道明会的托马斯思想注释家和捍卫者, 此外 Jean Capréolus, Juan de Torquemada 等道明会成员也是十九世纪前托马斯主义者代表人物。虽然这个阶段偶有非道明会的知名托马斯主义者出现, 如奥思定会(Ordo Sancti Augustini)的 Giles of Rome, 但这一切尚未说明托马斯思想在天主教会各个修会, 各个教育系统内取得主导地位。随着时间推移, 托马斯哲学在教会内部权威地位上升趋势越发明显。在 15 和 16 世纪巴黎和科隆等地的神学院里, 托马斯的《神学大全》渐渐成了必修的教材<sup>[18]</sup>。文艺复兴鼎盛期, 耶稣会和西班牙的萨拉曼

[12] Ibid, 9-10.

[13] Handbuch, 323-324.

[14] Handbuch, 331.

[15] Kerr, 12-13.

[16] Handbuch, 328.

[17] Walter Kasper (Hrsg.), Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche, neunter Band, (Freiburg im Breisgau: Verlag Herder, 2000), 1510. 在托马斯之前被教廷封为“教会圣师”者仅有四人, 分别是教宗格列高利一世, 圣安波罗修, 圣奥古斯丁和圣哲罗姆, 由教宗卜尼法斯八世于 1295 年 9 月 20 日册封。参见: Walter Kasper (Hrsg.), Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche, sechster Band, (Freiburg im Breisgau: Verlag Herder, 1997), 21.

[18] Walter Kasper (Hrsg.), Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche, neunter Band, (Freiburg im Breisgau: Verlag Herder, 2000), 1518.



卡学派的学者们也参与到托马斯思想的研究和推演中来,他们的思想也构成了后特伦托公会时期托马斯主义的重要形态。然而,随着启蒙运动兴起,托马斯主义难免走向彻底衰落。十七世纪大致上是经典托马斯主义最后的余韵,十八世纪之后,经典托马斯主义悄然而终,此时的天主教会已不再主导欧洲的思想的方向,哲学不再是教会神学的附属,哲学家也不再需要为基督教信仰命题服务。教会之外,各类哲学思潮风起云涌,反过来冲击着天主教会。至此,经典托马斯主义完成其历史历程。经典托马斯主义的重要特色体现在与道明会学术风格紧密关联上,其内部权力话语通过制度产生的助力作用更是不容小觑。然而,即便教会内部的障碍清除,甚至获得官方较大程度的认可,但因为欧洲本身的思想格局发生改变,其性质转变也在所难免。世俗哲学思潮的蓬勃发展,给予天主教会的思想者更多的可能性选项,传统经院哲学或托马斯主义已经不是其神学建构唯一可依从的思想资源了。由此,仅靠道明会内部制度性传承和外向推广,仅靠托马斯在学理上的体系性和完整性,已经百分之百吸引天主教的思想者了。由此,基于另一种需要而出场的新托马斯主义的历史契机也逐渐形成。

## 二、教廷的新托马斯主义

新托马斯主义之于经典托马斯主义的成型颇有性质上的不同,亦有极端观点认为标准的托马斯主义是在后笛卡尔哲学时期成型的,唯有新托马斯主义才符合这一标准概念的界定。Fergus Kerr认为,“托马斯主义”在近代思想史中真正的概念化通常指涉两个事件,一个是18世纪耶稣会和道明会神学家有关神恩和自由意志关系问题的争论,另一个则是19世纪后半期教宗利奥十三世基于反现代主义需要,即为了抵御后启蒙时期哲学对天主教神学的侵入而在普世天主教内自上而下发起的复兴托马斯哲学的运动<sup>[19]</sup>。显然,第二个意义正是本文所要探讨的“新-托马斯主义”,也正是在这个时期,教会政治的权力表达超越了特定修会的范围,并通过适用范围更广的制度性文件在普世天主教会范围内塑造了“新托马斯主义”,从而让“托马斯主义”这一原本从属于思想史研究的概念变成带有宗教建制色彩的概念。接下来,我们将会观察托马斯主义从“经典”到“新”,从衰落到复兴的转变过程中,教会权力话语如何在义理建构以外的场域进行表达以及变化。

综合第一部分所述,经典托马斯主义成型于中世纪末期和文艺复兴时代,而人文主义带来的哲学思潮发化(学界更常用笛卡尔哲学作为确切分界),使之从欧洲主流思想进路中逐步退场,而收缩成宗教内部的思想传统,其影响范围仅集中在与托马斯有直属关系的道明会或是部分有优良治学传统的修会中,如奥斯定会或耶稣会等,尚未进入天主教制度结构的核心位置。前者的原因除了新时代的思想逐渐脱离以基督信仰和教义轴心而转向世俗人文思潮,还在于自中世纪晚期起,市民和大众教育摆脱教会的掌控,以至高等教育、科学研究、古典文化诠释以及文艺创作不再为修会和僧侣保独有,而转移到世俗政府、官办院校和社会团体手中<sup>[20]</sup>。世俗化的洪流冲击着各个知识领域,其所造就的历史局面已非罗马教廷所能够逆转。各种基础条件的变动(如时代精神,治学兴趣、知识框架以及伴随而来的精神氛围)自然会给这一时期的学者带来新的哲学视野,也造就新的哲学流派取代旧有的局面,所以经典托马斯主义在广义上的衰落及变为狭义上特定宗教内的思想事件这一趋势并非偶然。如果说,以上所述内容至多只是天主教在西欧独一统退却后罗马教廷对世俗社会精神发展掌控力下降造成的,那么,托马斯主义在后笛卡尔时代甚至连在教会内部的影响力也在消退,则需要寻找其他层面

[19] Kerr,102.

[20] Erwin Iserloh, Handbuch der Kirchengeschichte, Band III/2, die mittelalterliche Kirche; Vom Mittelalter bis zum Vorabend der Reformation, herausgegeben von H. Beck, K. A. August, J. Glazik, E. Iserloh, H. Wolter, (Freiburg im Breisgau: Verlag Herder, 1985), 682.

的原因了。除了道明会法规和制度还在确保这一传统的延续, 还有其他修会受托马斯思想影响的学者也参与到其研究和诠释外, 其他教会内的神学家以及隶属教会各大学术机构的学者们似乎对这一思想传统的兴趣和热情随着时代推移变得越加淡漠。造成这些教会思想者对其兴趣淡然的根本原因恰好也在于, 他们都受到了教会外世俗哲学思潮的吸引。这股趋势到 19 世纪前半叶达到极致, 从而引发教会官方的忧虑。某种意义上讲, 这一切正是促使利奥十三世于 1879 年发表“*Aeterni Patris*”(永恒天父)通谕进而发起托马斯思想复兴运动的首要原因。

正如 Weisheipl 所写道, “为了理解教宗利奥十三世任内托马斯主义复兴运动的重要性, 我们必须考虑两个关涉到天主教自宗教改革运动之后思想发展的重要事实。一个事实是, 天主教的大学和神学院都受到‘现代’哲学家和非经院哲学家的巨大影响, 他们当中很多不是天主教徒。第二个事实是, 很多 19 世纪天主教知识分子真诚而热切地希望能够捍卫天主教教义不受敌对者攻击, 并且能够使这些教义在理性主义、怀疑主义、自然主义和自由主义的时代为人所接受。”<sup>[21]</sup> 在 1879 年教会正式做出制度性调整应对后启蒙思想入侵前, 天主教神学院的哲学教材的理论基础除了依从圣经外, 甚至还包含了笛卡尔<sup>[22]</sup>, 沃尔夫和牛顿的思想, 而托马斯却甚少提及。<sup>[23]</sup> 天主教各大教育机构的哲学教材不会只关注曾经的和当下的天主教会内“哲学家”说什么, 而是关注整个思想界哲学发展动态, 做到与时俱进, 这一点有其合理性。但在广泛地介绍“现代”哲学家思想的同时, 却过度冷落了传统的经院哲学, 这一点引发了教会保守人士的担忧。为了应对这一“与时俱进”, 教会必然要让经院哲学和托马斯思想在现代的语境下重生, 以适应教会时代需要。虽然早在 1879 年的“*Aeterni Patris*”通谕前的数十年时间里, 就已经有不少天主教的学者, 如意大利天主教神父 Gaetano Sanseverino 和德国耶稣会士 Joseph Kleutgen 自发重新诠释经院哲学和托马斯思想, 以彰显其对现代语境下的天主教会的重要性, 尤其在抵御后笛卡尔哲学“侵入”天主教神学的效用<sup>[24]</sup>。但真正从教会官方层面上确立托马斯思想的重要地位, 并且从制度和法令上对其进行推广和宣扬, 则一定要回溯到利奥十三世的“*Aeterni Patris*”通谕上。由于教宗利奥十三世对托马斯思想在现代复兴的巨大贡献, Fergus Kerr 也把通常意义上的“新托马斯主义”称为“利奥托马斯主义”(Leonine Thomism)<sup>[25]</sup>。此时我们必须询问, “利奥托马斯主义”是如何把上述经典托马斯主义时期道明会在修院内部实现的宗教权力话语表达推广到整个普世天主教会, 形成教会制度性的纲领和政策的?

“新托马斯主义”的诞生可以被理解为天主教会对于 18、19 世纪来自教会外各类思潮(哲学、历史学和社会学等)的“政策性”回应, 当中尤其指向哲学和形而上学思潮(如康德认识论和德国观念论等)。在天

[21] James A. Weisheipl, *The Revival of Thomism: An historical Survey*, 1.

[22] 笛卡尔虽然出身于天主教的文化语境, 但他与教会的关系颇为复杂。他早年接受过耶稣会的教育, 并且也学习到部分经院哲学的内容。但在日后的工作中, 他却开启了另一种哲思方式。他不接纳任何先入为主的权威的观点, 而把一切理论最为可靠的根基回溯到自我之“思”。他原本希望这一新的方法能为天主教会所接受, 最终却没能得到当时的神学家和神职人员的赏识, 原因除了他是平信徒外, 更因为他的哲学方法与传统经院哲学的方法出入较大。由此, 笛卡尔哲学本质上并未被教会定性为“天主教哲学”, 更是常被神学家视作中世纪之后“非教会哲学”的开端。然而, 由于笛卡尔哲学在教会以外思想界的巨大影响力以及在哲学史中的重要地位, 几个世代之后的天主教会神学院的哲学教材也无法回避笛卡尔, 也会用较大的篇幅论及笛卡尔哲学, 甚至借用其思想方法进行论述。这一笛卡尔主义化的天主教哲学教材的使用在 19 世纪迎来了高潮, 但这一切并不会让笛卡尔哲学在天主教保守派眼中变成“教会哲学”, 反而会让它们忧虑教会的神学思想已被教外哲学渗透。参见: *Ibid.*, p. 3-4.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 5-6.

[24] Joseph Louis Perrier, *The Revival of scholastic Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century*, (New York: The Columbia University Press, 1909), 158-159, 196-197.

[25] 参见: Kerr, 17-19, p. 37-38, p. 208 etc.; 109-113.

主教思想史框架内,则可以把新托马斯主义的出现界定为迎战“现代主义”思潮,反“现代主义”<sup>[26]</sup>观念运动中的理论手段。“现代主义这一概念常用于指代 19 世纪末期罗马天主教会内出现的思想运动,他们致力于将天主教的传统教理与同时代的思想,尤其是哲学、历史学和社会学进行更紧密的结合。这一概念大致是在 1905 年前后被使用,并且首先被这一运动的反对者使用。”<sup>[27]</sup>这场运动本质上是 19 世纪欧洲天主教会知识分子的现代性革新运动,然而它在当时并没有得到教会官方的支持,反而遭到了激烈的反对。早在 1907 年 7 月 3 日教廷主管信理的“至圣圣部”(sanctum officium)就已经发布了题为“Lamentabili”的法令,虽然没有明言提及“现代主义”,但已经谴责其思想。教会官方文献中首次正式出现“现代主义”(Modernismus)这一术语是教宗庇护十世于同年 9 月 8 日发布的通谕“Pascendi dominici gregis”,在这份通谕中,教宗总结了现代主义在神学和哲学中各种谬误和缺失的具体表现,并将之称为是“所有异端的综合体。(“nemo mirabitur si sic illud definimus, ut omnium haereseon conlectum esse affirmemus“).<sup>[28]</sup>在教宗庇护十世眼中,这场运动的兴起表明,主张谬论的人已经不仅存在于教会外面公开的敌人中,而且已经隐藏在教会的“萧墙”之内(“in ipso latent sinu gremioque ecclesiae“<sup>[29]</sup>)。

为了应对现代主义者,教廷重新将视线聚焦在 13 世纪的托马斯哲学上,并且主张天主教神哲学的基础思想必须重新回到托马斯。如果说早期托马斯主义的发展有赖于道明会的制度约束进而形成学术传统,更由于其自身义理系统性和论辩完整性,从而使其影响力延伸出道明会以外进入到其他修会和教会学术机构中,逐渐形成教会内的普遍影响力,成为经院哲学的首要代表,那么 19 世纪中后期出现的新托马斯主义则带上了异样的色彩。因为此时教会官方号召各大修院和教会学校教授托马斯哲学已是其反制“现代主义”倾向而采取的必要之策。庇护十世于 1914 年 6 月 29 日发布的名为“Doctoris Angelici”的自发手谕(Motu Proprio),其意图在于号召教会各级院校的教授托马斯的哲学。在这一手谕的鼓舞下,一些学者归纳了托马斯形而上学最具代表性的 24 条原则。托马斯思想基础原则的提出可以被视作新经院哲学或新托马斯主义在本世纪最为完整的纲领性自述。这一提纲提交教廷后,同年 7 月 27 日,教廷的教育部正式颁布法令(Decretum),从官方层面认定这 24 条原则的合理性<sup>[30]</sup>。即便如此,庇护十世任内所发布的有关托马斯的各类官方文件,其主导精神实质上都可以回溯到其前任利奥十三世于 1879 年 8 月 4 日发布的通谕“Aeterni Patris”,亦是这份通谕最先确立了教廷对托马斯首要地位的确认,将之制度化 and 法令化。“Aeterni Patris”通谕传递了教廷的长远意旨:即期盼恢复大公教会的经院哲学传统,尤其是圣托马斯的哲学传统,并在教会的教育机构中推广这一传统,以免让其思想陷入到同时代世俗哲学的现代性泥淖之中,让教会的神学错误地奠基在不当的哲学之上。

到此我们已经了解了两个阶段托马斯主义发展所植根和依赖的制度性平台:经典托马斯主义时

[26] 天主教神哲学的“现代主义”转向始源于 19 世纪中后期,大致上意指天主教内部对传统思想的革新运动。它包括对圣经采用历史主义,理性主义和批判性的解释进路,对康德和黑格尔哲学等同时代哲学采纳包容和接纳的立场,放弃敌视和批判,试图将它们与天主教信仰相结合。此外它也隐含有对基督新教神学一定程度的认同,其具体表现为注重人的主体性、责任和良知,提升人作为个体存在相对于教会整体性的地位。由此,这样的革新运动也被视为具有自由主义色彩,具有对教会传统体制进行革新的精神。参阅:Walter Kasper (Hrsg.), Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche, siebter Band, 367-368.

[27] Gerhard Müller (Hrsg.), Theologische Realenzyklopädie, Band XⅢ, (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1994), 130. Eintrag „Modernismus“ von Bernard M. G. Reardon. “现代主义”这一概念并非是其代表者标识自身思想而使用的概念,反而是出自其批判者,是批判者加诸在他们身上的概念。这一概念不见得为所有所谓的“现代主义者”接受。

[28] Pius X, Pascendi dominici gregis, 1907. 09. 08. 通谕中对现代主义“谬误”之批判主要集中在:哲学原则之谬误(如现代主义者倾向于接纳康德认识论的“现象主义”立场而可能走向不可知论),对信仰概念理解的谬误(如现代主义者可能会着重个人主观的信仰经验从而倾向于施莱尔马赫的感觉论 Gefühlstheologie),对圣经,基督以及信仰的历史批判性进路的谬误以及护教方法的错误。参阅:Heinrich Denzinger, Enchiridion symbolorum definitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et morum, herausgegeben von Peter Hünermann, (Freiburg im Breisgau: Verlag Herder, 2014), 875-886.

[29] Pius X, Pascendi dominici gregis, 1907. 09. 08.

[30] 参阅:Heinrich Denzinger, Enchiridion symbolorum definitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et morum, herausgegeben von Peter Hünermann, (Freiburg im Breisgau: Verlag Herder, 2014), 907-908.



期的制度性保障主要源自道明会内部法规,它起始于在困难和低潮时期至少确保托马斯思想依旧得以在特定修会内延续的意旨;新托马斯主义本质上则颇为不同,它根源自教会为了应对时代压力而做出的政策性调整,是宗教权威自上而下变革知识圈和教育圈基础理论的努力。

### 三、总述:两个概念趋向同化的背后

从前面的论述中,我们注意到,无论在道明会抑或其他修会,经典托马斯主义阶段的各个时期都有优秀代表人物和论著涌现。但哪怕其提供了新的理论诠释和拓展方向或是崭新的洞见,他们都不被视为“新-托马斯主义”,甚至就连“托马斯主义”这一概念本身都尚未获得具体化和明晰化。这意味着“新”这一界定并不全然在义理研究当中,并没有一个明确的思想结点做标准来评判具备它的托马斯主义者为新,不具备它的为旧。毋宁说制度性因素也对新旧之分起到了关键作用。经典阶段的托马斯主义无法彻底实现概念具体化的原因体现在:第一,它缺乏教会内的普世影响力;第二,这一时期的世俗思想洪流还未真正侵入到天主教的教育系统和神学基础建构中;最后,教会也因此尚未找到足够的理由把托马斯思想之尊崇制度化,纳入到建制的一环。唯有 19 世纪下半叶兴起的新托马斯主义运动,尤其是经由教宗利奥十三世通谕“Aeterni Patris”确立和制度化的“利奥托马斯主义”,才能完全实现上述三个条件。从另一种角度看,要促成新托马斯主义兴起和初期发展,仅凭教会内思想家的理论建构和诠释,是远远不够的。若只有思想者的努力,则结果与经典托马斯主义别无二致,即便有再多学者参与,也无法快速形成一个席卷教会整体的思潮<sup>[31]</sup>。由此可见,托马斯思想在利奥十三世任内复兴的直接动因恰恰是源于教会制度性支持,如在教会的教育和学术机构中进行强制性学习和研究等。某种意义上讲,没有这一层宗教威权和政治权力的表达<sup>[32]</sup>,托马斯主义并不能成为影响 20 世纪天主教神哲学的重要思潮。接下来我们需解释“新经院哲学”这一与“新托马斯主义”相蔓生的概念在思想史研究上与之日趋同义化所反映的问题。

“新经院哲学”和“新托马斯哲学”两个概念本身并不难区分。经院哲学是欧洲中世纪中后期重要的哲学传统和思辨方法,托马斯·阿奎那的哲学-神学体系是其极具代表性的一环。后者并不必然等同于整个经院哲学传统。通常在介绍经院哲学的著作或教材中,对托马斯哲学和神学的介绍往往会是其中重要的章节,但绝不会是唯一的章节,除了托马斯以外,其他经院哲学家,如安瑟伦、大阿尔伯特、波纳文都、邓斯·司各脱和奥卡姆都会占据一定的篇幅。所以,把托马斯主义与经院哲学同义化必是缺乏合理性的做法。实际上,在托马斯的年代,其思想就不乏批评者和反对者。除了上文提及的 1277 年教会官方的谴责外,拒斥托马斯思想的人物除了部分教会的神职外,也包括其他经院哲学家,当中尤以方济各会的学者对托马斯的批评最为知名和明确,如波纳文都和邓斯·司各脱<sup>[33]</sup>。方济各会甚至在 1286 年禁止《神学大全》在其修会流通,只有那些极具理性判断能力的教师才能使用<sup>[34]</sup>。由此,哪怕之后历代道明会会士和其他学者对托马斯思想的研究和推广多有积极,也不代表他的哲学和神学可以说服所有人,不代表教会内不会存在反对和批评

[31] 在 1879 年普世天主教会做出制度性回应之前,19 世纪上半叶欧洲各国的地方教会就已自发反对现代主义,反对现代哲学思潮和主张重回经院哲学和托马斯思想传统。参见:卓新平 Zuo Xinping,《当代西方天主教神学》Dangdai xifang tianzhujiao shenxue [Contemporary Theology of the Western Catholicism],上海三联书店 Shanghai sanlian shudian [Shanghai Joint Publishing House], 1998), 18-20.

[32] 我们甚至应该把教宗利奥十三世也视作新托马斯主义诞生的重要因素之一。鉴于他在天主教会圣统制中的崇高地位和权力,他对教廷政策的制定和价值观方向的把握也有着巨大影响。由此,他个人对传统哲学的定位和同时代世俗哲学对教会影响的判断和看法,也会深切地影响到这一制度的形成。参阅:Marcia L. Colish, St. Thomas Aquinas in Historical Perspective: The Modern Period, Church History, Vol. 44, No. 4, (1975), 434-435.

[33] Walter Kasper (Hrsg.), Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche, neunter Band, (Freiburg im Breisgau: Verlag Herder, 2000), 1517-1518.

[34] Kerr, 104. 方济各会经院哲学家与托马斯主义者的论战客观上反而有助托马斯神哲学在义理建构上获得进一步的澄清和辨析。

的声音。但是,何以在谈及新经院哲学和新托马斯主义的思想史语境下,两个概念常常会被混用呢?这种同义化趋向并非近年来的思想史研究才出现的,早在二十世纪初的新经院哲学研究中,就有学者注意到这个情况<sup>[35]</sup>。早在教会对托马斯主义进行制度化推广之前,其实在欧洲各地就有不少神学院自发地把托马斯的《神学大全》当作必修教材。基于这一原因,再加上教会早在中世纪时期就给予托马斯的崇高地位<sup>[36]</sup>,使得人们无形中逐渐把托马斯置于经院哲学的首要位置,渐渐把他视为经院哲学的首席代表,直至教会最终正式将其思想维护制度化,纳入到教育体系,并在官方层面确立其首席地位,如此,则新托马斯主义和新经院哲学涵义同一化也获得了外在于思想研究语境的必然性基础<sup>[37]</sup>。“Aeterni Patris”通谕将托马斯尊为大公教会神学和哲学“师长”,并确立他在经院哲学中的首要位置(“inter Scholasticos Doctores, omnium princeps et magister, longe eminent Thomas Aquinas”<sup>[38]</sup>)。庇护十世 1914 年的自发手谕“Doctoris Angelici”将托马斯尊为“经院哲学崇高向导(praecipuum nostris scholasticae philosophiae ducem daremus Thomam)”<sup>[39]</sup>如无教会在制度上确立了托马斯作为经院哲学“集大成者”的地位,如无教会在 19 世纪下半叶独尊托马斯的情况,如无教会各级学校对托马斯思想的义务性教授而使学习者对托马斯思想熟悉度超过对其他人的熟悉度,仅凭学者的义理论辩和思想认同,则难以导致两重概念同义化的情况。我们并不否认托马斯神哲学自身的完整性以及其在不同思想时代的适应力。然而教会在宗教信仰和法令制度上给予托马斯思想义理外的“特权”辅助,制度性确立其凌驾其他经院哲学家之上,这一点也为两个概念涵义趋向同一化这一现象提供基础。

“新”托马斯主义之“新”并不意味着它与经典托马斯主义传统产生革命性割裂而产生异质化思想,不如说,新托马斯主义之“新”更多体现在“更新”(Erneuerung)上,也就是将一个由于时代精神格局发生转变从而衰落的思想体系“重新”在一定限度内复活,“重新”将旧有的哲学体系在新的世界观念中唤醒。这样的“新”托马斯主义既有对传统刻板回归从而逃避世俗哲学新发展的一面,也有着开放和积极接纳世俗哲学,复兴托马斯敢于尝试将异教哲学与基督教思想进行建构性融合的一面<sup>[40]</sup>。新托马斯主义虽然诞生于教会反现代主义的保守思潮中,其发展进程中却逐步生发出能与教外哲学思想对话和结合的思想进路。新托马斯主义开放性的一面在初期的发展中容易被忽略,从而使得教外学者常把它批评为某种宗教政治的产物<sup>[41]</sup>。然而,新托马斯主义早期发展所依托的宗教保守主义和排他性立场,这种与世俗人文思潮针锋相对的立场,并不会一直获得天主教知识分子的认同。天主教会内的自由主义思潮最终在“Aeterni Patris”通谕发布将近 100 年后的梵蒂冈第二次大公会议中取得了主导。梵二之后,随着教会对多元思想的包容和鼓励,“独尊托马斯”的制度举措也被逐渐淡化,新托马斯主义复归到其作为学术思想应有的境地,从早期与宗教政治权力话语杂糅不清的处境抽身而出。虽然不再拥有体制性的核心地位,但它也摆脱制度束缚,朝着更加多元化的路线发展。

[35] Perrier, 5.

[36] 托马斯虽然不是第一位被天主教会封为圣人的经院哲学家(早在 1163 年安瑟伦就已被封为圣人),但他依然比其他的经院哲学家更早成为圣人。而更为重要的,托马斯在 1567 年被罗马教廷尊为“教会圣师”,这是教廷第二次进行封立“教会圣师”的仪式,并且这一次仅确立托马斯一人作为“教会圣师”。波纳文都要等到 1588 年才获此称号,而安瑟伦则要等到 1720 年。

[37] Perrier, 5, 36.

[38] Leo XIII, Aeterni patris, 1879. 08. 04.

[39] Pius X, Doctoris Angelici, 1914. 06. 29. 参阅: Heinrich Denzinger, Enchiridion symbolorum definitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et morum, (Freiburg im Breisgau: Verlag Herder, 2014), 907-908.

[40] 这两股张力一直贯穿于整个新托马斯主义发展始终,一方立场严苛而保守,主张回归历史中本真的托马斯,另一方开放而进步,主张托马斯思想诠释需试图与同时代教外哲学对话和结合。

[41] Perrier, p. 4.

**English Title:**

**Neo-Thomism and the Ensuing Transformation of Discourse of Power in the Roman Catholic Church**

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**Abstract:** This paper investigates the kinds of philosophical and hermeneutical structures and thought elements that significantly contributed to the emergence of Neo-Thomism and facilitated its early development. The perspective chosen for investigating the conditions under which Neo-Thomism began is tied to the issue of the discourse of ecclesiastical power within the Roman Catholic Church. This research on the institutional and systematic manifestations of a philosophical trend inside the Catholic religious confession aims to existentially reduce a series of abstract epistemological theories into concrete religious phenomena that are socially visible. In order to set out a plausible theoretical structure for the investigation, it is necessary to make a conceptual distinction between classical Thomism and Neo-Thomism and to observe how the discourse of ecclesiastical authority and power underwent a subtle change from one phase to another and how both of these parts interact with each other.

**Key Words:** Neo-Thomism; Middle Ages; Roman Catholic Church; Theology; Philosophy of Religion



# 爱欲的分野与历史实在的生成： “上帝之城”与“地上之城”二元历史架构探源<sup>[42]</sup>

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**摘要:** 神人关系及其具体表现, 即恩典与自由意志的辩证是奥古斯丁神哲学的重中之重。从意志原初的偏离出发, 我们进入到了人的本性的削减, 以及历史实在的变迁, 即地上之城的发展; 而经由恩典之作为, 历史的内部萌生出了新的意志, 人性开始与罪之链条作斗争, 充满希望的新的历史实在在历史时间内部展开自身, 此即上帝之城。对于奥古斯丁而言, 世界历史的全部秘密不是在于历史的时间内部, 而是在于神之恩典进入了历史的时间内部, 从而开启了世界历史的全新征程。

**关键词:** 奥古斯丁; 上帝之城; 历史实在

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众所周知, 中世纪政治模式——精神权力与世俗权力的二元架构——是由奥古斯丁以上帝之城与地上之城这两座城的划分奠定其理论基础的。那么, 上帝之城与地上之城的二元架构本身又是如何可能的呢? 换句话说, 划分这两座城的深层次根据何在?

奥古斯丁本人是这样来描述这两座城的区别的:

“两种爱造就了两个城。爱自己而轻视上帝, 造就了地上之城, 爱上帝而轻视自己, 造就了天上之城。地上之城荣耀自己, 天上之城荣耀上主。地上之城在人当中追求光荣; 在天上之城中, 最大的光荣是上帝, 我们良知的见证。地上之城在自己的光荣中昂头, 天上之城则对自己的上帝说, 你‘是我的荣耀, 又是叫我抬起头来的’。在地上之城, 君主们追求统治万国, 就像自己被统治欲统治一样; 在天上之城, 人们相互慈爱, 统治者用政令爱, 在下者用服从爱……”<sup>[43]</sup>

“两种爱造就了两个城”, 划分上帝之城与地上之城的依据在于人内在地为哪种爱所支配, “爱自己而轻视上帝, 造就了地上之城, 爱上帝而轻视自己, 造就了天上之城”。根本性的困难也随之而来。

[42] Cf., Paulos Huang, “Dialogue and Critique: The 16<sup>th</sup> Century Religious Reform and Modernity”, *International Journal of Sino-Western Studies*, vol. 12, 1-12. (<https://www.sinowesternstudies.com/back-issues/vol-12-2017/>)

[43] 基金项目: 浙江省哲学社会科学规划课题“诠释现象学进阶下的奥古斯丁《忏悔录》研究”(19NDQN354YB) 奥古斯丁 Augustine, 《上帝之城》Shangdizhicheng [City of God], 吴飞 Wu Fei 译, (上海 Shanghai: 三联书店 Sanlianshudian [SDX Joint Publishing Company]), 2008, 225-226.

因为, 一个现代的马基雅维利、霍布斯或是弗洛伊德将会宣称, 根本就不存在“对上帝的爱”。这些现实主义者们认为, 一切爱归根结底都是“对自己的爱”, 所谓地“对上帝的爱”只不过是这一“对自己的爱”的极为精致巧妙的伪装而已, 撕去这一伪装, 我们最后在人性中所能够发现的只能是赤裸裸地“对自己的爱”。而如果“对上帝的爱”归根结底可以被还原为“对自己的爱”, 那么, 事实上就只有一种爱, 而不是两种爱。而如果只有一种爱, 那么, 也就只有一座城, 只有一座地上之城了, 上帝之城与地上之城的二元架构沦为无稽之谈。而随着两座城的区分被消解, 精神权力与世俗权力间的紧张状态也势必被消解, 从而导致整个公共政治层面的根本性转变。

这样看来, 对上帝的爱是否可能, 怎样可能, 就成了一个生死攸关的问题。不解决这一问题, 不以一种肯定的方式答复这一问题, 则任何对上帝之城与地上之城的区分的确显得孱弱无力。而这就意味着, 在进行到对上帝之城与地上之城这一二元政治架构所规定的人类政治生活的思考中去之前, 我们不得不面对更为根本的神哲学问题。而问题正是: 爱欲的分野究竟如何发生? 历史实在为何不能被理解成静止不变的客观实在, 而是总是在爱欲的驱动之下历史性地展开自身呢?

## 一、澄清关于“自爱”的几个误解

奥古斯丁以“爱上帝”还是“爱自己”来区分两座城。但对大多数现代读者而言, “爱上帝”、“爱自己”这两个词汇的含义本身也是比较模糊的。尤其是受近代西方主体性哲学话语的影响, 对“自爱”的理解出现了一些根本偏差。

### 1. 爱的秩序

一个首当其冲的误解是把“爱上帝”与“爱自己”截然对立起来, 似乎两者水火不容, 似乎为了爱上上帝, 人就必须彻底弃绝自身, 不能有任何形式的对自己的爱<sup>[44]</sup>。这必然是错误的, 因为圣经本身就有“爱人如己”这一根本教诲, 也就是说, 某种形式的对自身的爱是完全合理的。奥古斯丁在《忏悔录》中也旗帜鲜明地肯定了对自身的爱, 比如, 他这样写道:

“主啊, 我怎样寻求你呢? 我寻求你天主时, 是在寻求幸福的生命。我将寻求你, 使我的灵魂生活, 因为我的肉体靠灵魂生活, 而灵魂是靠你生活”<sup>[45]</sup>

对自身的爱正是人热烈地追寻上帝的根本动因, 人如果已然对自身的生命毫不在乎, 那么, 对上帝的爱也就必然在他的生命里无所追寻了。

因此, 自爱不一定是个问题。之所以会把自爱和对上帝的爱截然对立起来, 是因为我们受近代西方主体性哲学的影响, 已经不假思索地把“爱”主体化、私人化了, 即, 一旦我们谈论爱, 就过分轻易地把它理解成内在于主体的一种激情的盲目奔流, 而遗忘了那个古典世界最深刻的洞见: 在作为一种主体的激情的盲目奔流之外, 还有一种客观的爱的秩序。自爱作为一种激情的奔流, 只要它是顺着爱的秩序在流动, 那么, 它就是健康的, 只有当它违背了爱的秩序而奔流时, 自爱才变得盲目危险。关于这一爱的秩序, 奥古斯丁这样写道:

[44] Anders Nygren 的引发广泛争议的著作“agape and eros”(University of Chicago press, 1982), 其被人诟病的主要地方正在于把这两种爱截然对立。参见 A. Armstrong, platonic love and Christian agape(in Armstrong, Plotinian and Christian studies, variorum reprints, 1979)一文对尼格伦的批评。

[45] 奥古斯丁 Augustine, 《忏悔录》Canhui lu [Confessions], 周士良 Zhou Shiliang 译, (北京 Beijing: 商务印书馆 Shangwu yinshuguan [the commercial press], 2008, 203.

“除了唯一、真正、幸福的上帝,没有不变的好。他创造的万物是好的,是因为来自于他;是可变的,是因为万物不出自上帝,而是无中生有。他们都不是最高的好,因为上帝是更大的好。不过,这可变的好仍然是巨大的好,因为他们可以亲近不变的好,从而获得幸福。这不变的好就是他们的好,因为有了他,他们一定变得悲惨。……所以,不顺从上帝都是对自身本性的一种伤害。因为他们处于这样一个优越的被造的位置上,虽然是可变的,但可以亲近不变的好,也就是至高的上帝,从而获得幸福。他们不能满足需求,除非获得幸福,而只有上帝才能提供那一幸福”<sup>[46]</sup>

简而言之,正确的爱的秩序就是:人的被造的本性决定了人必须亲近、顺从上帝,爱上帝,即,爱那最高的善。如果人出于对自身的爱,而走向了对上帝的爱,那么,这时自爱就处于正确的爱的秩序中,是好的。只有当人因为自爱,而开始“陶醉于自身的权势,把自己当成自身善好的源泉”<sup>[47]</sup>时,自爱才成了问题,因为“他们宁愿自我膨胀,也不愿要最卓绝的永恒;宁愿陶醉于虚妄的狡黠,也不愿要最确定的真理;宁愿狼狽为奸,也不愿要不分彼此的爱。他们变得高傲、欺骗、嫉妒”<sup>[48]</sup>。在对爱的秩序的颠覆中,人最终跌入虚无,悖谬地爱自己反而伤害了自身的生命。

## 2. 爱先行于主体

人们之所以陷于对人爱上帝的可能性的怀疑,并把一切最终都化约为对自我的爱,还有这样一个根本原因:即,近代以来笼罩在一切哲学思考之上的主体性阴影。人们一上来就过分轻易地预设了一个主体,这个主体为了自身的需求在盲目地爱和追逐,无论爱的对象怎样变幻,这个主体本身却始终坚固。它是如此地坚固和难以满足,以至于自身之外的一切都成了满足它欲望的对象。

从奥古斯丁神哲学的立场来看,这一坚固的主体,这一能够自由地、随心所欲地主导自身的爱欲的主体,本身就是一个幻象。奥古斯丁无比深刻地洞察到的一点正在于:不是主体在爱与追逐,而是爱在牵引着主体这样做,也就是说,不是主体在驾驭爱,而是爱在驾驭主体。“我的重量即是我的爱。爱带我到哪里,我便到哪里”<sup>[49]</sup>。而之所以如此,是因为爱是一个关系性事件,是位格间的交互,另一个位格总是能够逃脱主体对他的支配,尤其当另一个位格是上帝时。

事实上,在上帝与人之间的爱的联结中,上帝至始至终都占据着主动的地位。一方面,人本身就是上帝出于爱而无中生有地创造的,在上帝出于爱的意志造人之前,人并不存在,“人无中生有地被创造,并从上帝那里接受了获得至福的能力”<sup>[50]</sup>;另一方面,人从上帝那里接受而来的这一通过亲近上帝而获得至福的能力,如果没有上帝出于爱而持续的激发,也是会衰退的,奥古斯丁这样写道:

“上帝无中生有地创造了一个能享受他的善的本性,但如果上帝没有在先地激发那个渴望至福地意志到一个更高的强度,从而使得它通过享受上帝而变得更好,那么,一切善良意志都会变得贫乏,并处于渴求之中。”<sup>[51]</sup>

[46] Augustine, *The city of God*. A new translation by Henry Bettenson (中国社会科学出版社影印本 Zhongguo shehuikexue chubanshe yingyinben [China Social Publishing House], 1999), book XI, chapter 13, p. 472

[47] Ibid, p. 471.

[48] Ibid, p. 471. 此处用的是吴飞的中译本。

[49] 奥古斯丁 Augustine, 《忏悔录》Canhui lu [Confessions], 周士良 Zhou Shiliang 译, (北京 Beijing: 商务印书馆 Shangwu yinshuguan [The Commercial Press], 2008), 294.

[50] Augustine, *The city of God*. A new translation by Henry Bettenson, (中国社会科学出版社影印本 Zhongguo shehuikexue chubanshe yingyinben [China Social Publishing House], 1999), book XI, chapter 13, 472.

[51] Ibid, book xii, chapter 9, p. 482.

如果说是爱驾驭人,而不是人驾驭爱,那么,这里真正要达到的洞见正是:人并不是自身存在的根基,上帝才是存在的源泉。一切顽固地试图把人自身立定为存在根基的做法(“自爱”一词狭义上的内涵),都导致人本身的瓦解,这也许就是基督教创世神学最根本的洞见之一。“人所拥有的善良意志并不是叫人转向他自身,他自身在存在上始终是次一级的,而是转向那至高的存在者。人通过归顺他,参与到他之中,才能增进自身的存在,并活在智慧与幸福之中。”<sup>[52]</sup>

### 3. 切身性

以上我们从基督教创世神学出发澄清了关于“自爱”问题的一些误解。但读者或许会说,这些讨论都是建立于对上帝的信仰之上的,因此,首先得用理性证明这一信仰的切实性,否则上述讨论就依然缺乏说服力。

然而要求用理性去证明信仰,这本身又是一个误解。信仰并不是建立于理性的证明之上,而是建立于一种“切身性”之上。所谓切身性,就是灵魂层面的一种原初直观。人直观地感受到上帝对自身生命的促进、转变、照耀和提升,如此就产生和加固了对上帝的信仰,然后在信仰的基础上,人才能用理性去论证和解释上帝对人的爱。“你们若是不信,定然不得理解”<sup>[53]</sup>。关于上帝对人的生命的切身性,奥古斯丁有这样一段描述:

“但我爱你,究竟爱你什么?不是爱形貌的秀丽,暂时的声势,不是爱肉眼所好的光明璀璨,不是爱各种歌曲的优美旋律,不是爱花卉膏沐的芬芳,不是爱甘露乳蜜,不是爱双手所能拥抱的躯体。我爱我的天主,并非爱以上种种。我爱天主,是爱另一种光明、音乐、芬芳、饮食、拥抱,在我内心的光明、音乐、馨香、饮食、拥抱;他的光明照耀我心灵而不受空间的限制,他的音乐不随时间而消逝……”<sup>[54]</sup>

## 二、爱欲的分野

两座城的分野源于两种爱的分野,本文的这一部分我们探讨两种爱的分野。而为了思考两种爱的分野,我们需要对在奥古斯丁那里得到极大深化了的“意志”概念有一个先行的理解。

### 1. “意志”的根本作用

迪赫(Albrecht Dihle)在《古典时代的意志理论》一书中认为奥古斯丁发明了一种特定的意志理论<sup>[55]</sup>,并给与了这一意志理论以极高的评价。他这样写道:

“奥古斯丁的意志概念掀起了神学思考史上的一个转向……通过奥古斯丁的反思出现了这样一个关于人的意志的概念:它独立和先行于理智的认识,但又根本上区别于感性和非理性的情感。通过这一意志,人可以回应那不可捉摸的神的意志”<sup>[56]</sup>

具体点说,在奥古斯丁的神哲学中,除了本文第三部分要探讨的意志在历史实在的生成中所起的

[52] Ibid, p. 482.

[53] 奥古斯丁 Augustine,《论三位一体》Lun sanwei yiti [The Trinity], 周伟驰 Zhou Weichi 译, (上海 Shanghai: 上海人民出版社 Shanghai renmin chubanshe [Shanghai Renmin Press], 2005), 213.

[54] 奥古斯丁 Augustine,《忏悔录》Canhui lu [Confessions], 周士良 Zhou Shiliang 译 (北京 Beijing: 商务印书馆 Shangwu yinshuguan [The Commercial Press], 2008), 190.

[55] 见 Albrecht Dihle, The theory of will in classical antiquity (University of California press, 1982), p. 123.

[56] Ibid, p. 127.

关键作用之外,意志的核心作用体现在以下两点。

### 1.1 意志是神人关系的联结点

在奥古斯丁那里,意志概念是在神义论语境中出场的。被造的本性由于是上帝所创,所以是好的。因此,恶的原因就不能归结于本性,不能从任何实体性出发去解释恶。自由意志于是出场。恶是对创世的秩序的偏离,是意志的转向,即人从对上帝的爱转向了对低于上帝的存在者的爱。

从意志的转向来捍卫神义论,这却附带产生了一个极为根本的后果:即,把意志从人的本性中独立出来,极大地提升了意志的地位。因为,是意志,而不是人性中任何别的因素,优先地处于神人关系的联结点。神人关系的调和,是由于人的意志的顺服;神人关系的失调,是由于意志的偏离。“我们发现好的天使幸福的最真实的原因,那就是与至高者的亲近。而要探讨坏的天使悲惨的真正原因,我们该想到,那是因为他们离开了至高者,转向自身,而他们自己不是至高的”<sup>[57]</sup>。而由于神人关系是人的存在的重中之重,“上帝之城是此世的过客,他们在必朽之生中全部和最高的使命,就是呼唤上帝之名”<sup>[58]</sup>,因此,意志概念第一次在西方思想史上得到了最高程度的强调。

### 1.2 意志与本性

通过把意志置于神人关系的联结点,奥古斯丁使得意志处于一种存在论的优先地位,获得了相对于人性中其他因素的优先性和独立性。正是通过意志,或,正是由于神人关系的变革,人的本性也经受着全部的变迁。意志的转向,神人关系的疏离,并不能伤害上帝,但能够伤害被造的本性。“如果他们能亲近至高者,那他们就会有更高的存在。因为他们更看重自己,所以就只能获得更低的存在”<sup>[59]</sup>。当然,“存在”一词在此指的是一种价值论的存在。奥古斯丁这样写道:

“这一过错造成的伤害指的是什么呢?它们指的是本性丢失了正直、美、健康或德性,或本性中的其它一切善好。这一本性,会由于意志的偏离而遭到毁灭或削减。”<sup>[60]</sup>

意志的转向不但会促成人的存在的增减,而且,内在于本性的情感的价值归根结底也是由意志运行的方向决定的。比如,快乐作为一种情感,其价值却受到人在何处,为了什么而快乐决定,即受到意志粘附于何处而决定。如果意志转向神圣者,并以此为乐,那么,这一快乐就值得称赞;反之,如果意志粘附于被造之物,以此为乐,那么,这一快乐就是有害的。《上帝之城》第14卷第6章的标题即为“意志的特性决定了情感的品质”,奥古斯丁这样写道:

“在所有这些情感中,重要的是意志的特性。如果意志被错误地引导,情感就是坏的;如果意志是正确的,那么,情感就不仅不应受到责怪,而且应该得到赞美。意志渗透进了所有的情感之中,事实上,所有这些情感归根结底都是意志的作为”<sup>[61]</sup>

## 2. 意志与爱:爱洛斯还原

神人关系的亲近或疏离,人的存在的增益或减损,都系于意志的由低到高或由高到低的转向之中。然而问题在于:究竟是什么在促使意志的转向呢?是意志本身吗?并不是意志本身。意志并没

[57] Augustine, *The City of God*. A new translation by Henry Bettenson. Book xii, chapter 6, p. 477. 此处中译文用的是吴飞的译文。

[58] *Ibid*, Book xv, chapter 21, p. 635. 此处中译文用的是吴飞的译文。

[59] *Ibid*, Book xii, chapter 6, p. 478.

[60] *Ibid*, Book xii, chapter 3, p. 474.

[61] *ibid*, Book xiv, chapter 6, p. 555.



一开始所以为的那么能动。让奥古斯丁惊讶不已的一个存在状态就是意志本身的一种被动性, 一种经常性的瘫痪状态:

“这种怪事哪里来的? 原因何在? 灵魂命令肉体, 肉体立即服从; 灵魂命令自己, 却抗拒不服。灵魂命手动作, 手便应命而动, 发令和执行几乎不能区分先后, 但灵魂总是灵魂, 手是属于肉体的。灵魂命令灵魂愿意什么, 这是命令自己, 却不见动静。这种怪事哪里来的呢? 原因何在? 我说, 灵魂发令愿意什么, 如果灵魂不愿, 便不会发令, 可是发了命令, 却并不执行”<sup>[62]</sup>

显然, 意志本身需要得到激发。而那驱使意志做出决断, 使意志明确说出愿意或不愿意的力量, 在奥古斯丁那里被界定为“爱”。“爱就是最为有效力的意志”<sup>[63]</sup>, 是爱在驱动着意志的转向。人爱什么, 意志就转向什么。如果说“意志渗透进了所有的情感之中”, 那么, 由于意志本身受到爱的驱动, 所以, 实际上是爱渗透进了所有的情感之中。意志所获得的存在论的优先地位, 让位于爱。奥古斯丁这样写道:

“好的爱使得意志得到了正确的引导, 坏的爱则使得意志变得悖谬。爱若渴望所爱的事物, 那就是欲; 如果安享所拥有的, 那就是乐; 避开所反对的, 就是惧; 遇到所反对的, 就是哀。于是, 如果爱是坏的, 那么, 所有这些情感就都是坏的; 如果爱是好的, 那么, 所有这些情感就都是好的”<sup>[64]</sup>

总之, 在奥古斯丁这里, 我们已经看到了一种极具深度的爱洛斯还原(其程度是柏拉图主义无法相比的), 即, 爱通过驱动意志, 引发神人关系的转变, 从而造成历史人性的全部变迁。奥古斯丁将历史人性的一切都悬于爱欲之上, 生成于爱欲的追逐之中。正是因为如此, 所以, 爱欲的分野就构成了历史人性的根本张力。

### 3. 意志原初的偏离

行文至此, 两种爱, 即对上帝的爱(圣爱)与对自己的爱(欲爱)的内涵已经是比较清楚的。两者的决定性差别是圣爱把上帝作为自己的根基, 把全部的希望寄托于上帝之上; 而欲爱则把人自身作为存在的根基, 把全部的希望寄托于自身、寄托于尘世内部。奥古斯丁这样写道:

“两者的区别来自于意志和欲望的差异。其中一种一直与万物共有的善好(也就是上帝自身)在一起, 坚守上帝的永恒、真理、爱; 另外一些却更喜爱自己的法力, 好像自己就是自己的善好的来源, 脱离了他们共有的更高的幸福的善好, 陷入自身之中”<sup>[65]</sup>

然而问题在于, 在由神所创的本性中, 也就是说, 归根结底都是善好的本性中, 为何最终出现了分

[62] 奥古斯丁 Augustine,《忏悔录》Canhui lu [Confessions], 周士良 Zhou Shiliang 译, (北京 Beijing: 商务印书馆 Shangwu yinshuguan [The Commercial Press], 2008), 152

[63] 奥古斯丁 Augustine,《论三位一体》Lun sanwei yiti [The Trinity], 周伟驰 Zhou Weichi 译, (上海 Shanghai: 上海人民出版社 Shanghai renmin chubanshe [Shanghai Renmin Press], 2005), 439.

[64] Augustine, The City of God. A new translation by Henry Bettenson. Book xiv, chapter 7, p. 557.

[65] Ibid, Book xii, chapter 1, p. 471. 此处中译文用的是吴飞的译文。



野,为何其中一些从对上帝的依附中滑落,转向了自身呢?

比较清楚的一点是,由于本性是好的,因此,不能寻找任何实体因,而必须在意志本身中寻找原因,“当意志从高处转向低处时,意志就是坏的。这并不是意志转向的事物是坏的,而是这一转向本身就是悖谬的。不是低劣的事物引发了错误的抉择,而是意志本身,由于是被造的,以一种悖谬和错乱的方式欲求着低劣的事物”<sup>[66]</sup>。

在意志的最初的转向中,已然是对自身的爱开始压倒了对上帝的爱,自爱的阴影已经笼罩在本性之上。但奥古斯丁认为,不能继续追溯这自爱的最初萌生的原因了。意志原初的偏离是一个迷。奥古斯丁这样写道:

“谁也不该去找导致坏的意志的动力因;因为坏不是一种主动力(efficiens),而是无动力(deficiens)。它不是一种力(effetio),而是一种欠缺(defectio)。从至高存在者转向次一级的实在,这就是欠缺,是坏的意志的开端。这些欠缺的原因,不会是动力,而是欠缺。谁想发现这原因,就如同想看到黑暗,想听到沉默。我们知道什么是黑暗和沉默,知道黑暗要用眼睛,知道沉默要用耳朵。但不是通过看或听的对象,而是通过对象的缺失”<sup>[67]</sup>

奥古斯丁的意思是,通过人性的现有的状况,我们推知一定发生了某种意志的原初的偏离。但是偏离的原因,不是某种实体性的东西,而是一种匮乏,因而是不可知的。“作为一种本性,意志的存在源于上帝的创造;但意志从它的真实存在中的跌落,则是由于意志是从虚无中被造的”<sup>[68]</sup>。

意志从虚无中被创造,这使得意志有一种原初的匮乏,而这一匮乏又导致了意志原初的偏离。但绝不能由此推论说由于这一原初匮乏的存在,所以这一被造的意志是坏的。一方面,正是由于人有意志,而别的存在物没有意志,从而人才在创世的秩序中处于一个优先的位置;另一方面,这一意志并不必然会偏离至高存在者,当这一意志归顺于至高存在者时,它当然是好的。奥古斯丁这样写道:

“他创造的万物是好的,是因为来自于他;是可变的,是因为万物不出自上帝,而是无中生有。他们都不是最高的好,因为上帝是更大的好。不过,这可变的好仍然是巨大的好,因为他们可以亲近不变的好,从而获得幸福。这不变的好就是他们的好,因为有了他,他们一定变得悲惨。在被造的宇宙中,别的那些事物不会变得悲惨,但不能由此认为,他们就更好。正如我们身体上别的器官不会因为它们不会变瞎,就比眼睛好。正如有感觉的自然好的,痛苦的感觉也比石头的不会痛苦好。所以,理性的自然即使是悲惨的,也比缺乏理性、缺乏感觉,从而不会陷入悲惨的自然更高”<sup>[69]</sup>。

这里最终牵涉到的正是著名的自由意志问题。爱的秘密也就是自由的秘密。爱之为爱,必然是纯乎一心的,自愿的,否则就不是爱。爱是最勉强不得的。在神创的秩序中,上帝给了人这一自由意志的空间,从而使得人能够爱。“没有上帝的保佑,人没能力活得好,哪怕在伊甸园里,但是要活得不

[66] Ibid, Book xii, chapter 6, p. 478.

[67] Ibid, Book xii, chapter 7, p. 479-80.

[68] Ibid, Book xiv, chapter 13, p. 572.

[69] Ibid, Book xii, chapter 1, p. 472. 此处中译文用的是吴飞的译文。

好却在他的能力之中,不过这样他的福祉就不会持久,最正义的惩罚就会到来”<sup>[70]</sup>。总之,认为自由意志中蕴藏着恶的可能性,从而认为上帝创世是有缺陷的,并应该取缔自由意志,这是彻头彻尾错误的。“谁敢认为或说,天使和人不会堕落,这不在上帝的力量之内?但是他不愿意夺取他们的力量,而要展示,他们的高傲会有怎样的坏的力量,他的恩典有怎样的好的力量”<sup>[71]</sup>。

#### 4. 本性、意志与恩典

随着意志原初的偏离,人性开始陷入一连串的衰败、瓦解之中,“罪使得人性处于一连串的我们能看到和感觉到的衰退之中,以至于死。人被各种各样猛烈的和相互冲突的情感所纠缠和折磨,人成了一种跟他犯罪之前在伊甸园中曾经之所是很不一样的一种存在”<sup>[72]</sup>。

正是在这样一种处境中,我们面临着本文最初的那个问题:对至高存在者的爱还可能吗?正是对这个问题的回答,奥古斯丁发展出了无比独特的恩典说。为了更清晰地显示出恩典观的原创性和独特性,我们先看看柏拉图主义对这一问题的回答。

##### 4.1 柏拉图主义的方案

灵魂如何接近最高的善,毫无疑问也是柏拉图主义的一个根本问题。柏拉图认为,灵魂的堕落不是由于本性的败坏,人依然具有一种“灵魂的视力”能够凝视形而上的实在。但是这一灵魂的视力现在却没有在一个正确的方向上看,它粘附于形而下的实在了。在《理想国》卷七中苏格拉底这样说道:

“这方面或许有一种灵魂转向的技巧,即一种使灵魂尽可能容易尽可能有效地转向的技巧。它不是要在灵魂中创造视力,而是肯定灵魂本身有视力,但认为它不能正确地把握方向,或不是在看该看的方向,因而想方设法努力促使它转向。”<sup>[73]</sup>

与奥古斯丁一致,柏拉图这里实际上也已经触及到了爱与意志的问题。因为,那使得灵魂在一个错误地方向看的是因为灵魂对形而下事物的爱,而灵魂转向的技巧,那能使得灵魂转向形而上实在的,也只能是对形而上实在的爱。在《理想国》卷六中苏格拉底这样说道:

“追求真实存在是真正爱知者的天性;他不会停留在意见所能达到的多样的个别事物上的,他会继续追求,爱的锋芒不会变钝,爱的热情不会降低,直至他心灵中的那个能把握真实的,即与真实相亲近的部分接触到了每一事物真正的实体,并且通过心灵的这个部分与事物真实的接近,交合,生出了理性和真理,他才有了真知,才真实地活着成长着。”<sup>[74]</sup>

这样,跟奥古斯丁一致,苏格拉底是肯定存在着“对至高存在者的爱”的。这一爱,就完好无损地存在于“真正爱知者的天性”之中。但令我们好奇的是,为何一方面苏格拉底以肯定的方式回答了“对上帝的爱”是否可能这一问题,但另一方面,苏格拉底对这一问题的回答却没有像在奥古斯丁那里那样发展出上帝之城与地上之城的二元架构呢?

看来,从柏拉图到奥古斯丁,人类思想还得经历一段漫长艰辛的跋涉。我们在此只能描述一下这

[70] Ibid, Book xiv, chapter 27, p. 592. 此处中译文用的是吴飞的译文。

[71] Ibid, Book xiv, chapter 27, p. 593. 此处中译文用的是吴飞的译文。

[72] Ibid, Book xiv, chapter 12, p. 571.

[73] 柏拉图 Plato,《理想国》Lixiangguo [Republic], 郭斌和 Guo Binghe, 张竹明 Zhang Zhuming 译, (北京 Beijing: 商务印书馆 Shangwu yinshuguan [The Commercial Press], 2010), 278.

[74] 同上, 第 237-238 页。

段路程的基本轨迹。大致趋势是这样的:在柏拉图那里,形而上的理念世界是超越于形而下的有形世界的,因此,对柏拉图而言,灵魂的转向主要地是指灵魂由低到高的上升;柏拉图往后,思想家们开始把柏拉图那高高在上的理念世界不断拉下来,思想家们认为,理念世界就存在于灵魂的深处,就在人的心中,因此,灵魂的转向不再是一种由低到高的上升而是一种由外而内的深入。在新柏拉图主义者普罗提诺那里,我们已经能够读到这样的由外而内的灵魂运动:

“道路在哪里?方法在何处?人怎样才能寻获那异乎寻常的美?这美居留于内在的圣所,并不会显示于外让那些庸俗者看见。那么,就让人们醒悟过来,反求诸己吧,把对外在事物的观察放下吧,再也不要回到那有形之物的美之中去。”<sup>[75]</sup>

熟悉奥古斯丁《忏悔录》的人都知道,这一普罗提诺式的灵魂由外而内的运动对奥古斯丁的影响是怎么强调都不过分的。但同样,在普罗提诺那里,这一灵魂由外而内的运动并没有生发上帝之城与地上之城的二元分化。要实现这一二元紧张与对立,似乎尚需要添加某种极为独特的基督教的因素。

#### 4.2 恩典的作为

对奥古斯丁而言,灵魂本身亦只不过是一种被造之物,作为一种被造之物,灵魂在其最好的状态下,也只可能是一种与上帝类似的形象而已,而不可能是上帝本身。这就意味着,奥古斯丁虽然也会像柏拉图主义者那样认为灵魂的本性是好的,但是,在奥古斯丁那里,被造之物与造物者之间的根本差异拒斥了普罗提诺意义上的灵魂与神性的那种神秘的合一,同时,灵魂作为一种被造之物,并不是不可朽坏,并不是永不会丧失其本性的,灵魂本身就充满着变动,在《忏悔录》卷四中,奥古斯丁这样写道:

“如果你欢喜灵魂,你应在天主之中爱灵魂,因为灵魂也变异不定,唯有固着于天主之中,才能安稳,否则将走向毁灭。因此你该在天主之中爱灵魂,尽量争取灵魂,拉它们和你一起归向天主。”<sup>[76]</sup>

灵魂的被造的本性决定了它与造物主的本体论层面的差异,这决定了灵魂只能归向上帝才能保存自己。灵魂与造物者之间的这一根本差异同时也标志了奥古斯丁与柏拉图主义者之间的根本差异。这一差异将会引发一连串其它的差别。

灵魂的这一变异不定的状况,使得灵魂始终面临着彻底腐坏和堕落的可能性,“离弃上帝,存于自身之中,愉悦自身,这不会一下子就使得人失去全部存在,但确实使得人的存在趋于虚无”<sup>[77]</sup>。因此,当普罗提诺返回内心,感受到的是与神的交融与合一,奥古斯丁返回内心,首先看到的则是一个灵魂因罪而深陷其中的黑暗的深渊。“天使堕落了,人的灵魂也堕落了,二者说明一切精神受造物的深渊是处于那样的无底黑暗中”<sup>[78]</sup>。类似的感叹一再地弥漫于《忏悔录》全书中。

奥古斯丁灵魂观的真正原创性部分正是在于这里:在灵魂的样子的一种无底黑暗之中,灵魂本

[75] Plotinus: Ennead 1:6. 8, cited from Phillip Cary: Augustine's invention of the inner self (Oxford university press, 2000), p. 37.

[76] 奥古斯丁 Augustine,《忏悔录》Canhui lu [Confessions],周士良 Zho Shiliang 译,(北京 Beijing: 商务印书馆 Shangwu yinshuguan [The Commercial Press], 2008), 62.

[77] Augustine, The City of God. A new translation by Henry Bettenson. Book xiv, chapter 13, p. 572.

[78] 奥古斯丁 Augustine,《忏悔录》Canhui lu [Confessions],周士良 Zho Shiliang 译,(北京 Beijing: 商务印书馆 Shangwu yinshuguan [The Commercial Press], 2008), 293.

身已经无力去爱上帝,而是需要上帝恩典的介入,人才能够重新爱上帝。奥古斯丁的思路与柏拉图和现代的怀疑论者都不同。与柏拉图主义相比,奥古斯丁否认了靠灵魂自身依然能爱上帝;与现代的怀疑论者相比,奥古斯丁通过恩典的介入,依然肯定了爱上帝的可能性。

在《忏悔录》卷 13 中,奥古斯丁对这一灵魂层面的黑暗深渊做了一个极具灵性意味的的确是大师级的类比,奥古斯丁把这一灵魂层面的黑暗类比于《圣经·创世纪》开篇中的“地是空虚混沌,渊面黑暗”。通过这一类比,奥古斯丁就开启了一场宏伟的“灵魂的创世纪”的剧目。奥古斯丁灵魂观的新奇、独特与深刻,虽然一定程度上受柏拉图主义的影响,但其中的核心和精华则完全来自于他本人极具创造性的对《圣经·创世纪》开篇的灵性化解读。

《圣经·创世纪》中紧接着“地是空虚混沌,渊面黑暗”的是“上帝的灵运行在水面上”。对奥古斯丁而言,“上帝的灵运行在水面上”,其灵性化的含义就是“圣神慈祥地运行在我们黑暗漂流的心灵之上”<sup>[79]</sup>。这样,当奥古斯丁返回内心,虽然首先看到的是渊面黑暗,但再抬头向上看时,则看到了(模糊地看到了)圣神,那永恒的真理之光,照耀着这个黑暗。这就是奥古斯丁版本的内在性转向的要点,即著名的“由内而上”(in then up),在《忏悔录》卷七中,奥古斯丁这样写道:

“你指示我反求诸己,我在你引导下进入我的心灵,我所以能如此,是由于你已成为我的助力。我进入心灵后,我用我灵魂的眼睛——虽则还是很模糊的——瞻望着在我灵魂的眼睛之上的、在我思想之上的永定之光。这光,不是肉眼可见的、普通的光,也不是同一类型而比较强烈的、发射更清晰的光芒普照四方的光。不,这光并不是如此,完全是另一种光明。这光在我思想上,也不似油浮于水,天复于地;这光在我之上,因为它创造了我,我在其下,因为我是它创造的。谁认识真理,即认识这光;谁认识这光,也就认识永恒。惟有爱能认识它。”<sup>[80]</sup>

当然,对奥古斯丁而言,“圣神慈祥地运行在我们黑暗漂流的心灵之上”并不意味着人心内在的黑暗状态由此一劳永逸地被穿透了,“圣神慈祥地运行”只是使得人心有可能从这种黑暗状态中摆脱出来,它只是开启了一种全新的可能性空间,一种生命的新的向度,而至于选择光明还是耽于黑暗,则尚有待于人自己的抉择。换种表述方式是,圣神通过慈祥的运行,以一种全新的终末盼望召唤人,从而激发了人性中一种新的爱,一个新的意志。并且,正是在这个意义上,我们说这一新的爱与意志不是灵魂自发产生的,而是圣神的恩赐,因为,正如《约翰福音》所言,拥有了这一新的爱与意志的人“不是从血气生的,不是从情欲生的,也不是从人意生的,乃是从上帝生的”<sup>[81]</sup>。

这样,奥古斯丁神哲学的基本命题就是:对上帝的爱之所以是可能的,是因为上帝爱我们。如果不是上帝首先以“言语打开了我的心”<sup>[82]</sup>,如果没有上帝“用奇妙而隐秘的方式来解救我们”<sup>[83]</sup>,则人性将继续沉沦于黑暗之中,从而也就不可能有对上帝的爱。但正如奥古斯丁所言,上帝对人的爱是很奇妙的,上帝绝不会由于自身对人的爱而使得人本身可以放弃任何努力,因此,上帝对人的爱的其中一个奇妙之处就在于,他通过赐予人性一个新的意志,一种新的爱,从而使得人性内在地处于一种紧张状态之中,一种新的意志与旧的意志,新的爱(对上帝的爱)与旧的爱(对被造之物的爱)之间的紧

[79] 同上,第 299 页。

[80] 同上,第 126 页。

[81] 《约翰福音》1:13

[82] 奥古斯丁 Augustine,《忏悔录》Canhui lu [Confessions],周士良 Zhu Shiliang 译,(北京 Beijing:商务印书馆 Shangwu yinshuguan[The Commercial Press],2008),189.

[83] 同上,第 109 页。



张状态。恩典不是取消自由意志,而是使得人开始与罪作斗争,使得人开始为了自由,即从罪的束缚中解脱而努力。

这样,通过恩典的作为,才在自爱而来的深渊之中,兴起了对上帝的爱,“灵魂的恶,是由于它自己的意志的主动;但灵魂的善,造物主的意志采取了最先的行动,无论是指对灵魂的创造本身还是指当灵魂因为堕落而毁灭时再造灵魂”<sup>[84]</sup>。这就是爱欲的分野。但由于恩典不取消自由意志,这最终也意味着,两种爱,两种意志的分野与斗争将贯穿于历史的始终。而由于人性本身是在爱欲的牵引之下才塑造成型,从而爱欲的分野也构成了两种人的分野,即地上之城和上帝之城公民的分野。奥古斯丁这样写道:

“两个城开始死生相继的过程,其中最先问世的,乃是这个世俗之城,随后才是上帝之城中的公民,是此世中的过客。他靠恩典被预定了,靠恩典被拣选了,靠恩典成为下界的过客,靠恩典成为上界的公民。至于他自己,则起源于一开始就整个被谴责的质料”<sup>[85]</sup>。

### 三、历史实在的生成

前面的讨论使得我们已经收获了这样两个比较可靠的结论:其一,如果“对上帝的爱”是不可能的,那么,也就不可能有上帝之城与地上之城的二元架构;其二,即便“对上帝的爱”是可能的,这也不足以必然产生上帝之城与地上之城的二元架构,前者只是后者的必要条件,并不充分。尽管在柏拉图那里我们已经看到了形而上的理念世界与形而下的有形世界之间的二元紧张,尽管在普罗提诺那里,这一二元紧张已经被表述为灵魂之内与灵魂之外的二元张力,但是这些二元张力并没有转化为公共政治领域的上帝之城与地上之城的二元紧张。

究竟是什么因素使得在奥古斯丁这里出现了宏伟的上帝之城与地上之城的二元历史架构呢?这里也许存在着一种基本的精神取向上的差异。柏拉图主义的基本精神取向是超越的,是要超越这个形而下的世界,不断地向那个形而上的理念世界挺近。而在奥古斯丁所属的基督教传统这里,绝对的超越者本身进入了历史的时间内部,进入了这个形而下的世界,拯救这个形而下的世界。超越者的这个恩典的作为,引发了与柏拉图主义的彻底决裂。

#### 1. 意志的转向与历史实在的生成

世界作为上帝的造物,因而是好的;同时,道本身成了肉身,进入了历史的时间内部。正是这二重因素促使基督教意识敢于肯定历史实在本身。

所谓基督教意识肯定历史实在,就是指基督教意识肯定生成、变动。一方面,历史实在绝不是静止的东西,而是在人的意志的转向中处于一个不断生成的过程中。另一方面,这一生成、变动是有意义的,因为有一个好的意志参与到了历史实在的生成之中,这个好的意志最终在历史时间内部兴起了一座上帝之城。

关于意志与历史实在的交织,有以下三点。

其一,作为历史实在展开自身的基本的时间结构,即,过去、现在和将来,都需要在意志的参与中才成为一个有意义的统一体。奥古斯丁对时间的著名定义就是:时间是意志的延展。一种没有人的意向性介入其中的客观时间,是纯粹的耗散,是无意义的时间。如果没有记忆,也就没有过去;如果没

[84] Augustine, *The City of God*. A new translation by Henry Bettenson. Book xiii, chapter 15, p. 523.

[85] *Ibid.*, Book xv, chapter 1, p. 596. 此处中译文用的是吴飞的译文。

有专注,也就没有现在;如果没有期望,也就没有将来。奥古斯丁这样写道:

“但将来尚未存在,怎样会减少消耗呢?过去已经不存在,怎样会增加呢?这是由于人的思想工作有三个阶段,即:期望,注意与记忆。所期望的东西,通过注意,进入记忆。谁否定将来尚未存在?但对将来的期望已经存在心中。谁否定过去已不存在?但过去的记忆还存在心中。谁否定现在没有长度,只是疾驰而去的点滴?但注意能持续下去,将来通过注意走向过去。因此,并非将来时间长,将来尚未存在,所谓将来长是对将来的长期等待;并非过去时间长,过去已不存在,所谓过去长是对过去的长期回忆。”<sup>[86]</sup>

其二,随着意志原初的偏离,随着存在的重心从天国跌落到尘世,人不但削减了自己的本性,人还随之而进入到了一个自我构建起来的虚幻不实的历史实在,即地上之城去了。奥古斯丁这样写道:

“他拒绝服从他的创造者,在傲慢中他把自身的权势视为自己的私人所有物,并陶醉于这一权势之中。所以,他既是一个欺骗者 又是一个被骗者,因为没有存在者能够逃脱全能者的权势。他拒绝接受实在(reality),并在他的骄傲自得中放肆地去伪造一个非实在(unreality)”<sup>[87]</sup>。

说地上之城是一个“非实在”,说它虚幻不实,是指它是对原初的实在的偏离,并最终趋向于虚无。“地上之城起源和终结于地上,它除了在此世可见的之外没有任何别的希望”<sup>[88]</sup>。

其三,历史的时间内部绝非仅有地上之城,使得历史的时间充满意义的正是在于经由恩典之经世,一部分人开始悔改、觉醒,兴起了对上帝的爱,从而形成了一座漂泊中的上帝之城。对奥古斯丁而言,上帝之城的全部现实性是由上帝本身所担保的,因为上帝之城本就是上帝亲手恩赐和拣选的结果,在《忏悔录》卷 13 中奥古斯丁这样写道:

“我们在羁旅之中已经得到保证,日后将成为光明;我们已经因希望而得救,已是光明之子,白昼之子,不再是过去的黑夜之子,黑暗之子。在二者之间,在人类变化不定的意识中,只有你能区分,因为你洞悉我们的心,你称光为昼,称暗为夜。除了你,谁能鉴别我们?我们有什么不受自你的呢?从同一团泥,一块作成贵重的器皿,而另一块作成卑陋的器皿”<sup>[89]</sup>

## 2. 希望原理

历史的时间内部已经兴起了一座上帝之城。基督教意识在此却必须保持一种微妙的平衡。一方面,上帝之城已然是一种经验性的实在,因而任何把它抽象化为一种理想和原则的解读,都偏离了奥古斯丁的意图。“因着信仰,在尘世就形成了上帝之城,它是由那些渴望呼唤上帝之名的人组成的”<sup>[90]</sup>。另一方面,任何因为历史的时间内部已然兴起了一座上帝之城,从而绝对肯定历史本身的做法,也彻底误解了奥古斯丁。羁旅中的上帝之城一方面被外在的恶所包围,另一方面也依然处于和自己内在的罪做斗争的进程之中。“只要我们依然处于肉身和灵性的内在纷争之中,我们就不能认为自己已经获得幸福,而幸福是我们希望通过胜利达成的目标。谁会那么智慧,以至认为根本不必再与欲望作战?”<sup>[91]</sup>

历史的时间并不完全属于地上之城,但是,在历史的时间内部也并不会出现一种终极完美的状

[86] 奥古斯丁 Augustine,《忏悔录》Canhui lu [Confessions],周士良 Zho Shiliang 译,(北京 Beijing:商务印书馆 Shangwu yinshuguan [The Commercial Press],2008),255-256.

[87] Augustine, The City of God. A new translation by Henry Bettenson (中国社会科学出版社影印本 Zhongguo shehuikexue chubanshe yingyinben [China Social Publishing House],1999),Book XI,chapter 13,p. 445.

[88] Ibid,Book xv,chapter 18,p. 627.

[89] 奥古斯丁 Augustine《忏悔录》Canhui lu [Confessions],周士良 Zho Shiliang 译,(北京 Beijing:商务印书馆 Shangwu yinshuguan[The Commercial Press],2008),299.

[90] Augustine, The City of God. A new translation by Henry Bettenson. (中国社会科学出版社影印本 Zhongguo shehuikexue chubanshe yingyinben[China Social Publishing House],1999),Book XI,chapter 13,p. 628.

[91] Ibid,Book xix,chapter 4,p. 854.



态,这就是奥古斯丁试图揭示的微妙平衡。奥古斯丁为他的著作《论三位一体》的第15卷,也是最后一卷取了这样一个很有意思的题目:“人这一完善形象的绝对的不足之处”。

然而,如果说在历史的时间内部不会出现一种终极完美的状态,那么,奥古斯丁也由此打开了人的存在的一个根本维度:希望的维度。人并不仅仅活在过去和当下,人也活在对将来的希望之中。“人是在希望中作为复活之子活着的;上帝之城在羁旅中,也活在希望之中,而这源于对基督复活的信仰”<sup>[92]</sup>。

对基督教意识而言,希望最终意味着一种信任和托付,对道成肉身以及最后的终末审判的信任和托付。希望意识是一种末世论意识。

## 四、结论

神人关系及其具体表现,即恩典与自由意志的辩证是奥古斯丁神哲学的重中之重。从意志原初的偏离出发,我们进入到了人的本性的削减,以及历史实在的变迁,即地上之城的发展;而经由恩典之作为,历史的内部萌生出了新的意志,人性开始与罪之链条作斗争,充满希望的新的历史实在在历史时间内部展开自身,此即上帝之城。对于奥古斯丁而言,世界历史的全部秘密不是在于历史的时间内部,而是在于神之恩典进入了历史的时间内部,从而开启了世界历史的全新征程。

恩典与自由意志的辩证,在现代性的哲学话语中已经被破坏和流失,恩典的维度被切割了,剩下的仅仅是那主导着自由意志的爱欲的迷狂了。比如,在霍布斯的人性学说那里,我们已经只能找到欲望与激情近乎盲目的奔流,我们已经再也找不到那运行于欲望与激情之上的那一永恒的内在之光。同样,在尼采那里,位于人性深处的那个处于永恒意欲状态中的权力意志构成我们存在的本源。

在这个意义上,我们可以说现代性的哲学话语是一种遮蔽,它过分地使我们的目光聚焦于地上之城及其运行规律,而遮蔽了上帝之城这一历史实在。

[92] Ibid, Book xv, chapter 18, p. 628.

**English Title:**

**The Divergence of Love and The Genesis of Historical Reality: An Inquiry into Augustine's Thesis of Two Cities**

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**Abstract:** The dialectic between grace and free will, which reflects the relationship between God and man, is the most important point of Augustine's theory of two cities. Due to the original misuse of free will, mankind experienced the ruin of its nature, as a result of which the earthly city formed. Through the work of grace, a new will was formed in historical time, whereby the city of God began to develop. For Augustine, the secret to understanding world history can be found in the breakthrough of grace into historical time.

**Key Words:** Augustine, the city of god, historical reality

# The Similarities and Differences between the Aristotelian Relations and the Duality Relations: From the Traditional Square of Oppositions to the Buridanian Octagons<sup>[1]</sup>

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**Abstract:** This article attempts to deal with two sets of logical relations, namely Aristotelian relations and duality relations. Through classical diagrammatic representations assigned to them, we get the Aristotelian square of oppositions and the duality square which seem to have a sort of isomorphism. As a matter of fact, many interesting Aristotelian squares turn out to also be duality squares, and vice versa. The aim of this article, however, is to show that the two sets of relations in question are neither equivalent nor isomorphic. They not only have a variety of different logical properties, but are also mutually independent both in essence and conceptually. By adding more formulas, the diagrams exhibiting the logical relations between these formulas became more complicated and the differences between the Aristotelian diagrams and the duality diagrams have become more perspicuous. One of these complicated diagrams that has been chosen for this article is the octagon provided by Buridan, the great 14<sup>th</sup> century logician. This octagon is both an extension of the opposition square and the duality square. As a result, the non-isomorphism between Aristotelian relations and duality relations embodied in this one and single representation is more easily and clearly perceived.

**Key Words:** Aristotelian relations; Duality relations; Traditional square of oppositions; Duality square; Buridanian octagon

## 1. Introduction

This article attempts to deal with two sets of logical relations which are known in the literatures by the names of the Aristotelian relations and the duality relations. The purpose of this discussion is to gain a deeper and better understanding of each by inspecting one with reference to another. The name of the former set of relations has an apparent historical connotation as the four types of logical relations classically incorporated under its head appear for the first time in Aristotle's logical works. In the later development of that theory, however, the explications and applications of those relations by some of the main logicians and philosophers go far beyond the original linguistic and conceptual

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[1] Cf. ,Paulos Huang, "Dialogue and Critique: The 16<sup>th</sup> Century Religious Reform and Modernity", International Journal of Sino-Western Studies, vol. 12, 1-12. (<https://www.sinowesternstudies.com/back-issues/vol-12-2017/>)

framework offered by Aristotle. Hence whenever the term Aristotelian is used, it is not intended to mean that the following concept or proposition modified by it is historically proposed or used by Aristotle himself. Rather it is merely a mark or a tag indicating a certain well-defined logical relation in question.

Duality is a very general and pervasive phenomenon encountered in nearly every branch of mathematical theories and other theories that have mathematically formalized languages to some extent. Generally speaking, the principle of duality associates one object, concept, structure or theorem with another one. It is a principle about how two concepts or operations can be substituted with each other in a variety of contexts. Probably the most popular and simple example of the general notion of duality comes from set theory. The various kinds of operations involved in complementation typically represent the duality phenomenon. Suppose that both the sets  $A$  and  $B$  are subsets of a given set  $E$ . That is to say, all the complementation operations ( $'$ ) are to be performed relative to  $E$ . Then we will have the following facts:

- ①  $\emptyset' = E$  and  $E' = \emptyset$
- ②  $A \cap A' = \emptyset$  and  $A \cup A' = E$
- ③  $A \supseteq B$  iff  $B' \supseteq A'$
- ④  $(A \cup B)' = A' \cap B'$  and  $(A \cap B)' = A' \cup B'$

It is quite easy to see that all the equations appear in pairs. This highlights the syntactic feature of the notion of duality, which mainly concerns the possibility of making substitutions of certain logical operations in our formulas. The formulas resulting from the substitutions become the dual formulas of the original ones.<sup>[2]</sup> In particular there is one kind of duality phenomenon pervasive in various natural and artificial languages which concerns the interaction between external negation and internal negation. It is this duality that is most frequently discussed in linguistic, logical and philosophical contexts and specifically it is this duality that people have in mind as they are thinking about the Aristotelian square of oppositions. Furthermore, there is an interesting phenomenon in the history of logic that various concrete squares proposed and considered by logicians of different era are both Aristotelian squares and duality squares embodying the interactions between the negation operations.

The most apparent and prominent non-logical feature shared by Aristotelian relations and duality relations is that they are both given certain diagrammatic representations. Doubtlessly the most popular one is the so called traditional square of oppositions and its corresponding duality square. In middle ages, several important logicians all pay their attentions to the square of

[2] Paul Halmos, *Naive Set Theory*, (Springer, New York, 1974), 17-18.

oppositions, such as Avicenna (Chatti 2012, 2014)<sup>[3]</sup> and Buridan (Hughes 1987; Read 2012).<sup>[4]</sup> At the same time, in order to investigate more complex logical systems and syllogism patterns, the medieval logicians start to go beyond the restrictive area of squares and 4 propositions. They take so many more propositions and logical relations into account that the resulting diagrams become extraordinarily complicated, such as the hexagon of William of Sherwood (Kretzmann 1966; Khomskii 2012)<sup>[5]</sup> and 3 complex octagons of Buridan. In contemporary formal logic, the square of oppositions is widely used in a variety of branches, like general modal logic (Fitting and Mendelsohn 1998; Carnielli and Pizzi 2008)<sup>[6]</sup>, epistemic logic (Lenzen 2012)<sup>[7]</sup> and temporal logic (Rini and Cresswell 2012)<sup>[8]</sup>. At the same time, the opposition square is also applied far outside of the boundary set by logic and philosophy into the field of natural language, psychology, neural science, computer science and so on. Just as the logician Jacqueline said, the opposition square and the logical relations demonstrated in it have already become a certain type of lingua franca used in various different domains.<sup>[9]</sup>

Similar situation obtains in the case of duality. The ubiquity of the phenomenon in most of the formal languages following the laws of classical logic and the logical behaviors of it are already well-known. In natural language, duality exists cross-linguistically and systematically and the realizations of which are much more diverse and complicated. These data about duality have led to the view that it would be better to be treated as a type of semantic universal.<sup>[10]</sup> Hence duality and duality square also indeed play the role of lingua franca no less than the Aristotelian relations. In virtue of focusing on duality, we are hopefully able to achieve a better understanding of the interactions between natural languages and logics on one side and their formal counterparts on the other.

[3] S. Chatti, "Logical Oppositions in Arabic logic: Avicenna and Averroes", in Béziau, J. Y. & Jacqueline, D. eds., *Around and Beyond the Square of Opposition*, (Springer, Basel, 2012), 21-42. And Chatti, "Avicenna on possibility and necessity", *Hist. Philos. Log.* 35, 2014, 332-353.

[4] G. Hughes, "The modal logic of John Buridan," in Corsi, G., Mangione, C. & Mugnai, M. eds., *Atti del convegno internazionale di storia della logica e teorie delle modalita*, (CLUEB, Bologna, 1987), 93-111. S. Read, "John Buridan's theory of consequence and his octagons of opposition." In Béziau J. Y. & Jacqueline, D. eds., *Around and Beyond the Square of Opposition*, (Springer, Basel, 2012), 93-110. For the historical origin and development of the traditional square of opposition, see: T. Parsons, "The traditional square of opposition," in Zalta, E. N. ed., *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, (CSLI, Stanford, 2017); P. Seuren, *The Logic of Language*, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010), Chapter 5; D. Londey and C. Johanson, *The Logic of Apuleius*, (Brill, Leiden, 1987); M. Correia, "Boethius on the square of opposition," in Béziau, J. Y. & Jacqueline, D. eds., *Around and Beyond the Square of Opposition*, (Springer, Basel, 2012), 41-52.

[5] N. Kretzmann, *William of Sherwood's Introduction to Logic*, (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1966). Y. Khomskii, "William of Sherwood, singular propositions and the hexagon of opposition", in Béziau J. Y. & Jacqueline, D. eds., *Around and Beyond the Square of Opposition*, (Springer, Basel, 2012), 43-60. For the modern version of this hexagon, see: T. Czeżowski, "On certain peculiarities of singular propositions," *Mind*, 64, (1955), 392-395.

[6] M. Fitting & R. Mendelsohn, *First-Order Modal Logic*, (Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1998). W. Carnielli & C. Pizzi, *Modalities and Multimodalities*, (Berlin, Springer, 2008).

[7] W. Lenzen, "How to square knowledge and belief," in Béziau J. Y. & Jacqueline, D. eds., *Around and Beyond the Square of Opposition*, (Springer, Basel, 2012), 305-311.

[8] A. Rini & M. Cresswell, *The World-Time Parallel. Tense and Modality in Logic and Metaphysics*, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012).

[9] D. Jacqueline, "Thinking Outside the Square of Opposition Box," in Béziau J. Y. & Jacqueline, D. eds., *Around and Beyond the Square of Opposition*, (Basel, Springer, 2012), 81.

[10] van Benthem, "Linguistic universals in logical semantics", In: Zaefferer, D. ed., *Semantic Universals and Universal Semantics*, (Foris, Berlin, 1991), 17-36.

The first apparent impression we get by inspecting the Aristotelian square and the duality square side by side is that they seem to have an isomorphism to some extent. As a matter of fact, a good deal of interesting Aristotelian squares turns out to be duality squares simultaneously and vice versa. In spite of that, the two sets of relations in question are actually neither equivalent nor isomorphic. They have not only a variety of different logical properties but are also mutually independent both essentially and conceptually. It is not appropriate to characterize one set of logical behaviors in terms of languages and concepts suitable for the other. At the level of a square, as simple as it is, the inappropriateness is not that prominent. With the addition of more formulas, however, the geometric figures exhibiting the logical relations among them are getting more complicated and consequentially the differences between the Aristotelian diagrams and the duality diagrams are getting more perspicuous. By reference to those mutual discrepancies, it is easier to shed light on the nature of each one of them separately. The complicated diagram chosen in this article is the octagon provided by Buridan, the great 14th century logician. This octagon is both an extension of the opposition square and the duality square. As a result, the non-isomorphism between the Aristotelian relations and the duality relations embodied in this one and single representation is more clearly perceived.

This article then follows the following structure: in section 2, duality is dealt with. After the presentation of some typical cases of duality relations, a formal definition is given, the logical properties are characterized and the duality squares are drawn; in section 3, the Aristotelian relations are expounded both formally and informally. The corresponding opposition squares are drawn at last; in section 4, the structural similarities and the essential differences of the Aristotelian relations and the duality relations are discussed in two parts respectively. In section 5, the focus is on Buridan's modal octagon, the purpose of which is to make the differences between the two sets of logical relations much more prominent.

## 2 Duality and its definition

### 2.1 Some typical cases of duality

As has been said in introduction, the duality phenomenon concerned with in this article comes from the interactions between two kinds of negation. In this section, some simple and concrete examples are presented.

In propositional logic, we have the following four equivalences about the logical behaviors of conjunction and disjunction:

$$(1) \varphi \wedge \psi \equiv \neg (\neg \varphi \vee \neg \psi)$$

$$(2) \varphi \vee \psi \equiv \neg (\neg \varphi \wedge \neg \psi)$$

$$(3) \neg (\varphi \wedge \psi) \equiv \neg \varphi \vee \neg \psi$$

$$(4) \neg (\varphi \vee \psi) \equiv \neg \varphi \wedge \neg \psi$$

The four equivalents make it clear that the external negation of conjunction (disjunction) equals the internal negation of disjunction (conjunction) and the external negation of the internal negation of conjunction (disjunction) equals disjunction (conjunction). Taken together, the above four



equivalents themselves are equivalent to each other and say the same thing, that is, the conjunction and disjunction connectives are each other's dual.

Another classical example comes from predicate logic, which concerns the logical interaction between the universal quantifier and the existential quantifiers. Again, we have four equivalents about the logical relations between universal and existential quantifiers:

$$(5) \exists x\varphi \equiv \sim \forall x \sim \varphi$$

$$(6) \forall x\varphi \equiv \sim \exists x \sim \varphi$$

$$(7) \sim \exists x\varphi \equiv \forall x \sim \varphi$$

$$(8) \sim \forall x\varphi \equiv \exists x \sim \varphi$$

Analogously the four equivalents indicate that the universal quantifier stands in the duality relation to the existential quantifier.

Finally in modal logic and between the necessity operator and possibility operator, the similar equivalents obtain once again:

$$(9) \Box \varphi \equiv \sim \sim \varphi$$

$$(10) \varphi \equiv \sim \Box \sim \varphi$$

$$(11) \sim \Box \varphi \equiv \sim \varphi$$

$$(12) \sim \varphi \equiv \Box \sim \varphi$$

## 2.2 General definitions and logical properties of duality

Duality can be defined on different levels of abstraction. Based on the typical examples above, the logical operators involved will be generalized to any n-ary operator. Assuming  $A$  to be the set of all well-formed formulas,  $\sim$  to be the negation connective in classical logic and  $O, Q$  to be two n-ary operators on set  $A: A^n \rightarrow A$ , then for any n number of formulas  $a_1, \dots, a_n$  in  $A$ , the duality relations can be defined as follows:

- $O$  is the external negation of  $Q$  ( $E(O, Q)$ ) iff  $O(a_1, \dots, a_n) \equiv \sim Q(a_1, \dots, a_n)$
- $O$  is the internal negation of  $Q$  ( $I(O, Q)$ ) iff  $O(a_1, \dots, a_n) \equiv Q(\sim a_1, \dots, \sim a_n)$
- $O$  is the dual of  $Q$  ( $D(O, Q)$ ) iff  $O(a_1, \dots, a_n) \equiv \sim Q(\sim a_1, \dots, \sim a_n)$

The duality examples from 2.1c clearly show that any group of duality phenomenon actually involves not only two propositions or operators, but four. Given a proposition  $P$ , negating it externally, internally and both, we will get a group of four propositions including the original one. Some logicians, therefore, recommend replacing the notion of duality with the notion of quaternality (Gottschalk 1953).<sup>[11]</sup> In order to technically tackle the four propositions in a uniform manner, it would be better to view the proposition  $P$  itself as a result of some operation, which is called identity (ID) and defined as follows:

$$\bullet O = Q \text{ (ID}(O, Q)\text{) iff } O(a_1, \dots, a_n) \equiv Q(a_1, \dots, a_n)$$

As a result, we get a set of duality relations containing four elements:  $D = \{ID, E, I, D\}$ . It is easy to check that the elements in  $D$  are not just any old relations but functions. For any operator  $O$  and for any relation  $R$  in  $D$ , there exists a unique operator  $Q$  such that  $R(O, Q)$ . As long as the functionality of the duality relations is guaranteed, we are able to change our notation from relation to function and relative to the set  $D$ , for any operator  $Q$  we are able to form another four-element set

[11] W. H. Gottschalk, "The theory of quaternality," *Symb. Log.* 18, (1953), 193-196.

of duality operators generated by  $Q: O(Q) = \{ID(Q), E(Q), I(Q), D(Q)\}$ . By investigating the above concrete duality examples, simple logical computations reveal the following properties of the set  $D$ :

- a)  $E \circ E(Q) = ID(Q) = Q$
- b)  $I \circ I(Q) = ID(Q) = Q$
- c)  $D \circ D(Q) = ID(Q) = Q$
- d)  $E \circ I(Q) = I \circ E(Q) = D(Q)$
- e)  $E \circ D(Q) = D \circ E(Q) = I(Q)$
- f)  $D \circ I(Q) = I \circ D(Q) = E(Q)$

Informally speaking, for any operator, the external negation of its external negation, the internal negation of its internal negation and the dual of its dual are all equivalent to itself. And among  $E, I$  and  $D$ , any combination of any two of them equal the third. The first three clauses together confirm that all the duality relations have the property of symmetry. From the above equations, it is not difficult to see that the set  $O(Q)$  actually can be generated by any one of its element. Generally speaking, for any operator  $Q' \in O(Q)$ , we have  $O(Q') = O(Q)$ , which implies that  $\mathcal{A}(Q)$  is closed under the duality relations. Applying any operation in  $\mathcal{D}$  any number of times to any operator in  $O(Q)$  will not take us outside of the set.<sup>[12]</sup> In their concrete linguistic realizations, the relevant logical behaviors are not expressed merely by one single proposition or sentence but a set of logically equivalent propositions.

As so many scholars have already pointed out (Piaget 1949; Gottschalk 1953; Loebner 1990; van Benthem 1991; Peters and Westerståhl 2006; Demey and Smessaert 2015), the property of duality can be clearly shown by a Klein four group V4 with the following Cayley table:

$\circ$	$ID$	$E$	$I$	$D$
$ID$	$ID$	$E$	$I$	$D$
$E$	$E$	$ID$	$D$	$I$
$I$	$I$	$D$	$ID$	$E$
$D$	$D$	$I$	$E$	$ID$

### 2.3 Duality squares

According to the above definitions of duality relations, based on the set of duality operators  $O(Q)$  generated by any  $Q$  and its logical properties, we can visually represent the duality relations as follows (INEG stands for internal negation; ENEG stands for external negation; DUAL stands for dual. ):<sup>[13]</sup>

[12] Westerståhl formulates this property as a fact about the duality square, that is, each quantifier in the square spans the same square. See: D. Westerståhl, "Classical vs. modern squares of opposition, and beyond," in Béziau, J. Y. & Payette, G. eds., The Square of Opposition: A General Framework for Cognition, (Peter Lang, Bern, 2012), 195-229; S. Peters and D. Westerståhl, Quantifiers in Language and Logic, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006).

[13] There is also an Identity function in the set of duality relations  $\mathcal{D} = \{ID, E, I, D\}$  which is not explicitly signified in the squares. In every vertex, however, there are two equivalent propositions, which implicitly show the Identity relation. If we also want to visually clearly indicate the Identity relation in each square, we just need to put a loop on all the vertices pointing to themselves.




Figure 1 Duality Squares: (a)Conjunction and Disjunction(b)Universal quantifier and Existential quantifier(c)Necessity and Possibility operators(d)Material Implication

### 3 The Aristotelian relations

#### 3.1 Informal characterizations

The typical Aristotelian logical relations appear firstly inDe Interpretatione. Aristotle says:

I call an affirmation and a negation contradictory opposites when what one signifies universally the other signifies not universally, e. g. every man is white—not every man is white, no man is white—some man is white. But I call the universal affirmation and the universal negation contrary opposites, e. g. every man is just—no man is just. So these cannot be true together, but their opposites may both be true with respect to the same thing, e. g. not every man is white—some man is white. (17b. 16-26)<sup>[14]</sup>

In this passage Aristotle explicitly mentions two types of opposition relations which are contradictory and contrary. It amounts to say that A and O are contradictories, E and I are contradictories, and that A and E are contraries. Moreover, the contradiction relation constitutes the starting point of his treatment. This of course is consistent with his basic attitude towards the Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC). In his point of view LNC is the first principle which cannot be demonstrated. It is a primitive axiom of his entire logical system. As regards LNC, Aristotle actually give us several non-equivalent formulations. What are relevant here are the two versions of LNC distinguished by Łukasiewicz, which are ontological and logical respectively:

It is impossible for the same thing to belong and not to belong at the same time

[14] J. L. Ackrill, Aristotle: Categories and De Interpretatione, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1963).

to the same thing and in the same respect. (Met. 1005b19-23)

The opinion that opposite assertions are not simultaneously true is the firmest of all. (Met. 1011b13-14)

LNC imposes a requirement on the contradictory propositions, which is that they cannot be true together. But it does not mention the possibility about the distribution of the falsity. Therefore we are not able to get a pair of contradictions only by LNC. It is just not sufficient to distinguish between the contradictory opposition and contrary opposition. Contradiction needs a stronger logical property. This property is governed by another improvable logical law which is the Law of Excluded Middle (LEM):

Of any one subject, one thing must be either asserted or denied. (Met. 1011b24)

As a result, for any pair of contradictory propositions, one of them is true if and only if the other one is false. LNC guarantees them not to be both true and LEM guarantees them not to be both false.

After establishment of the logical properties of contradiction, we are now turning to investigating the contrary opposition. Based on the above quoted text from *De Interpretatione*, we can tell that Aristotle points out two conditions: firstly two contrary propositions cannot be true together; secondly their opposites (apparently meaning the contradictory opposites) can be true together. It is easy to infer from this that if the contradictories of the two contrary propositions can be true together, then according to the truth value distribution requirements of LNC those two contrary propositions can be false together.

Aristotle does not explicitly put forward the notion of subcontrariety.<sup>[15]</sup> In the passage we have seen, he only denotes them as the (contradictory) opposites of the contraries and states that they can be true together. Assuming that they are both false, the contradictories of them will both be true. Their contradictories of them, however, are two contrary propositions, which cannot be true together. Therefore the propositions in the relation of subcontrariety cannot be false together. In *Prior Analytics*, Aristotle only counts the subcontrary propositions as verbal oppositions. Probably the reason is that for Aristotle there is a kind of strict sense for the notion of opposition to have, which is that for two propositions to stand in a mutually opposed relation they at least have to be mutually exclusive. So if Aristotle conceives the strict notion of opposition in terms of incompatibility, two propositions opposed to each other cannot be true together. It is not unreasonable, however, to

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[15] Aristotle seems to have no technical term for the concept of subcontrariety. Normally speaking, he uses *antiphrasis* and *antiphatikos antikeimenos* to name contradiction. Or as shown in the quoted text, *antikeimenos* is directly used alone to name contradiction. As for contrariety, he has the term *enantiai*. The first appearance of the notion of subcontrariety can be found in Apuleius' work *Peri Hermeneias*. In it, he uses the Latin term *subpares* for the concept of subcontrariety. *Incongruae* denotes opposition and *alterutrae* names contradiction. (M. W. Sullivan, *Apuleian Logic*, (North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1967), 65; Londey and Johanson, (1987), 56, 88-89, 111; Seuren, (2010), 152). The Greek counterpart of *subcontrariae* is *hypoenantiai* the first use of which can be found in Ammonius' Greek Commentary on Aristotle's *De Interpretatione*; "The particulars are called sub-contraries, because they are placed below the contraries and follow from them." (A. Busse, *Ammonius in Aristotelis De Interpretatione Commentarius*, (Royal Prussian Academy of Science, Georg Reimer, Berlin, 1897), 92).

incorporate the subcontrariety in an indirect way into the traditional square of oppositions. After all, this concept can be ultimately defined by the concept of contrariety and the latter satisfies the condition for opposition in the strict sense.

The situation is similar in the case of subalternation. After the identification of the truth value distribution properties for contradiction, contrariety and subcontrariety, the relevant property of the subalternation relation naturally follows. As in the relation of subcontrariety, two propositions that are in subalternation can be true together. In light of Aristotle's choice of words, we may have to view them as opposed to each other only verbally. On the other hand, also like the case of subcontrariety, we are able to define subalternation in terms of contrariety. A and I are in subalternation only if there is an E such that A and E are contrary and I and E are contradictory. Another important thing worth noting is that subalternation involves directionality. That is to say, when A is true, I has to be true. The modal force here conveys the property of directionality and indicates the truth being transmitted from A to I, not the other way around.

In sum the typical four Aristotelian logical relations can be formulated informally as follows:

- Two propositions are contradictory iff they cannot have the same truth value, i. e. cannot both be true and both be false.
- Two propositions are contraries iff they cannot both be true but can both be false.
- Two propositions are subcontraries iff they cannot both be false but can both be true.
- A proposition is a subaltern of another iff it must be true if its superaltern is true, and the superaltern must be false if the subaltern is false.

### 3.2 Formal definitions

In the course of trying to formally define the Aristotelian relations, it is necessary for us to pay special attentions to two of the features in our informal descriptions of them. Firstly, in our informal characterizations of contradiction, contrariety and subcontrariety, the word both occurs in all cases. It indicates one crucial criterion to distinguish among those three relations, which concerns the possibility of an identical truth value distribution. In the following formalizations, we will use the common sentential conjunction to deal with this criterion. Secondly there exists certain modal force in our informal definitions of the four Aristotelian relations, which is reflected in words like can and must. We consider this modal force expressing the notion of logical validity, which means we cannot define the Aristotelian relations simply by the logical connectives but have to define them in terms of valid and invalid relations.

Based on the above two points, we firstly define a simplified Aristotelian opposition language as  $L(OP) = \langle P, C \rangle$ .  $P$  is a countable set of predicates,  $C$  is the set of logical constants, including the necessary ordinary sentential connectives (here we take negation and conjunction as primitive) and the four special symbols for constructing the Aristotelian categorical propositions, which are a, e, i and o. In Aristotle's terminology, they correspond respectively to "hyparchein panti", "hyparchein oudeni", "hyparchein tini" and "ouch hyparchein tini".<sup>[16]</sup> The well-formed formulas of this language are pretty simple: if  $A$  and  $B \in P$ , then  $AaB$ ,  $AeB$ ,  $AiB$  and  $AoB$  are well-formed and based on those types of elementary propositions the negations and conjunctions of them can be formed. Further, let's

[16] See: J. Lukasiewicz, *Aristotle's Syllogistic*, (Clarendon, Oxford, 1957), 16.

assume a consequence relation ( $\models$ ) for this language. Then for any two formulas  $\varphi$  and  $\psi$  in  $L$ , we define a set of Aristotelian relations  $R = \{CD, CT, SCT, SA\}$  (corresponding respectively to contradiction, contrary, subcontrary and subalternation) as follows:

- $CD(\varphi, \psi)$  iff  $\models \sim(\varphi \wedge \psi)$  and  $\models \sim(\sim\varphi \wedge \sim\psi)$ ;
- $CT(\varphi, \psi)$  iff  $\models \sim(\varphi \wedge \psi)$  and  $\models \sim(\sim\varphi \wedge \sim\psi)$ ;
- $SCT(\varphi, \psi)$  iff  $\models \sim(\varphi \wedge \psi)$  and  $\models \sim(\sim\varphi \wedge \sim\psi)$ ;
- $SA(\varphi, \psi)$  iff  $\models \varphi \rightarrow \psi$  and  $\models \psi \rightarrow \varphi$ .

$\models \sim(\sim\varphi \wedge \sim\psi)$  means that there exists a model capable of satisfying  $\sim\varphi \wedge \sim\psi$ . So the two propositions in contrary relations can be false together. Similarly  $\models \psi \rightarrow \varphi$  means there is model capable of satisfying  $\psi \wedge \sim\varphi$  which in turn determines  $\psi \rightarrow \varphi$  to be invalid.

### 3.3 The Aristotelian opposition squares

It is not Aristotle himself that visually represents the four opposition relations defined as above by squares. The main focuses of Aristotle are on the relations of contradiction and contrariety, since only these two can be counted as true oppositions strictly speaking. But if just these two relations got represented diagrammatically, that would not bring square into existence. According to Londey and Johanson (1987), the earliest use of a square-like figure to present the four Aristotelian relations are done by Apuleius. As we already know, it is Apuleius who puts the subcontrary relation underneath, just parallel to the contrary relation. And it is him who proceeds to describe the situation in geometric terms; two universal propositions should be put on an upper line (superior linea) and two particulars should be placed on a lower line (inferiore linea) (Sullivan 1967). This kind of usage of words in describing the logical relations strongly suggests a square-like representation. Apuleius, however, has not yet identified the two subalternations,<sup>[17]</sup> which means that even if he actually drew a figure with four vertices it would not be a square but only a kind of crossed polygon. The square figure finally gets completed by the hands of Boethius. On the one hand, he explicitly puts forward the relation of subalternation, which provides the theoretical preparation for the possibility of adding two sides to Apuleius' polygon. On the other hand, he considers the visual presentation of the Aristotelian relations to be so important that he is self-consciously trying to do this. In his point of view, if the abstract objects of understanding could be concretely demonstrated in front of the eyes, they would be stored in our memories for a much longer period.<sup>[18]</sup>

In the following, we will present a few modern versions of the Aristotelian squares of oppositions:

[17] In fact, Apuleius does not have any terminology for subalternation.

[18] Superioris autem disputationis integrum descriptionis subdidimus exemplar, quatenus quod animo cogitationique conceptum est oculis expositum memoriae tenacius infigatur. (Meiser 1880: p. 152)






Figure 2 Aristotelian square of oppositions: (a) conjunction (b) universal quantifier (c) necessity operator (d) codes

## 4 The seminaries and dissimilarities of the duality squares and the Aristotelian squares

### 4.1 Structural similarities

By comparison of figure 1 and 2, it is easy to see that the squares constructed by the connectives, quantifiers and modal operators are both duality squares and Aristotelian squares. On the diagrammatical level, there seems to be some kind of isomorphism between those duality squares and opposition squares. In any given duality square, we have 2 external negations, 2 internal negations and 2 duals. In any given opposition square, we have 2 contradictions, 1 contrariety, 1 subcontrariety and 2 subalternations. Since external negation is the most common and typical way to construct a pair of contradictories, we tend to directly associate the 2 contradiction relations in an opposition square with the 2 external negation relations in a duality square. This parallelism is well-established and very neat.

At the same time, it is known that in propositional logic the formula  $\varphi \rightarrow \psi$  is equivalent to the formula  $\sim (\varphi \wedge \sim \psi)$ . And given any two operators  $O$  and  $Q$ , if they are each other's dual, then  $O \equiv \sim Q \sim$ . Therefore, it gives us an apparent impression that both in the case of subalternation and dual, there involve the interactions between external and internal negation. Of course, the impression is misleading to the effect that the so-called internal negation in the formula  $\sim (\varphi \wedge \sim \psi)$  is a negation only applied to  $\psi$ . Besides that, the most common arrangements of the diagrams themselves also strongly induce us to make this correspondence between subalternation and dual, as they are both drawn as occupying the two sides of a square. After establishing these two isomorphisms, the third one naturally follows, which is between internal negation on one side and contrariety and subcontrariety on the other. The problem here, however, is that the corresponding between internal negation and contrariety and subcontrariety is not perfect. It is not a 1-1 mapping, since there are two Aristotelian relations which cause the mess of 1-2.

Generally speaking, if the attention were limited only to the cases of sets of four propositions each of which has only one dominant operator, significant structural similarities between the duality squares and the Aristotelian squares would very likely be found, even to the point of isomorphism.

No matter the square is constructed from conjunction-disjunction pair or from quantifiers or from modal operators, it is both a duality square and an Aristotelian opposition square. And this kind of overlapping seems to result from the interaction between external negation and internal negation. It is obvious and intuitive. With respect to the duality squares, the relations embodied in them are just defined by external and internal negation. As for the Aristotelian relations, the reasons leading to the different situations of truth value distributions are also tended to be thought as consisted in the different positions of the occurrence of negation.

It is true that there is a pretty tight connection between the Aristotelian relations and the negation operations. This fact has already been noticed and confirmed by the medieval logicians. In Peter of Spain's work, he proposes three rules forequipollences (SL. I 18):

- If before any sign we put a negation, it is equipollent to its contradictory.
- If after any universal sign we put a negation, it is equipollent to its contrary.
- If before and after any universal or particular sign we put a negation, it is equipollent to its subalternate.<sup>[19]</sup>

William of Sherwood also puts forward similar rules and further concludes them by the help of a mnemonic verse as follows: Pre contradict, post contrariatur, pre postque subalternantur. (Introductiones 19)<sup>[20]</sup>

The tight connection between the Aristotelian relations and the duality relations, also between the corresponding diagrams, is significantly instantiated by the association of the contradiction of the external negation. In his comment on the above-mentioned first rule of equipollence, Buridan points out that: "there is no better and more reliable way to form the contradictory of a proposition than by prefixing a negation to it that is understood to be operating on the whole proposition." (Summulae 1. 5. 2)<sup>[21]</sup>

From the diagrammatic point of view, inspection and comparison of some of the so called 'collapsed' duality squares and 'degenerate' opposition squares help to shed some lights on the nature of the close connection between contradiction and external negation, which in its turn is conducive to dealing with the problem of similarity between those two sets of squares.

The most famous degenerate version of the traditional square of opposition is its modern

[19] De equipollentiis assignantur regule tales; si alicui signo preponatur negatio, equipollet suo contradictorio. Et ideo equipollet iste; non omnis homo currit/quidam homo non currit; et ita de aliis. Secunda regula talis est; si alicui signo universalis postponatur negatio, equipollet suo contrario, sicut iste; omnis homo non est animal/nullus homo est animal; vel iste; nullus homo non currit/omnis homo currit; et ita de aliis signis universalibus affirmativis et negativis. Tertia regula est talis; si alicui signo universalis vel particulari preponatur et postponatur negatio, equipollet suo subaltern. sicut iste; non omnis homo non currit/quidam homo currit; et iste similiter; non quidam homo non currit/omnis homo currit. Et sic de quolibet alio signo. (B. Copenhaver, C. Normore and T. Parsons, Peter of Spain; Summaries of Logic. Text, Translation, Introduction, and Notes, (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2014), 116-117).

[20] See; N. Kretzmann, William of Sherwood's Introduction to Logic, (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1966), 38. Peter of Spain also likes to propose such kinds of mnemonic verses. Actually, there is the conjecture that one of the reasons that the logical works of Peter of Spain are more popular at that time than the ones of William of Sherwood is simply that the formers contain much more and better mnemonic verses (Kneale, The Development of Logic, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1962), 234). And generally speaking, the way of using metrical devices to help understanding and memory begins to be popular at least since the twelfth century.

[21] Et ista regula sic correctata est universaliter vera, sive in propositionibus categoricis sive in hypotheticis, sive in propositione sit aliquod signum sive non, quia non potest melius et firmiter sumi contradictio ad aliquam propositionem quam sibi praeponendo negationem quae intelligatur cadere super totam propositionem. (Hubien 2001)

revision. As we know, a necessary condition to assure the validity of the Aristotelian relations is the existential import of the affirmative propositions. Specifically, in the Aristotelian logical system, not only do the particular affirmatives have existential import, but also the universal affirmatives do. That is to say, in Aristotelian logic, a type A proposition as “Every S is P” should be formalized as  $x(Sx \rightarrow Px) \wedge \exists xSx$ . Therefore, if there is no entity having the property expressed by S in our domain, the universal judgment is simply false. Only by the warrant of truth conditions determined by the existential import, the logical relations presented by the Aristotelian square of opposition are valid. In contemporary classical first-order logic, however, universal affirmatives do not have existential import. If we formulate the four quantified propositions into the notations of standard first-order predicate calculus, we would end up losing most of the logical relations embodied in it. For example, if we symbolize the logical form of ‘Every S is P’, ‘No S is P’ and ‘Some S is P’ respectively as  $\forall x(Sx \rightarrow Px)$ ,  $\forall x(Sx \rightarrow \sim Px)$  and  $\exists x(Sx \wedge Px)$ , it is not difficult to see that according to the standard truth conditions of these quantified formulas A and E can both be true if the contained subformula Sx is false, especially when there is no x such that Sx. For the same reason, A doesn’t imply I in the sense that there is a model in which A is trivially true but I is false. Therefore, without existential import the traditional square of opposition would be doomed to be a degenerate one, which would give rise to the following diagram with only two pairs of contradictions as survivals:




Figure 3 a degenerate Square of Oppositions

As for the duality squares, the possibility of collapse comes from the loss of efficacy of the negation operation. That is to say, for any given operator, theoretically speaking, applying any operation in the set  $D = \{ID, E, I, D\}$  gives us the original operator itself. It will be shown soon, however, that in reality the efficacy of E cannot be lost in order to secure the consistency of the underlying logical system. If the efficacy of D is cancelled, then for any operator  $O$ ,  $D(O) \equiv O$ .  $O$  becomes the dual of itself. Since  $E \circ D(O) = I(O)$ , by substitution of equivalents, it follows that  $E(O) = I(O)$ . If  $O$  is a self-dual operator, its external negation equals its internal negation. Under such a circumstance, the duality square collapses into the diagram below:





Figure 4 A collapsed square constructed by a self-dual operator

Similar possibility also occurs to internal negation operation. If the efficacy of I is cancelled, then for any operator  $O$ ,  $I(O) \equiv O$ . Since  $D \circ I(O) = E(O)$ , by substitution of equivalents, it follows that

$D(O) = E(O)$ : for an operator that is the internal negation of itself, its dual equals its external negation. Under such a circumstance, the duality square also collapses;



**Figure 5** A collapsed duality square constructed by an operator which is its own internal negation

Taking the collapsed situations above into account, it is easy to discover that the duality square and the Aristotelian square have the similar pattern of collapse. In the two cases of collapsed duality, only the relation of external negation is substantially preserved. If the supposed structural isomorphism were to map external negation to contradiction, we would be in a position to expect that in the case of degenerate opposition the only survivor would be contradiction, which is exactly what happens. And if we move further to consider the possibility for E to collapse, which is amount to identify an operator with its own external negation, we would be led to directly violate the Law of Non-Contradiction. In such a situation, the result of applying the operator in question to any operand would be true and false simultaneously. In order to guarantee the validity of LNC, the application domain of such an operator has to be empty which automatically cancels the efficacies of E, I, and D altogether. The whole square would be reduced to a point.

In light of all considerations above, we are strongly inclined to think that the Aristotelian logical relations and the duality relations are conceptually interdependent and even equivalent. The isomorphism exhibited at the level of squares seems to result from their characterizing essentially the same set of logical relations. Extensionally speaking, nearly all the frequently discussed Aristotelian squares are at the same time duality squares, and vice versa. In the following section, however, efforts are made to show that this first impression based on simple squares is not reliable and highly misleading. In fact, the Aristotelian relations and the duality relations are different in nature and conceptually independent. The satisfaction of the requirements imposed by one set of relations is not sufficient and necessary for the satisfaction of the other.

Now, away from the abstract treatment of dissimilarities between the Aristotelian relations and duality relations, the discussion is moving to a concrete diagram proposed by Buridan. It is not a simple square containing 4 propositions but a very complicated octagon. As will be seen soon, when more propositions and more operators are taken into account, the resulting diagrams will be more complicated and the seeming isomorphism diagrammatically revealed before at the simple geometric level will be largely lost.

## 4.2 The differences between the Aristotelian relations and the duality relations

Investigating the logical properties of the two sets of relations, it is not difficult to discover some apparent differences. Firstly, from the cases of the two collapsed duality squares discussed above, we notice that at least D and I can be reflexive. In Aristotelian relations, however, there is no reflexive one. One of the consequences followed from reflexivity is that with respect to a self-dual operator there exist two propositions standing both in the relation of external negation and the relation of internal negation. By the same reason, with respect to an operator that is its own internal negation, there exist two propositions standing both in the relation of external negation and the relation of dual. No two propositions, however, can stand in more than one Aristotelian relation. The Aristotelian relations are mutually exclusive.

Secondly and most frequently pointed out by various scholars, the duality square is perfectly symmetrical. For any relation  $R$  in  $D = \{ID, E, I, D\}$ , ORQ iff QRO. In Aristotelian relations, however, not all the relations are symmetric. Subalternation is just one-sided.

Finally, although any two arbitrary propositions can stand in only one Aristotelian relation, one proposition is allowed to be in relations with several non-equivalent propositions with respect to the Aristotelian relations except for contradiction. That is to say, although one proposition has only one contradictory counterpart, it is capable of having more than one contrary, subcontrary and subalternate counterparts which are all not equivalent. As for the duality relations, however, any proposition can have only one external, internal negation and only one dual. They are all functions, which is also the ground for us to form the set  $O(Q) = \{ID(Q), E(Q), I(Q), D(Q)\}$  based on  $D = \{ID, E, I, D\}$ .

Besides the above apparent dissimilarities of the logical properties between the two sets of relations, their definitions reveal some deeper differences. Firstly, the definitions of the duality relations essentially involve the interaction between the external and internal negation. They inevitably impose some restrictions of different levels of strength on the domain of duality. The specific strength of the restrictions depends in large part on how to exactly understand the notion of negation in question. If we confine the notion of negation within a syntactic level, the restrictions become the strongest, since it requires that for any dual relation a grammatical negation is possible. There exist, however, various kinds of predicates the grammatical negations of which are ungrammatical themselves but which still seem to be able to stand in the duality relations. Therefore, it would be better for us to understand negation semantically, which means that the indication of the presence of negation is not the necessary occurrence of certain grammatical negation signs. We need to appeal to some semantic criteria, which would consequently enlarge the domain of duality.

Even so, there is still a potential misleading element in the definitions of duality which concerns the notion of an operator. It is not clear how we should understand this notion precisely. In the most natural way, the typical examples of an operator are given to us as the sentential connectives, the quantifiers and the modal operators. They all take one or more predicate type operands that can allow negation imposed upon them, which realize the internal negation in the definition. Furthermore, the combination of those operators with their operands can also be negated, which realize the external negation. With these two requirements fulfilled the duality relations can be well-defined. Therefore,

construed in this way, any duality operators, that is any element of the set  $O(Q) = \{ID(Q), E(Q), I(Q), D(Q)\}$ , has to be at least second-order. According to the definition and the common notation of type in formal semantics, the sentential connectives are of the type  $\langle t, t \rangle$  and the quantifiers are of the type  $\langle \langle e, t \rangle, e \rangle, t \rangle$ . If all the elements in  $O(Q)$  are at least second-order, then the duality relations between them, that is all the elements in  $D = \{ID, E, I, D\}$  has to be at least third-order.

Secondly, the Aristotelian relations are explicitly defined along the semantic dimension, which directly appeals to the different distributions of truth values without stipulating how to achieve those distributions syntactically or semantically. The comment made by Buridan on Peter of Spain's first rule of equipollence has already been mentioned above. In his view, external negation is the best and most reliable way to construct contradictories. But logically speaking, there may still be other ways to form a pair of contradictories. In his comment on the second rule of Peter of Spain, Buridan states that since the negation does not precede the universal sign, it does not remove its universality, but, since it precedes the copula, it changes the quality of the proposition; therefore, those two both remain universal, the one being affirmative and the other negative; and such are contraries (Summulae 1. 5. 3).<sup>[22]</sup> Similarly in his comment on the third rule, Buridan says that since two negations occur before the copula, they cancel each other such that the quality of the proposition stays the same; But the negation before the universal sign changes the quantity such that the two propositions are in subalternation (Summulae 1. 5. 4)<sup>[23]</sup>

It is clear from Buridan's comments that in discussing the interactions between negations and the results thus produced he actually presupposes the Aristotelian relations. The latter get defined and generated independently, although the negation operations can have the same generative effects in a certain sense. On the one hand, not all instances of the Aristotelian relations are created by the operation of negation. On the other hand, not all manipulations of negation would produce an instance of an Aristotelian relation. The operation of negation and the generation of Aristotelian relations are conceptually completely independent. They are basically two distinct processes; just sometimes in some case converge to some extent. Buridan's comments actually suggest a methodology to compare the Aristotelian relations and the duality relations; presupposing one of the two sets of logical relations on independent grounds and then going on to see if the operations from the other set can be used to produce the presupposed relations.

Although in the formal definitions from section 3. 2 the domain of the Aristotelian relations is limited to the well-formed formulas of  $L(OP)$ , it actually can be generalized and defined over any first-order predicate as internal negation is out of question. Therefore, different from the duality relations as stipulated in the syntactic definitions (not necessarily in the group-theoretic approach),

[22] Causa huius regulae est quia negatio, cum non praecedat signum, non removet eius universalitatem, sed, quia praecedit copulam, mutat qualitatem propositionis; ideo illae remanent ambae universales, una affirmativa et alia negativa, et tales sunt contrariae. (Hubien, Johannes Buridanus: Summulae de dialectica. [http://www.logicmuseum.com/wiki/Authors/Buridan/Summulae\\_de\\_dialectica](http://www.logicmuseum.com/wiki/Authors/Buridan/Summulae_de_dialectica), 2001).

[23] Et causa huius regulae est quia illae duae negationes praecedentes copulam destruunt se in ordine ad copulam, ideo dimittunt qualitatem propositionis eandem. Ista enim ambae sunt affirmativae 'omnis homo currit' et 'non omnis homo non currit', et istae ambae negativae 'nullus homo currit' et 'non nullus homo non currit'. Sed quia sola negatio praecedit signum, ideo mutat quantitatem propositionis. Modo tales sunt subalternae, scilicet eiusdem qualitatis et diversae quantitatis, una universalis et alia particularis. (Hubien, 2001)



any Aristotelian relation can be a second-order relation holding between two first-order predicates. For example, let's consider the following 4 first-order predicates: "is a cat", "is a dog", "not is a dog" and "not is a cat". The Aristotelian relations are able to be defined legitimately on them. "is a cat" and "is a dog" cannot be true of the same argument, but can be false of the same argument, which makes them contraries. "is a cat" and "not is a cat" are contradictory to each other, so are "is a dog" and "not is a dog". The final two subalternation relations are easily established. The 4 predicates in question, however, have no way to form a duality square, for there is no spot for internal negation.

## 5 Buridan's modal octagon

After the abstract discussion of the dissimilarities between the Aristotelian relations and duality relations, it's time to go back to a concrete diagram. If the arguments proposed above were accepted, it would be expected that there should be a certain type of diagram which is able to dispel the isomorphism illusion created by a simple square and further clearly shows the differences between opposition relations and duality relations. Without any doubt, Buridan's modal octagon provides us with a perfect example.

The advantage of Buridan's octagon lies in the fact that it is both an extension of the traditional square of oppositions and of a square of dualities. Since the sets of relations are simultaneously presented in one and the same square, we are in a position to observe that the correspondence situation between them is actually quite disordered, so far from being an isomorphism.

Buridan's modal octagon is an extension of the Aristotelian square for the reason that it is essentially a combination of two basic opposition squares, i. e. the square created by quantifiers and the square created by modal operators.

With respect to a traditional opposition square constituted by quantifiers, Buridan makes the relevant enlargement as such: instead of putting one proposition at one vertex, he substitutes it by a set of equivalent propositions. For example, at the A corner of the traditional square, he puts 6 propositions, 3 of which are logically relevant for the square:

- 'every man is running' (omnis homo currit).
- 'no man is not running' (nullus homo non currit)
- 'not any man is not running' (non quidam homo non currit)

The three propositions are equivalent, which results from the duality among the operators in them. The first one concerns the quantifier  $\forall$ . The third one concerns the quantifier  $\exists$  which is lexicalized in English in this context as any and which is the dual of  $\forall$ . The second one concerns the external negation of  $\exists$  which is lexicalized as no and which is the internal negation of  $\forall$ . This arrangement of propositions clearly shows that the duality properties of operators are well understood by Buridan. Theoretically speaking, it is anticipated that a traditional modal square should also be expanded by Buridan through putting 3 propositions at each vertex. This expectation is assured in Dorp's Compendium. There actually exists a modal square the vertices of which contain 3

equivalent propositions. Combining the two squares together, we get a polygon each vertex of which has 9 equivalent propositions. Furthermore, combining the quantifiers and the modal operators, Buridan produces the following 8 propositions (Summulae 1. 8. 6):

- 1) all  $B$  are necessarily  $A$
- 2) all  $B$  are possibly  $A$
- 3) some  $B$  are necessarily  $A$
- 4) some  $B$  are possibly  $A$
- 5) all  $B$  are necessarily not  $A$
- 6) all  $B$  are possibly not  $A$
- 7) some  $B$  are necessarily not  $A$
- 8) some  $B$  are possibly not  $A$

These 8 propositions make sure that the new polygon be an octagon. Each vertex of it contains one of the propositions above plus another 8 propositions that are equivalent to it. And all these together constitute the basic frame of Buridan's modal octagon.

The above 8 propositions embody 8 possible interactions between the quantifiers and modal operators, which are 1.  $\forall \square$ ; 2.  $\forall \sim$ ; 3.  $\exists \square$ ; 4.  $\exists \sim$ ; 5.  $\forall \square \sim$ ; 6.  $\forall \sim \square$ ; 7.  $\exists \square \sim$  and 8.  $\exists \sim \square$ . Two pairs of operators are concerned with here. According to duality, however, the situation can be reduced to involve only two operators. Since  $\exists \equiv \sim \forall \sim$  and  $\equiv \sim \square \sim$ , by substitution, we get: 1.  $\forall \square$ ; 2.  $\forall \sim \square \sim$ ; 3.  $\sim \forall \sim \square$ ; 4.  $\sim \forall \square \sim$ ; 5.  $\forall \square \sim$ ; 6.  $\forall \sim \square$ ; 7.  $\sim \forall \sim \square \sim$  and 8.  $\sim \forall \square$ .

The 8 combinations exactly represent the integration of a quantifier duality square and a modal duality square. Each square refers to one operator and the 4 distribution possibilities of its negation. The result of combining two operators is the addition of the third position for negation. Besides the original external and internal negation, we acquire another negation possibility just in the middle of the two operators, which accordingly constitutes the reason why the Buridan's Octagon is an extension of a duality square.

Based on those 8 modal propositions, Buridan works out the 28 combination possibilities between any two different propositions of them (Summulae 1. 8. 6). Furthermore, Buridan investigates each one of the combinations in order to see if it satisfies any Aristotelian relation or not. At last, he reaches the following conclusions: there are 10 subalternations, 5 contrarieties, 5 subcontrarieties, 4 contradictions and 4 disparate relations (standing in no Aristotelian relations at all) (Summulae 1. 8. 6).<sup>[24]</sup> On account of all the theoretical studies, Buridan presents his modal octagons, one simplified version of which looks like the following figure, which is mainly presented from the first viewpoint;

[24] Decem sunt subalternationes, quinque contrarietates, quinque subcontrarietates, quattuor contradictiones et quattuor disparationes. (Hubien 2001)




Figure 6 Buridan's modal octagon

If we want to examine this octagon clearly from the viewpoint of duality, it is only required to make the relevant substitutions, which highlights the distribution pattern of negations. Besides the old combinations, we have external + inter negation (EI), external + middle negation (EM), middle + internal negation (MI) and external + middle + internal negation (EMI);




Figure 7 Buridan's modal octagon from the duality point of view

From Buridan's complex combinations of operators and negations, it can be discovered that between the Aristotelian relations and the duality relations only contradiction and external negation stand in one to one correspondence. As a matter of fact, the 4 contradiction relations correspond just to the 4 external negation relations. Different from the structural properties exhibited on the level of squares, the results of internal negation are not only contrariety and subcontrariety, but also 2 disparate relations. And the results of external negation of internal negation do not include just subalternations, but also 2 other disparate relations. By parity of reasoning, all the combination possibilities can be established. Diagrammatically speaking then, it is pretty clear that the correspondence between the Aristotelian relations and the duality relations are so chaotic that besides contradiction and external negation it is impossible to propose any equivalent principle associating an Aristotelian relation with a negation operation as the any one suggested by Peter of Spain .

## 6 Conclusions

The Aristotelian relations and the duality relations are two independent sets of logical relations. Apart from a variety of apparent differences between their logical behaviors, there are essential dissimilarities on the level of concept. The formers are given explicit semantic definitions in terms of the truth conditions of propositions or the satisfaction conditions of any predicate. The specific

syntactic or semantic way to achieve a certain truth value distribution is not stipulated. Hence the Aristotelian relations can be defined on any first order predicate and express second order relations between them.

The duality relations concerned with in this article, however, are defined on the interactions between negations. In the simple case of single operator, there are 2 negation spots and 4 combination possibilities of external and internal negations. In Buridan's modal octagon, there are 2 operators, 3 negation spots and 8 distributions of negations. Since duality relations require the operation of negation, the operator itself has to be of predicate type and at least one of the operands has to be of predicate type. Therefore, any duality operator has to be at least of second order and the relation between any two of them has to be at least of third order.

On the diagrammatic level, simple squares involving just 4 propositions are very misleading in the sense that opposition squares and duality squares are seem to be isomorphism based on the fact that a good deal of interesting Aristotelian squares turns out to be duality squares at the same time and vice versa. When we turn to more complicated diagrams, such as Buridan's modal octagon, the huge differences between them are made prominent. The octagon considered, both as an extension of a duality square and an opposition square, presents more instances of the two relations. By close comparison of all the instances, the correspondence between the Aristotelian relations and the duality relations are shown to be so chaotic that besides contradiction and external negation it is impossible to propose any equivalent principle associating one of the former with one of the latter.

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中文题目:

## 亚里士多德式逻辑关系与对偶性关系的异同:从传统正方形到布里丹八边形

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**摘要:** 本文将处理两套逻辑关系:“亚里士多德式关系(Aristotelian relations)”和“对偶性关系(Duality relations)”。对这两套关系进行图形化表达,可以得到亚里士多德式对立正方形和对偶性正方形,它们似乎具有某种同构关系。大量有趣的亚里士多德式正方形同时也是对偶正方形,反之亦然。然而,本文试图阐明,这两组逻辑关系既不等价,也不同构。它们不仅拥有众多逻辑特征上的差异,从本质上和概念上来说,也是相互独立的。随着我们加入更多的公式,展现这些公式间相互逻辑关系的图形就将变得更加复杂,二者间的差异也就更加明显。本文所选的复杂图形,是由14世纪逻辑学家布里丹所提出的八边形。我们将会看到,这个图形既是对立正方形的扩展,也是对偶正方形的扩展,其中所体现的亚里士多德式关系和对偶关系具有明显的非同构性。

**关键词:** 亚里士多德式关系;对偶性关系;传统对立正方形;对偶性正方形;布里丹八边形

# 《国学与西学：国际学刊》 (中英文双语半年刊)

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a. Both a Chinese and an English title, the author's occupation, position, and contact information; see the Article Submission Cover Page.

b. A 200-700-word abstract and the maximum of 5 keywords in English and Chinese should be included.

c. Full information on publications should be included in the footnotes.

Footnotes must follow the style stated in our Footnote Format and Requirements. For the purpose of an anonymous review, please refrain from revealing the author's identity in the article; when citing the author's own work, please refrain from using the first person pronoun.

6. Please submit two paper copies of the article by mail and one in an electronic form through email. The electronic file should take the Microsoft Word format.

7. Article submitted to IJS will be peer-reviewed first by the editorial committee, then by two scholars of a relevant field, and if necessary a third scholar will be invited to review. The author will receive the decision within three months after submitting the article. The editorial committee has the

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# 注释体例及要求

## Footnote Format and Requirements

### 一、总则 General Principles

1、采用页下注(脚注),从文首至尾依次加注。

Use continuous footnotes from the start to the end of your article.

2、一般情况下,引用外文文献的注释仍从原文,无须另行译出。

Use original literature when the reference is in a language other than the article, a translation of the citation is not required.

3、文章正文后不另开列“参考文献”。

Independent bibliography is not required.

4、所引资料及其注释务求真实、准确、规范。

Please use authentic, accurate, and standard literature references.

5、非汉语语言以英文为例。

We use English as an example of all the non-Chinese languages.

### 二、分则 Detailed Rules

1、专著 Monograph:

黄保罗 Huang Baoluo,《汉语学术神学》Hanyu xueshu shenxue [Sino-Christian Academic Theology],(北京 Beijing;宗教文化出版社 Zongjiao wenhua chubanshe [Religion and Culture Press],2008),155-159。

Paulos Huang, *Confronting Confucian Understandings of the Christian Doctrine of Salvation: A Systematic Theological Analysis of the Basic Problems in the Confucian-Christian Dialogue*, (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2009), 88-89.

2、编著 Compiled works:

罗明嘉 Luo Mingjia、黄保罗 Huang Baoluo 主编,《基督宗教与中国文化》Jiduzongjiao yu zhongguo wenhua [Christianity and Chinese Culture],(北京 Beijing;中国社会科学出版社 Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe [Chinese Social Sciences Press],2004),155。

Miikka Ruokanen & Paulos Huang, eds., *Christianity and Chinese Culture*, (Grand Rapids & Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2010), 3.

3、译著 Translated literature:

麦克·阿盖尔 Maiké Agaier,《宗教心理学》Zongjiao xinlixue [Religious Psychology],陈彪 Chen Biao 译,(北京 Beijing:中国人民大学出版社 Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe [The Press of Renmin University of China]),2005,30。

Fung Yulan, *A History of Chinese Philosophy*, tr. by Derk Bodde, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), 150.



#### 4、外文稿件引用中文资料 Chinese literature in non-Chinese articles:

Liang Qichao, *Gushu zhenwei jiqi niandai* [The Genuinity of Chinese Ancient Books and their Dates], (Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan [The Commercial Press], 1923), 20.

#### 5、文集中的文章 Articles in collections:

张敏 Zhang Min, “基督徒身份认同——浙江温州案例” *Jidutu shenfen rentong——Zhejiang Wenzhou anli* [The Personal Identity of Christians], 张静 Zhang Jing 主编:《身份认同研究:观念、态度、理据》*Shenfen rentong yanjiu: guannian, taidu, liju* [A Study on Personal Identity], (上海 Shanghai: 上海人民出版社 Shanghai renmin chubanshe [Shanghai People's Publishing House], 2006), 101-105.

Zhuo Xinping, “Comprehensive Theology: An Attempt to Combine Christianity with Chinese Culture,” in Miikka Ruokanen & Paulos Huang, eds., *Christianity and Chinese Culture*, (Grand Rapids & Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2010), 185-192.

#### 6、报纸中的文章 Articles in newspapers:

曹曙红 Cao Shuhong, 《信仰之旅 慈善之行——上海玉佛寺禅寺觉群慈爱功德会参访团西藏行纪实》*Xinyang zhi lu, Cishan zhi xing——Shanghai Fochansi Juequn ciai gongdehui canfangtuan Xizang xing jishi* [The Trip of Faith and the Travel of Charity], 《中国民族报》*Zhongguo minzubao* [The Newspaper of Chinese Ethnic Minorities] (2011年8月23日), 第5版。

David E. Sanger, “U. S. and Seoul Try to Ease Rift on Talks with the North,” *New York Times*, (11 June, 2005).

#### 7、期刊中的文章 Articles in journals:

李炽昌 Li Chichang, “跨文本阅读策略: 明末中国基督徒著作研究” *Kuawenben yuedu celue: Mingmo Zhongguo jidutu zhuzuo yanjiu* 【The Strategy of Readings in Chinese Christian Writings】, 《基督教文化学刊》*Jidujiao wenhua xuekan* 【Journal of Christian Culture】, No. 10, (北京 Beijing: 中国人民大学出版社 *Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe* 【The Press of Renmin University of China】, 2003), 168.

J. R. Carrette, “Religion and Mestrovic's Postemotional Society: The Manufacturing of Religious Emotion,” *Religion*, vol. 34, (2004), 271.

#### 8、会议论文 Conference papers:

田海华 Tian Haihua, “汉语语境中的‘十诫’: 以十九世纪基督新教的诠释为例” *Hanyu yujing zhong de 'Shijie': Yi shijiu shiji jiduxinjiao de quanshi wei li* [The Ten Commandments in the Chinese Context], “第四届‘基督教与中国社会文化’国际年青学者研讨会” *Disijie 'Jidujiao yu Zhongguo shehui wenhua' guoji qingnian xuezhe yantaohui* [The Fourth International Young Scholar Conference on Christianity and Chinese Social Culture], (香港 Xianggang, 香港中文大学 *Xianggang zhongwen daxue* [Chinese University of Hong Kong], 2008年12月5-9日), 3.

John Barwick, “Liu Tingfang, Chinese Protestant Elites, and the Quest for Modernity in Repu Xinping Republican China”, presented in “The 4th International Young Scholars' Symposium on 'Christianity and Chinese Society and Culture'”, (Hong Kong: The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 5-9 December, 2008).

9、学位论文 Dissertations:

刘家峰 Liu Jiafeng,《中国基督教乡村建设运动研究(1907—1950)》Zhongguo jidujiao xiangcun jianshe yundong yanjiu [A Study on the Movement of Chinese Christian Countryside Construction], (武汉 Wuhan: 华中师范大学博士论文 Huazhong shifan daxue boshi lunwen [Ph. D. dissertation in Central China Normal University],2001),55。

Nathan C. Faries, The Narratives of Contemporary Chinese Christianity, (The Pennsylvania State University, PhD dissertation,2005),22.

10、互联网资料 Internet source:

<http://www.leeds.ac.uk/polis/englishschool/wilson03.doc>,2005-03-27.

11、重复引用 Consecutively repeated citations:

同上书,第19页。

Ibid. ,pp. 73-75.

12、转引 Quotation from a secondary source:

新疆档案馆档案政 Xinjiang dang'anguan dang'an zheng 2 —5 —140 [Xinjiang Archives . Politics], 转引自木拉提·黑尼亚提 Mulati Heiniyati:《喀什噶尔瑞典传教团建堂历史考》Kashigeer Ruidian chuanjiaotuan jiantang lishikao [A Study on the History of Church Establishment in Kashgar by Sweden Missionaries],《新疆社会科学》Xinjiang shehui kexue [Social Sciences in Xinjiang],(乌鲁木齐 Wulumuqi;2002年第3期),64-65。

Stanley A. Erickson,“Economic and Technological Trend Affecting Nuclear Nonproliferation,” The Nonproliferation Review,vol. 8, no. 2,2001, p. 43,quoted from Michael Wesley,“It’s Time to Scrap the NPT,” Australian Journal of International Affairs,vol. 59,no. 3,(September 2005),292.

13、华人姓名写法 Writing of Chinese personal names:

如果华人拥有外文名字,则按西文方式名前姓后,如:Paulos Huang;若只有中文名字,则按中国方式姓前名后,如:Zhuo Xinp ing 等。If a Chinese person uses the Westernized first name,his name can be written in this way:Paulos Huang;but if he ONLY uses the Chinese name,it must be written in the Chinese way,for instance:Zhuo Xinp ing,etc.

14、其他 Others:

河北省地方志编纂委员会 Hebei sheng difangzhi bianzhu an weiyuanhui [The Editorial Committee of Hebei Provincial Chorography] 编:《河北省志·宗教志》Hebei sheng zhi . Zongjiaozhi [Hebei Provincial Chorography . Religions],(北京 Beijing: 中国书籍出版社 Zhongguo shuji chubanshe [Chinese Books Publishing House],1995),224。

U. S. Agency for International Development, Foreign Aid in the National Interest, (Washington, D. C. ,2002),1.

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